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The single aim of this thesis can be stated clearly: to argue for the use and usefulness 
of thick and thin concepts within law.  The distinction between thick and thin concepts 
- recently popularized in analytic philosophy - has in the last two decades migrated 
from its point of origin in meta-ethics to other areas of philosophy and now law.  My 
contention is that whilst use of the distinction within law is welcome, legal deployment 
of the distinction has been haphazard, with the idea left vague and ambiguous.   
 
Although the lack of clarity within the legal literature could be explained by the 
infancy of these ideas within legal discourse, the imprecision and ambiguity that results 
has undermined the juristic value of the central distinction for law.  In particular I note 
the lack of any attention at all within the legal literature to the question of whether 
normative and descriptive aspects of thick concepts are capable of being separated Ð 
even though this controversy has dominated the philosophical literature.  However, my 
criticism of the legal deployment of thick and thin is not restricted to this idea alone. 
Failure to investigate (or mention) the several issues I identify has, I argue, seen 
opportunities missed for the gainful use of the distinction in law, with my thesis 
focusing, in illustration, on the value to be gained through such analysis in the areas of 
jurisprudence and legal education.   I select these two areas because they ably 
demonstrate the opportunities that I contend exist, and also because their scope, from 
theoretical analysis to educational practice, serves notice that these insights might 
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...justice, fairness, and impartiality, to take one cluster of notions; 
liberty, equality, freedom of expression to take another; privacy, 
self-respect, envy, to take a third; needs, well-being, and interests 
to take a fourth; and rights, autonomy, and consent for a fifth.  Are 
the concepts on this list thick or thin?1 
 
This question, put by Samuel Scheffler in his review of Bernard WilliamsÕ coinage (in 
print) of the term ÔthickÕ ethical concept, has only recently attracted attention from legal 
theory.2  Despite the terms infancy, an increasing number of legal scholars are directing 
their research efforts towards enquiries concerning thick and thin concepts within law, 
and an even larger number are deploying these terms within their wider research with 
varying degrees of understanding and success (the least successful baldly attributing 
thickness or thinness to specific legal concepts without elucidating the reasons for such 
classification).3  This present thesis recognises the importance of these ideas within 
																																																								
1 Samuel Scheffler, ÔMorality through Thick and Thin: A Critical Notice of Ethics and the Limits of 
PhilosophyÕ (1987) 96 (3) The Philosophical Review 411, 417   
2 The distinction between thick and thin concepts first arose in meta-ethics and Bernard Williams is 
attributed with the first coinage in print of the term thick ethical concept, see: Bernard Williams, Ethics 
and the Limits of Philosophy (Routledge Classics, 2011)   
For the first coinage in print of the distinction between thick and thin description, see: Gilbert Ryle, ÔThe 
Thinking of Thoughts: What is ÔLe PenseurÕ Doing?Õ in Collected Essays 1929-1968 (Routledge, 2009)  
The terms thick and thin have also been applied to ethical theories as a method of distinguishing 
between moral arguments based on their thickness or thinness (although this is not dealt with in this 
thesis), see: Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1994) 
3 The following list is not exhaustive, but these theorists are all writing on thick and thin concepts within 
the legal context (the articles are referenced within chapters five through eight).  R. A. Duff, ÔLaw, 
Language and Community: Some Preconditions of Criminal LiabilityÕ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 189; Bernard Williams, ÔAfterword What Has Philosophy to Learn from Tort Law?Õ in 
David G. Owen (ed), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford University Press, 1995); David 
Enoch and Kevin Toh, ÔLegal as a Thick ConceptÕ in Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa (eds), 
Philosophical Foundations of The Nature of Law (Oxford University Press, 2013); Heidi Li Feldman, 
ÔAppellate Adjudication as Conceptual EngineeringÕ in Graham Hubbs &Douglas Lind (eds), 
Pragmatism, Law and Language (Routledge, 2014); Heidi Li Feldman, ÔThe Distinctiveness of 
Appellate AdjudicationÕ (2012) 5 Washington University Jurisprudence Review 61; Heidi Li Feldman, 
ÔBlending Fields: Tort Law, Philosophy and Legal TheoryÕ (1998) 49 South Carolina Law Review 167; 
Heidi Li Feldman, ÔObjectivity in Legal JudgmentÕ (1994) 92 (5) Michigan Law Review 1187; Henry 
Mather, ÔNatural Law and Right AnswersÕ (1993) 38 American Journal of Jurisprudence 297; Harvey 
Siegel, ÔIs Education a Thick Epistemic ConceptÕ (2008) 37 (3) Philosophical Papers 460; J. E. Penner, 
ÔLegal reasoning and the authority of lawÕ in Lukas H. Meyer, Stanley L. Paulson and Thomas W. 
Pogge (eds), Rights, Culture, and the Law: Themes from the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph 
Raz (Oxford University Press, 2003); J. E. Penner, Ô Common Law Cognition and Judicial AppointmentÕ 
(2001) 38 Alberta Law Review 683; John Finnis, Reason in Action: Collected Essays Volume I 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011); John Finnis, ÔA Response to Harel, Hope, and SchwartzÕ (2013) 8 
Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 147; Jose Juan Moreso, ÔIn defense of Inclusive Legal PositivismÕ in 
P Chiassoni (ed), The Legal Ought Proceedings of the IVR Mid-Term Congress in Genoa 2000, 
(Giappichelli, 2001); Joseph Raz, Engaging Reason (Oxford University Press, 1999); Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Harvard University Press, 1992); Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal 
Theory (Hart Publishing, 2001); Lawrence B. Solum & Linghao Wang, ÔConfucian Virtue 
JurisprudenceÕ in Amalia Amaya & Ho Hock Lai (eds), Law, Virtue and Justice (Hart Publishing, 2013); 
Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, ÔPluralistic Nonoriginalism and the Combinability ProblemÕ (2013) 
91 Texas Law Review 1739; R. A. Duff, ÔCriminalizing EndangermentÕ (2005) 65 Louisiana Law 
	 7	
analysis and argues that ÔthickÕ and ÔthinÕ concepts offer a new way of approaching legal 
analysis, the potential benefits of which has so far gone relatively unnoticed within law 
due to the localised invocation of these ideas to many disparate topics within law.  It is a 
major intended strength of my thesis that it not only recognises the importance of these 
ideas within analysis and the significance of this relatively new analytic tool for law, but 
that it also responds to the need for an overarching conspectus of thick and thin within 
law.  My thesis is the first sustained attempt to provide a clearer picture of the current use 
of thick and thin within law and offers an extensive collation of the many disparate (but 
not all) legal uses of thickness and thinness, with particular emphasis placed upon thick 
concepts and thin concepts.  Linking, comparing and contrasting the different uses of 
thickness in legal scholarship adds value to my thesis because it brings to attention the 
need to look across adjoining areas of legal scholarship to discover whether apparently 
similar uses of thickness are in fact all the same use of thickness, or in fact one of many 
different uses of thickness.  An important aspect of my thesis is therefore to be found in 
my compendious footnotes as much of the excavation of the research literature and its 
interconnections and similarities to other work in the relevant subject areas, is contained 
in my footnotes. 
 
One seminal theorist writing on thick concepts, Simon Kirchin, explains the recent 
interest in the distinction among philosophers by drawing attention to the following 
features of thick concepts: 
 
They are practical concepts and everyday concepts.  They are 
concepts that pull us Ð and others Ð in certain directions and justify 
some actions and not others.  We can use them to shape our world and 
colour it in special ways.  Thick concepts are important to us and our 
world because they seem to be a necessary way of understanding 
what the world and its people are.  If we understand what these 
concepts are and how they work, we might better understand 
ourselves and the world we find ourselves in.4  
 
It is these same features noted by Kirchin that support my argument for their use and 
usefulness within law (their relevance for law).  My argument (after careful exploration 
																																																																																																																																																																
Review 941; Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press, 2011); Simon Hope, 
ÔThe Basic Goods and the ÒLawlikeÓ Use of Reason: Comments on Human Rights and the Common 
GoodÕ (2013) 8 Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 136; and Toni M. Massaro, ÔGay Rights, Thick and 
ThinÕ (1996) 49 Stanford Law Review 45 
4 Simon Kirchin ÔIntroduction: Thick and Thin ConceptsÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts 
(Oxford University Press, 2013), 18 
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of the current use of the distinction between thick and thin concepts) aims to elicit the 
potential this analytic tool carries for legal scholars, educators and practitioners in 
clarifying their subject and their endeavours within it, thereby demonstrating the 
usefulness of the distinction between thick and thin concepts for a wide spectrum of 
legal actors.  This analytic tool is drawn from what is to many legal scholars an 
unfamiliar discipline: meta-ethics. It is therefore unsurprising in light of the relatively 
recent emergence of this analytic tool and its origin in an unfamiliar discipline, that the 
present legal understanding requires sharpening.  Although the distinction and 
associated literature is understood only partially, inconsistently, or even mistakenly in 
contemporary legal scholarship, which places limits upon its current use within law, 
my thesis still successfully demonstrates the usefulness and potential significance 
(which in many ways remains untapped) of this distinction for many aspects of law.   
 
Invocation of the distinction between thick and thin concepts (as I show in my earlier 
chapters) carries with it philosophical, metaphysical and ethical commitments which 
can be seen in the divisions amongst the philosophers who use these terms.  These 
philosophical, metaphysical and ethical commitments also appear within the legal 
scholarship, although at present their occurrence may be inadvertent and haphazard.  
One of the values of my thesis is therefore the recognition of a pressing need to clearly 
understand the distinction and the commitments that it carries and the subsequent 
argument that you cannot (and shouldnÕt) invoke the distinction between thick and thin 
concepts in a slight or casual way.  Whilst I take no stance within my thesis as to which 
version of the distinction ought to be adopted because such an argument would entail 
these philosophical, metaphysical and ethical commitments that are the cause of 
division within the source literature, I do advance a wider argument that legal theorists 
invoking the distinction between thick and thin concepts need first to understand that 
there are divisions within the source literature and second that those divisions are 
reflective of wider philosophical commitments.  The main ambition of the present 
thesis is therefore to demonstrate the use and usefulness of thick and thin concepts 
within law, my thesis acknowledges that further research study and discussion is 
required to enhance the current level of legal understanding.   
 
The distinction in question, between thick and thin concepts, is a philosophical 
distinction drawn from analytic philosophy, which is practiced chiefly by philosophers 
working within the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Canada and 
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elsewhere.  It is therefore susceptible to the routine charges that are laid against 
analytic philosophy by legal practitioners, who challenge its relevance in resolving the 
practical legal matters that concern them.  It is also susceptible to the critical attacks 
levied against analytic conceptual analysis within law, which views these modes of 
reasoning as out-dated.5  These attitudes may go someway to explaining its current 
under-appreciation within law.  Nonetheless, this thesis will attempt to demonstrate 
both the relevance and importance of the distinction to matters that routinely form the 
subject matter of legal discussion, legal scholarship, legal education and legal practice; 
and so it therefore follows that successful demonstration of my thesis will also go part 
way in defending the role of analytic philosophy, particularly conceptual analysis, 
within law.  These matters are, however, supplementary and any such defence is 
secondary to my primary aim - which is the articulation of the terms ÔthickÕ concept 
and ÔthinÕ concept, and a demonstration of the usefulness of this distinction (when 
properly understood), for law.  What merit there is in my thesis is to be found in the 
success of my responses to these primary concerns, rather than in the supplementary 
matters that I turn to in passing. 
 
The criteria that I will employ in determining usefulness are not particularly technical.  
My method will simply be to show the benefit found in the use of the distinction in 
relation to a series of persistent problems or standing concerns within the frame of 
legal theory, legal understanding and legal practice.  In brief, and in advance 
advertisement of my claims, these benefits will include new and helpful ways of 
understanding existing difficulties and the generation of new and profitable avenues for 
research study and discussion, but also extend to the claim that awareness of the 
distinction creates the opportunity for a radical remodelling of how we understand law 
and come to build knowledge and expertise within legal practice.   
 
Pursuing my thesis will require exegesis and explanation of the relevant source 
literature (analytic philosophy) to clarify the distinction in question, facilitate an 
assessment of its present deployment within the legal literature and to support my 
argument that these ideas currently have untapped potential of benefit for legal 
																																																								
5 The legal challenges are a reflection of similar challenges from within philosophy, which attack both 
analytic philosophy, and more specifically analytic conceptual analysis as modes of reasoning.  That 
philosophy of law voices similar concerns to philosophy is hardly surprising, because as Brian Bix 
notes: Ôissues within legal theory are often mere instantiations of more general problems and debates.Õ  
Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (Sweet & Maxwell, 6th edition 2012), 8 
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understanding.  This argument is intended to have a wide scope in application to its 
target scholarship, and so to demonstrate the extended reach of my argument I attend to 
more than one area of law.  This thesis is therefore pursued in relation to two related 
but distinct areas of law - philosophy of law (conceived broadly as jurisprudence or 
legal theory) and legal education - with the hope and intention that this range provides 
support for its wider scope within law, perhaps in relation to other more practical 
aspects of law (such as legislating), although these will not be pursued in this present 
work.  
 
Sharpening the topic. 
 
 For purposes of clarity, I state again that my subject is a particular analytic tool Ð the 
distinction between thick and thin concepts Ð as understood by the analytic 
philosophical literature from which it recently emerged.6  The distinction between thick 
																																																								
6 The following is not an exhaustive list but it demonstrates the rise in popularity of the distinction 
within ethics, see: Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn, ÔMorality and Thick Ethical ConceptsÕ (1992) 
66 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 267; Allan Gibbard, Wise Choice, Apt Feelings (Clarendon 
Press, 1992); Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Routledge Classics, 2011); 
Christine Tappolet, ÔThrough thick and thin: ÔgoodÕ and its determinatesÕ (2004) 58 (2) Dialetica, 207; 
Debbie Roberts, ÔItÕs Evaluation only ThickerÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford 
University Press, 2013); Edward Harcourt and Alan Thomas, ÔThick Concepts, Analysis, and 
ReductionismÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013); Eric Wiland, 
ÔWilliams on Thick Ethical Concepts and Reasons for ActionÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts 
(Oxford University Press, 2013); Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other 
Essays (Harvard University Press, 2004); John McDowell, ÔCritical Notice of Bernard Williams' Ethics 
and the Limits of PhilosophyÕ (1986) 95 Mind 377; Jonathon Dancy, ÔPractical ConceptsÕ in Simon 
Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013); Jonathon Dancy, ÔIn Defense of Thick 
ConceptsÕ (1995) 20 (1) Midwest Studies in Philosophy 263; Joseph Raz, Engaging Reason (Oxford 
University Press, 1999); Matti Eklund, ÔEvaluative Language and Evaluative RealityÕ in Simon Kirchin 
(ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013); Michael Smith, ÔOn the Nature and Significance 
of the Distinction between Thick and Thin Ethical ConceptsÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts 
(Oxford University Press, 2013); Nick Zangwill, ÔMoral Metaphor and Thick Concepts: What Moral 
Philosophy Can Learn from AestheticsÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford University 
Press, 2013); Pekka Vayrynen, ÔThick Concepts and VariabilityÕ (2011) 11 (1) Philosophers Imprint 1; 
Pekka Vayrynen, The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty: A Study of Thick Concepts in Ethics (Oxford 
University Press, 2013); Pekka Vayrynen, ÔEssential Contestability and EvaluationÕ (2014) 92 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 471; Pekka Vayrynen, ÔShapelessness in ContextÕ (2014) 48 Nous 
573; Pekka Vayrynen ÔThick Concepts and UnderdeterminationÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts 
(Oxford University Press, 2013); Pekka Vayrynen, ÔThick Concepts: WhereÕs Evaluation?Õ in R. Shafer-
Landau Oxford Studies in Metaethics volume 7 (Oxford University Press, 2012); Pekka Vayrynen, 
ÔObjectionable Thick Concepts in DenialsÕ (2009) 23 Philosophical Perspectives 439; Philippa Foot, 
ÔMoral beliefsÕ (1958) 59 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83; Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices 
(Oxford University Press, 2002); Samuel Scheffler, ÔMorality through Thick and Thin: A Critical Notice 
of Ethics and the Limits of PhilosophyÕ (1987) The Philosophical Review 96; Simon Blackburn, 
ÔDisentangling DisentanglingÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013); 
Simon Kirchin, ÔThick Concepts and Thick DescriptionsÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts 
(Oxford University Press, 2013); Timothy Chappell, ÔThere Are No Thin ConceptsÕ in Simon Kirchin 
(ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013); T. M. Scanlon, ÔThickness and TheoryÕ (2003) 
100 (6) The Journal of philosophy 275; Valerie Tiberius, ÔWell-being, Wisdom, and Thick Theorizing: 
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and thin concepts is best introduced by way of examples.  Imagine a scenario where 
you are describing an individual (W) a witness in a criminal case as GOOD.7  It is likely 
that you are intending to convey that this person is Ômorally goodÕ as opposed to good 
at maths or cleaning.  If your intention is to provide a character reference for W then 
good does not reveal much about WÕs character as there are many ways in which 
people can be good.  If you now continue to elaborate upon your initial description of 
W and add that they are HONEST and RELIABLE, then these additional descriptions 
provide a better sense of WÕs goodness, (in this context, then, likely establishing the 
credibility of W more securely).  Given typical linguistic conventions it is likely that it 
will be inferred from the description of W as HONEST and RELIABLE that these 
character traits warrant approval, because these more specific concepts Ð HONEST and 
RELIABLE Ð seem to be connected to approval (or disapproval) in some manner.  In 
very bold outline, these more specific concepts may be taken, in virtue of their 
specificity, to be thicker than the more general attribution of good.  In more detail 
thicker concepts are said to contain both evaluative conceptual content and descriptive 
conceptual content, whereas thin concepts are said to clearly contain evaluative content, 
but if they contain any descriptive content this is thought to be extremely limited.8  
 
Alongside this distinction emerged different uses of ÔthickÕ and ÔthinÕ, and different yet 
analogous terms.9  Although my thesis is not generally concerned with the elucidation 
of these other uses and analogous terms (even though they can be found within legal 
scholarship as well as analytic philosophy), it will be necessary for purposes of clarity 
to individuate the distinction that I will be working with from these other philosophical 
ideas, and this individuation will be most prominent within my critique of the legal 
literature where these philosophical ideas suffer from problems of ambiguity.  
 
																																																																																																																																																																
on the Division of labor between Moral Philosophy and positive PsychologyÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), 
Thick Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013) 
7 I follow the convention within meta-ethics that is used to distinguish between a concept and the 
associated term.  Consider the example of honest, the concept is referred to in the following manner: 
HONEST, and the associated term is referred to in the following manner: ÔhonestÕ. 
8 As will be demonstrated by chapter three the above characterization of thick concepts and thin 
concepts is very crude and is only intended as a quick explanation of the main difference between these 
concepts.  The above distinction is a basic overview of the orthodox position, but this is widely 
contested and there are many interesting aspects of these concepts that will be elaborated upon in both 
chapters three and four. 
9 Susan Hurley used the terms centralism and non-centralism to discuss ideas similar to those conveyed 
by the distinction between thick and thin concepts, her work is discussed in chapter two.  See: Susan 
Hurley, Natural Reasons Personality and Polity (Oxford University Press, 1992) 
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The core distinction between thick and thin concepts is one of many notions that seek 
to better understand concepts and conceptual meaning, which include, but are not 
limited too: matters of modality (i.e. of necessary and sufficient conditions); of 
properties and relations; of predication; of sense and reference; of transitivity and non-
transitivity; and of symmetry and asymmetry.  The distinction between thick and thin 
concepts is the most recent analytic tool and sits alongside other distinctions, such as 
the distinction between concepts and conceptions, and the distinction between kind and 
degree.  Although these other analytic tools and aspects of analytic conceptual analysis 
have generated a wealth of literature that is often loaded with disagreements, a certain 
level of knowledge regarding analytic conceptual analysis will be assumed and this 
present enquiry will only attend to aspects of this supplementary literature when it 
bears materially on my thesis and the distinction with which my thesis is concerned.  
 
The focus, then, is on a particular analytic tool Ð a distinction - and the objective is to 
consider how this distinction can help towards a better understanding of the concepts 
that we use, within the context of law; that is, in relation to legal concepts. The thesis at 
no point asserts that thickness or thinness are ontological features of language, 
meaning, or our form of life (even if they are).  The resulting objective is narrow but 
has considerable significance: enabling the recasting and possible resolution of long-
standing legal problems and disputes; offering the prospect of a better understanding of 
law; and assisting in the re-imagining of topics which fall under the concern of general 
jurisprudence.  I aim to show that this distinction has current relevance: it can help to 
inform the present debates regarding the ambition and shape of legal education and 
impacts upon the legal service (it has implications for both legal professionals as 
service providers and their clients).  I aim to show how the distinction carries 
significance for reviews such as the Legal Education and Training Review (LETR);10 
and for the shape of the legal curriculum at British universities, which needs to reflect 
the dramatic legislative changes the legal system has recently undergone.  The Legal 
Services Act 2007 (LSA)11 and the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders 
																																																								
10 Work commenced on the LETR in May 2011 and the report was published in June 2013.  The LETR 
was initiated by the Legal Services Board (LSB), which is a regulatory overseer in the legal sector 
created by the Legal Services Act 2007.  The three main legal regulators Ð the Solicitors Regulation 
Authority (SRA), the Bar Standards Board (BSB) and ILEX Professional Standards Ð were responsible 
for managing the LETR and overseeing the team of researchers conducting the review. 
11 One of the important implications of the LSA 2007 was that it enacted provisions to enable law firms 
to become Alternative Business Structures in partnership with other occupations; this marks a change in 
the distinctiveness of both the legal profession and legal services. 
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Act 2012 (LASPO)12 are currently transforming the legal landscape within England and 
Wales.13   These dramatic structural changes have impacted upon the ethos of the 
profession and legal education (the full impact of these changes is yet to be seen); and 
will in turn affect many different aspects of English Law.  It is a strength of this thesis 
that the deployment of thick and thin concepts in law is both relevant and of use to the 
current legal climate and on-going transformation.  By demonstrating the use and 
usefulness of thick and thin concepts in relation to two dissimilar topics within law 
(philosophy of law and legal education), one of which is currently of prominent interest 
to many legal professionals (legal education), I hope to offer a more robust and 
comprehensive demonstration of the value of the distinction than would have been 
possible had my focus remained bound to a single focus or areas of potential 
application. This enables my thesis to demonstrate the wider scope of these terms 
(ÔthickÕ concept and ÔthinÕ concept), and ensures the strength of my single thesis: that 
thick and thin concepts are useful within law. 
 
 Limiting my thesis to the deployment of this distinction as an analytic tool better 
captures the spirit of analysis from which it derived, and ensures that it is not necessary 
(or even helpful) to entertain the philosophical disputes concerning the possible 
metaphysical nature of thick and thin concepts if perceived to be metaphysical entities.  
Despite this limitation, my thesis may still be of interest to philosophers interested in 
the possible perception of thick and thin concepts as metaphysical entities, because 
investigating the use and usefulness of thick and thin concepts within law provides the 
opportunity to better understand the pressures exerted on concepts (and conceptual 
analysis) in social practices such as law, and this can be revealing and rewarding for 
both philosophers and legal practitioners.14  Indeed, Bernard Williams noted that legal 
																																																								
12 The cuts to legal aid implemented by LASPO 2012 have dramatically eroded the Ôsocial serviceÕ 
aspect of the legal profession. 
13 The legal profession and legal system is undergoing a series of changes due to these legislative 
enactments (such as those noted in the previous two notes), the full impact of these enactments remains 
unknown. 
14 This is presented as a law thesis and aimed at a legal audience, but due to the interdisciplinary nature of 
this thesis and the close connection between the philosophical and legal ideas relating to concepts and 
conceptual analysis the relevance of this thesis may extend further than a legal audience.  Bernard 
Williams is one of the key theorists of this thesis and is a prime example of a theorist who argued for the 
benefits of interdisciplinary work.  Williams was a philosopher whose primary field of research was 
ethics, but he also published work within jurisprudence (amongst other fields), see: Bernard Williams, 
ÔAfterword What Has Philosophy to Learn from Tort Law?Õ in David G. Owen (ed), Philosophical 
Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford University Press, 1995) and Bernard Williams, ÔProfessional Morality 
and Its DispositionsÕ in David Luban (ed), The Good Lawyer: LawyersÕ Role and LawyersÕ Ethics 
(Rowman & Allanheld, 1983), which both argue for the usefulness of interdisciplinary work between law 
and philosophy (particularly ethics). 
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cases exert pressure on concepts that can enrich the philosophers understanding of 
concepts.15 
 
Ambition, Structure and methodology of the thesis. 
 
This thesis amounts to a sustained argument in favour of the value to law of thickness 
and thinness as a distinction between concepts.  Over the following nine chapters I 
intend to articulate and support this claim, though at times (particularly in the early 
stages) my style and overarching argument will necessarily have to be expository and 
descriptive.  When I consider the legal literature on thickness and thinness as a 
distinction, the writings and the areas of application have been deliberately selected on 
the basis that they best support and demonstrate my claim (the value of this distinction 
for law).  This may be because the area is of manifest significance and interest (for 
example my study of H. L. A. HartÕs legal positivism, which has significant relevance 
for general jurisprudence), or because it shows the practical benefits of the distinction 
(as is the case with legal education).  Success in demonstrating the value of thickness 
and thinness as a distinction between concepts within these areas will at least be a 
prompt for future research in other areas, though the indication that this distinction has 
value within other areas of law will only be an implication of my thesis.  The value of 
my analysis, claim and argument therefore lie in the usefulness I demonstrate in the 
topics canvassed in the forthcoming chapters. 
 
For these reasons, and in light of my general aim, the thesis is structured in the 
following way.  This thesis begins with an exposition of the meta-ethical treatment of 
the distinction because although it is legal concepts that are the subject of my thesis, 
much of the literature on concepts and conceptual analysis engaged with is not specific 
to law and legal concepts, the distinction between thick and thin concepts is borrowed 
from meta-ethics and therefore specifically addresses ethical concepts (hence chapters 
two through four are located within meta-ethics).  Similar philosophical issues arise in 
both disciplines regarding the analytic traditionÕs philosophical treatment of concepts 
and the conceptual analysis this generated (as demonstrated by chapter two).  Outlining 
these philosophical issues can help to better understand how the ideas of thick and thin 
																																																								
15 Williams was referring specifically to thick and thin legal concepts, see: Bernard Williams, 
ÔAfterword What Has Philosophy to Learn from Tort Law?Õ in David G. Owen (ed), Philosophical 
Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford University Press, 1995) 
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concepts and the accompanying literature can prove useful for law.  Chapter two 
therefore covers essential philosophical terrain relating to concepts and conceptual 
analysis that will be built upon by the later legal application of the distinction between 
thick and thin concepts.  
 
There is much controversy within the literature on thick and thin concepts regarding the 
appropriate framing of the distinction and the content that this distinction identifies. 
Chapter three addresses some of the many formulations that help to highlight key 
aspects of the controversy and the philosophical problems faced by thick and thin 
concept theorists, this chapter is important in fostering a better understanding of both 
the terminology and the nature of the distinction, which will be important for my later 
analysis of the legal application of the distinction and accompanying claim that the 
legal understanding of this distinction needs sharpening. 
 
At no point is an argument in favour of any one particular formulation of the distinction 
between thick concepts and thin concepts advanced. Instead Bernard WilliamsÕ work on 
thick concepts is chosen because of its central importance: he is accredited in both the 
legal and meta-ethical literature as the first to coin in print the term ÔthickÕ ethical 
concept;16 it is his formulation of thick and thin that is most commonly referenced by 
the legal literature;17 he has noted both the existence of thick and thin legal concepts 
and the relevance of these ideas for enriching the philosophical understanding of thick 
and thin;18 and many of his wider ethical claims relating to the distinction between thick 
and thin ethical concepts are relevant and useful for other social practices such as law. 
  
WilliamsÕ work remains a central focus throughout the following chapters; his ideas Ð 
both his specific formulation of thick and thin concepts and his wider arguments 
regarding thick and thin Ð are cited throughout the legal literature on thick and thin 
																																																								
16 see note 2   
17 The majority of the theorists cited in note 3 reference Williams on thick and thin concepts. 
18 see note 15  
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(chapters five through seven);19  in addition to this, he has published within law 
regarding thick concepts.20 
 
Despite acknowledgment by prominent legal theorists such as Lawrence Solum of their 
importance for law (in general),21 thick and thin concepts are commonly misunderstood 
by the legal theorists that cite these terms.  Although chapter five is not intended as a 
literature review it does collate together a number of legal sources and disparate uses in 
an attempt to provide an overarching conspectus of thick and thin within law, which 
supports my argument: that the legal understanding of thickness and thinness as a 
distinction between concepts needs sharpening and rendering more consistent, for it is 
only then that the full value of this analytic tool can be realised (for law).  The 
distinction between philosophy of law, legal theory and jurisprudence is often hard to 
articulate and is to a certain extent superfluous to my thesis, as my argument for the 
value of thickness and thinness as a distinction between concepts extends to all three.22   
 
Chapter six analyses the value of this distinction in enriching understanding of H. L. A 
HartÕs The Concept of Law,23  which is considered a seminal text however legal 
theoretical scholarship is conceived.  Demonstrating the usefulness of the distinction in 
addressing HartÕs legal positivism adds strength to my thesis because of the central 
importance of HartÕs legal positivism: legal positivism is still the current model for the 
United KingdomÕs legal system and many of the philosophical issues addressed by Hart 
remain a central starting point for any theory (or philosophical narrative) that wishes to 
																																																								
19 His work is also used within philosophy of education to argue for the epistemic benefits of conceiving 
of EDUCATION (and many other associated epistemic concepts) thickly.  Catherine Elgin utilises 
WilliamsÕ work on thick concepts to argue for a kind of epistemic confidence that can be derived 
through conceiving epistemology thickly.  See:  Catherine Z. Elgin, ÔTrustworthinessÕ (2008) 37 (3) 
Philosophical Papers 371; Catherine Z. Elgin, ÔEpistemologyÕs Ends, PedagogyÕs ProspectsÕ (1999) 1 
Facta Philosophica 39 
20 see note 14 
21 Solum notes their importance in his online blog on legal theory: Lawrence B. Solum, ÔLegal Theory 
LexiconÕ, (2012) <http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2012/01/legal-thoery-lexicon-fact-and-
value.html.> accessed December 2012.  He also utilises the distinction to varying degrees in the 
following articles: Lawrence B. Solum & Colin Farrelly (eds), Virtue Jurisprudence (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008); Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centred Theory of JudgingÕ 
(2003) 34 Metaphilosophy 178; Lawrence B. Solum, ÔJudicial Selection: Ideology Versus CharacterÕ 
(2005) 26 Cardozo Law Review 659; Lawrence B. Solum, ÔVirtue Jurisprudence: Towards an Aretaic 
Theory of LawÕ in Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer & Nuno M.M.S. Coelho (eds), Aristotle and the 
Philosophy of Law: Theory, Practice and Justice (Springer, 2013); Lawrence B. Solum & Linghao 
Wang, ÔConfucian Virtue JurisprudenceÕ in Amalia Amaya & Ho Hock Lai (eds), Law, Virtue and 
Justice (Hart Publishing, 2013) 
22 I favour the term philosophy of law within my thesis and refer to chapters five through seven as being 
located within philosophy of law. 
23 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edition 1994) 
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elucidate the nature of law.  Within this chapter I also consider the thick concept LEGAL 
VALIDITY, my argument here being used as a test case to reveal the possibilities for 
analysing specific legal concepts, which further supports the relevance of this 
distinction to analytic conceptual analysis within law.  It is important to address specific 
legal concepts (the concepts that feature in legal statements and legal judgments), such 
as LEGAL VALIDITY, because the distinction has been most commonly employed by 
meta-ethicists as a tool to better understand specific normative concepts, and because 
the value this analytic tool offers for enriching our understanding of specific legal 
concepts is relevant to my later argument (chapter eight) for the distinctions relevance 
within legal education. 
 
Legal theories such as that proffered by Hart in The Concept of Law attempt, amongst 
other things, explanations of our legal system and legal practices, and in doing so 
address specific legal issues that have traditionally been the subject of contest and 
debate.  I focus upon two aspects of jurisprudence - the judicial activity and legal 
objectivity - as in these areas there has already been published research by prominent 
legal theorists regarding thick and thin concepts.24  Chapter seven uses this existing 
legal research and publication to support my argument for the value of thickness and 
thinness as a distinction between concepts (used as an analytic and expository tool) to 
invigorate jurisprudential debates such as those concerning the judiciary and legal 
objectivity.  At no point is it implied or intended that the distinction could solve long-
reigning jurisprudential debates in these areas (though some may be resolved to) - my 
argument principally offers a possibility for reframing traditional jurisprudential 
problems and facilitating new research ideas and discussion. 
 
The individual arguments for the value of the distinction between thick and thin 
concepts employed within law in relation to legal concepts, legal positivism and key 
jurisprudential debates (chapters five through seven), are advanced in support of my 
thesis and the overall argument that runs throughout: that the distinction between thick 
and thin concepts has value for law, but that this value is currently limited because legal 
understanding of this distinction needs sharpening and rendering more consistent.  
																																																								
24 David Enoch and Kevin Toh, ÔLegal as a Thick ConceptÕ in Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa (eds), 
Philosophical Foundations of The Nature of Law (Oxford University Press, 2013); Hilary Putnam, The 
Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (Harvard University Press, 2004); Joseph Raz, 
Engaging Reason (Oxford University Press, 1999); Lawrence B. Solum, ÔLegal Theory LexiconÕ, (2012) 
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2012/01/legal-thoery-lexicon-fact-and-value.html.> accessed 
December 2012 and Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press, 2011) 
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These individual arguments (chapters five through seven) form one overall argument 
for the relevance of thick and thin concepts to philosophy of law, which in this 
investigation is one of two areas of law subject to examination.  Thick and thin have 
already been successfully utilised within educational theory by prominent philosophers 
of education, such as Harvey Siegel25  (particularly in relation to epistemological 
issues).26  Chapter eight draws upon this literature in arguing for the relevance of thick 
and thin concepts within legal education. 
 
Chapter eight argues that thick and thin concepts are relevant to two key aspects of 
legal education: the method(s) of teaching law and the ethical values fostered by legal 
education. At present, the future of the legal profession and legal education are unclear 
as the effects of recent legislative changes are yet to be fully realised or understood, but 
it is clear at least that the method(s) of teaching law and the ethical values fostered by 
legal education will be important topics in the debate concerning the future of the legal 
profession, as this was identified by the Legal Education and Training Review (LETR).  
In light of continuing uncertainty in this arena, the aim of chapter eight is to 
demonstrate the usefulness of thickness and thinness for legal education in the hope of 
facilitating wider research and discussion of these philosophical ideas within law, 
especially regarding matters pertaining to legal education.  Research generated and 
decisions made within the field of legal education have practical implications for many 
other areas of law, and have the potential to alter the shape of the legal system and 
therefore legal practice; therefore if this chapter successfully demonstrates the value of 
thickness and thinness within legal education it helps further to demonstrate that my 
thesis has both broad theoretical scope and practical relevance for law. 
 
In addition to my central thesis there is an underlying assumption running throughout, 
which culminates in the approach offered in chapter eight: that all aspects of the legal 
profession are connected (legal practice, legal education, legal ethics, legal regulation 
																																																								
25 Harvey Siegel (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education (Oxford University Press, 
2009); Harvey Siegel, ÔEpistemology and Education: An Incomplete Guide to the Social-
Epistemological IssuesÕ (2004) 1 (2) Episteme 129; Harvey Siegel, ÔTruth, Thinking, Testimony and 
Trust: Alvin Goldman on Epistemology and EducationÕ (2005) 71 (2) Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 345; Harvey Siegel, ÔIs Education a Thick Epistemic ConceptÕ (2008) 37 
(3) Philosophical Papers 460 
26 Ben Kotzee, ÔEducation and ÒThickÓ EpistemologyÕ (2011) 61 Educational Theory 5, 549; Ben 
Kotzee and Jeremy Wanderer, ÔA Thicker Epistemology?Õ (2008) 37 (3) Philosophical Papers 337; and 
Harvey Siegel, ÔIs Education a Thick Epistemic ConceptÕ (2008) 37 (3) Philosophical Papers 460 
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and legal research),27 and that changes within one aspect of the legal profession will in 
some way impact upon other aspects of the legal profession.  As discussion proceeds 
through successive chapters, and as I draw on more examples of these connections in 
the service of my thesis, my claims about the interconnections at issue take on the 
quality of an argument both for their existence and importance.  In this manner it is 
therefore suggested that the recent legislative changes and resulting shifts in the legal 
landscape will affect and lead to changes within many, perhaps all areas of the legal 
profession.  Considering the interrelated nature of these aspects of law, although it is 
not directly argued, the implication is that if thickness and thinness have value for one 
aspect of law, it is likely that they will have value for other aspects of law, although this 
would need to be determined by further research.  
 
Finally it is important to note that because my thesis aims are overarching Ð to 
demonstrate the use and usefulness of thick and thin within law Ð I have employed a 
number of brief examples of thick concepts particularly thick concepts that have been 
deployed within legal cases (chapters five through eight), to demonstrate the benefit of 
both recognising and operating with the distinction between thick and thin concepts 
within law.  These examples are brief and can be in light of the groundwork undertaken 
in my early chapters to demonstrate the philosophical, metaphysical and ethical 
commitments that are necessarily entailed by adoption of the distinction.  The 
employment of examples highlights not only the existence of thick and thin concepts 
within law, particularly case law, but it also facilitates a wider argument within my 
thesis that deployment of thick and thin concepts within law brings to attention key 
jurisprudential questions, such as the distinction between facts and values which is 
central to the debate between separationists and non-separationists within the thick-thin 
literature and the debate between legal positivists and natural lawyers within 
jurisprudence.  The distinction between thick and thin concepts therefore has significant 
implications for our general theories of law, such as legal positivism (as I demonstrate 
in chapter six), which can be brought to life in every single case that deploys thick 
concepts. 
 
This thesis has been structured in the above way, as this best supports the aims and 
objectives of my research, and offers the strongest support possible for my thesis: that 
																																																								
27 This list is not exhaustive there may be other areas of the law that could be highlighted, but this 
chapter addresses these particular areas. 
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the distinction between thick and thin concepts has value within law.  As my thesis 
concerns a distinction between different concepts, which is an analytic tool that can be 
used within conceptual analysis, it is concepts and conceptual analysis that I now turn 
my attention to in the following chapter. 
	 21	
Chapter Two: Concepts and 
Conceptual Analysis
	 22	
1 Ð Introduction. 
 
The division of concepts into thick concepts and thin concepts was part of wider 
developments and changes in 20th century analytic conceptual analysis; this chapter 
therefore begins (section two and three) by locating this division of concepts (into thick 
and thin) within the wider literature on concepts and conceptual analysis (in both 
philosophy and law).  This preliminary exposition is important because it covers 
essential philosophical terrain that is helpful in understanding the close connection 
between law and philosophy regarding the interrelated philosophical ideas of ÔconceptsÕ 
and Ôconceptual analysisÕ.  The assertion that the philosophical literature on thick and 
thin concepts could be useful for legal conceptual analysis is supported by the close 
connection between law and philosophy.  The division of concepts into thick and thin 
just so happened to be played out in a particular branch of philosophy Ð meta-ethics, 
and this is where the majority of the literature on thickness and thinness is located, 
therefore the ideas at issue in this chapter (sections four and five) and the next two are 
firmly located within meta-ethics, in which ethical concepts take centre stage. 
 
 
2 Ð Concepts. 
 
The term ÔconceptÕ is the modern replacement for the older term ÔideaÕ (stripped of 
some of its original associations) and thought to be intimately connected to language, 
although the extent of this intimacy is contested.28 Certain technical concepts seem to 
be beyond the grasp of ÔlanguagelessÕ29 creatures and have previously been thought to 
be beyond the grasp of infants (and or young children),30 but there are certain basic 
																																																								
28 Concepts are also of importance to an overall theory of cognition and the mind see: Dennis Earl, 
ÔConceptsÕ (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) <www.iep.utm.edu/concepts/> accessed 10 March 
2015 
29 This is the terminology used by Bede Rundle, ÔConceptsÕ entry in Ted Honderich (ed), The Oxford 
Companion to Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2005).  I have in mind those incapable 
of human language or Ôreflexive subconsciousnessÕ (see John Locke) such as animals (even if they may 
be capable of interaction within and outside their own species). 
30 It was originally thought that infants and young children lacked conceptual abilities as these were 
acquired throughout childhood.  Recent research has challenged this see Gregory L. Murphy ÔConcepts 
in InfancyÕ and ÔConceptual DevelopmentÕ in The Big Book of Concepts (MIT Press, 2004).  Eric 
Margolis, ÔHow to Acquire a ConceptÕ in Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence (eds), Concepts Core 
Readings (MIT Press, 1999); Renee Baillargeon ÔThe Object Concept Revisited: New Directions in the 
Investigation of InfantsÕ Physical KnowledgeÕ in Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence (eds), Concepts 
Core Readings (MIT Press, 1999); and Susan A. Gelman and Harry M. Wellman ÔInsides and Essences: 
Early Understandings of the Non-ObviousÕ in Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence (eds), Concepts Core 
Readings (MIT Press, 1999) 
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attributes that both humans and animals share that indicate a common conceptual 
ability.31  It is the nature of this conceptual ability that has been controversial.32  
Concept users are often judged on their ability to grasp a concept or to possess a 
concept;33 but this seems to require a whole host of capacities such as applying the 
concept to existing and new cases (this could also include misapplication), abandoning 
the concept for an alternative concept or modifying the existing concept - all of which 
are more complicated than the basic ability to respond differently to things which fall 
under the concept (this can be achieved by a languageless creature).34  This section 
expands on the basic notion of a concept and introduces some of the many issues 
associated with concepts and conceptual analysis,35 which are present in both the meta-
ethical literature on thick and thin concepts and the legal literature on legal concepts.36  
This philosophical exegesis covers important philosophical ground that is often much 




31 Nicola S. Clayton, Timothy J. Bussey & Anthony Dickinson, ÔCan animals recall the past and plan for 
the future?Õ (2003) 4 Nature Reviews: Neuroscience 685; Susan Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds), 
Rational Animals? (Oxford University Press, 2006); and Marc D. Hauser, Wild Minds: What Animals 
Really Think (Penguin, 2000) 
32 Our conceptual abilities have been investigated in a number of disciplines; for example both 
philosophers and psychologists have investigated colour concepts (e.g. RED, BLUE, GREEN etc.) and 
colour perception.  For example see: Jules Davidoff, ÔLanguage and perceptual categorisationÕ (2001) 5 
(9) Trends in Cognitive Sciences 382 
33 The notion of possessing a concept is precarious, for example do we mean that there is only one way 
to possess a concept (the ÔrightÕ way) and if so how do we identify this way.  Dennis Earl, ÔConceptsÕ 
(Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) <www.iep.utm.edu/concepts/ > accessed 10 March 2015 
34 There is a preliminary question that I have brushed over: can there be concepts without language?  
Some philosophers such as Robert Brandom, Michael Dummett and Donald Davidson maintain that 
possession of natural language is necessary for having any concepts and a tight connection between the 
two can be established on a priori grounds.  See Robert B. Brandom, Making it Explicit: Reasoning, 
Representing, and Discursive Commitment (Harvard University Press, 1994); Michael Dummett, Seas of 
Language (Oxford University Press, 1993); see also: Donald Davidson, ÔThought and Talk in InquiriesÕ 
in Truth and Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 1975).  Other philosophers such as Jerry Fodor 
and Steven Pinker maintain that concepts are prior to and independent of natural language on the 
grounds that natural language is just a method of conveying thoughts.  See Jerry Fodor, The Language of 
Thought (Harvard University Press, 1975) and Steven Pinker, The Language Instinct: The New Science 
of Language and Mind (Penguin, 1994).  Others such as Peter Carruthers and Elizabeth Spelke occupy a 
kind of halfway position maintaining that at least some concepts occur within the internal system of 
representation (constituted by natural language) and therefore require competency with natural language.  
Peter Carruthers, Language, Thought, and Consciousness (Cambridge University Press, 1996); Peter 
Carruthers, ÔThe Cognitive Functions of LanguageÕ (2002) 25 (6) Behavioural and Brain Sciences 657 
and Elizabeth Spelke, ÔWhat Makes Us Smart? Core Knowledge and Natural LanguageÕ in D. Gentner 
& S. Goldin-Meadow (eds), Language in Mind (MIT Press, 2003), 277-311 
35 For a brief introduction see Bede Rundle, ÔConceptsÕ entry in Ted Honderich (ed), The Oxford 
Companion to Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2005)  
36 Law is a social practice or institution and legal concepts have therefore received mixed treatment.  
Many of the conceptual problems in law arise because some theorists seem to be taking a descriptive 
approach towards law whilst also making conceptual claims (claims about the nature of the concept LAW 
or individual legal concepts).  H. L. A Hart is an example of a theorist whose work has been criticized in 
this manner, for more detail see chapter six of my thesis. 
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The Nature of Concepts. 
 
There is much controversy surrounding   Ôthe nature of concepts Ð the kinds of things 
concepts are Ð and the constraints that govern a theory of concepts have been the 
subject of much debate.  This is due, at least in part, to the fact that disputes about 
concepts often reflect deeply opposing approaches to the study of the mind, to 
language, and even to philosophy itself.Õ37  Our concepts are the embodiment of much 
of our knowledge of the world and they help us navigate through the world and interact 
with others.  Thus comments such as MurphyÕs are typical of the wider literature:  
 
If we have formed a concept (a mental representation) corresponding 
to that category (the class of objects in the world), then the concept 
will help us understand and respond appropriately to a new entity in 
that category.  Concepts are a kind of mental glue, then, in that they 
tie our past experiences to our present interactions with the world, 
and because the concepts themselves are connected to our larger 
knowledge structures.Õ38  They help us identify new things in the 
world and what properties they have so that we can use our 
knowledge of past experiences and apply this to new examplars of 
these categories.39  They are crucial to many psychological processes 
such as Ôcategorization, inference, memory, learning and decision-
making.40   
 
Concepts play a key role in linguistic practices - our linguistic utterances express 
propositions which also express concepts - and concepts are closely connected to the 
meanings of linguistic entities such as predicates and adjectives.41   When we converse 
we attempt to communicate our ideas about objects, people, and events and we 
understand these through the use of certain concepts therefore our words and sentence 
meanings are connected to specific concepts.  These capacities involve claims of 
knowledge and therefore concepts play an important role in epistemology.42  Concepts 
are important to a wide array of philosophical disciplines and any general theory of 
																																																								
37 The term ÔconceptÕ can be traced back to the Latin conceptum Ð something conceived.  Eric Margolis 
and Stephen Laurence, ÔConceptsÕ (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy first published 7 Nov 2005, 
substantive revision 17 May 2011) < www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/> accessed 4 March 2015 
38 Gregory L. Murphy, The Big Book of Concepts (MIT Press, 2004), 1. 
39 Concepts are of importance to any theory of cognition and the mind because it is by appeal to various 
facts involving concepts and our grasp of such concepts that we can analyse and distinguish various 
thoughts (especially those which involve/express propositions).   
40 See note 38 
41 Dennis Earl, ÔConceptsÕ (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) <www.iep.utm.edu/concepts/> 
accessed 10 March 2015 
42 See note 38 
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concepts will have implications for philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, 
cognitive science and psychology.43   
 
The psychology of concepts post 1960 has revealed that this phenomenologically 
simple process (like many other phenomenological processes such as understanding, 
walking or speech) is a far more complex scientific problem than previously thought.44 
Both epistemological and metaphysical questions about concepts arise in the legal and 
meta-ethical literature.45  The distinction between and analysis of concepts based on 
their thickness and thinness, and philosophy of law, demonstrate the many issues that 
arise when trying to generate a theory of concepts (especially an overall theory).46  This 
thesis does not generate a theory of concepts but it does advocate a particular approach 






44 Concepts apply to many of the categories that are of interest to psychologists (such as social and 
person categories, emotions, linguistic entities, events, and actions) and we rely on these categories to 
direct our behavior (even if sometimes we directly observe reliable information contrary to this).  
Psychological approaches to concepts and conceptual analysis are not considered in this thesis as they 
are outside the parameters of my research (such a detailed investigation of conceptual analysis in this 
field would distract from my research aim), but it is interesting for thick and thin concept theorists to 
consider how this literature could be relevant for their method of conceptual analysis. 
45 Concepts seem to be the sorts of entities that are grasped, possessed or understood as a part of belief 
formation (and knowledge) about the world, but grasping, possessing and understanding are far from 
straightforward notions.  We use concepts to categorize features of the world and this behavior is a 
prerequisite for various kinds of knowledge.  Epistemologists are interested in the notion of 
categorization and psychologists are interested in our behavior when we categorize.  The most basic 
metaphysical question asks what is the nature of a ÔconceptÕ? Answering this involves identifying the 
identity conditions for concepts or a specific concept and therefore answering a host of other questions 
such as: are concepts universal (is there only one concept of BEING A STAR or do agents have their own 
individual concepts of BEING A STAR)? Are concepts mind-dependent i.e. particular ideas in ones mind or 
mind-independent entities such as predicates or references to objects?  How do we distinguish between 
different concepts (identity conditions) and are some concepts more metaphysically complex than 
others?  There are obviously many more metaphysical questions that could be asked but these are a good 
starting point. 
46 Legal language is one area where the relationship between the physical and metaphysical is under 
constant scrutiny.  Marnie Riddle argues that the ever increasing influence of science and the physical 
can be seen through changes in legal language and legal theory, legal positivism has extended the logical 
positivist approach to previously unscientific terms and concepts, terms that were traditionally 
considered to be metaphysical and therefore meaningless by the positivists.  These previously 
metaphysical terms have began to metamorphose into the physical and taken on a whole new level of 
meaning, this has resulted in layers of the metaphysical which were previously unknown being revealed.  
See: Marnie Riddle ÔReasonable Discourse: A Philosophical Discourse on LanguageÕ (1997) < 





One of the key issues that has gripped concept analysts is Ôconcept masteryÕ: grasping 
the meaning of a concept.47  The issue is wide reaching because it affects both internal 
and external participants to a practice; for example, how do those external to the legal 
practice understand legal concepts?48   ÔConcept masteryÕ ties directly to concept 
application - whether that application successfully tracks or reflects our understanding 
of the concept Ð but successful application of a concept may not be the result of concept 
mastery, and this requires criteria for judging whether the application was successful 
that will at least in part be guided by grasping the meaning of the concept.   
 
James Higginbotham discusses the difference between Ôconcept masteryÕ and Ôconcept 
acquisitionÕ, proposing a threefold distinction between Ô(i) merely possessing a word, 
or having it in oneÕs repertoire, and so being able to use it within its meaning; (ii) 
knowing the meaning of the word; and (iii) having an adequate conscious view of its 
meaning.Õ49 Higginbotham seems to be arguing that someone may possess a concept 
such as CHAIR whilst failing to count objects with three legs that can be sat upon 
among chairs, revealing that their conception of chairs (not their conception of A 
CHAIR) is inaccurate; therefore revealing that they have not mastered the concept 
CHAIR.50  Similarly they may master the concept CHAIR and yet their conception of a 
chair may not be conscious; therefore even under ideal circumstances a person could 
																																																								
47 For some further reading see: Melissa Bowerman and Stephen C. Levinson (eds), Language 
Acquisition and Conceptual Development (Cambridge University Press, 2001); Ray Jackendoff, ÔWhat 
is a Concept, that a Person May Grasp It?Õ (1989) 4 Mind & Language 68; and Eric Margolis, ÔHow to 
Acquire a ConceptÕ in Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence (eds), Concepts Core Readings (MIT Press, 
1999) 
48 This problem exists at many levels for example within a particular country and on an international 
scale such as the European Union, how do different member states understand EU legal concepts?  I 
return to the distinction between internal and external participants within chapter six. 
49 James Higginbotham, ÔConceptual competenceÕ (2009) 9 Philosophical Issues 149.  Genoveva Marti 
opines that Ôit is better to understand the structure of the argument not so much as proposing a 
distinction between three different notions, but rather as advancing two different distinctions: one is a 
distinction between tacit and explicit conceptions associated with concepts.  The other distinction, which 
cuts orthogonally, separates mastery from possession of concepts.Õ  Genoveva Marti, ÔThe Significance 
of the Distinction between Concept Mastery and Concept PossessionÕ (1998) 9 Philosophical Issues 
165.  For a discussion of HigginbothamÕs paper see also: Pierre Jacob, ÔConceptual Competence and 
Inadequate ConceptionsÕ (1998) 9 Philosophical Issues 169; Joseph Macia, ÔOn Concepts and 
ConceptionsÕ (1998) 9 Philosophical Issues 175; and Maite Ezcurdia, ÔThe Concept-Conception 
DistinctionÕ (1998) 9 Philosophical Issues 187 
50 Concept mastery is a complex notion and ordinary language philosophers such as Gilbert Ryle have 
focused on our concept use.  He highlighted that you can quite plausibly describe someone as using an 
expression illogically or meaninglessly, but it is implausible to describe the ÔconceptÕ as illogical or 
meaningless (if you were to refer to them individually without context).  See: Gilbert Ryle, ÔOrdinary 
LanguageÕ in Collected Essays 1929-1968 (Routledge, 2009) 
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not articulate or fully explicate what a chair is.  ÔConcept acquisitionÕ or possession 
does not necessarily lead to Ôconcept masteryÕ but the question remains, then, what is 
meant by Ôconcept masteryÕ, and in particular, whether it amounts just to conceptual 
competence or something more advanced. 
 
Higginbotham defines conceptual competence as the state of mind of an individual 
who knows the nature of his own concepts:51  
 
The distinction between the meaning of a word for a person and the 
personÕs tacit conception of the meaning allows us to ascribe 
expressions of thoughts to that person, whose content she herself 
only partly understands, or even misconceives.  It also allows us, in 
my view appropriately, to see the process of language acquisition as 
coming to know the meaning of words, where at a given stage the 
learnerÕs conception is an hypothesis about the meaning.  Likewise, 
if there is a distinction between the concept that a person possesses 
and her conception of it, it will be appropriate to ascribe to that 
person thoughts involving the concept that she only partly 
apprehends, or even misconceives; and the distinction allows us to 
view a personÕs increased sophistication with a concept as a 
consequence, not of progressive replacement in thought of one 
concept by another, but of acquiring a more adequate conception.52 
 
HigginbothamÕs distinction between the concept itself and the conception of things 
falling under the concept works best if the process from concept acquisition to 
conceptual competence is seen as a gradual process (allowing for different degrees of 
grasping or mastering the concept).  Conceptual competence according to this model is 
not a yes/no issue because there are different degrees of conceptual competence (in the 
same way that there are different degrees of language competence);53  and this 
challenges the idea that those agents who exhibit lower degrees of conceptual 
competence should be described as attaching labels to concepts wrongly.54 Conceptual 
																																																								
51 Within the same volume see Pierre JacobÕs response to Higginbotham on conceptual competence: 
Pierre Jacob, ÔConceptual Competence and Inadequate ConceptionsÕ (1998) 9 Philosophical Issues 169 
52 see note 49 at 153 
53 For an ordinary language philosophy approach see: Gilbert Ryle, ÔThinking Thoughts and Having 
ConceptsÕ in Collected Essays 1929-1968 (Routledge, 2009).  He considers how we acquire knowledge 
of a concept.  When acquiring knowledge of a concept there is the point at which you do not possess 
such knowledge and the point at which you do possess such knowledge; but in between there is a point 
at which you cannot be said to fully Ôpossess the conceptÕ but you can also no longer be said to not 
possess it.  Ryle argues that there may be many stages in the development of concept acquisition, there 
maybe many ÔintellectualÕ and ÔconversationalÕ tasks that need to be mastered involving that particular 
concept.  Throughout the process of mastering these tasks we gradually acquire a better grasp of the 
concept.   
54 In the 1950Õs and 1960Õs W. V. Quine and Hilary Putnam challenged the traditional notions of a priori 
conceptual inquiry and noted that science sometimes overturns those concepts that we hold as most 
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analysis grapples with these challenging issues and is the topic of the next section.  It is 
also the primary topic of this thesis in which an investigation is made into the 
usefulness of a particular form of philosophical conceptual analysis (the division of 
concepts into thick concepts and thin concepts) applied to law. 
 
 
3 - Conceptual analysis. 
 
Conceptual analysis Ð that is, Ôthe attempt to solve philosophical problems, or exhibit 
them as illusory, by defining words or being clear about how concepts are usedÕ55 - 
relies heavily on philosophical logic as it is premised on demonstrating the entailment 
of various definitions through the process of logical deduction.56  Analytical and 
definitional approaches to concepts can be problematic because some concepts seem 
resistant to analysis or verbal definition.57  It can be useful to consider the purpose of 
such definitional approaches.  Brian Bix,58 identifies three possible objectives: 
 
(1) they can be an attempt to track and explain linguistic usage; (2) 
they can be an attempt to discover the ÒsignificanceÓ of a concept, 
hidden in our practices and intuitions regarding usage; or (3) they 
can impose moral or qualitative criteria which must be met before 
the label should be applied (perhaps on the basis that such criteria 
are deeply embedded in our usage).59 
																																																																																																																																																																
established.  See Hilary Putnam, ÔThe Analytic and the SyntheticÕ in H. Feigl & G. Maxwell (eds), 
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of science, Volume III. (University of Minnesota Press, 1962).  
Putnam and Saul Kripke emphasized that we can possess a concept despite being ignorant or mistaken 
about the kinds of thing the concept picks out.  See Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Harvard 
University Press, 1972) 
55 Stephen Priest, ÔConceptual AnalysisÕ entry in Ted Honderich (ed), The Oxford Companion to 
Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2005)  
56 This led to the idea that philosophy should be conducted from the proverbial armchair as it was 
essentially the a priori analysis of concepts.   
57 The later Wittgenstein argued that not all concepts could be categorized in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions because there was no class of definitional features that all items falling under that 
concept class possessed.  This is where ordinary language philosophy re-surfaces because he argued that 
philosophers should focus on linguistic usage rather than definitions. 
58 This chapter addresses many of BixÕs ideas on conceptual analysis in law as discussed in: Brian Bix, 
ÔConceptual Questions and JurisprudenceÕ (1995) 1 (4) Legal Theory 465 and Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: 
Theory and Context (Sweet & Maxwell, 6th edition, 2012) 
Andrew Haplin challenges BixÕs analysis of concepts in Andrew Haplin, ÔConcepts, Terms and Fields of 
EnquiryÕ (1998) 4 Legal Theory 187 
59 BixÔs distinction between the second and third category distinguishes between evaluations of 
ÒsignificanceÓ that at least purport to be morally neutral (for example H. L. A HartÕs discussion of legal 
rights), and those definitions where moral judgements are used openly and are encouraged (for example 
the work of natural law theorists).  ibid Bix at 471   
Haplin argues that we need to distinguish carefully between terms and labels when discussing concepts 
and categories and prefers the use of ÔtermÕ as opposed to ÔlabelÕ: ÔFirst, I shall favour at a more 
elementary level ÒtermÓ over Òlabel,Ó so as to be able to convey those instances where terms that may be 
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Very few conceptual theories aim simply to track usage (there is often a tie to use but it 
is a loose one),60 and theorists who do pay attention to use usually do so because they 
believe a deeper, more interesting truth can then be revealed.61  The second justification 
for conceptual definitions asserts that a particular definition is justified on the basis that 
it better displays interesting or important aspects of the practice (that may be hinted at 
by our linguistic practices); 62  these underlying judgments may be insufficiently 
objective though.  A theorist could maintain their definition even if an alternative 
(potentially better fitting) definition is available,63 and this can lead to theoretical 
stalemate between two theorists who have different views of (for example) lawÕs 
objectives.64  The third approach suggests establishing standards that must be met for 
the relevant label to apply.65  Could these standards ever remain morally neutral or 
would we need to resort to evaluations?  Thick concepts through their combination of 
evaluative and descriptive raise this question and many more.  The controversy 
surrounding thick and thin ethical concepts stems in part from problems of definition: 
how do we define or analyse the terms thick ethical concept and thin ethical concept 
and then how do we identify which concepts count as thick and which count as thin.  In 
order to begin to address these issues it is helpful to provide an outline of the most 
orthodox approach to conceptual definition, which happens to be the theory that has 
most typically been deployed in legal analysis, too. 
 
																																																																																																																																																																
used as labels for specific concepts are being employed for a different purpose: so as to convey the 
subject matter under investigation as constituted by material objects, or social phenomena, or whatever 
the subject matter may comprise Ð even an imprecise collection or tradition of thoughts; or so as to 
convey some subject matter that is not properly or sufficiently identified Ð where the term is left (at least 
partially) inexplicated and must be explicated in order to fulfil any useful role; or indeed, to cover the 
possibility of the term being employed simultaneously for different labels pertaining to quite distinct 
concepts.  ibid Haplin at 189 
60 Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Clarendon Press, 1994), 179-82 discusses linguistic 
approaches to the nature of law. 
61 This idea has many interesting parallels with debates in other areas of philosophy, such as philosophy 
of language and metaphysics.  Michael Dummett has argued that a theory of language and a theory of 
meaning offer a good starting point for addressing metaphysical questions about physical reality.  See: 
Michael Dummett, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (Harvard University Press, 1991) 
62 For example see: John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press, 1980), 3-11; or note 
60 at 216-218 
63 For example Hart defended his Ôclaim theoryÕ of legal rights on the basis that his definition captured 
an important aspect of peoples perception and experience of legal rights; even though he conceded that 
there was an alternative definition that better fitted the current use of the legal term.  See H. L. A. Hart, 
ÔLegal RightsÕ in Essays on Bentham (Clarendon Press, 1982) 
64 The classic example of such unresolvable disagreement is between legal positivists and their critics.  
See H. L. A. Hart, ÔPostscriptÕ in The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 1994), 248-9 
contrasting his views with Ronald Dworkin regarding the primary purpose of law. 
65 For example you might believe that a piece of writing can only be called ÒliteratureÓ, or an object that 
has been created can only be called ÒartÓ, if it has stood the test of time. 
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The Classical Theory of Concepts. 
 
The classical theory of concepts and conceptual analysis (also referred to as the 
empiricist theory of concepts or definitionism) 66  dominated philosophy until the 
1970Õs.67  Theories regarding the structure of concepts (post the classical theory) are 
developments of or reactions to the classical theory68 (the competing theories of thick 
and thin concepts that are addressed in the next chapter are a prime example of this).  
According to the classical theory concepts have a definitional structure: a list of 
features that something must possess to be a member of that particular class of concept 
(these features must be both necessary and sufficient).69  BACHELOR is one of the most 
well known examples: a bachelor is defined by the features unmarried and man 
therefore an entity falls under the class of concept BACHELOR if and only if it possesses 
both of these features. The classical theoryÕs popularity rested on its unified explanation 
of concept acquisition, categorization and reference determination (these could all be 
explained by reference to the definitional features of the concept) and its close 
connection with conceptual analysis.70  The classical theory of concepts and conceptual 
																																																								
66 It can be traced back to Aristotle and classical philosophy. 
67 The classical theory of concepts was still popular with early 20th century philosophers such as Gottlob 
Frege, Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore and despite falling out of popularity it is still advanced by some 
contemporary philosophers such as Frank Jackson, ÔArmchair MetaphysicsÕ in M. Michael and 
J.OÕLeary-Hawthorne (eds), Philosophy in Mind (Kluwer, 1994); Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to 
Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis (Clarendon Press, 1998); David Pitt, ÔIn Defense of 
DefinitionsÕ (1999) 12 (2) Philosophical Psychology 139; Christopher Peacocke, A Study of Concepts 
(M.I.T. Press, 1992); and Dennis Earl, A defense of the Classical View of Concepts (Doctoral 
Dissertation, University of Colorado, Boulder, 2002), Dissertation Abstracts International, 63, o6A. 
68 It is not relevant to my thesis to address these theories individually but it is important for contextual 
reasons to note that Ôat least five general theories of concepts have been proposed: The Classical theory, 
which takes concepts to be analyzed in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions; neoclassical 
theories, which hold that concepts have necessary conditions, but denies that all concepts have 
individually necessary conditions that are jointly sufficient; prototype theories, which take concepts to 
be accounted for in terms of lists of typical features (instead of metaphysically necessary conditions) or 
in terms of paradigm cases or exemplars; theory-theories, which take concepts to be entities individuated 
by the roles they play in internally represented ÒmentalÓ theories (where such a  theory is immanent in 
the mind and of some category or other); and atomistic theories, which take most concepts to be 
primitive unanalyzable entities.Õ Dennis Earl, ÔConceptsÕ (Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy) 
<www.iep.utm.edu/concepts/ > accessed 10 March 2015   
See also Entry on Concepts in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for more detail.  For specific 
readings on these theories see: Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence (eds), Concepts Core Readings 
(MIT Press, 1999); and Gregory L. Murphy, The Big Book of Concepts (MIT Press, 2004).   
69 The idea is that the category (concept) can be defined by a set of attributes which are singly necessary 
(if an item lacks one of these attributes it is not a member of the category irrelevant of how many other 
necessary attributes it may have) and jointly sufficient (if an item has all the attributes deemed sufficient 
then it is a member of the category irrelevant of what other attributes it lacks).  A similar discussion in 
modern philosophy now takes place within the topic of Natural Kinds theory.   See: Hilary Putnam, ÔThe 
Meaning of ÒMeaningÓÕ in Philosophical Papers Volume 2: Mind Language and Reality (Cambridge 
University Press, 1975), 215-271 
70 Concept acquisition, categorization and reference can all be explained as different stages of the 
process of assembling the definitional features of a concept (or assembling new complex concepts from 
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analysis came under considerable pressure after attacks from within;71 and outside 
philosophy.72  Within philosophy there are very few examples of successful definitional 
analyses and those that appear successful are typically controversial.73  The vast 
literature on the analysis of knowledge and knowledge claims is indicative of the 
problems faced by classical accounts of conceptual analysis (and therefore, by turns, 
thick and thin conceptual theorists).74  This does not necessarily mean that definitional 
theories are unobtainable - it may be that definitions are much trickier than previously 
thought - much of the literature now seriously considers the possibility that our 
concepts lack a definitional structure.75  
 
In analytic philosophy conceptual analysis has undergone a revival despite critical 
attack in the latter 20th century.76  Contemporary conceptual philosophers such as 
George Bealer, 77  David Chalmers, 78  Frank Jackson, 79  and David Lewis 80  (among 
																																																																																																																																																																
a combination of simpler concepts and their definitional features), the psychological process of checking 
the necessary and sufficient features are present and applicable to the entity in question. 
71 For an overview of criticisms of the classical style of analysis see: Gilbert Harman, ÔDoubts About 
Conceptual AnalysisÕ in Reasoning, Meaning and Mind (Oxford University Press, 1999), 139-143.  One 
approach was to undermine the analytic/synthetic distinction and with it the classical views commitment 
to analytic truths. See: Hilary Putnam, ÔThe Analytic and the SyntheticÕ in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell 
(eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume III. (University of Minnesota Press, 
1962), 358-397; this was part of the Naturalist attack on philosophy see: David Papineau, Philosophical 
Naturalism (Blackwell, 1993) 
72 For example psychologists have been critical of the classical theories struggle to explain a robust set 
of empirical findings, they base this on studies that indicate certain items are more typical and easier to 
identify as falling under a particular conceptual category e.g. the category of fruit - apples are judged to 
be a more typical example than plums because apples are judged as having more features in common 
with fruit and are therefore categorized more efficiently. 
73 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell, 3rd edition, G. E. M. Anscombe 
(trans.), 1953-1958) and Jerry Fodor, ÔThe Present Status of the Innateness ControversyÕ, in 
Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science (MIT Press, 1981) 
74 Since the first challenge to the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief by Edmund 
Gettier (1963) no one has been able to come up with an accepted complete definition.  Edward Gettier, 
ÔIs Justified True Belief Knowledge?Õ (1963) 23 Analysis 121 
75 This is an interesting line of argument that is yet to be fully developed in relation to thick and thin 
concepts and legal positivism, but it is not one that I will advance in this thesis. 
76 The naturalist attack on conceptual analysis also took place within legal theory.  Brian Leiter argues 
for the adoption of naturalist analysis and the abandonment of pure conceptual analysis in law.  For an 
overview of naturalism in law and a useful bibliography of relevant texts see Brian Leiter, ÔNaturalism 
in Legal PhilosophyÕ (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first published 15 July 2002, substantive 
revision 31 July 2012) <www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-naturalism/ > accessed 1 March 2015 
77 George Bealer, ÔThe Philosophical Limits of Scientific EssentialismÕ in Tomberlin, J. (ed), 
Philosophical Perspectives 1 (Atascadero, 1987), 289-365.  George Bealer, ÔIntuition and Autonomy of 
PhilosophyÕ in Michael DePaul, and William Ramsey (eds), Rethinking Intuition (Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 1998), 201-239 
78 David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford University Press, 
1996) 
79Frank Jackson, ÔArmchair MetaphysicsÕ in M. Michael and J.OÕLeary-Hawthorne (eds), Philosophy in 
Mind (Kluwer, 1994) and Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual 
Analysis (Clarendon Press, 1998) 
80 David Lewis, ÔReduction of MindÕ in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 291-324 
	 32	
others), spearheaded this revival by reinterpreting the role of conceptual analysis and 
arguing that it remains a viable and necessary part of philosophy.  Contemporary 
accounts of conceptual analysis are not merely restatements of past ideas and theories.81 
Contemporary conceptual analysts try to respond to and explicitly engage with the 
criticisms that led to the decline of conceptual analysis originally, aiming to offer more 
sophisticated explanations of our practices of conceptual analysis.  Despite this 
resurgence some of the deepest divides amongst contemporary philosophers concern 
the philosophical problems identified above Ð the limits of empirical inquiry, the nature 
of conceptual analysis and subsequently the nature of philosophy Ð and concepts are at 
the centre of these philosophical disputes.82 Conceptual analysis has not yet regained its 
original status and this thesis does not provide a defence of analytical conceptual 
analysis, but it is nonetheless an exercise in legal conceptual analysis, and stands as an 
argument for it to that extent.   
 
Legal Conceptual Analysis. 
 
Many of the hotly debated issues regarding contemporary conceptual analysis translate 
into philosophical issues in law.  Legal theorists arrived at meta-philosophy much later 
than other disciplines83 Ð they have only recently started to seriously question their 
methodology and the nature of their claims Ð and by doing so started to explore the role 
of conceptual analysis in legal theory.  This approach can be clearly differentiated from 
descriptive legal theory.84  Joseph Raz in his later work asked  - Ôwhether conceptual 
analysis is appropriate to analysing the nature of law and whether one can speak of 
necessary truths in jurisprudenceÕ85 Ð he answers yes to both.86  Julie Dickson argues 
																																																								
81 Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, ÔConcepts and Conceptual AnalysisÕ (2003) 67 (2) Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 253 
82 David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford University Press, 
1996); Michael DePaul, & William Ramsey (eds), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and 
Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry (Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Ned Block, & Robert Stalnaker, 
ÔConceptual Analysis and the Explanatory GapÕ (1999) 108 (1) Philosophical Review 1; Timothy 
Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy (Blackwell, 2007) 
83 Bix makes a similar claim in his: Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (Sweet & Maxwell, 
6th edition, 2012), 17 
84 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 1994) and John Finnis, 
Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press, 1980); are two of the most influential descriptive 
theories of law from the latter 20th century.  Both theorists discussed in their texts how it is possible to 
have a descriptive account of social phenomenon such as law and how such theories can inevitably only 
capture a portion of the relevant facts of a complex social practice such as a legal system. 
85 see note 83 
86 It is important to note that RazÕs notion of ÔnecessityÕ is different to that found elsewhere in 
philosophy e.g. logical necessity, Platonic philosophy and Naturalism.  ÔRaz treats the/our concept of 
law as something unique, a matter about which theorists can be right or wrong in their descriptions, and 
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that Ôall legal theorists take an implicit stand on meta-theoretical or methodological 
questions such as [the purpose of the theorizing endeavour].  Few, however, address 
such matters directly, and to the extent to which this does occur, the authors concerned 
often confine themselves to some relatively brief remarks in the course of pursuing 
some other agenda.Õ87  Ronald Dworkin agrees that Ôit is difficult to find any helpful 
positive statements of what these methods and ambitions are ÉÕ88 and Brian Bix is 
equally critical, opining that Ôconceptual analysis is an integral part of legal theory, but 
the nature and purpose of such inquiries are often not clearly stated.Õ89 Andrew Haplin 
has noted that this problem may not be specific to philosophy of law, noting that Ôwider 
reading on conceptual analysis reveals a lack of agreement on what the technique (or 
art) of conceptual analysis amounts to.Õ90 
 
Bix cautions that we need to place our conceptual theories in context: most legal 
theories are descriptive in the sense that they usually attempt to describe the world in 
such a way that we can better understand the events of the past and therefore better 
predict future events, but that this then introduces some evaluative and prescriptive 
element.91 The constantly evolving nature of social practices means that it is not clear 
why past regularities should dictate future events or be useful in understanding the 
present practice.  As practices change over time the labels (concepts) our conceptual 
theories generated to refer to those specific practices no longer fit the practice.  
Wittgenstein uses the example of a game of chess to demonstrate the nature of the 
problem: if we agree we are playing a game of chess, to what extent can we change the 
rules and still be playing the game ÔchessÕ?92  At what point does a practice (game) 
																																																																																																																																																																
which they cannot simply reinvent for their own purposes (though he does note that since concepts of 
law are in flux, our theories of law, even mistaken theories, could influence the concept of law future 
generations have).Õ ibid at 17-18 
Joseph Raz, ÔOn the Nature of LawÕ (Kobe Lectures of 1994), (1996) 82 Archiv fur Rechts- und 
Sozialphilosophie 1; Joseph Raz, ÔCan there be a Theory of Law?Õ In Martin P. Golding & William A. 
Edmundson (eds), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of law and Legal Theory (Blackwell, 2006), 324-
342 
87 Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory (Hart Publishing, 2001) 
88 Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Harvard University Press, 2006), 165 
For further authors who cite a similar concern see: Brian Leiter, ÔLegal Realism, Hard Positivism, and 
the Limits of Conceptual AnalysisÕ in Jules Coleman (ed), HartÕs postscript: Essays on the Postscript to 
the Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2001) and Nicos Stavropolous, ÔHarts SemanticsÕ in Jules 
Coleman (ed), HartÕs postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2001) 
89 Brian Bix, ÔConceptual Questions and JurisprudenceÕ (1995) 1 (4) Legal Theory 465 
90 Andrew Haplin, Reasoning with Law (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2001) 
91 ibid n 89 at 467 
92 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell, 3rd edition, G. E. M. Anscombe 
(trans.), 1953-1958)   
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cease to exist and a new practice (game) takes its place?  This is an important question 
for legal theorists to consider, especially if we accept that out conceptual theories are 
supposed to capture our practices with at least some degree of accuracy.93 
  
The term Ôconceptual analysisÕ doesnÕt refer to a single approach, but rather refers to a 
range of possible methodologies.  Therefore any evaluation of the role of conceptual 
analysis in law must start with this recognition and identification of the wide variety of 
these possible analyses.  At least two principal forms of conceptual analysis can be 
identified in philosophy of law, one ÔdescribesÕ what concepts are like and the other 
ÔprescribesÕ how they should be understood (it is this latter form of conceptual analysis 
that emphasises of the normative nature of law is chiefly to be found).94  Descriptive 
analysis Ôattempts to mirror or model the external reality of some phenomenaÕ95 and has 
been a prominent form of legal analysis.  It is the style of conceptual analysis 
undertaken by H. L. A. Hart (one of its most notable proponents) who is the subject of 
chapter six.   In the Postscript he characterised his theory of law as, inter alia, 
Ôdescriptive sociologyÕ:  
 
My aim in this book was to provide a theory of what law is which is 
both general and descriptive.  It is general in the sense that it is not 
tied to any particular legal system or legal culture, but seeks to give 
an explanatory and clarifying account of law as a complex social and 
political institution with a rule-governed (and in that sense 
ÔnormativeÕ) aspectÉ.  My account is descriptive in that it is 
morally neutral and has no justificatory aims: it does not seek to 
justify or commend on moral or other grounds the forms and 
structures which appear in my general account of law, though a clear 
understanding of these is, I think, an important preliminary to any 
useful moral criticism of law.96 
 
HartÕs choice of conceptual analysis has received considerable attention, with many 
commentators questioning whether his inclusive legal positivism (or soft positivism) 
can be both descriptive and morally neutral and this is in turn indicative of the criticism 
																																																								
93 I return to WittgensteinÕs work and the influence of his ideas on rule-following in the final section of 
this chapter. 
94 Aaron J. Rappaport, ÔOn the Conceptual Confusions of JurisprudenceÕ (2014) 7 Washington 
University Jurisprudence Review 77, 79.  Aaron Rappaport identifies four primary kinds of conceptual 
analysis used within legal theory - intuitive, empirical, categorical and contingent Ð and these can be 
distinguished based on their theoretical goals. 
95 ibid at 82 
96 H. L. A. Hart, ÔThe PostscriptÕ in The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 1994), 
239-240 
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that descriptive theories of law have received.97  As Jules Coleman, another prominent 
legal positivist, notes Ôthere is no issue more prominent in the recent literature than the 
dispute between the proponents of normative and descriptive jurisprudence..Õ98  This 
dispute between normative and descriptive jurisprudence is part of a wider challenge 
towards the appropriateness of conceptual analysis within law and philosophy.  Brian 
Bix cautions that we need to re-evaluate the role of conceptual analysis in philosophy of 
law: Ôto determine whether conceptual analysis is appropriate for legal philosophy (or 
for any area of philosophy); whether, even if appropriate, it is sufficient (or needs 
supplementation by moral evaluation); and whether, even if appropriate and sufficient, 
its objectives and achievements are substantial.Õ99 It is not the primary aim of my thesis 
to defend conceptual analysis in law (or philosophy), but by demonstrating the 
usefulness of thick and thin in legal conceptual analysis this thesis offers renewed 
interest in conceptual analysis (as it has done within philosophy) as an appropriate 
enterprise for philosophy of law. 
 
This section has shown the fundamental importance of concepts and conceptual 
analysis to both philosophy and philosophy of law, the ground being covered to 
demonstrate the significance of my thesis for both disciplines.  This thesis follows in 
the footsteps of Bernard Williams who suggested that traditional jurisprudence could 
be used by philosophers to consider whether it is philosophy that could learn 









97 I return to HartÕs theory and his critics in my legal theory chapter (six) where I use HartÕs work as a 
focal point for my discussion of the usefulness of thick and thin concepts in illuminating the nature of 
law (and therefore legal theory). 
98 Jules Coleman, ÔMethodologyÕ in J. Coleman, S. Shapiro and K.E. Himma (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press, 2002), 312 
99 ibid at 5   
The caution Bix shows here contrasts with his earlier work which recognised the importance of 
conceptual inquiries in maintaining a structure for meaningful discussion to take place within.   
see note 89 at 469 
100 Bernard Williams, ÔAfterword What Has Philosophy to Learn from Tort Law?Õ in David G. Owen 
(ed), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford University Press, 1995) 
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4 - Distinguishing between different kinds of concept. 
 
Within both philosophy and philosophy of law conceptual analysis has led to the 
distinction between different kinds of concepts. 101   One of the most basic and 
fundamental distinctions is between ÔgeneralÕ concepts and ÔspecificÕ concepts.102  The 
more specific a concept the smaller its extension and the longer its list of necessary and 
sufficient features.103  As with any distinction defining and constructing the distinction 
often leads to disagreement (such as the problems discussed earlier relating to 
conceptual analysis and definitions). For example even if the nature of ÔgeneralÕ and 
ÔspecificÕ as distinguishing categories can be agreed upon there may be disagreement 
regarding which category certain terms fall under (disagreements of classification). 
 
Centralism and Non-Centralism. 
 
In the late 1980Õs a significant development concerning conceptual analysis lay in 
Susan HurleyÕs introduction of the terms ÔcentralismÕ and Ônon-centralismÕ.104 Hurley 
defines centralist accounts as those which take the general concepts in some category 
to be conceptually prior to and independent of the specific concepts: ÔThe general 
concepts, such as right and ought, are taken to be conceptually prior to and 
independent of the specific concepts, such as just and unkind.Õ105 Non-centralism 
rejects the conceptual priority attributed to general concepts: ÔInstead it may take the 
identification of discrete specific values such as justice and kindness as a starting point, 
subject to revision, and give an account of the relationships of interdependence 
																																																								
101 ÔKindsÕ refers to the identification and distinction of concepts based on their conceptual content, and 
categorizing or grouping contents with similar ÔkindsÕ of content together.  Heidi Feldman (see chapter 
seven) uses the phrase Ôevaluative taxonomyÕ to refer to the same process (grouping concepts together 
that share similar evaluative content). 
102 These terms are used with their standard dictionary definition they are not technical philosophical 
terms.  The distinction between thick concepts and thin concepts is just one possible way of 
distinguishing between concepts. For example both philosophy and law distinguish between technical 
and non-technical terms.  See Gilbert Ryle for an ordinary language philosophy discussion of this 
distinction.  Gilbert Ryle, ÔOrdinary LanguageÕ in Collected Essays 1929-1968 (Routledge, 2009) 
103 This is the fundamental premise of Gilbert RyleÕs distinction between thick and thin description, I 
address this in the final chapter of my thesis in relation to legal education and caselaw. 
104 Susan Hurley is another theorist who was influenced by Wittgenstein on concepts and her work is 
another prime example of the overlap between meta-ethics and legal theory.   
105 Susan Hurley, ÔObjectivityÕ in Natural Reasons Personality and Polity (Oxford University Press, 
1992), 11.  The orthodox account of the distinction between thick and thin starts with this same idea that 
there are some concepts that are more specific and some that are more general. 
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between the general concepts and specific reason-giving concepts.Õ106  Distinguishing 
between concepts then raises the question: which concept is prior?107 
 
Centralism and non-centralism applies to concepts in general - they are not specific to 
ethics or law108 - although they have been utilised within these two fields.109  When 
applied to ethics and law the reason-giving (normative) content of such concepts 
becomes of central importance:  
 
 On a centralist view of reason-giving concepts, 
disagreement is located in some general evaluative concept that is 
prior to and independent of specific reason-giving concepts.  But 
on the non-centralist view that the general evaluative concepts are 
not prior to the specific and that claims about what ought to be 
done, all things considered, are claims about the relationships 
among specific values, if one creature does not possess the specific 
reason-giving concepts of another, then the minimal element of 
conceptual congruence that is a prerequisite of substantive 
disagreement between them may fail to obtain.  Non-centralism 
claims that there are conceptual connections between claims about 
what ought to be done, all things considered, and a list of certain 
familiar specific values; the sense of ought that is a function of the 
specific values on the list can be used to challenge and revise views 
about the relationships among these values, but it cannot be used to 
endorse an entirely unfamiliar list.  Thus non-centralism threatens 
to deprive us of a sense in which to disagree about things we seem 
to want to disagree about.110 
 
Conceptual disagreement is a common theme in conceptual analysis (not just within 
centralism/non-centralism);111 and is not limited to discussions of conceptual priority, 
																																																								
106 ibid   
107 Conceptual priority arises within any account that distinguishes between kinds of concepts.  I return 
to conceptual priority later in this chapter and in relation to thick and thin concepts in the next two 
chapters.  Conceptual priority also arises in discussions of legal concepts although this is not addressed 
in my thesis. 
108 Hurley cites centralism about colours and logical centralism as examples. 
109 Meta-ethical theories such as Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism (I explain these in the next section 
of this chapter) can be classified as centralist or non-centralist.  Ethical Naturalists in the late 20th and 
early 21st centuries used non-centralism to attack thick moral concepts and challenge the fact-value 
distinction.  
110 Susan Hurley, ÔDisagreementÕ in Natural Reasons Personality and Polity (Oxford University Press, 
1992), 30.  Hurley refers to Bernard WilliamsÕ discussion of the Ôlocus of disagreementÕ and I discuss 
WilliamsÕ ideas on disagreement in chapter four of my thesis.  This is another example of the already 
existing connections between the legal and meta-ethical literature. 
111 With theorists such as Colin McGinn challenging the idea that people disagree about concepts.  He 
argued it didnÕt make sense to talk in this way because they could only be characterized as talking about 
different concepts.  Colin McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1984), 146-147 
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it is of particular relevance to legal theory. 112   One famous example is the 
jurisprudential debate between H. L. A Hart113 and Lon Fuller114 who offered opposing 
analyses of law with different underlying purposes.  The purpose of HartÕs analysis 
was the maximisation of clarity in legal discussion both in general and specifically 
regarding the moral evaluation of legal rules.  Fuller offered a moral test for 
application of the term ÔlawÕ that was based partly on usage and partly on a view of 
law as a form of social ordering that could be contrasted with other forms of social 
ordering.  The incompatibility therefore derives from their differing underlying 
purposes and their conception of what constitutes a legal system (and therefore LAW).  
Brian Bix argues that legal conceptual theories and their claims can only be evaluated 
in light of their underlying purposes115 but that many conceptual theories of law and 
conceptual claims fail to articulate their purposes, which often results in legal 
disagreement.  The subject of legal disagreement arises again in chapter seven (in the 
context of DworkinÕs use of thick and thin concepts), so the present discussion turns 
instead to a conception of legal centralism. 
 
The application of centralism to general jurisprudence would seem to hold the general 
concept of law as prior to and independent of specific legal concepts and associated 
principles, as determined by specific legal practices; e.g. tort and contract.  A centralist 
account of specific legal concepts (e.g. contract) would present its status as providing 
reasons for a legal decision in some way in terms of a general concept of law that is 
prior to specific legal concepts, principles and practices, perhaps in the manner of 
HartÕs rule of recognition, in terms of endorsement of rules. 
 
The opponent to legal centralism (i.e. non-centralism) would appear to require that you 
need to understand at least some of the specific legal concepts and practices to 
understand the general concept of law.  In addition, recognition of certain substantive 
																																																								
112 Conceptual disagreement is addressed throughout my thesis in relation to both meta-ethical concepts 
and legal concepts.  Bix opines: ÔLegal theory would be more clearly (and more deeply) understood if its 
issues and the writings of its theorists were approached through a focus on questions rather than 
answers.  Once one sees that different theorists are answering different questions and responding to 
different concerns, one can see how these theorists are often describing disparate aspects of the same 
phenomenon, rather than disagreeing about certain simple claims about law.Õ  Brian Bix, ÔOverview, 
Purpose and MethodologyÕ in Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (Sweet & Maxwell, 6th edition, 2012), 
3 
113 H. L. A Hart, ÔPositivism and the Separation of Law and MoralsÕ (1958) 71 (4) Harvard Law Review 
593 
114 Lon. L. Fuller, ÔPositivism and Fidelity to Law Ð A Reply to Professor HartÕ (1958) 71 (4) Harvard 
Law Review 630 
115 see note 83 at 25 
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principles as binding on courts is direct; it doesnÕt depend on recognition of some 
central reason-giving status, such as endorsement by the rule of recognition.  A legal 
judgement that is backed by a rule of recognition may also be accountable to specific 
legal practices that havenÕt been validated by the master rule.116  HurleyÕs discussion of 
centralism and non-centralism is an important precursor to the application of the 
distinction between thick and thin concepts.  It was accompanied by a discussion of 




Both meta-ethics and law have adopted the distinction between uncontestable concepts 
and contestable concepts (in which there are varying levels of contestability).117  
Conceivably, contestable concepts - those that wouldnÕt normally admit of alternative 
conceptions or substantive disagreement Ð are contrasted with essentially contestable 
concepts - whose meaning is always open to substantive disagreement or alternative 
conceptions.  It is by reference to practices (such as legal practices) that we identify 
circumstances where contest is conceivable and locate such contested applications 
(such as the application of a particular legal rule (CONCEPT) in a legal case) on our 
spectrum from conceptual to substantive difference in order to identify the kind of 
disagreement present (e.g. conceptual or substantive disagreement).  Often in law 
though the problem is that the scope of the category (such as LAW, or RIGHTS) is as 
contested as the meaning of the items that fit within that particular category (such as 
RAPE within the wider category of LAW). 
 
The idea of an essentially contested concept was coined in print by W.B. Gallie.118  
The term refers to the idea that there are some concepts whose meaning is always 
contested, yet these contested concepts and disagreements are intelligible nontheless.  
																																																								
116 The above points are familiar to Ronald DworkinÕs discussion of HartÕs legal positivism in relation to 
Ôhard casesÕ. According to Hart the validity of specific rules of law stems from their validation by the 
rule of recognition, which is accepted but not valid.  Dworkin disagrees.  I elaborate on this in chapter 
six.  HurleyÕs work is relevant to my thesis because of its relation to both Hart and Williams, and 
because all accounts of thick and thin concepts utilise her distinction between ÔspecificÕ concepts and 
ÔgeneralÕ concepts in some way. 
117 WittgensteinÕs influence on both the meta-ethical and legal discussions of conceptual disagreement 
can be seen in relation to the idea of conceptual contestability.  WittgensteinÕs thoughts on cultures 
different to our own involve scenarios of uncontestable or conceivably contestable concept application. 
118 W. B. Gallie ÔEssentially Contested ConceptsÕ (1956) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 167.  
Gallie also considered the application of this idea to aesthetics, see: W. B. Gallie, ÔArt as an Essentially 
Contested ConceptÕ (1956) 6 (23) The Philosophical Quarterly 97.  It has been used by many of the 
theorists I cite, such as Hurley: see note 110 at 46-7 
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Gallie is keen to show that the disagreements surrounding these concepts are rational.  
The idea of an essentially contested concept (ECC) is popularly cited in academic 
disciplines outside philosophy, such as the social sciences.  It seems to be able to 
Ôexplain, rather than explain away, complex substantive disagreements while not 
demanding controversial ontological commitmentsÕ oppines Bix. 119   Many legal 
concepts have been cited as ECCÕs e.g. RAPE,120 THE RULE OF LAW,121 and THEFT.122 
 
The kinds of disputes and disagreements Gallie is interested in are those where two 
disputants are arguing over the meaning of a concept.  For example disputant A argues 
that a particular example is an example of concept X, whereas disputant B disagrees.  
This dispute cannot be settled by recourse to strict logic, empirical evidence or 
language analysis.  He uses the example of two people debating whether a picture is a 
work of art, as in this case there is Ôan evident disagreement as to Ð and the consequent 
need for philosophical elucidation of Ð the proper general use of the term Òwork of 
artÓ.Õ123  Gallie identifies seven necessary conditions for a concept being essentially 
contested: 
 
1)  In order for a concept to be essentially contested it Ômust be appraisive in the sense 
that it signifies or accredits some kind of valued achievement.Õ124  
 
2)  ÔThis achievement must be of an internally complex character, for all that its worth 
is attributed to it as a whole.Õ125   
																																																								
119 See note 89 at 469; see also Jeremy Waldron, ÔVagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical 
IssuesÕ (1994) 82 California Law Review 509, 526 
Andrew Haplin offers an alternative analysis of ECCÕs arguing that what ECCÕs capture is value 
pluralism (this can be moral or aesthetic), but rather than being the product of conceptual analysis this 
value pluralism exerts an external influence over the use of the concept; Ôwhat is contested is not strictly 
what the concept should be but what value should be selected to fill out an element found within the 
concept.Õ Andrew Haplin, ÔConcepts, Terms and Fields of EnquiryÕ (1998) 4 Legal Theory 187, 203 
120 Eric Reitan ÔRape as an Essentially Contested ConceptÕ (2001) 16 (2) Hypatia 43 
121 Jeremy, Waldron ÔIs the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in florida)?Õ (2002) 21 (2) 
Law and Philosophy 137 
122 This can also be a problem for legislators Haplin uses the example of the Theft Act: Ôit is arguable 
that the Criminal Law Revision Committee in making proposals for the definition of theft enacted in the 
Theft Act 1968 made exactly the mistake of assuming a uniform standard of dishonesty in society where 
in fact a plurality existed, and so unwittingly provided a contestable concept of dishonesty in the 
definition of theft.Õ  See note 119 Haplin at 204.  See: A. Halpin, ÔThe Test for DishonestyÕ (1996) 
Criminal Law Review 283 
123 W. B. Gallie ÔEssentially Contested ConceptsÕ (1956) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 167   
124 ibid at 171   
Gallie only has positive connotations of appraisiveness in mind, but it could just as easily apply to 
concepts that indicated something deemed a failure or un-worthwhile, so this correction needs to be 
considered. 
125 ibid at 171-172   
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3) Ô[a]ny explanation of its worth must therefore include reference to the respective 
contributions of its various parts or features;É.Õ  Different interpretations can privilege 
different parts, Ôthe accredited achievement is initially variously describable,Õ but any 
explanation or analysis of the ECC would have to pay attention to all these parts 
(although different rival interpretations might privilege different parts within the 
whole).126  
 
4)  ÔThe accredited achievement must be of a kind that admits of considerable 
modification in the light of changing circumstance; and such modification cannot be 
prescribed in advance.  For convenience I shall call the concepts of any such 
achievement ÒopenÓ in character.Õ127  Gallie refers to this idea again when he indicates 
the achievement an ECC accredits has a Ôpersistently vague characterÕ.128  
 
5)  The disagreeing parties both contend that their view regarding the concept is 
correct, but Ôeach party recognizes the fact that its own use of it is contested by those 
of other parties, and that each party must have some appreciation of the different 
criteria in the light of which other parties claim to be applying the concept in 
question.Õ129  
 
6)  ÔThe derivation of [an ECC] from an original exemplar whose authority is 
acknowledged by all contestant users of the concept.Õ130   This allows Gallie to 
highlight a feature of disagreement (later emphasised by Dworkin) Ð that they are in 
genuine disagreement about the concept because they agree on paradigm cases, hence 
the disagreement cannot be put down to talking past each other or multiple concepts.131  
																																																																																																																																																																
By this Gallie means that the attribution of the ECC in question is really a function of different things 
which are part of that thing as a whole. 
126 ibid at 172 
With regards to criteria two and three these seem to be very inclusive, according to these criteria non-
atomistic concepts could qualify as complex, and this challenges the work that the label ECC can do.   
127 ibid  
128 ibid at 173   
ItÕs a social construct not just a function of stipulation.  This is open to modification because of the 
context so it has to have a persistently vague character, so as to decide whether to ascribe the concept 
due to changing circumstances. 
129 ibid at 172   
It is unclear why such concepts would be essentially contested, rather than contested concepts. 
130 ibid at 180 
131 It is interesting how he moves between the phenomena and the philosophy of language, in criteria six 
he identifies that it is meaningful disagreement about the same phenomena that he is interested in, 
because they agree on paradigmatic cases.  This leads me to question whether Gallie is really interested 
in which concepts are ECCÕs or disagreement.   
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7)  Ôthe probability or plausibilityÉof the claim that the continuous competition for 
acknowledgement as between the contestant users of the concept, enables the original 
examplarÕs achievement to be sustained and/or developed in optimum fashion.Õ.132   
 
ECCÕs have received considerable attention across many disciplines,133 and Gaillie 
after his initial discussion of ECCÕs considered their application to art.134 The RULE 
OF LAW is an example of a legal concept that has received attention by legal scholars 
addressing the topic of ECCÕs in law.135  There is a wealth of literature on ECCÕs that 
analyses the usefulness of the distinction and whether it holds up in practice.  It is not 
the details of this literature that are useful (to my thesis) but the context of the idea 
ÔECCÕ in relation to thick and thin concepts and its prominent recognition by both 
meta-ethicists and legal theorists that is useful.  Consideration of ECCÕs as a 
supplement to the literature on thick and thin concepts provides an early indication of 
the potential usefulness of thick and thin for law: for example, both ECCÕs and 
thick/thin concepts could feature usefully in legal discussions of conceptual 
disagreement and conceptual agreement, both of which are key to understanding and 
explaining legal reasoning. 
 
																																																								
132 ibid at 180   
There needs to be a continuous acknowledgement that the ECC relates to the paradigmatic case and 
condition six and seven are important because they rule out certain kinds of disagreements, such as those 
where the two disputants are talking past each other and highlight the specific kinds of disagreement 
Gallie is interested in.  Those where there is a dispute, Ôwhere the common word stands for the same 
concept, but where there is a dispute as to exactly what the concept stands for and which examples fall 
under it.  This dispute cannot be resolved with patient analysis if what one is after is either some victor 
or some realisation that there is no dispute at all.  No one side will emerge as having the definitive 
definition of the concept at issue.Õ  ibid 
Conditions six and seven also put restraints on the current usage of the concept.  Condition seven 
provides a link to current use by ensuring that the concept users still care about the concepts exemplar 
and conceive of themselves as following the exemplars tradition, whereas condition six provides a link 
to previous use and derivation. 
133 C. McKnight, ÔMedicine as an Essentially Contested ConceptÕ (2003) 6 (23) Philosophical Quarterly, 
97; S. A. Merrill, Ô?person? as Essentially Contested Concept in the Commonwealth of DiscourseÕ 
(1992) 23 (4) Metaphilosophy 363; Adaeze Okoye, ÔTheorising Corporate social Responsibility as an 
Essentially Contested Concept: Is a Definition Necessary?Õ (2009) 89 (4) Journal of Business ethics 613; 
Andrew Mason, ÔOn Explaining Political Disagreement: ÔThe notion of an Essentially Contested 
ConceptÕÕ (1990) 33 (1) Inquiry 81 
134 W. B. Gallie, ÔArt as an Essentially Contested ConceptÕ (1956) 6 (23) The Philosophical Quarterly 
97 
135 For example see: David Collier, Fernando Daniel Hidalgo and Andra Olivia Maciuceanu, ÔEssentially 
Contested concepts: debates and applicationsÕ (2006) 11 (3) Journal of Political Ideologies 211; and 
Kenneth M. Ehrenberg, ÔLaw is not (best considered) an essentially contested conceptÕ (2011) 7 (2) 
International Journal of Law in Context 209   
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GallieÕs ECCÕs highlight one area where thick and thin concept theorists and legal 
theorists have already begun to work together.136 Simon Kirchin and Stephen Pethick 
challenge the appraisive nature of ECCÕs - they worry that GallieÕs notion of appraisive 
is not given enough discussion or defence, and as such can be interpreted very liberally 
- a liberal membership policy that weakens the significance of labelling a concept an 
ECC.137  Placing constraints on the criterial application of appraisive would restrict 
which concepts would be classed as ECCÕs and therefore preserve its theoretical 
significance, but they worry that this then fails to capture the particular kind of 
disagreements that Gallie was recognising: ÔIn short, when explaining agreement and 
disagreement it just seems better to work with some account of concepts that wears its 
broad application on its sleeve (such as the concept-conception distinction).Õ138 
Traditionally law favoured the concept-conception distinction over the distinction 
between thick and thin concepts.139  A small group of legal theorists have begun to 
challenge the concept-conception distinction,140 and my thesis continues this challenge 
by asserting the usefulness of thick and thin concepts in defending and promoting the 
role of conceptual analysis in legal theory and legal education.  
 
																																																								
136 Thomas Perry suggests that GallieÕs idea of essentially contested concepts could be applied to Ronald 
DworkinÕs discussion of legal discretion (he notes Dworkin never actually refers to essentially contested 
concepts or to Gallie) although he concludes that it is insufficient on itÕs own to defend DworkinÕs Ôright 
answer thesisÕ.  See: Thomas D. Perry, ÔContested Concepts and Hard CasesÕ (1977) 88 (1) Ethics 20. 
137 Simon Kirchin and Steve Pethick, ÔThe Appraisive Nature of Essentially Contested ConceptsÕ 
currently under revision. 
138 ibid at 4  
In contrast to their concerns, Debbie Roberts argues that Ôa concept being evaluative is sufficient for it 
being essentially contestable, though it may not be necessary, there may be non-evaluative concepts that 
are essentially contestable.Õ  Debbie Roberts, ÔItÕs Evaluation only ThickerÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick 
Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013), 89 
139 Dworkin in particular favoured the concept-conception distinction in his earlier work see: Ronald 
Dworkin, LawÕs Empire (Harvard University Press, 1986) and Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 
(Duckworth, new impression with a Reply to Critics, 2005); but in his more recent work he has 
acknowledged the use of the distinction between thick and thin concepts to capture a similar phenomena, 
see: Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press, 2011) 
140 David Enoch and Kevin Toh, ÔLegal as a Thick ConceptÕ in Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa (eds), 
Philosophical Foundations of The Nature of Law (Oxford University Press, 2013); Heidi Li Feldman, 
ÔAppellate Adjudication as Conceptual EngineeringÕ in Graham Hubbs &Douglas Lind (eds), 
Pragmatism, Law and Language (Routledge, 2014); Heidi Li Feldman, ÔThe Distinctiveness of 
Appellate AdjudicationÕ (2012) 5 Washington University Jurisprudence Review 61; Heidi Li Feldman, 
ÔBlending Fields: Tort Law, Philosophy and Legal TheoryÕ (1998) 49 South Carolina Law Review 167; 
Heidi Li Feldman, ÔObjectivity in Legal JudgmentÕ (1994) 92 (5) Michigan Law Review 1187; J. E. 
Penner, ÔLegal reasoning and the authority of lawÕ in Lukas H. Meyer, Stanley L. Paulson and Thomas 
W. Pogge (eds), Rights, Culture, and the Law: Themes from the Legal and Political Philosophy of 
Joseph Raz (Oxford University Press, 2003); J. E. Penner, Ô Common Law Cognition and Judicial 
AppointmentÕ (2001) 38 Alberta Law Review 683; John Finnis, Reason in Action: collected essays 
volume I (Cambridge University Press, 2011); Joseph Raz, Engaging Reason (Oxford University Press, 
1999); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Harvard University Press, 1992); Lawrence B. 
Solum & Linghao Wang, ÔConfucian Virtue JurisprudenceÕ in Amalia Amaya & Ho Hock Lai (eds), 




So far this chapter has established that there are already existing connections between 
law and philosophy - many of the core concerns and philosophical issues associated 
with concepts and conceptual analysis are shared by both law and philosophy - these 
same core concerns and philosophical issues have also gained the attention of early 
meta-ethicists and later thick and thin concept theorists (some of the terminology has 
changed but the fundamental substantive ideas remain the same).141  
 
 
5 - Meta-ethical analysis prior to thick and thin.  
 
Occupation with thick and thin ethical concepts presently amounts to only a very small 
part of meta-ethical enquiry, and to understand these two terms it is important to first 
understand that they are part of a wider meta-ethical discussion of ethical concepts that 
was originally captured by the terms ÔcognitivismÕ and Ônon-cognitivismÕ which in turn 
preceded the terms Ôthick meta-ethical conceptÕ and Ôthin meta-ethical conceptÕ (it was 
these ideas that thick and thin theorists were developing and redefining).  Many of the 
theorists and core concerns cited below are heavily referred to by the thick and thin 
concept theorists discussed in the next chapter and by Williams in chapter 4, but 
interestingly not by the wider literature on thick and thin concepts that addresses non-
ethical concepts.142  This presages one of the criticisms that I make of the legal 
literature on thick and thin identified in chapter five of my thesis Ð as legal theorists 
seem to treat WilliamsÕ work on thick concepts as the starting point of thick concepts, 
with the meta-ethical literature prior to WilliamsÕ ELP is rarely cited.  However, as we 
shall see, this isolates WilliamsÕ work and removes important contextual information 
and background knowledge from consideration in the legal scholarship.  My argument 
in the later chapter will show that many of the mistakes made by the legal theorists 
regarding Williams could be avoided through better understanding of the literature that 
preceeded the coinage in print of the terms ÔthickÕ concept and ÔthinÕ concept.  The 
																																																								
141 I am referring to those meta-ethicists writing before the coinage of the terms ÔthickÕ and ÔthinÕ ethical 
concept such as John McDowell, R. M. Hare, Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn, although due to the 
infancy of meta-ethics many of these theorists later wrote on thick and thin ethical concepts.  The rest of 
this chapter demonstrates that much of early meta-ethics discussed ideas that are now captured by the 
language of thickness and thinness. 
142 Those theorists who were first writing about thick and thin concepts such as Bernard Williams, John 
McDowell, Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard were all originally writing about cognitivism and non-
cognitivism prior to the coinage in print of thick concepts. 
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remainder of this chapter and the next outlines the relevant literature but should not be 
construed as a chronology of the terms thick and thin, despite their subject matter being 
the meta-ethical literature before and after the introduction of the specific terms 
themselves.  
 
At the beginning of this chapter attention was drawn to 20th century analytic 
philosophyÕs turn towards language and meta-ethicists were no exception to this 
because they wanted to better elucidate the nature of ethical concepts and ethical 
propositions.  Meta-ethics (the metaphysics of ethics) asks questions about the 
metaphysical nature of our ethical concepts and to answer these questions often looks 
to the language employed.  From this period there were and remain two principal 
approaches to ethical propositions and these can be characterised as cognitivist and 
non-cognitivist.143  Cognitivists claim that ethical propositions are expressions about 
the way the world is or ought to be and they are therefore capable of truth or falsity 
(truth-aptness).  It is important to note that although cognitivists believe that ethical 
propositions are capable of being truth-apt this does not commit cognitivists to 
believing that they can happen to be or are always true.144  It is perfectly consistent 
with cognitivism to hold that a (all) moral proposition(s) are false.145  
 
Non-cognitivism denies the propositional nature of moral claims and therefore their 
ability to be truth-apt; that is, despite appearing to be ÔaboutÕ statements (propositions) 
they are actually expressions of emotions or belief states.  According to the non-
cognitivist, despite appearances there is no ethical object for cognition (there is no 
cognitive object being described) as what is being described is really an emotion or 
																																																								
143 There are many ways to be cognitivist or non-cognitivist so within the meta-ethical literature there 
are many ethical positions, for example expressivism and non-projectivism are forms of non-cognitivism 
and sensibility theorists or realists are forms of cognitivism.  This particular area of philosophy is 
complex and distinguishing between the different forms of cognitvism and non-cognitivism requires a 
considerable amount of wider reading that is unnecessary and counter productive to my thesis.  The 
discussion is constrained to the key texts and ideas that are necessary to demonstrate the core concerns 
that are useful to understanding thick and thin concepts.  For introductory texts on these ideas within 
meta-ethics see: Alexander Miller, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics (Cambridge Polity 
Press, 2003); Andrew Fisher, Metaethics an Introduction (Acumen, 2011); and Simon Kirchin, 
Metaethics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 
144 Cognitivism is a label for meta-ethical theories that hold to these two claims in some way; it doesnÕt 
dictate how to adhere to or accommodate these claims, that is left to a more precise version of 
cognitivism to decide.   
145
 Error theory is a cognitivist form of moral nihilism and accepts the propositional nature of ethical 
statements but at the same time maintains that all ethical propositions are false (incapable of being truth-
apt) therefore we are generally in error when we make a moral statement (if we assert its truth-aptness). 
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belief state Ð such as approval or disapproval towards something Ð and expressions 
such as these are not capable of truth-aptness (being true or false).146 
 
John McDowellÕs and Simon BlackburnÕs papers are some of the most well known in 
the classic debate between non-cognitivists and cognitivists.147  The debate between 
McDowell and Blackburn (and therefore between non-cognitivism and cognitivism) 
regarding the nature of ethical language was an extension of philosophyÕs interest in 
language.148  McDowell and BlackburnÕs debate takes place in the context of rule-
following considerations found within WittgensteinÕs later work, 149  and applies 
WittgensteinÕs work on propositions to moral language.   In light of this it is to 
WittgensteinÕs work that exposition must now turn. 
 
Wittgenstein and Ordinary Language Philosophy. 
 
WittgensteinÕs later work (post-Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) saw philosophy as an 
activity in language Ð a practical activity in clearing up confusions that arise through 
misunderstanding language Ð as opposed to theory construction. 150   Rather than 
																																																								
146 The labels cognitivism and non-cognitivism raise questions as to what is meant by characterising 
something as a ÔbeliefÕ state or a Ônon-beliefÕ state.  This is not addressed in this study, as it is not of 
direct relevance to thick and thin concepts. 
147 John McDowell, ÔNon-Cognitivism and Rule-followingÕ in Andrew Fisher and Simon Kirchin (eds), 
Arguing about Metaethics (Routledge, 2006); Simon Blackburn, ÔReply: Rule-Following and Moral 
RealismÕ in Andrew Fisher and Simon Kirchin (eds), Arguing about Metaethics (Routledge, 2006); John 
McDowell, ÔProjection and Truth in EthicsÕ in Andrew Fisher and Simon Kirchin (eds), Arguing about 
Metaethics (Routledge, 2006) 
For wider reading see: Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions (Clarendon Press, 2000); Jonathon Dancy, 
Moral Reason (Blackwell, 1993); Allan Gibbard, Wise Choice, Apt Feelings (Clarendon Press, 1992); 
David McNaughton, Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics (Blackwell, 1988); Peter Railton, ÔWhat 
the Non-Cognitivist Helps us See the Naturalist Helps us to ExplainÕ in John Haldane and Crispin 
Wright (eds), Reality, Representation and Projection (Oxford University Press, 1993), 279-300; Peter 
Railton, ÔReply to David WigginsÕ in John Haldane and Crispin wright (eds), Reality, Representation 
and Projection (Oxford University Press, 1993), 315-28; David Wiggins, ÔCognitivism, Naturalism and 
NormativityÕ in John Haldane and Crispin wright (eds), Reality, Representation and Projection (Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 329-38; David Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth (Oxford University Press, 3rd 
edition, 1998) 
148 Cognitivists and non-cognitivists were leading the discussion regarding ethical propositions but in 
other areas of philosophy and in philosophy of law similar conversations were taking place regarding the 
nature of non-ethical propositions. 
149 Most notably his Philosophical Investigations: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 
(Blackwell, 3rd edition, G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.), 1953-1958)   
See also: Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Harvard University Press, 1984); 
Gerald Lang, ÔThe Rule-Following Considerations and Metaethics: ÔSome False MovesÕÕ (2001) 9 (2) 
European Journal of Philosophy 190; Alexander Miller and Crispin Wright (eds), Rule-Following and 
Meaning (Acumen, 2002) 
150 My discussion here is limited to a brief outline of the ideas that the cognitivists and non-cognitivists 
were responding to.  For a more detailed analysis of Wittgenstein on language see: James Boogen, 
WittgensteinÕs Philosophy of Language: Some Aspects of Its Development (Routledge, 2014); David 
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engaging with the polemics of specific theories and their opponents his method was to 
trace the source of such polemics through the confusions in the language employed by 
those theorists.  As Ray Monk puts it in his well-known biography of the philosopher, 
 
Philosophers, Wittgenstein believed, had been misled into thinking 
that their subject was a kind of science, a search for theoretical 
explanations of the things that puzzled them: the nature of meaning, 
truth, mind, time, justice, and so on.  But philosophical problems are 
not amenable to this kind of treatment, he claimed.  What is required 
is not a correct doctrine but a clear view, one that dispels the 
confusion that gives rise to the problem.  Many of these problems 
arise through an inflexible view of language that insists that if a 
word has a meaning there must be some kind of object 
corresponding to itÉ  Another closely related source of 
philosophical confusion, according to Wittgenstein, is the tendency 
to mistake grammatical rules, or rules about what it does and does 
not make sense to say, for material propositions, or propositions 
about matters of fact or existence.151 
 
WittgensteinÕs view changed from a conception of meaning as representation to one 
that looks to use in determining meaning.  He urged philosophers when investigating 
Ômeaning as useÕ that they must Ôlook and seeÕ the wide variety of uses that are made of 
a particular word.152  He urges philosophers ÔDonÕt think, but lookÕ153 and further to this 
enjoins that they donÕt look to the general, but look at particular cases of use.  
Wittgenstein concluded that Ôfar from being a truth-functional calculus, language has no 
universally correct structure Ð that is, there is no such thing as an ideal language.  
Instead, each language-system  - be it a full-fledged language, a dialect, or a specialized 
technical language used by some body of experts Ð is like a game that functions 
according to its own rules.Õ154  These rules cannot be stated - unlike the rules of 
grammar (which are descriptions of rules already existing in the practices of the 
linguistic community) Ð but are instead shown in the language practices of a particular 
community.   
 
																																																																																																																																																																
Blair, Wittgenstein, Language and Information: ÒBack to the Rough Ground!Ó: back to the Rough 
Ground! (Information Science and Knowledge Management) (Springer, 2006); T. Binkley, 
WittgensteinÕs Language (Martinus Nijhoff, 1973); Dale Jacquette, WittgensteinÕs Thought in Transition 
(Purdue University Press, 1998) 
151 Ray, Monk ÔLudwig WittgensteinÕ (Britannica Encyclopedia, last updated 1st September 2015) 
<http://www.britannica.com/biography/Ludwig-Wittgenstein> accessed 2nd November 2014 
152 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell, 3rd edition, G. E. M. Anscombe 
(trans.), 1953-1958), 11 
153 ibid at 66 
154 Aaron Preston, ÔAnalytic PhilosophyÕ (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) 




The ÒrulesÓ of grammar are not mere technical instructions from on-
high for correct usage; rather, they express the norms for meaningful 
language.  Contrary to empirical statements, rules of grammar 
describe how we use words in order to both justify and criticize our 
particular utterances.  But as opposed to grammar-book rules, they 
are not idealized as an external system to be conformed to.  
Moreover, they are not appealed to explicitly in any formulation, but 
are used in cases of philosophical perplexity to clarify where 
language misleads us into false illusions.155 
  
For the later Wittgenstein language is an intrinsically social phenomenon that cannot be 
studied in the abstract and grammar is situated within this activity.156  ÔLanguage 
systems, or language games, are unanalyzable wholes whose parts (utterances 
sanctioned by the rules of language) have meaning in virtue of having a role to play Ð a 
use Ð within the total form of life of a linguistic community.Õ157  The Ôforms of lifeÕ are 
what enable language to function and this idea has led to competing readings of 
Wittgenstein; on the one hand language games are contingent and change depending on 
culture, context and history, and so on; and on the other hand they represent a Ôshared 
human behaviourÕ that is common to humankind, allowing us, inter alia, to compare 
unknown languages. 
 
Throughout Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein returns to the concept of 
Ôlanguage-gamesÕ to explicate his thoughts on language.  ÔLanguage-gamesÕ point to 
the rule-governed character of language Ð there are not strict and definite rules for each 
individual language-game but there are general rules of convention that dictate the 
nature of this sort of human activity Ð it is in this sense that Ôlanguage-gamesÕ challenge 
definitional accounts of meaning (those that aim to provide final essential definitions of 
																																																								
155 Anat Biletzki ÔLudwig WittgensteinÕ (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first published 8 
November 2002, substantive revision 3 March 2014) < http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/> 
accessed 1 March 2015 
156 WittgensteinÕs thoughts on ordinary philosophy are a departure from his earlier work on ideal 
language philosophy found in the Tractatus Logicus Philosophicus.  His later views were mainly 
conveyed and spread through his teachings whilst lecturing at Cambridge and were posthumously 
collated in his Philosophical Investigations.  My thesis draws on WittgensteinÕs later philosophy. 
157 see note 154 
ÔLanguage gamesÕ is the name of the method of describing and imagining that Wittgenstein used to 
demonstrate his picture of language.  Language games are social activities that use specific forms of 
language and by describing these he could demonstrate the countless ways that language is used in 
human interaction and that Ôthe speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of lifeÕ.  
Traditionally it was thought words referred to objects and a words meaning was this correspondence 
relation.  Wittgenstein saw the meaning of a word as the use that is made of the word in Ôthe stream of 
lifeÕ. 
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the thing in question).158  Thus Wittgenstein rejects the idea that there is an essential 
core of meaning that is common to all uses of a particular word159 and instead advances 
the thesis that Ôa complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossingÕ160 
mark out a wordÕs use.  ÔFamily resemblanceÕ is used as a more suitable analogy for the 
connections between particular uses of words because these capture similarities of kind 
and demonstrate the lack of exact boundaries for the meaning (use) of a particular 
term.161  WittgensteinÕs influence and his importance in analytic philosophy is not the 
only reason for his inclusion here, for his work is of special significance to many of the 
theorists addressed within this dissertation, in particular Bernard Williams and H. L. A. 
Hart. 
 
The influence of ordinary language philosophy (broadly, 1945-1965)162 is evident 
throughout the articles by McDowell and Blackburn.163  They introduced many of the 
key ideas - such as disentangling164 and shapelessness165 Ð that remain central to the 
thick and thin concept literature in their earlier discussions of cognitivism and non-
cognitivism.  This thesis primarily focuses on thick and thin concepts, but cognitivism 
and non-cognitivism have been raised (albeit briefly) because they are important 
philosophical background and precursors to the distinction between thick and thin 
concepts, as we shall see (and sharpen) as my argument and exposition develops 
throughout subsequent chapters.  Indeed, it is easier to understand the literature on thick 
																																																								
158 It is here we can see WittgensteinÕs rejection of the classical account of concepts and conceptual 
analysis (I discuss these later in this chapter) that utilize necessary and sufficient conditions to provide 
criteria for definitions. 
159 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell, 3rd edition, G. E. M. Anscombe 
(trans.), 1953-1958), 65 
160 ibid at 66 
161 For a discussion of family resemblance see: Jeremy Waldron, ÔVagueness in Law and Language: 
Some Philosophical IssuesÕ (1994) 82 California Law Review 509 
162 There is some disagreement regarding the exact dates of the beginning of analytic philosophy and the 
various sub-movements within it, the dates I have used are those cited by the ÔAnalytic PhilosophyÕ 
entry from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  Ordinary Language Philosophy wasnÕt dominant 
until after the second World War (hence 1945-1965) and most of the important publications within this 
field (with the exception of Gilbert Ryle) happened as the linguistic approach was losing popularity 
(from 1949 onwards). 
163 Ordinary language philosophy was developed by the Cambridge philosophers Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and John Wisdom and the Oxford philosophers Gilbert Ryle, John Austin (not to be confused with the 
19th century legal positivist John Austin), Peter Strawson and Paul Grice. 
164 Both Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism, and thick and thin concepts are ways of distinguishing 
concepts.  By doing so they identify more than one kind of conceptual content and this raises the 
question how closely connected are these different kinds of content?  Are they so closely connected that 
they are entangled or are they separate enough that they could be disentangled?  At this stage in my 
thesis I provide only this brief summary of a complex issue, because it is more beneficial to explain this 
idea in the next chapter rather than here.  
165ÔShapelessnessÕ is an extension of the debate on ÔdisentanglingÕ and will also be addressed in the next 
chapter.  If it is possible to separate (disentangle) the conceptual content then this raises a further 
question: is this content intelligible once separated?  
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and thin concepts once it is understood that many of the theorists addressed in this 
thesis were instrumental in the development of both of these ways of looking at 
concepts (cognitivism/non-cognitivism and thick/thin concepts). The following chapter 
therefore primarily deals with thick and thin concepts, but where it is deemed relevant 
references will also be made to the meta-ethical literature on cognitivism and non-
cognitivism because of the close association and overlap between the two advertised 
here.   
 
 
6 Ð Conclusion. 
 
This chapter has canvassed essential philosophical and some legal ground relating to 
concepts and conceptual analysis, which will be crucial in understanding my main 
thesis claim: that the distinction between thick and thin concepts is useful in law.  Thick 
and Thin concepts are a development of the philosophical ideas relating to concepts and 
conceptual analysis covered in this chapter.  Many of the same issues relating to our 
conceptual practices will therefore also arise in the next chapter, where I outline in 
more detail the nature of the distinction between thick and thin concepts.  This chapter 
and the next two are preparatory chapters that equip the reader with the necessary 
understanding of the philosophical (in particular meta-ethical) ideas and literature that 
my thesis draws on through its legal application of thick and thin. 
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Chapter Three: 'Thick' Concepts and 
'ThinÕ Concepts
	 52	
1 Ð Introduction. 
 
This chapter addresses the wealth of literature on thick and thin concepts that can be 
found within meta-ethics.166  Despite the huge amount of disagreement regarding thick 
and thin concepts, all the theorists agree that thick concepts are more specific and thin 
concepts are more general.167 There are a variety of formulations of thick and thin 
concepts, and many of these formulations differ significantly in picking out content in 
relation to thick and thin.  Some of these formulations identify the differing content 
(and the concepts) as depending on a difference of kind, and, others disagree.   
 
One of the reasons why there are so many different accounts of thick and thin concepts 
(even those theorists who use the same terms e.g. ÔevaluativeÕ and ÔdescriptiveÕ when 
																																																								
166 Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn, ÔMorality and Thick Ethical ConceptsÕ (1992) 66 Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society 267; Allan Gibbard, Wise Choice, Apt Feelings (Clarendon Press, 1992); 
Bernard Williams, Ethics and the limits of Philosophy (Routledge Classics, 2011); Christine Tappolet, 
ÔThrough thick and thin: ÔgoodÕ and its determinatesÕ (2004) 58 (2) Dialetica 207; Debbie Roberts, ÔItÕs 
Evaluation only ThickerÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013); 
Edward Harcourt and Alan Thomas, ÔThick Concepts, Analysis, and ReductionismÕ in Simon Kirchin 
(ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013); Eric Wiland, ÔWilliams on Thick Ethical 
Concepts and Reasons for ActionÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford University Press, 
2013); Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (Harvard University 
Press, 2004); John McDowell, ÔCritical Notice of Bernard Williams' Ethics and the Limits of 
PhilosophyÕ (1986) 95 Mind 377; Jonathon Dancy, ÔPractical ConceptsÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick 
Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013); Jonathon Dancy, ÔIn Defense of Thick ConceptsÕ (1995) 20 
(1) Midwest Studies in Philosophy 263; Joseph Raz, Engaging Reason (Oxford University Press, 1999); 
Matti Eklund, ÔEvaluative Language and Evaluative RealityÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts 
(Oxford University Press, 2013); Michael Smith, ÔOn the Nature and Significance of the Distinction 
between Thick and Thin Ethical ConceptsÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford University 
Press, 2013); Nick Zangwill, ÔMoral Metaphor and Thick Concepts: What Moral Philosophy Can Learn 
from AestheticsÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013); Pekka 
Vayrynen, ÔThick Concepts and VariabilityÕ (2011) 11 (1) Philosophers Imprint 1; Pekka Vayrynen, The 
Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty: A Study of Thick Concepts in Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2013); 
Pekka Vayrynen, ÔEssential Contestability and EvaluationÕ (2014) 92 Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 471; Pekka Vayrynen, ÔShapelessness in ContextÕ (2014) 48 Nous 573; Pekka Vayrynen 
ÔThick Concepts and UnderdeterminationÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford University 
Press, 2013); Pekka Vayrynen, ÔThick Concepts: WhereÕs Evaluation?Õ in R. Shafer-Landau Oxford 
Studies in Metaethics volume 7 (Oxford University Press, 2012); Pekka Vayrynen, ÔObjectionable Thick 
Concepts in DenialsÕ (2009) 23 Philosophical Perspectives 439; Philippa Foot, ÔMoral beliefsÕ (1958) 
59 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83; Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices (Oxford University 
Press, 2002); Samuel Scheffler, ÔMorality through Thick and Thin: A Critical Notice of Ethics and the 
Limits of PhilosophyÕ (1987) The Philosophical Review 96; Simon Blackburn, ÔDisentangling 
DisentanglingÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013); Simon Kirchin, 
ÔThick Concepts and Thick DescriptionsÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford University 
Press, 2013); Timothy Chappell, ÔThere Are No Thin ConceptsÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts 
(Oxford University Press, 2013); T. M. Scanlon, ÔThickness and TheoryÕ (2003) 100 (6) The Journal of 
Philosophy 275; Valerie Tiberius, ÔWell-being, Wisdom, and Thick Theorizing: on the Division of labor 
between Moral Philosophy and positive PsychologyÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford 
University Press, 2013) 
167 This study addresses ethical and legal concepts that can be categorized as thick or thin concepts, but 
it is important to note that the distinction between thick and thin concepts can apply to concepts within 
any field.  It is not specific to meta-ethics, but as this is where the distinction was first coined the 
majority of the literature is meta-ethical and the examples used in this chapter will be ethical terms. 
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referring to the conceptual content within these concepts do not all offer the same, 
uniform account) is that at present there is yet to be an account of thick and thin 
concepts that can satisfactorily distinguish the concepts from each other, convincing 
even a majority of meta-ethicists that this is the best account of these concepts.168  
 
This chapter addresses two questions that successfully iterate the key aspects of the 
literature on thick and thin concepts that are most relevant to a legal application of 
thick and thin. 
 
Q 1 What is the nature of the content identified by the distinction 
between thick and thin concepts? 
 
Q 2 Is the distinction between thick and thin concepts based on a 
distinction between two different kinds of concept? 
 
It will not be possible to address all the meta-ethical literature on thick and thin 
concepts, or even all the literature that relates to the above two questions, and therefore 
my discussion is limited to those theorists (and their formulations) that best 
demonstrate the aspects of the literature that are relevant for a legal application of thick 
and thin, and that equip the reader with the necessary knowledge to understand 
WilliamsÕ formulation as his is the theory of thick concepts that will serve as a 
platform for consideration of issues throughout the remainder of this thesis (the 
specific detail of his formulation is discussed in the next chapter).  Therefore the aim 
																																																								
168 Simon Blackburn remains to be convinced that there are thick concepts as meta-ethicists envisage 
them: ÔI do not think there are any thick concepts, as these have been understood.  There may be 
concepts that are encrusted with the thickest of cultural deposits, but I shall urge that this is a different 
matter, and indeed one that subverts the normal notion of thickness.  Furthermore, although there are 
some thick words, they are of no great importance to the theory of ethics.  And in fact, there are many 
fewer thick words than philosophers have been prone to suppose.Õ  Simon Blackburn, ÔThrough Thick 
and ThinÕ in Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn, ÔMorality and Thick Ethical ConceptsÕ (1992) 66 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 285.  His views regarding this are outlined in his debates with 
John Mc Dowell in: Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds), Wittgenstein To Follow a Rule 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), and in: Ted Honderich (ed), Morality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J. 
L. Mackie (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985).  Timothy Chappell challenges the orthodox view of both 
thick and thin concepts.  Regarding thin concepts he argues that Ôthere are no thin concepts or almost 
none.  And those that there are, are like the higher-numbered elements in the periodic table, artefacts of 
theory which do not occur naturally, even once isolated, are unstable under normal conditions; they may 
have some theoretical interest, but we should expect far less of them than many theorists do.Õ  Timothy 
Chappell, ÔThere Are No Thin ConceptsÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 182. Regarding thick concepts, he doesnÕt think that the usual examples of derogatory 
terms Ð ÔYidÕ, ÔKrautÕ and ÔLimeyÕ are thick concepts.  Instead he claims they come into being when one 
group wants to outgroup some other group by calling them a jeering name.  
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of this chapter is to establish the philosophical grounding and basic understanding of 
ideas that are central to the study of thick and thin (and so to my thesis), which will 
also aid in better understanding the point of view presented by Williams.  This is 
important, because as I argue in the next two chapters he is widely misunderstood.  




2 - Conceptual Content. 
 
As noted at the start of this chapter it is not just that there are many possible accounts 
of thick and thin concepts, it is that many of these accounts pick out significantly 
different content in relation to thick and thin and therefore operate with different 
formulations of the distinction.  This is why the first of the two key questions 
addressed in this chapter focuses on the conceptual content picked out by the various 
theorists writing on thick and thin concepts. 
 
Q 1 What is the nature of the conceptual content identified by the distinction between 
thick and thin concepts? 
 
The orthodox account picks out evaluative conceptual content and descriptive 
conceptual content as important to the distinction, though not all thick and thin 
theorists categorise the relevant conceptual content in this way.169  For example, 
prescriptivists (as might be imagined) prefer to categorise the evaluative aspect as 
some form of prescription or demand that could be separated from the descriptive 
aspect (this latter element comprising the conceptual content).170  Another option taken 
up in the literature is to class the evaluative aspect as normative content and distinguish 
																																																								
169 Allan Gibbard adopts the same categorization of the conceptual content in a thick concept as the 
orthodox account Ð thick concepts contain a combination of both ÔevaluativeÕ and ÔdescriptiveÕ content Ð 
but his theory of thick concepts arises accidently, as a result of his treatment of moral terms in his: Allan 
Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Oxford University Press, 1990).  It is hard to describe Gibbard as 
a supporter of thick concepts because he explicitly notes that he finds thick concepts puzzling and that so 
far all the treatments he has seen strike him as failures. 
170 R. M HareÕs precriptivism is the most commonly referenced prescriptivist account in the literature on 
thick and thin concepts.  See R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Clarendon Press, 1952).  Hare never 
actually explicitly used the term ÔthickÕ concept because his work like that of many other cognitivists 
and non-cognitivists predated the coinage of the terms ÔthickÕ and ÔthinÕ concept, but he was discussing 
the same conceptual phenomena. 
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between normative and non-normative conceptual content. 171   Sometimes direct 
reference is made to the fact-value distinction (this predated the thick-thin distinction)  
in which the descriptive aspect of thick concepts is referred to as factual content and 
the evaluative aspect as value-laden content.172 Williams, whose formulation provides 
the test for my thesis, uses the terms Ôaction-guidanceÕ and Ôworld-guidednessÕ to 
identify the conceptual content involved in thick and thin concepts (again, WilliamsÕ 
formulation of thick and thin concepts is addressed in the next chapter).173  
 
At present the different ways of construing the conceptual content within thick and thin 
concepts identified above (evaluative and descriptive; prescriptive and descriptive; 
normative and non-normative; fact and value; action-guiding and world-guided) all 
seem to be problematic in some way, but as the orthodox account uses the terms 
evaluative and descriptive these terms are used when discussing thick and thin 
concepts both within this chapter and throughout this study (except when discussing 
Williams, or other theorists who identify the conceptual content differently).  These 
terms also better facilitate a discussion of the various features of thick and thin 
concepts that have captivated the attention of meta-ethicists, because much of the 
meta-ethical literature on thick and thin concepts focuses on the problems associated 
																																																								
171 Simon Kirchin notes this option in his introduction to the edited collection of papers on Thick 
Concepts, see: Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013).  There is a problem 
with construing this conceptual content as normative in nature though, because it is far from settled what 
normative content actually is, legal scholars often refer to law as being normative in nature because it 
influences us, provides reasons and is tied to action.  Yet there are many ways these things can be 
achieved and many types of actions Ð physical and non-physical.  In some ways it may be 
disadvantageous to assume that all thick and thin concepts contain normative content because it can be 
both too specific (exclude important conceptual content) and too vague (fail to usefully identify 
important aspects of the conceptual content) to really tell us anything accurate about thick and thin 
concepts.   
172 Philippa Foot and Iris Murdoch both discussed the potential separability of fact and value in thick 
concepts, although they didnÕt use the term ÔthickÕ concept as their work occurred prior to WilliamsÕ 
coinage in print of the term.  See: Philippa Foot, ÔMoral beliefsÕ (1958) 59 Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 83; Iris Murdoch, ÔVision and Choice in MoralityÕ (1956) 30 Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 32; and Iris Murdoch, ÔMetaphysics and EthicsÕ in D. F. Peters (ed), The Nature of 
Metaphysics (Macmillan, 1957), 59-75 
173 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Routledge Classics, 2011).  WilliamsÕ use of 
the terms Ôaction-guidingÕ and world-guidedÕ content has been widely criticised, and the following is an 
example of a criticism commonly levied against Williams.  Whilst certain thick concepts seem to be 
more practical than others (e.g. ethical concepts), because they seem to be more overtly action-guiding 
or at least their action-guidance is more prominent, there are many thick concepts (both ethical and non-
ethical) that are not used to guide action, even indirectly (e.g. aesthetic concepts). It therefore seems 
inappropriate to identify action-guiding content as one of the distinguishing features of thick concepts 
even if this action-guidance is loosely construed (even if ethical concepts are not required to provide 
direct reasons for action and it is sufficient that they often indirectly influence action).  These ideas will 
be further elaborated upon in the next chapter. 
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with construing the conceptual content as evaluative and descriptive in nature.174  This 
is hardly surprising as prior to the development of thick and thin concepts, cognitivists 
and non-cognitivists were concerned with the problematic nature of ethical concepts 
that seemed to possess both evaluative and descriptive content.175  
 
Within the literature on thick and thin concepts both evaluative and descriptive aspects 
of thick (and thin concepts) are problematic because there are two questions that 
remain unanswered within meta-ethics: what is descriptive content and what is 
evaluative content? 176  It is a concern that construing evaluation with sufficient 
flexibility (interpreting the term widely enough) to fit the majority of thick and thin 
concepts could then distort the very distinction the relevant theorists are trying to 
clarify; or again, that identifying thick and thin concepts as primarily or wholly 
evaluative in nature forces all thick and thin concepts to fit our preconceived notions of 
evaluative content. These are valid concerns especially as there is no reason to assume 
that all thick and thin concepts per se will be primarily or wholly evaluative, for 





174 One reason that all of the various conceptual contents picked out by the theorists operating with this 
distinction may be problematic, is that the conceptual content within thick and thin concepts may 
involve a combination of the possible conceptual content identified.  Simon Kirchin raises an interesting 
point that maybe what we need is an account that can recognise that the content may be one of many 
possibilities or a combination of those possibilities e.g. evaluative-cum-normative-cum-action-guiding.  
see note 171 at 6 
175 Many of the ethicists prior to the coinage of the term ÔthickÕ ethical concept (such as cognitivists and 
non-cognitivists) were involved in intractable debates regarding the fact-value distinction and the nature 
of evaluative concepts.  Hilary Putnam, ÔThe Analytic and the SyntheticÕ in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell 
(eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume III. (University of Minnesota Press, 
1966), 358-397; Philippa Foot, ÔMoral beliefsÕ (1958) 59 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83; Iris 
Murdoch, ÔVision and Choice in MoralityÕ (1956) 30 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 32; and Iris 
Murdoch, ÔMetaphysics and EthicsÕ in D. F. Peters (ed), The Nature of Metaphysics (Macmillan, 1957), 
59-75   
These debates have continued now within the framework of thick and thin: Simon Blackburn for 
example has continued his critique of the fact-value distinction and now combined this with his critique 
of thick concepts: ÔIn the end I want to oppose the popular idea that a proper understanding of thickness 
tells us surprising things about ethical objectivity, and even perhaps undermines the fact-value 
distinction.Õ  Simon Blackburn, ÔThrough Thick and ThinÕ in Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn, 
ÔMorality and Thick Ethical ConceptsÕ (1992) 66 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 285   
176 Different theories of ethical language have tried to answer these two questions and consider how 
ethical terms (and phrases) appear to function.  HareÕs prescriptivism (which has already been noted in 
this chapter) is an example of one possible explanation of how ethical language functions. 
177 Consider for example law, this maybe one area where it might be better to acknowledge the strongly 
normative nature of legal concepts by identifying both normative and evaluative content as an important 
aspect of thick and thin legal concepts (although depending upon how the ÔevaluativeÕ content is 
construed, normative could be viewed as a type of evaluative content). 
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Evaluative conceptual content. 
 
Most meta-ethicists are willing to grant that thick terms are somehow associated with 
evaluations, but this is where the agreement ends.  The issue for debate is not whether 
but how thick terms are associated with evaluations (what exactly the nature of this 
association is).178   
 
The matter above picks out a particularly complex and fraught area in the literature on 
thick and thin concepts, but there are two principal viewpoints Ð pragmatic and 
semantic Ð that it is immediately helpful to acknowledge.179   Supporters of the 
pragmatic view hold that the evaluative element is not found in a conceptÕs content, but 
is rather found elsewhere,180 whereas supporters of the semantic view hold that the 
evaluation is conceptually entailed. 181  Part of the disagreement stems from an 
assumption that the evaluative content in thick concepts is associated with evaluative 
content in thin concepts in some manner.182  The semantic viewpoint infers the 
conceptual entailment of thin evaluation within thick concepts, whereas the pragmatic 
																																																								
178 Blackburn, Vayrynen and Eklund have challenged the assumption that thick concepts have evaluative 
content at all.  See: Simon Blackburn, ÔThrough Thick and ThinÕ in Allan Gibbard and Simon 
Blackburn, ÔMorality and Thick Ethical ConceptsÕ (1992) 66 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
285; Pekka Vayrynen, ÔThick Concepts: WhereÕs Evaluation?Õ in R. Shafer-Landau Oxford Studies in 
Metaethics volume 7 (Oxford University Press, 2012); and Matti Eklund, ÔWhat are Thick Concepts?Õ 
(2011) 41 Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 
179 This study does not explore this aspect of the literature in depth as it is WilliamsÕ formulation that is 
investigated in more depth in the next chapter and serves as the exemplar in my study, but it is worth 
briefly expanding upon these two key viewpoints (pragmatic and semantic) as they will be mentioned 
again later in the thesis in chapters five through seven when addressing the legal theorists writing on 
thick and thin concepts. 
180 Debbie Roberts for example notes that pragmatists: Ôargue that the evaluations that thick terms can be 
used to convey (or the evaluations Òmost closely associatedÓ with thick terms) are located not in what is 
strictly said in an utterance employing a thick term but in some other aspect of what is communicated.Õ 
Debbie Roberts, ÔItÕs Evaluation only ThickerÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 79 
181 Brent Kyle offers a version of the Semantic View: ÔMany thick concepts (if not all) conceptually 
entail evaluative contents.Õ Brent Kyle, ÔHow Are Thick Terms Evaluative?Õ (2013) 13 Philosophers 
Imprint 2.  This maybe unappealing to many because philosophers such as Foot, Murdoch and Williams 
used thick concepts to undermine the fact-value distinction, but Kyle maintains that the semantic view 
can be reformulated in such a manner that would be consistent with their stance towards the fact-value 
distinction. 
182 This leads to a related issue known as Ôconceptual priorityÕ: if thick concepts are created out of an 
amalgam of thin evaluative content (the suggestion being that this evaluative content is the evaluative 
content from related thin concepts) and descriptive content; then are thin concepts conceptually prior to 
thick concepts (or alternatively can thick concepts be reductively analysed into a thin concept with 
additional descriptive content attached)?  Alternatively if the descriptive content is viewed as the more 
important aspect then it could be argued that thick concepts are conceptually prior to thin concepts in 
virtue of their richer descriptive content. 
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viewpoint argues that there is no element of thin evaluation in the content of thick 
terms/concepts.183   
 
Theorists such as Jonathan Dancy argue that it is not enough that there is some 
evaluative and descriptive conceptual content present, it must also be the ÔrightÕ 
content and present in the ÔrightÕ way.  If the evaluative or descriptive component is 
not present in the right way this affects the nature of the thick concept.  Consider the 
example of  Ôobjectionable thick conceptsÕ.184   Objectionable thick concepts are 
concepts that embody values that ought to be rejected by everybody.185  Identifying 
which values ought to be rejected and which concepts are objectionable thick concepts 
is extremely tricky and controversial.186  This is reflective of a wider issue in the thick 
and thin concept debate concerning how we account for other cultures whose 
evaluative concepts differ from ours - if we cannot provide a logical justification for 
our conceptual divisions then how can we explain our concept application to outsiders 




183 Roberts offers a third view point Ôthe inclusive viewÕ, which rejects the orthodox view that to be 
evaluative as a matter of content a concept must have thin evaluative content.  The inclusive viewpoint 
includes elements of both the content and pragmatic viewpoint, but argues that thick concepts are 
evaluative because they ascribe an evaluative property.  Debbie Roberts, ÔItÕs Evaluation only ThickerÕ 
in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013), 80.  Under the Inclusive View 
Ôevaluation drives the extension of thick terms.Õ ibid at 81 
184 Pekka Vayrynen has argued that objectionable thick concepts and their use within certain contexts 
sheds light on the relationship between thick terms and evaluation, he thinks there is evidence that this 
relationship is not semantic (he uses objectionable thick concepts in his discussion of semantic and 
pragmatic viewpoints).  Pekka Vayrynen, ÔObjectionable Thick Concepts in DenialsÕ (2009) 23 
Philosophical Perspectives 439  
185 Blackburn advances a similar line of thought, he argues that thinking in terms of thick concepts does 
a disservice to ethics, it discourages critique and can obscure reprehensible evaluations and as such 
believing in them can make it likelier you will uncritically accept these evaluations.  Blackburn uses the 
example of CUTE and thinks we should criticize it by using disentangling.  Simon Blackburn, ÔThrough 
Thick and ThinÕ in Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn, ÔMorality and Thick Ethical ConceptsÕ (1992) 
66 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 285 
186 Slurs are an important example, because it is controversial whether such terms should count as thick 
terms. Mark Richard argues for their inclusion as thick terms, others such as Dancy and Gibbard are 
hesitant.  The lack of a clear definition of a thick term does not make it easy to determine whether slurs 
are examples of thick terms. See: Mark Richard, When Truth Gives Out (Oxford University Press, 2008), 
14; Jonathon Dancy, ÔIn Defense of Thick ConceptsÕ (1995) 20 (1) Midwest Studies in Philosophy 263, 
264; and Allan Gibbard, Thinking How To Live (Harvard University Press, 2003) 
187 WilliamsÕ work on thick ethical concepts is again relevant here, because his discussion of evaluative 
standpoint within thick concepts was the result of considering the philosophical problems associated 
with defending our thick ethical statements as a form of knowledge (this is addressed in the next 
chapter).  This wider issue predates the literature on thick and thin concepts and has previously been 
discussed within the context of the debate between moral relativists and moral realists. 
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Williams (like many other cognitivists and non-cognitivists) was concerned with 
understanding the evaluative standpoint of thick and thin concepts (again, this is 
addressed in the next chapter in more detail), and the extent to which an outsider could 
grasp the evaluative communityÕs thick concepts.188  For now it is sufficient to note 
that Williams argues that one needs to know the appropriate evaluative standpoint of a 
thick term to know its extension and that the debate regarding this point concerns the 
role the evaluative content plays within thick and thin concepts in determining their 
extensions.189 The problems regarding the nature of evaluative content and how this 
content is associated with the (thick or thin) concept in question is a prime example of 
the complex nature of evaluations, which intensifies when we start to consider how the 
descriptive and evaluative aspects of a thick concept combine.190  As Fisher and 
Kirchin note, what unites all accounts of thick evaluative concepts is that they Ôare 
those concepts and associated terms that in some fashion combine both some 
evaluative, attitudinative aspect with a descriptive, non-evaluative aspect in some 
																																																								
188 This aspect of the literature draws on wider concerns within philosophy regarding concept mastery. 
Nick Zangwill is uncomfortable with this distinction between different ways of grasping concepts, 
claiming that ÔfullÕ grasp of a concept or meaning is a hypothesized state that there is no reason to 
believe in.  Nick Zangwill, ÔMoral Metaphor and Thick Concepts: What Moral Philosophy Can Learn 
from AestheticsÕ Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013), 197-209.  He is 
critical of theorists such as Peter Goldie and Adrian Moore, who claim that ÔfullÕ or ÔproperÕ grasp of the 
concept implies an evaluation.  See: Peter Goldie, ÔThick Concepts and EmotionÕ in Daniel Callcut (ed), 
Reading Bernard Williams (Routledge, 2008), 94-109 and Adrian Moore, ÔMaxims and Thick Ethical 
ConceptsÕ (2006) 19 Ratio 129  
189 An alternative way of discussing the issue is to distinguish outsiders from Ôa fully-fledged concept 
user.Õ  What we are trying to establish is the extent to which the outsider has to hold the exact same 
evaluations that the insider holds, to be able to understand the concept and its applications in the way 
that the insider does.  This raises further questions though: does the outsider need to sincerely hold those 
evaluations; and do all insiders share the same evaluations such that there can be a single evaluative 
stance associated with that particular concept?  The discussion normally begins by assuming that there is 
a single evaluative stance that can be identified as being specific to that particular cultures understanding 
of that specific concept, even if this is quite abstract and allows for additional individual differences. 
The distinction between outsiders and insiders concerns many practices, even those specific to a society 
such as law and it would seem to be too strict a requirement that you need to be an insider to a practice 
or a culture to be classed as sincerely holding the evaluations of the practice or culture.  It would seem to 
imply that many of our communications are based on insincere adoptions of evaluations and therefore 
incomplete understanding of the concepts we are using.  If something less is required to count as sincere 
then what mental state is required Ð pretence, imagination, appreciation etc?  This does nothing to clarify 
the original issue in fact it may complicate it further, it may well be that different situations require 
different mental states to satisfy the requirement of sincerity.  Different concepts will require different 
evaluative stances and this may require differing levels of sincerity.  The more complex concepts will 
take longer to grasp, by both the outsiders and the insiders. 
190  Nick Zangwill worries that thick concepts often seem to lead to moral dogmatism and over 
confidence on the part of some philosophers who employ them.  ÔThe step from (non-evaluative) fact to 
value is problematic and controversial, and not to be lightly skipped over, especially with the blithe 
assurance that doing so is part of the meaning of certain words or grasping certain concepts.  This is a 
serious error, for we must not turn our face away from the perilous abyss between (non-evaluative) fact 
and value.Õ  see note 188 Zangwill at 198.  He challenges many other defenders of thick concepts (such 
as Foot and McDowell) for thinking that if moral judgments had descriptive content then they could be 
known in broadly empirical ways. 
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fashion.Õ191  These authors are deliberately vague in their description of the relationship 
between the evaluative and descriptive aspect of thick concepts, because theorists 
disagree regarding the nature of this relationship (the association between the 
evaluative and descriptive content).   
 
 
3 Ð Evaluative and descriptive content within thick concepts. 
 
Allan Gibbard notes three ways in which the evaluative and descriptive aspects could 
combine within a thick concept Ð conjunction, licensing, or presupposition Ð and that 
all three fail, because there is insufficient descriptive content in a thick concept to meet 
the demands of these models.192  According to the conjunctive model, the concept user 
conjoins a descriptive statement and an evaluation, for example he states that the act is 
descriptively ÔgopaÕ and positively evaluates it.193  According to the licensing model, 
the concept user is licensed by the rules of language to use the term gopa, as long as he 
evaluates descriptive gopahood positively.194  The presuppositions of a statement are 
the things that must be accepted for there to be agreement or disagreement.  For all 
these models though there needs to be a clear understanding of what constitutes 
descriptive gopahood, and Gibbard argues that there is not.195   
 
Whether a clear understanding of descriptive gopahood can be established will be 
dependent upon how the evaluative and descriptive aspects within a thick concept 
																																																								
191 Andrew Fisher and Simon Kirchin, Arguing about metaethics (Routledge, 2006), 505 
192 The combination of evaluation and description within a concept is an issue that concerned meta-
ethicists prior to thick and thin concepts, and the three ways of characterizing the combination that 
Gibbard identifies (conjunction, licensing and presupposition) are not necessarily specific to thick 
concepts, although Gibbard is specifically addressing thick concepts in his article.  See: Allan Gibbard, 
ÔThick Concepts and Warrant for FeelingsÕ in Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn, ÔMorality and Thick 
Ethical ConceptsÕ (1992) 66 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 267  
193 Gibbard discusses thick concepts within the context of a scenario involving an anthropologist (an 
outsider) observing a Kumi tribe, he uses the example of GOPA (a thick concept): ÔIn the case of gopa, 
say, the evaluative meaning is positive, and the descriptive meaning is something like what I already 
suggested: A gopa act, descriptively, is the killing of an outgroup member in the face of danger.  Call 
such an act descriptively gopa, and call the property of being such an act descriptive gopahood.Õ  ibid at 
273 
194 Williams endorses a similar view: see note 173 at 143-5 and rejects the prescriptivist two component 
analysis of thick concepts at 141.  Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word (Oxford University Press, 
1984), 148-9 considers both a conjunctive and licensing model, suggesting that in practice it may be 
hard to determine between the two. 
195 The big problem for thick concepts like GOPA is that they are often surrounded by disagreement and 
uncertainty (in this instance we are imagining situations where the concept users are deploying their 
concepts carefully and yet still the standard criteria is unable to settle the matter).  Even amongst the 
Kumi there may be disagreements about whether a particular act was an instance of GOPA, and further 
facts would not resolve the matter.   
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(such as GOPA) combine, because the nature of this combination will determine 
whether purely evaluative and purely descriptive content can be separated from the 
thick concept (and whether once separated this content would remain intelligible).  
This was previously the concern of non-cognitivists who were united by the thought 
that the evaluative attitude or stance could be detached or separated from the 
descriptive content in an evaluative concept (this position was often characterised as 
separationism). 196   The terms ÔseparationismÕ and Ônon-separationismÕ are now 
employed by thick concept theorists in picking out the potential separability of the 
evaluative and descriptive aspects of thick (and thin) concepts.197 
 
Separability and Disentangling. 
 
If the evaluative and descriptive aspects of a thick concept are joined in such a way 
that they cannot be intelligibly separated from one another and identified as distinct 
isolated conceptual content then this tells us something very important about the way 
our concepts operate.198 A non-separationist approach (non-separationists are normally 
cast as thinking that a concept must be either pro or con, but not both) argues that the 
descriptive and evaluative components of a thick concept are inseparable.199  They are 
irreducible in the same way that concepts such as CARPET or CHAIR cannot be reduced 
into smaller parts.200  According to this view the evaluative and descriptive content 
forms an amalgam and even if the evaluative and descriptive content could be 
																																																								
196 HareÕs prescriptivism (which has already been noted in this chapter) characterized the evaluative 
attitude in terms of some prescription or demand, and emotivism (another non-cognitivist position) 
characterized the evaluative attitude in terms of emotions that were evinced. 
197 On the one hand thick concepts seem to undermine a sharp division between the evaluative and the 
descriptive because thick concepts (and possibly thin concepts) are concepts where evaluation and 
description is combined (or amalgamated) in some manner (the nature of this combination will effect the 
sharpness of the distinction between the evaluative and descriptive content), but on the other hand talk of 
a combination (of any type) of these two aspects indicates a theoretical division in the first place.  
198 This phenomena is often referred to as shapelessness, because it is thought that any content that could 
be separated would be shapeless and therefore unintelligible.  For a detailed discussion of the 
shapelessness hypothesis in relation to thick and thin concepts see: Simon Kirchin, ÔThe Shapelessness 
HypothesisÕ (2010) 10 (4) Philosophers Imprint 1; Pekka Vayrynen, ÔShapelessness in ContextÕ (2014) 
48 Nous 573; and Simon Blackburn, ÔDisentangling DisentanglingÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick 
Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013) 
199 The following discussion regarding the nature of the relationship between the evaluative and 
descriptive aspects in a thick concept, is an extension of an earlier discussion regarding the separability 
of facts and values within evaluative concepts that was undertaken by those theorists engaged in the 
earlier meta-ethical debate between cognitivists and non-cognitivists.  For example see the discussion 
between Blackburn and McDowell: John McDowell, ÔNon-Cognitivism and Rule-followingÕ in Andrew 
Fisher and Simon Kirchin (eds), Arguing about Metaethics (Routledge, 2006) and Simon Blackburn, 
ÔReply: Rule-Following and Moral RealismÕ in Andrew Fisher and Simon Kirchin (eds), Arguing about 
Metaethics (Routledge, 2006) 
200 Some theorists suggest that this is because there is some quality that unites all the honest things and 
justifies our application of the term ÔhonestÕ to honest things, and this quality of honesty is irreducible. 
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separated, the detached descriptive content is shapeless because it could not be used to 
reliably pick out the same features of the world as the thick concept.201   The 
supposition is that in an amalgam account the descriptive content is shaped by the 
evaluative so that it cannot stand on its own in an informative way.202   
 
If on the other hand though, the evaluative and descriptive aspects can be identified 
and separated out from a thick concept then this tells us something different about our 
concepts and about the sharpness of the distinction between the evaluative and 
descriptive, which is crucial to the earlier claim that thick concepts Ôin some fashion 
combine both some evaluative, attitudinative aspect with a descriptive, non-evaluative 
aspect.Õ203  For the separationist a thick concept consists of some separable evaluative 
content and some separable descriptive content and a pro or con judgement can easily 
be added to this (in some way) to indicate additional context-specific information.204  
 
																																																								
201 Jonathon DancyÕs work is one of the clearest accounts that asserts an amalgam view of thick 
concepts.  Jonathon Dancy, ÔIn Defense of Thick ConceptsÕ (1995) 20 (1) Midwest Studies in Philosophy 
263.  Andrew Payne challenges the amalgam view - he argues that Ôa proponent of the amalgam view is 
committed to denying that we can detach from a thick concept a descriptive, non-evaluative concept that 
picks out a feature of courageous actions that helps to explain why they are courageous.Õ  Andrew 
Payne, ÔA New Account of Thick ConceptsÕ (2005) 39 The Journal of Value Inquiry 98.  Payne suggests 
an account of thick concepts that draws heavily from GeertzÕs work on thick description, he argues that 
every thick concept will satisfy some thick description that shares the same beliefs, desires, and 
intentions necessary for satisfying the application of the thick concept in question.  Therefore satisfying 
the thick description is also a necessary condition for the thick concept.  Virtues and vices are the most 
obvious examples of concepts that satisfy this account of a thick concept, Payne argues that his account 
is favourable because it can also account for deontological thick concepts; such as those used to praise or 
blame actions or types of actions for being in line with or counter to a particular moral rule.  PayneÕs 
account departs from other amalgam views, because it allows for a distinction between the thick-
descriptive component and the evaluative component within a thick concept.  ibid at 89-103 
Payne challenges this amalgam view and claims that by using a suitable thick concept we can do this, 
because the thick description of the agents desires, beliefs, and intentions, could be used to identify some 
of the evaluation of ends and means implicit in particular actions.  The amalgam theorist (such as 
Dancy) may reply that there are many examples of actions satisfying the associated thick description that 
would not be examples of the thick concept, which clearly demonstrates that the description alone is 
insufficient. 
202 DancyÕs main argument for the amalgam view starts from an observation regarding the thick concept 
COURAGE, which he notes will have as its extension a wide range of actions with a bewildering array of 
descriptive properties. Attempting to detach from the thick concept COURAGE a purely descriptive 
concept that covers all of these instances of courage, will result in a concept that is naturally shapeless.  
The properties the detached descriptive concept COURAGE brings to mind will not constitute any 
consistent traits of courageous actions.  See note 201 and Jonathon Dancy, ÔPractical ConceptsÕ in 
Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013)  
203 see note 191 
204 Some separationists disagree with Hare and Blackburn and instead claim that the evaluation tied to 
the description is more specific than pro or con (whilst maintaining its ability to be analysed non-
cognitively, otherwise it would count as a thick concept in its own right), or that a specific evaluation is 
tied more intimately to the description whilst still being insufficient to become a concept on its own, or 
some other option.  It is also possible to be a separationist regarding thick concepts and a cognitivist 
(about one or all the elements thick concepts are supposedly composed of): the evaluative content is best 
not seen as an attitude, but rather represents a concept such as GOOD or PRO. 
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The debate between separationists and non-separationists considers the sharpness of 
the distinction between evaluation and description within thick (and possibly thin) 
concepts and whether this content could operate independently to pick out the same 
conceptual divisions and extensions that the thick and thin concepts could.  The first 
concern regarding the evaluative conceptual content is that it is too course grained or 
thin to be able to conceptually pick out the just from the kind, and the second concern 
is that even if there were a whole range of evaluations that attached to the relevant 
descriptive contents such that the evaluation may be thicker than previously thought, 
these evaluations would be unable to divide clearly enough to be able to map and 
explain our conceptual divisions.  Non-separationists argue that we cannot be certain 
that it is possible the detached evaluation could (logically) pick out the kind or just 
things without reference to the associated descriptive content.  The evaluative content 
is therefore said to be shapeless with respect to identifying descriptive content (often 
referred to as the shapelessness hypothesis).  
 
The descriptive content is viewed (by non-separationists) as equally incapable of 
independently mapping and explaining the conceptual divisions identified by thick and 
thin concepts.  In other words, it is not possible to descriptively characterise evaluative 
concepts in a manner such that the descriptive concept consistently maps the same 
conceptual divisions (and only those divisions) that the evaluative concept 
identified.205  Non-separationists argue that it is extremely hard (and there is no way of 
knowing if it is even possible) to identify descriptive characterisations of our 
evaluative concepts that can capture all the instances of Ð say - ÔkindÕ or ÔjustÕ.  The 
concern is that even if a descriptive list of features could be formulated for identifying 
instances of kindness and justness, these lists would always be open-ended and so it 
would be impossible to know when we had captured all the descriptive features of 
ÔkindÕ and ÔjustÕ.  This becomes even more problematic when identifying new 
instances of kindness and justness unless we can guarantee that new cases will be 
sufficiently similar to old cases to enable their identification, and even then it would 
need to be possible to descriptively (not evaluatively) explain why these new cases are 
similar to the old cases.  There may be no way out of the impasse between 
																																																								
205 Dictionary definitions of evaluative terms usefully illustrate the problem with attempting to find 
purely descriptive definitions of evaluative terms, as standard dictionary definitions use other evaluative 
terms and synonyms to explain the meaning of an evaluative term. 
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separationism and non-separationism, so that the debate regarding the fact-value 
distinction currently remains intractable.206 
 
The apparently intractable debate between separationists and non-separationists 
regarding ethical concepts is not specific to thick and thin concepts.  Simon Blackburn 
uses the issue of disentangling and shapelessness in his critique of thick concepts: 
 
I believe, as everyone does, that many words are loaded, and loaded 
with many different things.  I am more troubled with the idea that 
they introduce a unitary concept and hence that we cannot 
disentangle or usefully separate the different dimensions in the one 
term.  The important point is that the idea behind thick concepts is 
that a candidate, such as ÔchasteÕ or ÔcourageousÕ, simply does the 
one thing.207  
 
He suggests that there are other ways (such as loaded terms) that can be used to explain 
how within ethics our descriptions also perform an evaluative role.  Evaluative 
attitudes can be expressed by intonation and emphasis, not just lexical utterances.  
Characterising these ethical descriptions (that also seem to perform an evaluative role) 
in terms of a loaded description implies that the evaluation (the loading) can be 
removed and put upon something else.  ÔThe issue is whether we should see the 
unitary, thick concept as fundamental, or the idea of a loaded way of describing things, 
where the load plays a role in determining which things are so described, but where the 
load can in principle also be shed.Õ208  BlackburnÕs argument for the use of loaded 
terms over thick concepts demonstrates that whilst many separationists and non-
separationists now discuss ethical concepts using the language of thick and thin, not all 
meta-ethicists have been convinced by this transition.  Effectively these theorists (even 
																																																								
206 So far the above discussion has favoured non-separationism and as Simon Kirchin notes much of the 
literature on shapelessness and disentangling seems to adopt the view or prejudice that separationism is a 
non-starter.  He suggests that even if we could never know whether we had successfully captured an 
evaluative concept descriptively (irrespective of whether we had), and even if there was always the 
worry that the future would present new instances that could not be identified by the descriptive alone, 
this only suggests that it might be best to adopt non-separationism initially as a safety net.  see note 171 
at 8-10 
207 Simon Blackburn, ÔThrough Thick and ThinÕ in Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn, ÔMorality and 
Thick Ethical ConceptsÕ (1992) 66 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 122.  Blackburn along with 
other expressivists such as Hare and Stevenson are often accused of committing the ÔfallacyÕ of failing 
to recognize that a word can do two things at once: both describe and evaluate.  He replies that ironically 
itÕs actually the Ôthick loversÕ who are guilty of denying that there are two things we are doing, whereas 
expressivists recognize that there are two activities and we are engaged in both at once.  He in fact goes 
further than this by saying that there are many more than two things we are engaged in, since 
positive/negative evaluations are only one kind of stance that we often wish to communicate.   
208 ibid at 123 
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those who are yet to accept the merits of the thick-thin concept distinction) question 
whether thick concepts are whole concepts or whether they are merely shorthand for 
more basic terms or concepts that are grouped together under the convenient shorthand 
Ôthick conceptÕ.209   
 
At present the reader may be under the impression (quite understandably) that only two 
kinds of concepts (thick and thin) are distinguished in the meta-ethical literature, but 
not all theorists would agree with this.210  Hence my second question. 
  
Q 2 Is the distinction between thick and thin concepts based on a distinction between 
two different kinds of concept? 
 
The first thing that arises when discussing any distinction (such as the distinction at 
hand between thick and thin concepts) is the nature of the supposed distinction in 
question Ð is it a clear distinction?  Identifying two different concepts (thick and thin) 
as two separate, distinct conceptual entities (thick ones and thin ones) suggests that 
there is at least a fairly clear distinction at work here (not all theorists agree with this). 
 
Definitions that differentiate thick concepts from thin concepts on the basis that thick 
concepts contain both descriptive and evaluative content, whereas thin concepts 
contain only evaluative content, need to be treated with extreme caution, because often 
there is a more subtle distinction that is brushed over.  There is a subtle yet significant 
distinction between the claim that thin concepts are wholly evaluative and lack any 
descriptive content and the claim that thin concepts are predominantly, primarily, or 
mainly evaluative and therefore contain less descriptive content than their thick 
counterparts.  The first claim is indicative of a difference of kind between thick and 
thin concepts: thick concepts are concepts that specifically contain these two kinds of 
conceptual content and therefore based upon recognition of this conceptual content 
within a concept such as HONEST, it should be possible to identify HONEST as thick or 
thin.  If the distinction between thick and thin concepts picks out two different kinds of 
																																																								
209 Blackburn challenges the importance theorists have placed on thick and thin concepts, he finds it odd 
that Williams needed to find a term of art to describe a phenomena of language, when good words 
already existed that captured this (e.g. loaded words or loaded descriptions).   
210 There are obviously many ways of classifying concepts and even within meta-ethics ÔthickÕ and ÔthinÕ 
are not the only terms used to classify concepts, the question that is of interest to thick-thin theorists (and 
my thesis) is whether within the framework of thick and thin there exists only two categories, or whether 
there exists multiple categories of varying thicknesses and multiple categories of varying thinnesses. 
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concepts then ethical concepts must be either thick or thin. The second claim entails a 
difference of degree, asserting that thick and thin concepts contain evaluative and 
descriptive content of varying degrees, and so it is possible to compare and contrast 
ethical concepts such as HONEST and COURAGE against other ethical concepts such as 
JUST and KIND based on their differing levels of descriptive and evaluative content. 
 
A difference of degree is often thought of as one continuous scale ranging from the 
thickest to the thinnest concepts, and all of our thick and thin concepts could be plotted 
at some point along this scale.211 The position of a concept along the scale may alter, 
for example COURAGE may be thought to be a fairly thick concept but its exact 
position along the scale of thickness may alter as it is contrasted with other thicker or 
thinner concepts.  A concept does not need to be either thick or thin to occupy a 
position along the thick-thin scale for it could be thickish in some contexts and thinnish 
in others.  The scale could be open ended as there may be new concepts discovered (or 
created) that are thicker or thinner than those that were previously thought to sit at each 
end of the thick-thin scale. 212 
 
Even though a difference of kind doesnÕt necessarily indicate a sharp distinction 
between thick and thin concepts, it does presuppose a clearer distinction between thick 
and thin concepts than a difference of degree would allow.   A difference of kind may 
seem more favourable, because it seems neater and somehow easier to understand the 
difference between thick and thin if they are two distinct kinds of concept, as a concept 
can only be of one kind or the other.  In practice though thick and thin concepts do not 
neatly fall into one of two categories and there maybe many reasons for this - some of 
																																																								
211 Many commentators such as Scheffler and Tappolet like the idea of a difference of degree, because 
they argue that when we look at some typical examples of thick and thin concepts from our ethical 
vocabulary some thick concepts seem thicker than other thick concepts, and some thin concepts seem 
thinner than others.  Samuel Scheffler, ÔMorality Through Thick and Thin: A Critical notice of Ethics 
and the Limits of PhilosophyÕ (1987) 96 (3) Philosophical Review 411 and Christine Tappolet, 
ÔThrough Thick and Thin: Good and its DeterminatesÕ (2004) 58 (2) Dialetica 207 
212 Simon Kirchin in his ÔThick ConceptsÕ manuscript has suggested that the scale of thickness and 
thinness might not be best perceived as one long continuum, as it might be possible to identify different 
categories or subdivisions along the continuum.  The difference between these categories or subdivisions 
might be minute (appear to be a matter of degree) and there could be an increasing number of categories 
or subdivisions along the continuum, but all of these different sub-divisions would be distinct. This 
approach would result in multiple differences of kind, even if they were differentiated along a scale of 
thick and thin.   
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these reasons may be specific to the thick-thin distinction, others may apply to any way 
of distinguishing between concepts.213  
 
A difference of degree might seem messier and more open to disagreement, but it may 
be a more accurate reflection of our conceptual practices and the nature of our 
concepts.  For example GOOD and PRO seem very thin, whereas KIND and 
THOUGHTFUL seem thicker than GOOD and PRO, but thinner than COMPASSIONATE, 
EMPATHETIC and SYMPATHETIC.  Consider a situation where you are trying to 
distinguish between ÔgoodÕ and ÔrightÕ in determining what you ought to do in a 
particular situation.  Both seem fairly thin concepts, but good is thinner than right, 
because a good action is only one of a possible range of positive actions, whilst a right 
action (or answer, or idea) is the only option judged positively amongst a range of 
possible options.  There can be only one right thing, but there can be many good 
things. 
 
Arguing that ÔrightÕ is thicker than ÔgoodÕ does not mean that there cannot be even 
thicker concepts that can be useful in this scenario given more information regarding 
the context of the decision to be made.  What it does indicate is that a difference of 
degree rather than kind is the best possible way to explain the distinction between thick 
and thin concepts.  There are quite clearly connotations and associations suggested by 
both concepts, even if the thicker of the two concepts Ð ÔrightÕ Ð exhibits stronger 
connotations and associations.214   
 
Timothy Chappell has two a priori doubts regarding thin concepts: 
 
As we may put them, we can doubt whether there are thin concepts; 
we can doubt, too, whether there are thin concepts.  Maybe nothing 
could fit the specification of thinness as pure evaluation and still 
genuinely be a concept: that is the first doubt.  Or maybe the usual 
examples of thin concepts, though they are concepts, are thick 
concepts not thin ones: that is the second doubt.  I have both 
doubts.215 
																																																								
213 The problems that surface in relation to classifying concepts as thick or thin may actually be 
indicative of wider philosophical problems in relation to concepts and conceptual analysis, and may 
provide evidence that our concepts (of any type) are resistant to classification. 
214 Consider the examples - GOOD and PRO Ð both can be used descriptively, but does this mean that they 
contain descriptive content?  If they do, then this would be another argument in favour of a difference of 
degree as opposed to a difference of kind.   
215 Timothy Chappell, ÔThere Are No Thin ConceptsÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 184 
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Chappell worries that once weÕve separated off the descriptive part (if possible) then 
there will be nothing conceptual left for the evaluative to be a part of.  Therefore when 
we are dealing with thin ÔconceptsÕ where there is supposed to be only evaluative 
content, we wonÕt find anything genuinely conceptual at all.216  He argues Ôit is only 
our lack of analytical distance on our own key moral concepts that makes them seem 
anything other than thick to us.Õ217  He cites Elizabeth Anscombe as one author who 
manages to get some analytical distance, as she concludes that MORALLY GOOD, RIGHT 
and OUGHT are just extremely particular and indeed peculiar historical products and 
denies that OUGHT expresses any concept at all:  it is a word of Ômere mesmeric 
forceÕ.218  
 
Despite this Chappell does allow for two possible thin concepts.  He states from the 
beginning that there are almost no pure thin concepts, and if there are any, then 
GENERIC-DEMANDEDNESS and GENERIC-COMMENDEDNESS are the only two 
possibilities.  He only admits the theoretical possibility of these concepts, because they 
are unstable and less useful to ethicists than might at first be supposed.  They are not 
naturally occurring concepts, they have to be stipulated into existence, and even then 
when using such purely evaluative concepts it wonÕt necessarily be our own evaluation 
weÕre expressing, as we can still use them whilst distancing ourselves.  The gap 
between the naturally occurring moral concept and the theoretically stipulated moral 
concept is a large one, which for Chappell we cross at our own peril (too often we 
donÕt even notice when we have).  For GENERIC-DEMANDEDNESS and GENERIC-
COMMENDEDNESS to be purely thin concepts they have to be so abstract that they are 
unintelligible within the contexts and practices of any actual society. 
 
Many theorists - such as Simon Kirchin - suggest that even the thinnest thin terms such 
as PRO and CON could tell us something about the way the world is, as these contain at 
																																																								
216 Chappell allows for a continuum of thickness, and this has been used by his critics to argue that there 
are thin concepts under his account, they are just the ones closest to the thin end of the spectrum.  His 
denial of the existence of thin concepts is therefore criticized for being merely a terminological point.  
He replies: ÔTerminological perhaps, but not merely terminological.  Sometimes a thorough cleanout of 
our terminology is the best, may be even the only way to stamp out a persistent mistake.  So here, I 
think, Òthe relatively general and unspecific moral conceptsÓ is a better name for GOOD, OUGHT, and 
RIGHT, than Òthe relatively thin moral conceptsÓ, because it does not allow us so easily to slip back into 
the mistaken idea that any concepts are absolutely thin, or thin simpliciter.Õ ibid at 191 
217 ibid at 188 
218  Elizabeth Anscombe, ÔModern Moral PhilosophyÕ (1958) 33 (124) Philosophy 1.  Chappell disagrees 
with her on this specific point (he thinks it expresses a concept weÕre better off without), yet he can 
conditionalise her denial to say that if it expresses a concept, then it expresses a thick one. 
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least some descriptive content (even if this is sparse and tells us much less than GOOD 
or HONEST would).219  We use thin terms to represent and correspond to features of our 
world, however the extent to which these terms actually have purchase on reality is 
questionable, although use is a good indicator to start with.   
 
An alternative consideration of the distinction between thick and thin concepts 
contends that whilst a two-part distinction fails to sufficiently capture the variety of 
thicknesses and thinnesses that is possible, this is still not indicative of a difference of 
degree.  A difference of kind could still be the best explanation of the distinction 
between thick and thin concepts, as long as there are more than the two kinds Ð more 
than just thick and thin.  If thin concepts can only provide description of a positive or 
negative stance and comparative information about the thing in relation to others, 
whereas thick concepts can provide specific descriptive information about the thing 
being categorised, then this could be used as evidence of a difference of kind rather 
than degree, albeit a difference of kind that is made up of multiple kinds, not just two.  
When we consider thin concepts that are more overtly action-guiding such as OUGHT, 
then this distinction of kind may prove problematic.  Some accounts of OUGHT claim 
that not only is there a positive classification of the action conveyed when the term is 
used, but its use also indicates that we can perform that action, a kind of description of 
permissibility.  This could be classed as descriptive content, something only the thick 
concepts are meant to contain and if this is the case then it may point to a difference of 
degree, unless one were to classify OUGHT as a thick concept, but I think most theorists 
would agree that it is much thinner than most of our standard thick concepts.  There 
may be a way around this, if the additional information conveyed by the term ÔoughtÕ 
identifying it as a Ôdo-ableÕ action was perceived as relational content rather than a 
feature of the action itself, this would bring it more in line with our earlier examples of 
GOOD and RIGHT. 
 
Either way it is clear that we need to be careful when deploying a bald distinction 
between thick and thin concepts because there will always be an underlying 
commitment to a difference of degree or of kind and neither seems to be able to neatly 
capture all that is going on here. This study does not favour one over the other and 
																																																								
219 Simon Kirchin identifies generic-PRO and generic-CON as two basic thin concepts, but Chappell is 
suspicious, because he thinks generic-PRO either confuses demand and commendation, or ties to smuggle 
APPROVAL into the discussion (which is decidedly thick).  As CON is meant as the negation of PRO, it 
shares the same fault. 
	 70	
instead suggests that this point of contention amongst thick-thin theorists can actually 
prove useful for law because it emphasises the problematic nature of this aspect of our 
conceptual distinctions and conceptual practices. 
 
So far this study may have given the reader two impressions that need to be clarified.  
First: that the status of a concept as thick or thin is settled (however, not all theorists 
would agree with this picture of thick and thin concepts220); and second, that the 
evaluations associated with a thick (or thin) concept are settled - for example the 
concept will always be used to evaluate positively not negatively, or vice versa (again 
not all theorists would agree with this picture of evaluation221).  Clarifying these two 





Some supposed thick concepts have a flexible relationship with attitude and sometimes 
at any one time there may be a variety of attitudes and stances that could attach to the 
concept in question.222  Individual terms such as ÔdutyÕ can seem quite thin in most 
contexts, but if you consider the term ÔdutyÕ as spoken by an Italian Mafioso when 
talking about his family, or a philosophy seminar leader discussing KantÕs ethics, then 
																																																								
220 An account of thick and thin concepts that can change their thickness and thinness seems to fit well 
with an ordinary language approach that emphasises the importance of context in concept use (such as 
RyleÕs) and I highlighted in the previous chapter the influence of the ordinary language approach to 
philosophy on the development of thick concepts.   
221 Blackburn paints a picture of language where there is a multiplicity of attitudes and feelings that can 
be associated with terms, a repertoire of linguistic expression that is constantly changing and flexible, 
where feeling is often signalled by intonation rather than vocabulary.  It is often unreliable to read back 
attitude from vocabulary for these very reasons. Blackburn argues Ôthat attitude is much more typically, 
and flexibly carried by other aspects of utterance than lexical ones.Õ  See note 207 at 285.  Blackburn 
develops KantÕs line of thought that there is nothing conditionally good about concepts such as 
COURAGE and TEMPERANCE (they can be put to bad or good uses), of course we have expectations 
regarding their standard use but this is not set in stone by a prior theory or conventions that govern their 
use and go directly to their meaning.  Blackburn admits that while there are some terms where a positive 
or negative qualification is more often than not a part of their dictionary meaning, even in these 
instances we need to be careful regarding convention or meaning when we talk of evaluation.  
Communication of attitude in language is complex and can often be carried by intonation.  Saying 
something with attitude in your voice often licenses and leads the hearer to assume that the attitude is 
expressed because of what is said, rather than because of the way it was said.   
222 Blackburn argues that this is something that can equally be captured by loading.  Words can shed one 
load and bear another, words are often ready to be decoupled from the particular stances they are 
normally associated with.  It is only possible to decouple something that can be coupled though (or 
unload something that was loaded).  He thinks that for thick concept theorists this is not possible, all 
they can do is Ôjunk one term, and replace it by an (accidentally? unfortunately?) homologous one.Õ 
Simon Blackburn, ÔDisentangling DisentanglingÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 131 
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in both instances it is easy to see how the term ÔdutyÕ could be said to be much thicker 
than usual, because of the rich connotations (these could be descriptive or evaluative) it 
carries in context.  Consider the terms ÔfairÕ, ÔunjustÕ and ÔwrongÕ: it was unfair that 
Sam got the last ice cream, or it was unjust of them to not pick me or it was wrong to 
turn off the alarm clock and have a lie in.  All these terms can also be used in a legal 
context and just as with the above example of duty, these terms are much thicker than 
usual when used in a legal context because they carry legal connotations. 
 
ÔEvaluative flexibilityÕ, occurs when a thick concept is used in a pro way in one 
context and in a con way in another.  For example HONEST is normally used in a pro 
way, but there may be instances where we use HONEST in a con way, as a criticism 
rather than a compliment.  Maybe it was wrong to be ÔhonestÕ in that situation and it 
would have been better to be discrete instead.223  The fluidity offered by an account 
that allows for evaluative flexibility may be favourable based on the argument that 
these accounts of thick and thin concepts are a better reflection of our language 
practices.224   
 
It is normally assumed that evaluative flexibility is not an option (I phrase this 
tenuously because not all non-separationists would agree that evaluative flexibility is 
incompatible with non-separationism).  Evaluative flexibility may be captured by a 
non-separationist account of thick concepts that contains multiple conceptual versions 
of honesty, such as HONEST PRO, HONEST CON and HONEST NEUTRAL, which are all 
separate concepts.  They have a lot in common, but only one is applicable in any given 
situation.  Non-separationists are not committed to there being just one specific thin 
evaluation that is tied to any thick concept.  It is perfectly consistent for a non-
separationist to claim that sometimes honesty can be bad and at other times it can be 
good, because all they were committed to was the claim that evaluation (not 
																																																								
223 Linguistic devices such as sarcasm can often subvert typical linguistic conventions relating to that 
concept and this can not only lead to a change in a concepts thickness or thinness, but additionally a 
change in the attitude typically conveyed by this concept (for example from a positive to negative 
stance).  An example of this would be if you were to characterise someone as good but intend it to be a 
negative reflection of their character, maybe for example you think they are a Ôgoody-goody two-shoesÕ.  
The relationship between linguistic devices such as sarcasm and the evaluative aspect of thick and thin 
concepts is a contentious issue amongst meta-ethicists though and should be treated with caution.   
224 Separationists such as Hare and Blackburn, argue that the benefit of their account is that it can 
accommodate evaluative flexibility quite easily, whereas the non-separationist struggles. Blackburn 
argues that if there were thick or more basic concepts in ethics, surely these would be easier to find, if 
we consider the evaluative terms discussed by Hume and Aristotle (now touted as thick concepts) all we 
find is detachable and flexible attitudes that are coupled with descriptions of character traits or actions.  
see note 222 
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necessarily one specific form of evaluation) was irreducibly linked to description in 
thick concepts.  Non-separationist mastery of a thick concept would involve knowing 
which situations require a pro application and which a con application of HONESTY (or 
maybe something other than pro/con).  According to this account the thick concept can 
be applied with different evaluations, flexibly, as the context requires, it is just that 
only one evaluation will be suitable for that situation.  It is hard to imagine a kind of 
evaluation that is neither pro or con, that is neutral or something else entirely, but 
maybe this is because it is so deeply engrained within us that evaluation has to be 
either pro or con.  Even if it is hard to imagine that evaluation could have an evaluative 
valence that isnÕt either PRO or CON, this does not necessarily mean that our 
preconceived understanding of evaluation is correct (or incorrect), it may simply mean 
that discussion of evaluative flexibility in thick and thin concepts can help to shed light 
on evaluative valence and enrich our understanding of evaluative conceptual content.  
Discussion of thick and thin concepts can be extremely beneficial even if there is no 
resolution yet amongst theorists, because it encourages critical reflection upon so many 
aspects of our conceptual practices (including evaluative conceptual content and 
descriptive conceptual content) and although agreement may not have been reached yet 
the insights that can be gained from such critical reflection are particularly useful. 
 
 
4 Ð Conclusion. 
 
Despite the lack of consensus regarding the nature of thick and thin concepts the 
distinction is still advanced by many philosophers in multiple disciplines (its use is 
actually increasing as more disciplines begin to deploy it to achieve a variety of 
different tasks).  There is considerable scope for discussion (from the literature covered 
in this chapter it is clear that there are a variety of formulations of thick and thin 
concepts), which is why my thesis does not defend a particular version of thick and 
thin concepts.  To be able to apply the distinction between thick and thin concepts 
within law, I will need to adopt at least some kind of specific understanding of thick 
and thin concepts in my thesis (even if this formulation only serves as an exemplar for 
the possibilities of employing thick and thin in law and is not advanced as ÔtheÕ 
formulation of thick and thin concepts).  I have chosen Bernard WilliamsÕ formulation 
for reasons that will become clear, and therefore at this point - although there is more 
that could be said about the current meta-ethical treatment of thick and thin concepts - 
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it will be better to move onto an exegesis of WilliamsÕ formulation and flesh out the 
notion of a thick concept and thin concept in more detail through his work, subject of 






























Chapter Four: Bernard WilliamsÕ 













































1 Ð Introduction. 
 
 
There are three reasons why Bernard WilliamsÕ Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy225 
provides a good starting point for consideration of thick and thin concepts in law.226  
First Ð it is the first coinage in print of the term ÔthickÕ concept; second Ð it is the 
formulation that the majority of the legal theorists writing on thick and thin concepts 
work with; and third Ð it is one of the most well known formulations.  Williams was 
writing in meta-ethics so his classification of concepts as either thick or thin utilises 
ethical concepts as examples (although as the previous chapter indicated thick and thin 
concepts are not specifically ethical).227  WilliamsÕ formulation is accompanied by 
ethical claims/arguments that are of relevance to law, and because they provide some 
interesting insights into social practices such as ethics and law this chapter addresses 
both his formulation and the ethical claims/arguments that accompany it. 
 
 
2 ÐWilliamsÕ development of thick concepts. 
 
 
Bernard Williams coined the term thick ethical concept in his Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy (I will refer to this as ELP from now on) and provided the first formulation 
of a thick ethical concept; he also used the term Ômost abstract conceptÕ (as had Gilbert 
Ryle 228  before him in relation to thin descriptions), to refer to what was later 
																																																								
225 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the limits of Philosophy (Routledge Classics, 2011)  
226 Williams was one of the most important contemporary analytic philosophers who published mainly in 
the field of ethics.  The following is a list (not an exhaustive one) of some of his published books, see: 
Bernard Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1972); Bernard 
Williams, Problems of the Self (Cambridge University Press, 1973); Bernard Williams and J. J. C. 
Smart, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge University Press, 1973); Bernard Williams, 
Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry (Pelican, 1978); Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge 
University Press, 1981); Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (University of California Press, 1993); 
Bernard Williams, Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge University Press, 1995); Bernard Williams, 
Plato (Phoenix, 1998); Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton 
University Press, 2002); Bernard Williams, The Sense of the Past: Essays on the History of Philosophy 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Bernard Williams, Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline 
(Princeton University Press, 2005) 
See the following secondary literature, for a useful text on how to read WilliamsÕ philosophy: Daniel 
Callcut (ed), Reading Bernard Williams (Routledge, 2009); for an interesting biography on Williams 
see: Alan Thomas, Bernard Williams (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
227 I use the word either throughout this chapter even though it is indicative of a difference of kind rather 
than degree, because as will become apparent in this chapter it is not always clear whether the 
distinction between thick and thin concepts Williams advanced was based on a difference of kind or a 
difference of degree.  In the next three chapters the focus shifts from ethical concepts to legal concepts, 
although it is WilliamsÕ formulation of thick (ethical) and thin (ethical) concepts that is applied to law, 
so ethical concerns will resurface. 
228 Gilbert Ryle, ÔThe Thinking of Thoughts: What is ÔLe PenseurÕ Doing?Õ in Collected Essays 1929-
1968 (Routledge, 2009)  
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characterised as a ÔthinÕ concept.  It was Samuel Scheffler in his 1987 review229 of ELP 
who first used the term Ôthin conceptsÕ to discuss WilliamsÕ ideas.230 
 
Gilbert Ryle used the phrase Ôthick descriptionÕ in his The Thinking of Thoughts: what 
is ÔLe PenseurÕ doing?231 to refer to more specific descriptions, those which are used to 
categorize an action or thing.  Ryle poses a number of scenarios involving winking and 
thinking.  First he considers the action of winking and poses various scenarios 
involving similar actions.  Second he considers the activity of thinking and poses 
various scenarios involving similar activities to try to identify what it is for someone to 
be thinking.  Throughout his discussion of these scenarios he asks what is common to 
them and he concludes that it is the thinnest description.  So it is through the use of the 
terminology thick and thin description that Ryle thinks he can identify and explain how 
two actions can appear to be the same whilst ultimately being different.   Ryle chooses 
actions that can appear to all be the same (yet are quite clearly different and distinct) 
and argues that it is the thicker descriptions for these actions we rely on every day to 
distinguish between them.   
 
Both Ryle and Williams advance a non-separationist account and argue that the thin is 
abstracted from the thick. 232  Although Ryle never specifically discusses the idea of 
thick concepts, his ideas on concepts in general and his work on thick descriptions hint 
at the idea of thick concepts, or at the very least that his account of concepts could 
accommodate thick concepts.  They both advance the notion that some concepts are 
much more specific than others, and it is from Ryle that Williams gains the term Ôthe 
most abstractÕ concepts to refer to what is now generally known as a Ôthin conceptÕ.  
RyleÕs idea of thick descriptions (and of thick concepts in general) is much broader 
than WilliamsÕ because although they are evaluations in the wide sense that they are 
ÔjudgementsÕ, unlike Williams he does not overtly consider action-guidance, praise or 
blame.  RyleÕs ideas are not evaluative in the way Williams and others now envisage 
																																																								
229 Samuel Scheffler, ÔMorality through Thick and Thin: A Critical Notice of Ethics and the Limits of 
PhilosophyÕ (1987) 96 (3) The Philosophical Review 411 
230 The majority of the philosophical and legal literature post Williams, uses the term Ôthin conceptÕ even 
when referring to Williams distinction; I also adopt this approach. 
231 See note 228.  Thick descriptions are also mentioned in another paper within the same collection of 
his work, see: Gilbert Ryle, ÔThinking and ReflectingÕ in Collected Essays 1929-1968 (Routledge, 2009) 
232 In the previous chapter I explained the non-separationist claim that the two types of conceptual 
content (normally categorized as evaluative and descriptive) cannot be intelligibly separated. 
	 77	
thick concepts to be.233  Despite many differences WilliamsÕ early training in the 
philosophical methods of Ryle and Austin is clearly visible in his writing234 and the 
influence of Rylean and Austinian methods is indicated by WilliamsÕ emphasis on the 
importance of context.235  
 
WilliamsÕ formulation of thick ethical concepts is advanced alongside a criticism of 
linguistic analysis, and he makes it quite clear that he is by no means a linguistic 
philosopher, or in favour of what he terms the Ôlinguistic turnÕ that had come to 
dominate philosophy.236 Williams notes: 
 
What has happened is that the theorists have brought the fact-value 
distinction to language rather than finding it revealed there.  What 
they have found are a lot of those ÒthickerÓ or more specific ethical 
notions I have already referred to, such as treachery and promise 
and brutality and courage, which seem to express a union of fact 
and value.237 
 
In this section of ELP Williams defines thick concepts as expressing a union of fact 
and value, but very quickly moves away from this phrasing to defining thick concepts 
in terms of action-guidance and world-guidedness. 238   Thin ethical concepts are 
introduced in chapter eight entitled ÔKnowledge, Science, Convergence.Õ239  By this 
point his distinction is solely based on action-guiding and world-guided content.240   
																																																								
233 Williams had a very particular notion of thick ethical concepts in mind that involved the specific type 
of evaluation he refers to as action-guidance. I discuss this in section three of this chapter.  For criticisms 
of this see: See Simon Kirchin, Samuel Scheffler, Simon Blackburn, and Allan Gibbard. Simon Kirchin, 
ÔThick Concepts and Thick DescriptionsÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford University 
Press, 2013); Samuel Scheffler, ÔMorality through Thick and Thin: A Critical Notice of Ethics and the 
Limits of PhilosophyÕ (1987) 96 (3) The Philosophical Review 411; and Allan Gibbard and Simon 
Blackburn, ÔMorality and Thick Ethical ConceptsÕ (1992) 66 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 267  
234 Alan Thomas, Bernard Williams (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1 
235 Simon Kirchin notes Miranda Fricker mentioning to him that Williams once referred to Ryle as both 
his mentor and teacher.  See: Simon Kirchin, ÔThick Concepts and Thick DescriptionsÕ in Simon Kirchin 
(ed), Thick Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013) 
236 It is interesting to note that chapter seven where he first introduces the terms thick and thin concept is 
entitled Ð ÔThe Linguistic TurnÕ Ð chapter two of my thesis noted the turn towards language within 
Analytic Philosophy.  His choice of title reflects the context of the period of philosophy Williams was 
writing in: his formulation of thick and thin concepts challenges the Prescriptivist account of ethical 
concepts; and is influenced by the later Wittgenstein on language (meaning as use) and Gilbert Ryle who 
were both ordinary language philosophers.  The importance of ordinary language philosophy was also 
noted in chapter two. 
237 See note 225 at 143-144.  The similarities between WilliamsÕ formulation of a thick concept and 
HurleyÕs distinction between ÔspecificÕ and more ÔgeneralÕ concepts can be seen in this section of ELP.  
Susan Hurley, Natural Reasons Personality and Polity (Oxford University Press, 1992) 
238 At this point I do not elaborate on what he means by a union between fact and value or action-guiding 
and world-guided content, for example whether this union is permanent (advances non-separationism) or 
temporary (advances separationism), but this will be discussed later in this chapter. 
239 Again the choice of chapter title is important because it references the decline of the Classical Theory 
of Concepts (see chapter two) and the popularization of logical positivism as reflected in law by the rise 
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Lying at the heart of these treatments, the fact-value distinction is often described 
loosely as a distinction between Òwhat isÓ (fact) and Òwhat ought to beÓ (value).241  
Talk of facts and values often brings into play many other distinctions, such as those 
between science (facts) and ethics (values); positive and normative; and the evaluative 
and the descriptive.  These distinctions are not synonymous (although they are 
sometimes used co-extensively, or otherwise in a manner that would seem to imply 
that they are synonymous), but they are all related.  The fact-value distinction is a 
source of conflict between science and ethics, because scientific statements are 
statements about the way the physical world is that can be proved through empirical 
methods to be either a true or false account of the world (that is, they are truth-apt).  It 
is through scientific methods that we claim to be able to empirically and logically 
verify these truth claims and attribute to them, when we grasp them, the status of 
knowledge, hence they are often referred to as facts.  Value statements are frequently 
deemed to operate differently.  Subjectivists, for example, sometimes think that Òwhat 
ought to beÓ is a matter of consensus or a judgement that is merely ÔbelievedÕ to be 
objectively morally binding.  Values are often referred to as moral beliefs (factual 
claims are rarely referred to as beliefs), because values cannot be derived from the 
senses and then tested using scientific methods, and as is well known, this led some 
academics to argue that values are not truth-apt; they can be derived only from an 
individualÕs subjective reasoning about value, and they can be tested only by 
comparison with the individualÕs framework of value and worldview.  It is for this 
reason that facts are characterised as actual states of affairs and values are often 




of legal positivism.  It is also important to WilliamsÕ argument that the fact-value distinction would be 
better understood as a distinction between science and ethics. 
240 It is this latter definition that is widely associated with Williams and quoted throughout the literature 
on thick and thin, so I operate with this one throughout my study. 
241 David HumeÕs claim that you cannot derive an ought from an is and G. E. MooreÕs naturalistic 
fallacy are both based on a distinction between fact and value, although they understand it differently.  
MooreÕs treatment is more recent, but very controversial.  Hilary Putnam rejected the fact-value 
distinction and argued that the distinction between fact and value was not as clear-cut as Hume 
envisioned.  The literature on this is vast (Hume, Moore and Putnam are just a few of the notable 
contributors) but I am solely concerned with the literature on the fact value distinction that pertains to 
thick and thin concepts. 
242 The distinction between facts and values is widely contested, so there are multiple accounts available, 
but this basic distinction is sufficient to ground my discussion of WilliamsÕ work. 
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Philippa Foot argues it would not be an exaggeration to state that moral philosophy 
rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, often referred to as the 
fact-value distinction.  Statements of fact can be shown to be true or false on the basis 
of evidence, and there are certain constraints upon what counts as evidence.  No two 
people can count different things as evidence for the same statement without one being 
guilty of linguistic ignorance or at least conceptual ambiguity or mistake.  Good 
evidence for a factual conclusion cannot be ignored and not counted as evidence in 
order to evade a conclusion that otherwise appears to follow.  With evaluations though 
there are no such limitations; that is, there is no logical connection between evaluations 
and the factual statements on which they are based.  Two people may disagree whether 
a thing is good because only one accepts the fact as evidence of the things goodness.  
There is nothing within GOOD that dictates which things count as evidence and which 
do not, but there are nonetheless some constraints on the term ÔgoodÕ that prevent it 
from becoming morally meaningless.  Even if people disagree over which things to 
have pro-attitudes and therefore designate as good, they all still agree that good is used 
in connection only with a Ôpro-attitudeÕ.243  Foot identifies two assumptions about 
evaluations: 
 
Assumption (1) is that some individual may, without logical error, 
base his beliefs about matters of value entirely on premises which no 
one else would recognise as giving any evidence at all.  Assumption 
(2) is that, given the kind of statement which other people regard as 
evidence for an evaluative conclusion, he may refuse to draw the 
conclusion because this does not count as evidence for him.244  
 
Foot argues that assumption one is dubious and that we shouldnÕt be allowed to speak 
of ÔevaluationÕ, ÔcommendationÕ or Ôpro-attitudeÕ as if we can understand them, 
irrelevant of the action concerned.  Foot argues that assumption two could be true even 
if one were false, as it might be that even if on a particular question of values a 
disputant could accept the factual premises, they could still fail to draw the same moral 
conclusions or discuss any moral questions that might introduce moral terms.  She 
states: Ôthe point is that any statement of value always seems to go beyond any 
statement of fact, so that he might have a reason for accepting the factual premises but 
refusing to accept the evaluative conclusion.Õ245  The linguistic analystÕs heavy focus 
on words such as ÔoughtÕ, ÔgoodÕ and ÔrightÕ, has given these words when used in their 
																																																								
243 Foot does not have in mind uses that subvert typical linguistic conventions. 
244 Philippa Foot, ÔMoral beliefsÕ (1958) 59 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83, 84 
245 ibid at 95 
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moral context a false air of authority that is dependent on a moral and religious world 
view that no longer dominates. 
 
In ELP Williams notes the seminars led by Philippa Foot and Iris Murdoch in the late 
1950Õs and references the work they were producing at the time as a source of 
inspiration for his work on thick concepts.246 Williams uses his formulation of thick 
concepts to challenge the distinction between fact and value and to demonstrate that 
the distinction is not as clear-cut as many non-cognitivists think because it may not be 
easy to de-couple the attitudes from the things one has those attitudes towards and still 
offer any sort of action-guidance.247 It is therefore important to note that WilliamsÕ 
work on thick ethical concepts follows closely in the footsteps of Foot and MurdochÕs 
challenges to the fact-value divide popularised by Logical Positivism, which for many 
years prior to that had been widely accepted.248  
 
WilliamsÕ contribution to philosophy. 
 
 
WilliamsÕ contribution to philosophy extended much wider than ethics.249  One of the 
criticisms that is consistently levied against him, is that Ôhe was a brilliant critic of 
other philosophers but had no systematic outlook of his own.Õ  Alan Thomas argues Ôa 
systematic outlook, no; a consistent set of theses all arranged around what Williams 
called Òthe need to be scepticalÓ, yes.Õ250   WilliamsÕ scepticism towards ethical 
theories and morality is something that is very apparent in his work on thick and thin, 
in which he criticises ethical theories for distorting the subject matter and presenting an 
impoverished reality, resulting in ÒemptyÓ and ÒboringÓ moral philosophy.  Expecting 
WilliamsÕ formulation of thick ethical concepts to generate a theory of the thick would 
																																																								
246 see note 225 at 217-218 
247 I have only cited thick concepts here because it was thick concepts that combined both kinds of 
content and it was this combination that he thought challenged the fact-value distinction.  Williams 
agrees with FootÕs earlier concerns regarding the fact-value divide and de-coupling attitudes from the 
thing one has those attitudes to, that were voiced in her: Phillipa Foot, Virtues and Vices (Oxford 
University Press, 2002) 
248 There were many others writing on thick concepts (even if they were not using the term Ôthick 
conceptÕ) during the 1980Õs and 1990Õs, which I have not mentioned above - such as Simon Blackburn, 
Johnathon Dancy, Allan Gibbard, Susan Hurley, John McDowell and David Wiggins - their work has 
influenced my understanding of WilliamsÕ formulation and of thick and thin more generally.  I noted 
their contributions in chapters two and three when noting the influence of cognitivism and non-
cognitivism.  The idea of thick and thin concepts was still in its infancy at this time, many of these 
theorists were writing directly on the fact-value distinction and as a result contributed to the 
development of the literature on thick and thin concepts.   
249 His two main interests were moral philosophy and personal identity, towards the end of his career he 
was also interested in the concept TRUTH, see note 227 earlier in this chapter for a list of his publications. 
250 see note 234 at 2 
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therefore be inconsistent with WilliamsÕ philosophical outlook and aim.  WilliamsÕ 
contributions have not normally taken the form of theory construction precisely 
because he Ôoften perceived particular ethical theories as failing to orient themselves 
convincingly in relation to conspicuous features of ethical phenomena as actually 
experienced.Õ251   He was unconvinced Ôthat there is any legitimate philosophical 
question that is best answered by assembling the kind of normative intellectual 
structure that philosophers refer to as an ethical theory.Õ252 A reading of Williams that 
is open to his sceptical approach can see that rather than being destructive, his work 
challenges ethics to be something more than it had been and raises significant 
questions that at the very least need careful consideration.  His sceptical approach can 
be useful in challenging many of the shared, core concerns of philosophy and law, such 
as those that underpin the legal positivist conception of the fact-value distinction and 
objective knowledge.253 
 
Is it only ethical concepts? 
 
 
There seems to be a lack of clarity throughout ELP as to whether his formulation and 
comments are aimed only at ethical (thick and thin) concepts or non-ethical concepts as 
well.   The ethical certainly seems to be his priority and as outlined above he was 
clearly influenced by other meta-ethicists, and it may be that his concentration on 
ethical concepts means that his generalisation from these to all concepts results in the 
inconsistencies found in his account.  When he refers to thick concepts he tends to use 
the phrase Ôthick ethical conceptsÕ and his account argues for a distinction between 
science and ethics rather than the evaluative and the descriptive.  His discussion of 
objectivity is quite clearly aimed at ethical knowledge and confidence, so it may seem 
that his account only intends to apply to ethical concepts.  The tension arises where he 
introduces his wider claims and arguments regarding philosophyÕs tendency to focus 
on the more general than the specific, i.e. the thick as opposed to the thin.  It would be 
strange if his considerations of how we can be said to go on from one concept to 
another, and whether we need to share the evaluative viewpoint of a concept to be able 
to count as a competent user of that concept, applied only to the ethical.  Such a view 
																																																								
251 Samuel Scheffler, ÔMorality through Thick and Thin: A Critical Notice of Ethics and the Limits of 
PhilosophyÕ (1987) 96 (3) The Philosophical Review 411 
252 ibid at 412 
253 Chapter six demonstrates the usefulness of thick ethical concepts (utilizing WilliamsÕ ideas) for 
HartÕs legal positivism and chapter seven demonstrates their usefulness in understanding the shared, 
core philosophical concerns addressed in key jurisprudential debates. 
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would indicate that it is only the ethical that differs across communities, and this does 
not fit well with the wealth of WilliamsÕ work on social explanation.   
 
The above notwithstanding, Williams makes quite clear that he thinks there is a big 
difference between science and ethics and although there maybe a chance of some kind 
of ethical knowledge, or confidence, it will be very different from that associated with 
science.254 Ethical concepts and ethical knowledge are thus presented as being unique 
and this seems to imply that his formulation is aimed specifically at thick and thin 
ethical concepts only.  Such a claim and approach in his work seems incongruous with 
the influence of Ryle who clearly had non-ethical descriptions in mind when he 
discussed the idea of thick and thin description and when he considered concepts. 255  It 
is also counter to the claim that the thin is abstracted from the thick, and that there are 
some descriptions and concepts that are more specific and some that are more general 
(as advanced by Hurley).256  Construing thick and thin only in the case of the ethical 
would be a much narrower interpretation of thick and thin than that advanced by Ryle 
and, for example, Hurley.  Ethical concepts may have been used as a starting point to 
develop WilliamsÕ ideas on concepts (in general) but focusing on the ethical revealed 
some interesting features of ethical life (such as action-guidance) that dominated his 
formulation.  As will be demonstrated (in this chapter) it is questionable whether his 
formulation captures the variety of thick ethical concepts sufficiently. 
 
 
3 - WilliamsÕ formulation of thick and thin. 
 
 
At this point it is useful to present SchefflerÕs summary of WilliamsÕ formulation of 
thick and thin ethical concepts identifying the features of his formulation that will be 
expanded and analysed in section four:   
 
Williams distinguishes between two kinds of ethical concepts.  
First, there is what he calls ÒthickÓ or substantive concepts.  These 
are relatively specific concepts (p. 129).  They are also Òworld-
																																																								
254 For WilliamsÕ account of his distinction between science and ethics, and his arguments that ethical 
knowledge (what he terms convergence) is possible, but not along the same lines as scientific 
knowledge, see note 225 at 149-151.  I address both of these aspects of his work in section four of this 
chapter. 
255 My thesis does not consider in any further detail the relevance to law of RyleÕs thick descriptions, 
because my argument focuses upon the significance of the conceptual distinction between thick and thin. 
256 HurleyÕs centralism and non-centralism are first noted in chapter two and section four of this chapter 
returns to these ideas and elaborates upon conceptual priority. 
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guidedÓ: that is, their application Òis determined by what the world 
is likeÓ (p. 129).  One of the things this means is that people who 
have acquired them will typically agree about their application to 
particular cases (p. 141).  Thick concepts are also Òaction-guiding,Ó 
in the sense that Òif a concept of this kind applies, this often 
provides someone with a reason for action, though that reason need 
not be a decisive one and may be outweighed by other reasonsÓ (p. 
140).  Examples of thick concepts are ÔtreacheryÕ, ÔpromiseÕ, 
ÔbrutalityÕ, and ÔcourageÕ (p. 129).  The thick concepts are 
contrasted with a second group of concepts, which we may call 
ÒthinÓ.  The thin concepts are Ògeneral and abstractÓ (p. 152), and 
they Òdo not display world-guidednessÓ (p. 152).  Examples of thin 
concepts are ÔgoodÕ, ÔrightÕ, and ÔoughtÕ (p. 128).257 
 
SchefflerÕs statement of WilliamsÕ formulation in his review of ELP is one of the 
clearest accounts of WilliamsÕ formulation.258  It clearly identifies that there are two 
sorts of ethical conceptual content (action-guiding and world-guided) that Williams is 
interested in; that according to Williams thick and thin ethical concepts play a role in 
providing reasons for action; and that WilliamsÕ work builds on an already existing 
distinction between ÔspecificÕ concepts and ÔgeneralÕ or ÔabstractÕ concepts (such as 
those identified by HurleyÕs centralism and non-centralism).  It is important to note 
that WilliamsÕ formulation (and therefore SchelfflerÕs quotation above) at no point 
refers to evaluative or descriptive content in contrast to many other formulations of 
thick and thin (such as those noted in the previous chapter).259  Despite this difference 
both the previous chapter and this chapter address the same two questions as they are 
pertinent to understanding any conceptual distinction based on thickness and thinness: 
 
1.! What is the nature of the conceptual content identified by the distinction?260 
2.! Is the distinction between thick and thin concepts based on a distinction 
between two different ÔkindsÕ of concept?261 
 
																																																								
257 See note 251 at 415.  His page numbers are different to mine because he is using a different 
publication; he cites an earlier edition of ELP: Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 
(Harvard University Press, 1985) 
258 The reader may be surprised that I am citing SchefflerÕs description of WilliamsÕ formulation rather 
than quoting Williams, but this is because Williams delivers his formulation of thick and thin concepts 
in a piecemeal fashion throughout chapters seven and eight of ELP.  
259 Williams never explicitly refers to evaluative or descriptive content but they are relevant because 
action-guidance is a form of evaluation and world-guidedness is normally associated with a descriptionÕs 
ability to describe the way the world really is. 
260 In this case the distinction is WilliamsÕ formulation and the distinction is between Ôaction-guidingÕ 
content and Ôworld-guidedÕ content. 
261 I am referring to the debate discussed in the previous chapter regarding difference of degree and 
difference of kind.  Conceptual priority will also resurface in this chapter as a part of the discussion of 
the nature of the relationship between thick and thin concepts.   
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The literature on Williams and on his formulation is extensive but these two questions 
identify the key aspects of WilliamsÕ work that will be necessary for any useful 
application of it in law. 
 
WilliamsÕ accompanying claims/arguments. 
 
 
Williams advances his distinction between thick and thin ethical concepts to support 
his wider arguments and claims regarding the nature of ethics - the two are 
interconnected so neither can be taken on its own - therefore both are addressed.262  
The following is a list of the claims/arguments he advances in chapters seven and eight 
of ELP that are useful to understanding WilliamsÕ account of thick and thin, and that 
could be relevant to law (this list is not exhaustive).263  
 
¥! Ethical theories focus too much on the thin, they do this by reducing the thick 
down to some thin things that can be applied systematically and form the basis 
of an ethical theory.  Such ethical theories distort the real nature of their subject 
matter. 
¥! Our ethical lives are much richer and diverse than our ethical theories can 
accommodate and this is because they focus on the thin, the thick is better at 
representing this richness. 
¥! The thick is conceptually prior to the thin and the thin can be abstracted from 
the thick.  This links to another of his claims that the thick is better equipped to 
provide a more stable account of ethical knowledge and life. 
¥! There is more action in the thick, the thick offers a more stable chance of 
ethical knowledge and confidence because it is thick ethical concepts and the 
judgements they express that can be said to be true or false and constitute 
ethical facts. 
¥! Reflection can destroy ethical knowledge; ethical knowledge may be 
undesirable, ethical confidence is a better aim and this can come from the social 
sciences rather than ethics. 
¥! The distinction between fact and value is better reformulated as a distinction 
between science and ethics, because although ethical judgements may never be 
objective or constitute knowledge in the way that we attribute to science, there 
can be such a thing as ethical knowledge.  The distinction between science and 
ethics is better at dealing with objectivity and the challenges brought by 
relativists and realists. 
 
As can be seen from the above list of accompanying claims/arguments Williams has 
much more to say about thick and thin ethical concepts and ethics (in general) than is 
																																																								
262 WilliamsÕ wider arguments and claims encompass a wide variety of topics within ethics such as the 
nature of ethical knowledge, the nature of our ethical practices, and the nature of ethical disagreement 
etc. 
263 WilliamsÕ accompanying claims/arguments are delivered in a piecemeal fashion throughout ELP, but 
I have collated these into a series of bullet points. 
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captured by a definition of his distinction between thick and thin concepts alone (and 
so this chapter addresses both his definition and his accompanying claims/arguments to 
the extent that is necessary to understand his distinction between thick and thin 
concepts).  Adopting this approach not only provides a better understanding of 
Williams (significantly, as we shall see, the legal literature addressed in chapter five 
makes some key errors regarding Williams because focus is solely on his definition) 
but it also emphasises the aspects of WilliamsÕ account on social explanation that are 
relevant for social practices such as law. 
 
Law and ethics both exist as part of Ôsocial worldsÕ and are social practices, in contrast 
to the kind of objective reality Williams attributes to science, and it is WilliamsÕ heavy 
focus on action-guidance that could be particularly useful for law.264  Previous legal 
theories have tried to account for this social aspect of law, whilst trying to maintain 
that the claims of that legal system exhibit some kind of objective authority akin to that 
associated with scientific knowledge.  WilliamsÕ wider concerns regarding the 
tendency to focus on the thin as opposed to the thick and his claim that the thick is 
more closely linked to our ethical lives warrants further investigation; because a 
society which focuses on the thin is very different from a society that focuses on the 
thick.  Of course, WilliamsÕ concerns regarding overemphasis on the thin are 
dependent on there being a clear-cut distinction between the thin and the thick, and this 
is not unanimously agreed upon. WilliamsÕ concern prompts an interesting question: 
has our understanding of legal practices tended to favour thinner or thicker accounts, 
and if so why?  If we have tended to favour one account not only is there space to 
interrogate this approach, but the bias could also be revealing regarding the nature of 
thick and thin concepts.   
 
 
4 - Exposition and analysis. 
 
 
The previous sections established the breadth of WilliamsÕ ideas in ELP, the context of 
these ideas and his importance as a theorist. The following section details his specific 
arguments.  There is much that could be said on the distinction between thick and thin 
																																																								
264 Williams uses the term Ôsocial worldsÕ to refer to the difference between the physical world we 
inhabit of which there is only one possibility and it is the same for all cultures; and the Ôsocial worldÕ 
which refers to the society or culture we live in.  There are multiple possible Ôsocial worldsÕ but only one 
possible physical world, for WilliamsÕ discussion of this see: note 225 at 166-167 
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concepts (as advanced by Williams), so discussion is limited to those aspects of his 
account that are most useful to an application in law. 
 
It is first important to note that WilliamsÕ formulation was part of his attack on 
prescriptivism, hence he made it clear throughout ELP that the kind of evaluative 
content he was concerned with was Ôaction-guiding contentÕ.  His attack on 
prescriptivism was part of a wider attack on ethical theory (and ethical theorists), 
which he believed had been preoccupied with defining ethical terms.  The focus on 
definitions in ethics led to (in his opinion) one of the most Ôspectacular misnomersÕ: 
the naturalistic fallacy.265  His criticisms of the naturalistic fallacy are part of his wider 
attack on those theorists who employed the fact-value distinction, such as in R. M. 
HareÕs prescriptivism.  Williams writes: 
 
More recent work has tried to give a better explanation.  It takes as 
central the ban on deriving ought from is.  The central view is 
prescriptivism, developed by Hare, which explains the function of 
ought in terms of prescribing an action, or telling someone what to 
do.  Ought is seen as being like an imperative: strictly speaking, a 
statement employing ought used in the normal prescriptive way is a 
universal expression that entails imperatives applying to all agents 
in all similar circumstancesÉ. On this interpretation, what I have up 
to now been calling the evaluative will more revealingly be called 
the prescriptive, and it is the prescriptive that cannot validly be 
derived from the other class of statementsÑa class that, in this 
contrast, is appropriately labelled the descriptive.  The explanation 
of the ban is now fairly obvious.  The prescriptive does something, 
namely telling people to act in certain ways, which the descriptive, 
in itself, cannot do.266   
 
WilliamsÕ account of thick concepts challenges this prescriptivist account of fact and 
value and the prescriptivist interpretation of the claim that you canÕt derive an ought 
from an is.267  He preferred to use the term Ôaction-guidingÕ as opposed to either 
ÔevaluativeÕ or ÔprescriptiveÕ and Ôworld-guidedÕ as opposed to ÔdescriptiveÕ.  Yet as 
																																																								
265 Williams refers to the naturalistic fallacy as a Ôspectacular misnomerÕ at ibid 134.  The term 
Ônaturalistic fallacyÕ was introduced by G. E. Moore, see: G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (first published 
Cambridge University Press, 1903) where he argued that it was fallacious to reduce goodness to natural 
properties (or to try to define it in terms of natural properties) such as ÔpleasantÕ or ÔdesirableÕ. 
266 ibid Williams at 137  
WilliamsÕ work in ELP demonstrates how the literature on thick and thin concepts developed from the 
meta-ethical debate between non-cognitivists and cognitivists, and it is interesting to note that Hare was 
one of WilliamsÕ graduate supervisors. 
267 WilliamsÕ work can be understood as continuing the challenges to naturalism and reductionist 
attempts at reducing all moral judgements to some basic moral concept such as ÔgoodÕ, that was already 
being voiced by cognitivists at the time.   
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will be seen throughout the rest of this chapter his formulation of thick concepts in 
terms of action-guiding and world-guided content is problematic as it does not seem to 
neatly capture the nature of ethical concepts, which leads to inconsistencies within his 
account.  One such inconsistency that has been noted by critics is that his formulation 
often fails to capture the wider nature of his critique of ethical theory (in particular 
prescriptivism).268 The following section takes a more detailed look at WilliamsÕ 





The distinction that needs unpicking is a two-part distinction that distinguishes 
between two kinds of ethical concepts: thick and thin.269  Thick ethical concepts are 
defined as being both Ôworld-guidedÕ and Ôaction-guidingÕ, whereas thin ethical 
concepts are only Ôaction-guidingÕ because they do not contain Ôworld-guidedÕ 
content.270  The application of a thick concept is Ôdetermined by what the world is likeÕ 
(world-guidedness) and therefore people who have acquired the thick concept will 
typically agree about its application.271  If a thick concept applies it often provides the 
concept user with a reason for action, although this reason need not be direct and may 
be outweighed by alternative reasons (i.e. it has action-guidingness).272  Williams 
follows in the footsteps of Ryle and Hurley by distinguishing thick concepts as 
																																																								
268 T. M. Scanlon, ÔThe Aims and Authority of Moral TheoryÕ (1992) 12 (1) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 1 
269 These are not the only possible ways of distinguishing between concepts, and as demonstrated in the 
previous chapter not all thick and thin concept theorists are happy with a two-part distinction of 
thickness and thinness.  Some theorists argue that there are multiple levels of thickness and thinness 
therefore a two-part distinction fails to capture the variety of thick and thin.   
270 The terms Ôaction-guidingÕ and Ôworld-guidedÕ seem fairly straightforward but further investigation 
demonstrates that it is not completely clear what conceptual content Williams meant to capture with 
these terms.  This is elaborated upon by question one: What is the nature of the conceptual content 
identified by the distinction? 
271 Agreement and disagreement regarding typical application of concepts (not just thick and thin 
concepts) has always been a complicated issue for conceptual analysis, although the extent of the 
complexity of this has only been acknowledged since the ÔClassical Theory of ConceptsÕ fell out of 
popularity (see chapter two).  In section five of this chapter when I address WilliamsÕ accompanying 
claims and arguments I return to the discussion of agreement and disagreement in thick and thin 
concepts. 
272 The role of thick and thin concepts in providing reasons for action plays a part in WilliamsÕ internal-
external reasons thesis, but this aspect of his work requires far more detailed examination than is 
necessary for a useful application of his distinction between thick and thin concepts in law.  I therefore 
address his ideas on Ôreasons for actionÕ only to the extent that they are covered in ELP for a more 
detailed understanding of his internal-external reasons thesis see: Bernard Williams, ÔInternal and 
External ReasonsÕ, in Moral Luck (Cambridge University Press, 1981), 101Ð113 
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ÔspecificÕ concepts from thin concepts, which are ÔgeneralÕ and ÔabstractÕ.273  In order 
to make further progress it is helpful to revert back to the two questions introduced in 
the last chapter, here canvassed in the particular case of WilliamsÕ approach. 
 
 
Q 1 What is the nature of the conceptual content identified by the distinction? 
 
Any distinction that clearly distinguishes concepts based on the possession of certain 
conceptual content (specific features) needs to be able to clearly identify and explain 
the nature of that conceptual content.  What does it therefore mean to characterise 
something as action-guiding or world-guided?  This is the first important question to be 
answered. 
 
Williams first outlines his distinction between action-guidance and world-guidedness 
at 143 of ELP: 
 
The way these notions are applied is determined by what the world 
is like (for instance, by how someone has behaved), and yet, at the 
same time, their application usually involves a certain valuation of 
the situation, of persons or actions.  Moreover, they usually (though 
not necessarily directly) provide reasons for action.274 
 
Williams asserts a close connection between the action-guiding and world-guided 
aspects.  Eric Wiland notes having a reason to do something doesnÕt simply depend 
upon whether your judgment represents the way the world is independent of you, as it 
depends in the first place upon whether your reason for action fits well with your pre-
existing motives for action.  Your reasons for action therefore always depend on your 
psychology, and so they are not significantly independent from what you want.  
WilliamsÕ view on thick ethical concepts influences his account of reasons for action 
and introduces the idea of cultural dependence: whether it is reasonable to act in a 
certain way is to some extent dependent upon cultural features.  This is quite vague and 
could be interpreted in many ways, but Wiland suggests: ÔWhether a thick ethical 
concept (courageous, chaste, cruel) can be correctly applied to someone depends not in 
the first place upon the culture of the person up for ethical evaluation.  It depends upon 
																																																								
273 The distinction between ÔspecificÕ and ÔgeneralÕ concepts advanced by Susan Hurley was addressed 
in chapter two of my thesis, but I briefly return to this distinction in the context of ELP in section five of 
this chapter. 
274 see note 225 at 143-144 
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the culture in which the concept has its home and point.Õ275  If reasons operate in the 
same way thick ethical terms do, then whether an action is reasonable depends upon 
the culture that gives the concept REASONABLE its point.276  This aspect of WilliamsÕ 
account is often referred to as evaluative standpoint. 
 
Later on Williams adds about action-guidedness: 
 
TheyÕre characteristically related to reasons for action.  If a concept 
of this kind applies, this often provides someone with a reason for 
action, though that reason need not be a decisive one and may be 
outweighed by other reasonsÉ. Of course, exactly what reason for 
action is provided, and to whom, depends on the situation, in ways 
that may well be governed by this and by other ethical concepts but 
some general connection with action is clear enough.  We may say, 
summarily, that such concepts are Òaction-guiding.Ó277 
 
It is clear that for Williams, action-guidance is the prime function or perhaps 
Ôfoundational pointÕ of both thin and thick ethical concepts, although interestingly he 
seems unclear as to whether this is the case for all thick and thin concepts.278  Action-
guidance is a significant feature of ethical concepts - many ethical thick and thin 
concepts seem to be practical and active in a way that some non-ethical thick and thin 
concepts arenÕt, e.g. CHAIR and GALAXY - but this does not mean that ethical concepts 
will always guide action, or that non-ethical concepts normally wonÕt or can never 
guide action.  Such a conclusion would be too concrete and would fail to capture the 
flexibility of our ethical concepts (this indeed is one of the criticisms advanced by 
many against WilliamsÕ account).  Action guidance is an important aspect of thick and 
thin ethical concepts, but it is not the only important aspect.  Thus Kirchin writes, 
 
When it comes to the guidance of action, things are trickier when 
we are not talking of possible courses of action simply because we 
are not thinking about how to act.  When evaluating a person, we 
might try to guide how others should treat her or refrain from 
following her lead.  But, that need not always happen.  Often our 
aim is simply to express some evaluation.279   
																																																								
275 Eric Wiland, ÔWilliams on Thick Ethical Concepts and Reasons for ActionÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), 
Thick Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013), 211 
276 Wiland argues that we (WilliamsÕ is included here) make the mistake of thinking that the concept 
REASONABLE is timeless and universal, when it is actually culturally peculiar.  He uses the legal concept 
REASONABLE to demonstrate that this is not a universal legal concept. 
277 see note 225 at 155-156 
278 On the one hand what he has to say regarding the thick and thin is clearly orientated towards an 
account of ethical life and practices, but he also makes claims regarding what he perceives to be the 
flawed tendency of philosophers (not just ethicists) to focus on the thin as opposed to the thick, and this 
seems to refer to thick and thin non-ethical concepts, as well as ethical.  
279 see note 235 at 5 
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We could be indicating our negative view of someone through our use of a thick 
concept such as ÔbarbaricÕ or ÔwickedÕ, but intend this as a statement about their 
character in the world-guided way associated with thick concepts and still not intend to 
guide anyoneÕs action either directly or indirectly as a result of that judgement.  The 
same could apply to our praise of an institution: it may be that our judgment of that 
institution as ÔnobleÕ might be meant simply as an expression of praise, and not an 
attempt to influence and guide how others treat that institution or view it.  There is a 
valid concern then that WilliamsÕ construction of thick and thin ethical concepts 
requiring action-guidance (even though he mentions this is only typically their function 
and that it may be indirect) can force concepts to fit a mould that is not the best fit with 
their evaluative nature.   
 
Simon Kirchin worries that Ôthe link between some evaluative judgements and some 
actions are so loose and convoluted that it is strained to posit a link.  Doing so might 
reflect only a philosophical prejudice, not the truth of the matter.Õ280  This might be 
because our judgement of the person as ÔwickedÕ or the institution as ÔnobleÕ as 
discussed above was not meant to guide action even indirectly.  Or it could be because 
the individual instance of action-guidance is so weak that it is only when enough 
people make the same judgement that there could be a direct or indirect reason to act 
accordingly.  The concern being that even if action-guidance is a Ôfoundational-pointÕ 
of thick and thin concepts and one of the benefits of WilliamsÕ formulation is the 
attention he draws to the role of action-guidance, categorising everything that is Ônon-
world-guidedÕ in terms of Ôaction-guidanceÕ (as Williams does) misconstrues the 
reality.  
 
It is interesting to note this problematic aspect of WilliamsÕ formulation because 
Williams advances a similar criticism against HareÕs prescriptivism.  He criticises Hare 
for forcing all evaluative concepts into a prescriptivist mould: 
 
 In saying that anything is good or bad, admirable or low, 
outstanding or inferior of its kind, we are in effect telling others or 
ourselves to do something Ð as the explanation typically goes, to 
choose something.  All evaluation has to be linked to action. 
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 This result is not easy to believe.  It seems false to the spirit 
of many aesthetic evaluations, for instance: it seems to require our 
basic perspective on the worth of pictures to be roughly that of 
potential collectors.  Even within the realm of the ethical, it is 
surely taking too narrow a view of human merits to suppose that 
people recognized as good are people that we are being told to 
imitate.281 
 
Williams admits that his formulation when applied in aesthetics leads to an absurd 
conclusion.  As Williams himself points out in the above quotation - aesthetic concepts 
are not normally related to action-guidance (we donÕt all behave like art collectors all 
the time) - they are normally used to voice aesthetic judgements that are reports of how 
we view the thing aesthetically and reflections of the evaluation carried by the thick 
aesthetic concept chosen to express this.  This could be as simple as whether we like or 
dislike it, and how it makes us feel. 
 
Despite what I have said above, there are many instances where aesthetic concepts are 
used to guide action; the point is rather that as with ethical concepts, a construction of 
these that categorises all the Ônon-world-guidedÕ content as action-guiding fails to 
accurately represent them as a whole.  Everyday actions such as choosing what to wear 
or buy are often based on aesthetic considerations.  Indeed the aesthetic can be so 
important to some individuals that it can cause them to act in a morally questionable 
way, for example breaking promises or stealing.  This can raise questions as to the 
close proximity between these two spheres of our social lives, which may question the 
nature of the distinction between ethics and aesthetics. Not only are there problems 
with WilliamsÕ formulation regarding ethical concepts, but also aesthetic concepts, yet 
interestingly he only seems to be aware of the problem in the case of the aesthetic. 
 
If ÔprescriptionÕ and Ôaction-guidanceÕ fail to adequately capture the nature of the 
evaluative phenomena under consideration, then how do alternative meta-ethical 
accounts of thickness fare?  Accounts of thick and thin posed in terms of evaluation 
and description (such as those addressed in chapter three) can be equally problematic. 
They can also construe the terrain too narrowly or too widely. WilliamsÕ account 
seems to imply that action-guidance is a specific feature of ethical concepts, but there 
are many thick concepts that are not the traditional ethical concepts that we use to 
guide action, which can still be used in an action-guiding role.  For example: 
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ÔmeditationÕ, ÔturnÕ, ÔpithyÕ, ÔindustriousÕ and ÔtidyÕ.  We could envisage situations 
where a teacher praises a student for finally succeeding in meditation, a teaching load 
can be judged as manageable, you may be told it is not your turn and therefore not 
allowed to do something, a comment could be judged as pithy and we can praise or 
condemn people for being industrious or tidy.  Consider MEDITATION: 
 
The evaluative nature of MEDITATION is more complex than we are 
used to when thinking about our diet of thick concepts: it is not 
always used evaluatively, and it need not always be used positively 
perhaps.  Sometimes when it is used evaluatively, this is 
transmitted because of tone of voice or context.  At other times, I 
think that the concept itself, because of what it is, conveys 
evaluation.  My claim is that many concepts work like this.  
Without this insight they would be mistakenly classed as (mere) 
thick descriptions because our notion of a thick concept is 
limited.282 
 
The way the evaluative or action-guidance aspect of a thick concept is construed may 
not only distort our understanding of our conceptual practices (could lead to inadequate 
accounts of thick and thin concepts and the false identification of some concepts as 
thick descriptions); but it could also result in significant misunderstandings of our 
language practices. 
 
It should be made clear though that there does seem to be a difference between terms 
such as ÔmeditationÕ, ÔturnÕ, ÔpithyÕ, ÔindustriousÕ and ÔtidyÕ; and terms such as 
ÔhonestyÕ, ÔbraveÕ and ÔdeceitfulÕ. We would not normally consider the former 
concepts to be evaluative in the same way as the latter.  There seems to be something 
different about these evaluative concepts that the literature wishes to isolate.  Some 
theorists have described the latter concepts as wearing their pro or con evaluation on 
their sleeves, whereas the non-traditional examples I gave (ÔmeditationÕ, ÔturnÕ, ÔpithyÕ 
etc.) are not typically evaluative and therefore often classed as not being Ôessentially 
evaluativeÕ.  In both cases of a conceptÕs context, tone of voice and qualifiers may play 
a key role in directing the evaluation.283   
 
																																																								
282 see note 235 at 17 
283 Many wish to keep two things apart when it comes to concepts: content and function.  I agree there is 
a clear difference between what the conceptÕs content (meaning) is and how it is used, and I think there 
are some concepts where it is stretching the point to argue that they are evaluative even in the loosest 
sense, because they have been used in a positive or negative fashion.  What I wish to indicate though, is 
that the range of evaluative concepts is much wider than we first thought and this is often only brought 
out when they are used in particular ways and situations. 
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However this evaluative phenomena is identified it seems clear that the nature of 
evaluation is far more complicated than many accounts of thick and thin allow.  This 
complexity may require a degree of flexibility that is not there in accounts that try to 
construe all types of evaluation under broad headings, such as WilliamsÕ Ôaction-




Similar problems arise regarding world-guided content, which can be just as 
problematic and similarly fail to capture the nature of this aspect of thick concepts.  
Williams outlines world-guidedness at 155 of ELP: 
 
At the same time, their application is guided by the world.  A 
concept of this sort may be rightly or wrongly applied, and people 
who have acquired it can agree that it applies or fails to apply to 
some new situation.  In many cases the agreement will be 
spontaneous, while in other cases there is room for judgement and 
comparison.  Some disagreement at the margin may be irresoluble, 
but this does not mean that the use of the concept is not controlled 
by the facts or by the usersÕ perception of the world.  (As with 
other concepts that are not totally precise, marginal disagreements 
can indeed help to show how their use is controlled by the facts.)  
We can say, then, that the application of these concepts is at the 
same time word-guided and action-guiding.284 
 
The world-guidedness of WilliamsÕ notion of thick concepts might be thought of as a 
contrast between the greater empirical content of thick concepts when compared to thin 
concepts.  This would mean that a concept is world-guided to the extent that 
determination of its correct applicability is achieved by the empirical (physical and 
psychological) features of a situation.285   
 
Scheffler (with others) raises concerns regarding the determination of world-
guidedness: ÔWilliams says that one characteristic of world-guided concepts is that 
people who have them typically agree about their application in all but marginal cases.  
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285 Scanlon claims that such an understanding of world-guidedness casts doubt on the significance of the 
distinction between thick and thin concepts.  T. M. Scanlon, ÔThickness and TheoryÕ (2003) 100 (6) The 
Journal of philosophy 275.  Scheffler makes a similar argument Ð Williams deals with moral concepts 
that all seem to have a considerable amount of empirical content, so any contrast between thick and thin 
concepts based on empirical content can at best only be one of degree. Samuel Scheffler, ÔMorality 
through Thick and Thin: A Critical Notice of Ethics and the Limits of PhilosophyÕ (1987) 96 (3) The 
Philosophical Review 411.  Scanlon also discusses ELP in his: T. M. Scanlon, ÔThe Aims and Authority 
of Moral TheoryÕ (1992) 12 (1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1 
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However he explicitly denies that agreement is sufficient for world-guidedness, and he 
does not seem to regard agreement as strictly necessary either.Õ286  If this is the case 
then what does determine world-guidedness?  We are left unsure.  Agreement or 
disagreement and specificity or generality are matters of degree and they do not 
necessarily have to coincide, so this can make matters rather complicated.  
 
Using the term world-guided to refer to their content suggests that such content and 
any subsequent distinction between thick and thin concepts is in part due to a kind of 
objectivity Ð the judgements expressed by thick concepts express knowledge in virtue 
of their thickness, because they make claims about the way the world is that is guided 
by the way the world actually is.  Yet, how do we determine the way the world 
ÔactuallyÕ is with any accuracy? Williams never really answers this question but when 
responding to an imagined challenge from non-cognitivists he throws doubt on the 
objectivity of ethics in two ways. First, he argues that there is no reason to believe that 
there is a descriptive concept that picks out the same features of the world as its 
counterpart world-guided thick concept;287 and second, he argues that understanding 
the evaluative standpoint of a thick ethical concept is crucial to its application.  Both of 
these claims cast doubt on the objectivity of thick concepts, because any claims for 
objectivity could not be based only on the role of world-guidedness in their 
application, as they would also have to be applicable to the evaluative judgments that 
determine their ethical shape.288 
 
WilliamsÕ use of world-guidedness creates problems for his account in another way 
too, because it raises the question: what is the minimum amount of world-guidedness 
required for a concept to be a thick concept as opposed to a thin concept?  This 
question seems to be hard for Williams to answer and his lack of response is what has 
led many to disagree about the nature of the distinction he poses between thick and thin 
concepts Ð whether it is based on a difference of kind or a difference of degree.  For 
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287 It is this aspect of WilliamsÕ account that leads Jonathon Dancy to attribute to Williams the Ôstandard 
viewÕ on thick concepts.  ÔAn honest man is not a truth-respecter and good, but a truth-respecter and 
good for being so.  The evaluation, therefore cannot be peeled off from the description so as to stand as 
independently comprehensible. But neither can the description be peeled off from the evaluation, if we 
are dealing with a genuinely thick concept.  The leading feature of the thick was supposed to be that the 
descriptive ÒsideÓ is not independently comprehensible.Õ  Jonathon Dancy, ÔIn Defense of Thick 
ConceptsÕ (1995) 20 (1) Midwest Studies in Philosophy 263 
288 Scanlon has argued that this suggests not only a difference of degree as opposed to kind regarding 
empirical content, but a difference of degree regarding content (of any kind).  See: T. M. Scanlon, 
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example many concepts that are deemed thinner than thick concepts seem also to be 
determined (at least to some extent) by what the world is like.  Consider for example 
ÔproÕ or ÔconÕ - the thinnest thin concepts, and then consider the thicker (but still 
thinner than our traditional thick concepts) ÔgoodÕ and ÔrightÕ. Then consider the more 
traditional thick(er) ethical concepts ÔjusticeÕ and ÔfairnessÕ, which are thicker again 
than ÔproÕ and ÔconÕ, and ÔgoodÕ and ÔrightÕ, but still relatively thin in comparison to 
many other concepts. Distinguishing between all of these requires at least some level 
of world-guidedness.  It also seems odd to think that these concepts through a lack of 
world-guidedness are somehow not quite Ôin the worldÕ in the same way thicker 
concepts are.289  
 
Q 2 Is the distinction between thick and thin concepts based on a distinction between 
two different ÔkindsÕ of concept?290 
 
Scheffler argues in a review of ELP that Williams is wrong to insist on a two-part 
ÔkindÕ distinction, as opposed to a continuum of degree between thick and thin.  This 
seems to indicate that WilliamsÕ writing suggests a difference of kind as opposed to 
degree.  One of the main inconsistencies in WilliamsÕ account is whether his two-part 
distinction indicates a difference of kind or a difference of degree.  His non-
separationism surely indicates a difference of degree but he never explicitly states his 
non-separationism - it is instead hinted at through his choice of language (thereby 
leaving matters still unclear).  KirchinÕs work is helpful here, because he reminds us 
that a difference of kind could still contain interesting divisions, and be more complex 
than a two-part distinction.  A difference of kind could contain multiple divisions 
within each category; so for example there could be five different levels of thickness 
contained within the thick concept category, and five different levels of thinness 
																																																								
289 Christine Tappolet argues that Williams seems to have followed the path of a clear separation 
between thick and thin concepts, she proposes an account based on a difference of degree that interprets 
the relationship between general concepts such as GOOD and the more specific ethical concepts (cited as 
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that specific evaluative concepts are at least partly descriptive Ð and I think he is right Ð he has to say the 
same of thin concepts.Õ  Christine Tappolet, ÔThrough thick and thin: ÔgoodÕ and its determinatesÕ (2004) 
58 (2) Dialetica 207, 218-219 
290 I am referring to the debate discussed in the previous chapter regarding difference of degree and 
difference of kind.  
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contained within the thin concept category.  Even if the difference between these five 
(or whatever) levels of either thickness or thinness was one of degree, the distinction 
between a thick or thin concept could still be a difference of kind.  Of course, this 
would mean there has to be a clear distinction between thick and thin, so that a concept 
could be classed as one kind of concept Ð thin Ð as opposed to another kind Ð thick Ð 
and unfortunately this does not seem possible. 
 
Williams argues that the connotations and associations involved in thick concepts are 
stronger than those involved with thin concepts, but this does not mean that there arenÕt 
any connotations or associations involved with the thin.  If it is possible to successfully 
demonstrate that there are connotations and associations involved with the thin also, 
then this may indicate a difference of degree as opposed to kind.  The distinction 
between good and right is a prime example of this, because both are thin, although I 
would argue that good is thinner than right, but right indicates that it is the one option 
that should be selected, whereas good indicates that it may be one of many options.  
Good and right both involve pro and con (the barest possible evaluations), and if they 
didnÕt then it would be impossible to distinguish good things from right things.  The 
extra information added to pro in the examples of good and right seems to operate 
comparatively; i.e. it is done on the basis of how different options are viewed, for good 
and right are different positive judgements.  Some could argue this is indicative of a 
difference of kind, because thick concepts are normally considered to provide 
connotations and associations about the object they categorize in a way that extends 
beyond purely positive (pro) judgement or negative (con) judgement. 
 
WilliamsÕ account of thick and thin ethical concepts focuses mainly on the thick and 
doesnÕt explicitly indicate whether he thinks there are also associations and 
connotations involved with the thin.  This is partly because his account of thick 
concepts is advanced to demonstrate wider claims about ethical objectivity and 






291 I return to this in more detail in the next section of this chapter. 
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5 - WilliamsÕ wider claims and arguments. 
  
This section moves away from WilliamsÕ formulation of his two-part distinction 
turning instead to the context of this distinction Ð the wider claims and accompanying 
arguments Ð that are important to fully understand his distinction between thick and 
thin concepts.292  In brief the following points emerging from WilliamsÕ work are 
significant here (subsequent key features of WilliamsÕ perspective are treated under 
further bullet points below): 
 
¥! Ethical theories focus too much on the thin, they do this by reducing the thick 
down to some thin things that can be applied systematically and form the basis 
of an ethical theory.  Such ethical theories distort the real nature of their subject 
matter. 
¥! Our ethical lives are much richer and diverse than our ethical theories can 
accommodate and this is because they focus on the thin, the thick is better at 
representing this richness. 
¥! The thick is conceptually prior to the thin and the thin can be abstracted from 
the thick.  This links to another of his claims that the thick is better equipped to 
provide a more stable account of ethical knowledge and life. 
 
 
Scheffler states, ÔWilliams sees the leading contemporary ethical theories, whether 
deontological, contractualist or utilitarian as neglecting the thick ethical concepts in 
favour of the thin.  And he does not regard this as a matter of simple omission or 
incompleteness.  Rather, he claims, it is due to the fact that all of these theories are the 
products of reductive enterpriseÕ.293  Williams claims the thick is more closely linked to 
our practices and the way the world is, hence in his account only the thick and not the 
thin are said to contain world-guided content.294  He argues that we have specific 
evaluative concepts that directly attach to actions and objects and help us categorize our 
experiences accordingly; and then we have Ômore abstractÕ concepts that we derive from 
these thicker concepts.  This is why ethical knowledge (or confidence) is more likely to 
be gained by focusing on the thick. 
 
He argues that theorists are driven by a desire to show that one kind of ethical 
consideration is basic and that all other types can be explained in terms of it.  Ethical 
																																																								
292 Throughout this section I refer to the list of accompanying claims/arguments stated in section three of 
this chapter (and where useful group related claims/arguments together).  All bullet pointed statements 
are from this earlier list of WilliamsÕ accompanying claims/arguments, previously stated in section three. 
293 see note 229 at 415 
294 see note 225 at 155-156 
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theory therefore tries to look for the more general notions that could be used as a basis 
to systematize as many cases as possible.  The reductionist aim is contradictory to the 
idea of the variety of evaluation advanced by the thick.  In WilliamsÕ opinion such 
reductive ethical theories are committed to imposing an oversimplified structure on 
ethical thought and (therefore) the explanations they generate of our ethical lives 
substantially fail to capture the richness of those ethical lives.  Both he and Ryle 
instead argue that the thin is abstracted from the thick and this is quite different from a 
reduction down to supposedly constituent parts.  It is the specificity of the thick and the 
link thick concepts have to world-guidedness (in WilliamsÕ view) that leads Williams 
to wonder why we focus on the thin, when thinness lacks both of these and is instead 
very abstract.  Williams argues that a society that focuses on the thin will be 
remarkably different from one that focuses on the thick.295   
 
Williams is making two different but related claims and this leads Scheffler to consider 
whether Ôthere is a tension in WilliamsÕ account between them; that is, first, the claim 
that the morality system dominates contemporary ethical thought outside philosophy 
and not only within it, and second, the claim that our actual ethical lives are richer, 
more variegated, ÒthickerÓ than the morality system can acknowledge.Õ296  Scheffler 
cites this tension because Williams claims the morality system is not an invention of 
philosophers, but a feature of the modern world in general.  So that although different 
social worlds could be considered to have different morality systems, each of these 
systems is a feature of the relevant social world, not a creation imagined by the 
philosophers working within it.  Williams also argues that thick concepts have Òless 
currencyÓ in modern society and that Ôa society that relies on general expressions is 
very different from one that puts greater weight on more specific ones.Õ297  This view 
effectively leads to the conclusion that at present we live in the thinnest social world, 
to date.  Yet, on the other hand he consistently claims that the morality system and the 
ethical theories generated under it fail to capture the richness and variety of ethical 
thought and practice.  Williams clearly doesnÕt think there is any inconsistency here, 
but he certainly needs to explain further how a morality system that in his opinion 
precludes the generation of thickness, can have generated it to such an extent that 
explications of it can be criticised for failing to adequately capture this.  Williams 
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responds by allowing that the morality system exercises a strong influence on 
contemporary ethical life, but that this is not strong enough to remove the hold that 
some other thicker strands of ethical thought and their accompanying thick ethical 
concepts, have over us.  ÔThus, the claim may be, that our ethical lives, thin as they are, 
are still sufficiently thick that the morality system manages to misrepresent even 
them.Õ298 
 
SchefflerÕs consideration of the difference between the thin and the thick as advanced 
by Williams has wider implications for WilliamsÕ account. Arguing that focus has been 
on one rather than the other (i.e. that it has been on the thin) is based on the assumption 
that there is a fairly clear distinction between these two (thick and thin) and as the 
previous section demonstrated this is controversial.   
 
Recall KirchinÕs observation: 
 
Consider the following concepts, for example: justice, fairness, and 
impartiality, to take one cluster of notions; liberty, equality, 
freedom of expression to take another; privacy, self-respect, envy, 
to take a third; needs, well-being, and interests to take a fourth; and 
rights, autonomy, and consent for a fifth.  Are the concepts on this 
list thick or thin?299 
 
If they are all thick, then presumably WilliamsÕ criticism fails and contemporary 
ethical theories are far more concerned with thick concepts than he allows, because a 
cursory glance of any ethics textbook would reveal theories concerned with all the 
concepts listed above.  Alternatively, if all the concepts on the list are thin, then the 
class of thin concepts extends far wider than Williams perceives and is much richer 
than his account suggests.  So, even if ethical theories do concern themselves with the 
thin more than the thick, this finding would not necessarily lead to the 
oversimplification and distortion of ethical life he earlier alleged.  And if this is so his 
social argument loses considerable force and leads to doubts about whether he can 
confidently claim that the thick is more closely connected to our ethical lives and that 
the thick provides a better chance for ethical knowledge or confidence.  It may be that 
all Williams can legitimately claim is that the thick represents the complexity of our 
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ethical lives better, because these concepts are, by definition, richer more fine-grained 
and complex ethical concepts.300  
 
¥! There is more action in the thick, the thick offers a more stable chance of 
ethical knowledge and confidence, because it is thick ethical concepts and the 
judgements they express that can be said to be true or false and constitute 
ethical facts. 
 
WilliamsÕ ideas on thick and thin are discussed in the context of a response to 
relativism, and this is partly because he believes that it is thick ethical concepts that 
offer the best hope for ethical knowledge or confidence.301  Williams conceives that it 
is relativism that causes us to lose confidence in our ethical practices and claims in the 
first place.  Thick ethical concepts are not able to satisfy the relativistÕs challenge 
completely, but they nonetheless provide a better chance of doing so than the thin. This 
advantage relates to WilliamsÕ distinction between science and ethics and his claim 
that ethics operates in a different reality to the scientific, because there are competing 
Ôsocial worldsÕ and our ethical practices - and therefore knowledge claims - have to be 
understood as a part of the social world (reality).302 
 
An immediate relation can be found between the foregoing account of WilliamsÕ view 
and matters of interest in contemporary legal theory.  Thus WilliamsÕ discussion of 
relativism and objectivity relates closely to recent discussions of legal objectivity.  A 
challenge for any legal system (domestic or international) is to account for legal 
judgements as a source of authority, which issues also bear at another level in 
disagreements between different judges all trying to decide the same case. Williams is 
interested in social explanation and he is concerned that one of the things holding 
ethical knowledge back is a lack of authority to say that any one account is better (or is 
the right account) as opposed to another objectively speaking.  Law and ethics both 
operate as social practices and this is something that any account of legal objectivity 
needs to consider.  For example, legal positivists attempt to bring certainty and 
objectivity to law by construing the legal sphere as a reality that is much closer to that 
of the scientific than social, but Williams suggests that rather than asking Òis this a 
method of finding our way around the social world?Ó we should ask Òis this a good 
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way of living compared with others?Ó; or, to put it another way, Òis this the best kind of 
social world?Ó303 This is an interesting question to ask of law. 
 
¥! Reflection can destroy ethical knowledge; ethical knowledge may be 
undesirable, ethical confidence is a better aim and this can come from the social 
sciences rather than ethics. 
 
Williams poses the scenario of a ÔhypertraditionalÕ society in which the people use 
their thick concepts unreflectively, as a way of navigating their social world.304  Within 
that particular social world, the judgements they make using their thick concepts can 
amount to a kind of ethical knowledge and a form of justified true belief.  It is only 
when they are presented with an alternative social world that navigates differently, so-
to-speak, that they start to doubt their own practices and question their knowledge. The 
ÔhypertraditionalÕ society could therefore possess ethical knowledge at an unreflective 
level but ethical reflection may destroy this ethical knowledge or at least substantially 
decrease their confidence in these ethical knowledge claims.  Williams states it is 
important to be quite clear what ethical knowledge is in question (reflective or 
unreflective) within the ÔhypertraditionalÕ society: ÔIt is the knowledge involved in 
their making judgments in which they use their thick concepts.  We are not considering 
whether they display knowledge in using those concepts rather than some others: this 
would be an issue at the reflective level.Õ305  As soon as we stand back from our ethical 
practices and our concept use, and ask whether it is the right way to go on in that 
particular social world (Williams doesnÕt think it makes sense to ask this of a different 
society that is too far removed from our own social world), then we are questioning the 
ethical knowledge of the thick concepts users at a reflective level, and it is at this level 
which Williams concedes Ôthey certainly do not possess knowledge.Õ306   Engaging 
with this reflective enterprise can lead to a loss of confidence in our ethical knowledge 
and concepts.  If this lack of confidence is serious enough it can lead to the permanent 
loss of that knowledge, because when those members of the ÔhypertraditionalÕ society 
cease to make judgements using those concepts they no longer possess the kind of 
unreflective ethical knowledge Williams has in mind - Ôthe knowledge involved in 
their making judgments in which they use their thick concepts.Õ307  Ethical reflection 
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impedes our ability to use thick concepts because it raises the notion of other 
potentially better ways to Ògo onÓ, and this undermines our confidence in our own 
method.  Although we cannot go back to an unreflective time, reflective ethical 
knowledge is not the only possible kind of ethical knowledge, Williams suggests that 
we could instead ask: Ôwhether members of the society could, in exercising their 
concepts, express knowledge about the world to which they apply them, and the 
answer to that might be yes.Õ308 Williams suggests that unreflective ethical knowledge 
is to be located within our repertoire of thick concepts and our subsequent use of them, 
but can thick concepts hold up to reflection?  Williams argues that there are some thick 
ethical concepts that can stand up to reflection, and it is these thick ethical concepts 
that ensure the survival of some ethical knowledge at the reflective level, even if the 
residue is less than we originally believed we might possess, and this survival is 
sufficient to give us ethical confidence.309   
 
Surprisingly, WilliamsÕ final advice on the matter is that we should rethink entirely our 
quest for ethical knowledge because ethical confidence is more desirable than ethical 
knowledge.   It may seem ridiculous to suggest that we could ever have confidence in 
our ethical practices, without perceiving this confidence to be on the grounds of some 
kind of ethical knowledge (even if it was mistaken on our part).  However, Williams 
argues that the confidence in our ethical practices is to be found outside of ethics, in 
the social sciences and the humanities.  This final point is particularly interesting and 
potentially promising in helping to articulate or sum or even determine between 
accounts of legal objectivity. 
 
Valerie Tiberius agrees with WilliamsÕ suggestion that ethical confidence in our 
desires and ideals is more advantageous and proceeds to argue for a way of thick 
theorizing that shores up our confidence in our ethical concepts, so that ethical 
reflection of a certain kind can increase our confidence in terms such as ÔwisdomÕ and 
Ôwell-beingÕ.310  One worry about WilliamsÕ view on this count is that perhaps thin 
ethical concepts might be able to deliver the same outcomes. However, thick concepts 
do have some advantages over the thin here; their complexity gives theorists a lot of 
																																																								
308 ibid 
309 Williams never actually specifies which thick concepts he has in mind here, so it is unclear which 
thick concepts could be robust enough to hold up against reflection. 
310 Valerie Tiberius, ÔWell-being, Wisdom, and Thick Theorizing: on the Division of labor between 
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substance to work with and a wider variety of related commitments to appeal to.  Yet 
Tiberius argues that the biggest advantage of thick theorizing is also a disadvantage 
and has to do with scope: 
 
When we construct theories that speak to peopleÕs actual 
commitments, ideals, and values in fundamental ways, we are more 
likely to construct theories that are action-guiding, reason-giving, 
and persuasive, theories that can underwrite the sort of confidence 
Williams thinks is missing in our reflective age.  But when we 
draw on peopleÕs actual commitments, ideals, and values to 
construct theories, we also open ourselves to the charge that our 
theories will only apply to those who actually share these 
commitments.311 
 
TiberiusÕ observation is helpful, but in fact two different but related problems of scope 
need to be distinguished.  First, there will be people to whom our theory does not 
apply, and second, this lack of scope may then undermine the confidence in the theory 
for those to whom it does apply.  What really seems to be the issue though is that the 
ethical views and concepts of the people for whom the theory doesnÕt apply might 
represent a better way of Ògoing onÓ, even if this is the case it would only leave us in 
the position of wanting to revise our own theory or reject it entirely. 
 
J. E. J. Altham312 argues that WilliamsÕ core claim (that we have some limited ethical 
knowledge that is sustained by confidence in our ethical practices) conflicts with 
another of his claims; i.e. that we have ethical knowledge through our use of thick 
ethical concepts.  Altham and Alan Thomas both agree that the combination is unstable 
- it requires confidence to be capable of performing two incompatible roles: Ôto 
supplement thin, non-world guided commitments in their application and also, when 
we have thick concepts, to give us confidence in continuing to be committed to them 
when we know that others have incompatible sets.Õ313  Thomas also worries that 
modernization has led to a corrosive reflectiveness that erodes our thick ethical 
concepts whilst simultaneously demanding an increased transparency and truthfulness 
from them.  Ethical confidence may be our best hope, but it will not restore the thick 
ethical concepts we have already lost and it cannot guarantee the sustainability of those 
we currently have.  
																																																								
311 ibid at 229 
312 J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison, World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of 
Bernard Williams, (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 
313 Alan Thomas, ÔMaxims and Thick Ethical Concepts: Reply to MooreÕ available as a pdf 
<www.logical-operator.com/ReplytoMoore.pdf > accessed 20 November 2012 
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¥! The distinction between fact and value is better reformulated as a distinction 
between science and ethics, because although ethical judgements may never be 
objective or constitute knowledge in the way that we attribute to science, there 
can be such a thing as ethical knowledge.  The distinction between science and 
ethics is better at dealing with objectivity and the challenges brought by 
relativists and realists. 
 
The subject of the humanities is human thought and it therefore requires a human point 
of view, one that is infused with the culture and values of that particular social world.  
This is why scientific knowledge is very different from any potential ethical 
knowledge, since scientific knowledge will be ÔtrueÕ or ÔfalseÕ so-to-speak across all 
social worlds, because there is only one scientific reality.  Whereas the variation we 
see across different societies in terms of their ethical beliefs is a reflection of the 
multiple social worlds that exist.  Thus we can choose, or at least shape our social 
world; the same cannot be said for science.  Therefore an account of ethical knowledge 
asks whether a particular judgement could be viewed as ÔtrueÕ or ÔfalseÕ in that 
particular social world and as a piece of ethical knowledge, not across all social 
worlds.  This also explains (in WilliamsÕ view) why the dominant ethical judgements 
about a particular thing can also be subject to change throughout the history of a 
particular social world.   
  
It is WilliamsÕ work in social explanation that furthers his distinction between ethics 
and science, and discusses his idea that ethics operates within a different realm to the 
scientific.  His explanation (that multiple social systems are the result of multiple 
social worlds, and will therefore necessarily have to be accommodated within any 
account offering objective grounding to the knowledge claims it produces) is 
something that could be particularly illuminating to accounts of legal objectivity.  Like 
ethics, law has to account for the perspectival nature of legal thought; judicial 
disagreement is a prime example of this and has yet to be convincingly reconciled with 







314 see note 225 at 165 -166 
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6 Ð WilliamsÕ popularity. 
 
The above discussion of WilliamsÕ thick ethical concepts in ELP has been specifically 
limited to those aspects that appear to have a ready application in law.  WilliamsÕ 
formulation has been widely adopted by those working on thick and thin concepts 
outside ethics (e.g. legal theorists) but this begs the question why WilliamÕs 
formulation of thick and thin is not more popular with ethicists.   The following 
discussion addresses the contestation prompted in meta-ethics by the reception of 
WilliamsÕ work. 
 
Williams has a very specific notion of thick and thin concepts, and both world-
guidedness and action-guidance is key to this, as picked out in the preceding 
discussion. The ethical is more overtly linked to action-guidance than other spheres, 
such as aesthetics or epistemology, but both ethical and non-ethical concepts are not 
only concerned with action-guidance.  So it may be that WilliamsÕ sharp focus on 
action-guidance leaves meta-ethical readers uncomfortable, because even in the case of 
the ethical where he might be most justified to focus so sharply on the role of action-
guidance, this focus seems to ignore a large aspect of the role of ethics and ethical 
judgements.  Williams does allow in his formulation that they only typically guide 
action and that this, may be indirect, but he fails to elaborate on this and the rest of his 
account is so heavily focused on action-guidance, that it seems more like an escape 
clause than an explanation of the relationship between reasons and action-guidance. 
 
World-guided and action-guiding content are tricky to define (WilliamsÕ explanation is 
brief), but so are descriptive and evaluative content (and these remain popular).  It 
seems tricky to define descriptive and world-guided because if we take these to mean 
content that is used to describe, this leaves many moral theorists (especially 
cognitivists) unsatisfied.  There is a concern that some of the more abstract concepts 
that under WilliamsÕ formulation are presented as lacking world-guidedness, such as 
GOOD, seem to be just as much in the world, guiding our use of them, as thicker 
concepts such as TREACHERY.  The concern is that if concepts such as GOODNESS and 
CHASTITY are both as good as each other at describing the world (even though 
GOODNESS is generally seen as thin or at least thinner than CHASTITY), then the 
distinction between thick and thin concepts needs to be based on something more 
substantial than the claim that thick concepts contain world-guided content (describe 
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the world or some aspects of it) unlike their thin counterparts (where any possible 
world-guided content is minimal). 
 
It is worth noting that although most meta-ethicists do not use WilliamsÕ formulation 
of thick and thin concepts (Jonathan Dancy and Christine Tappolet work with 
formulations similar to WilliamsÕ), WilliamsÕ formulation is still a talking point for 
discussions of thickness and thinness.  WilliamsÕ formulation may have fallen out of 
popularity (within ethics), but his work and influence certainly have not.315  There may 
be problems with his specific formulation of thick and thin concepts, but his account 
illuminates many issues and highlights many more interesting facets of the debate that 
need consideration. 316 As the legal literature on thick and thin demonstrates, WilliamsÕ 
work is still popular as a starting point for discussion of thick and thin.   
 
The critical nature of the above discussion may seem contrary to the claim that thick 
and thin could be useful in law (using WilliamsÕ formulation) but the problems 
highlighted above are part of the wider problems of conceptual analysis (and therefore 
also applicable to any account of thick and thin).317   Any criticisms of Williams (such 
as those advanced above) are countered with the caveat that even the sections of 
WilliamsÕ work that are least persuasive are to be valued.  ÔHis explicitness and 
argumentative ingenuity focus the issues more sharply, and at greater depth, than any 
comparable work I know.  The writing, here and throughout, is compressed and 
energetic, and there is much incidental pleasure to be had from striking observations 





315 A recent conference celebrating thirty years since the first publication of ELP aims to explore the 
ways in which ELP remains to be an under-utilised and under-explored philosophical tool for ethical 
thought both within the analytical tradition in philosophy and beyond.  The conference Ô30 Years of 
Bernard WilliamsÕ Ethics and the Limits of PhilosophyÕ was held at the Department of Philosophy, 
Oxford University, 3rd - 5th July 2015. 
316 Many meta-ethicists note the importance of ELP and the distinction between thick and thin concepts.  
It is not WilliamsÕ ideas but his specific formulation of thick ethical concepts and thin ethical concepts 
that seems to be problematic.  Simon Kirchin opines that it is Ôtoo concrete and narrowly discrete, 
something that goes against the spirit of his writings.Õ see note 235 at 6 
317 In chapter two I charted the demise and resurgence of the classical theory of conceptual analysis in 
analytic philosophy; conceptual analysis has also undergone a resurgence in philosophy of law and this 
study argues that conceptual analysis is still a useful method for philosophical analysis in law. 
318 McDowell neatly concludes at the end of his review of ELP.  See: John McDowell, ÔCritical Notice 
of Bernard Williams' Ethics and the Limits of PhilosophyÕ (1986) 95 Mind, 377, 386 
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7 - Conclusion. 
 
This concludes the exposition of the meta-ethical literature on thick and thin concepts, 
which provides the philosophical grounding of this thesis.  The aim has been to chart 
key aspects of the development of thick and thin concepts, and in particular WilliamsÕ 
formulation of thick and thin concepts, as it will be the operating definition of thick 
and thin in this study.  Having articulated and defended my choice of WilliamsÕ 
formulation the following chapters of my study draw analogies from his formulation 
and wider ethical claims.  The next five chapters note the relevance and usefulness of 
WilliamsÕ ideas (as discussed in this chapter) for three aspects of substantive law: legal 
concepts, legal theory and specific jurisprudential debates (all three involve conceptual 
analysis); and for philosophy of education (with a particular emphasis on legal 
education).  Sometimes these chapters will not make explicit reference to WilliamsÕ 
work, but it is important to note that all the legal literature addressed in the next five 
chapters at least cites Williams on thick concepts (many cite Williams as the original 
source of thick ethical concepts), and his influence can clearly be seen in the legal 




























Chapter Five: Thick and Thin in Law
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1 Ð Introduction.  
 
Legal concepts are not human independent phenomena, they are constituted by our 
practices, goals, values and beliefs, and so these concepts arenÕt purely descriptive and 
neither are the legal judgments that employ them.  Our legal judgments do not aspire to 
be reflective of reality in a mind-independent way, free from practices, values, beliefs 
and goals.319  The distinction between thick and thin concepts captures many of these 
features of legal concepts and has the potential to elucidate the nature of legal concepts 
and legal judgments,320 but the distinction has only really gained popularity and 
received serious attention in legal theory since the beginning of the 21st century.321 
 
Lawrence Solum322 notes: Ôof course, there are many thick ethical terms.  For law 
students, the really interesting thing is that many legal concepts are closely related to 
																																																								
319 H. L. A Hart and his critics debated the extent to which legal positivism (the theory which is 
normally attributed with the claim that legal rules and judgments are purely factual or descriptive 
statements) can accommodate the evaluative aspects of legal practice, and therefore considered whether 
our legal judgments are reflective of reality in a mind-independent way.  
320 Heidi Li Feldman argues that whilst contemporary philosophers have been examining concepts that 
combine evaluation and description since the mid twentieth century (see the literature by Philippa Foot, 
Iris Murdoch and G.E.M. Anscombe) law has only started to address this conceptual phenomena after 
WilliamsÕ coinage of the term Ôthick ethical conceptÕ.  The legal literature is still in its infancy in 
comparison to the philosophical literature, but there are now seminal legal theorists advocating the 
usefulness of thick and thin concepts in law.  Feldman opines this in three of her articles relating to thick 
concepts, see: Heidi Li Feldman, ÔAppellate Adjudication as Conceptual EngineeringÕ in Graham Hubbs 
& Douglas Lind (eds), Pragmatism, Law and Language (Routledge, 2014); Heidi Li Feldman, ÔThe 
Distinctiveness of Appellate AdjudicationÕ (2012) 5 Washington University Jurisprudence Review 61; 
and Heidi Li Feldman ÔObjectivity in Legal JudgmentÕ (1994) 92 (5) Michigan Law Review 1187.  
321 After attention from the following notable legal theorists, see: Joseph Raz, ÔNotes on Value and 
ObjectivityÕ in Brain Leiter (ed), Objectivity in Morality and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 
1999); J. E. Penner, Ô Common Law Cognition and Judicial AppointmentÕ (2001) 38 Alberta Law 
Review 683; J. E. Penner, ÔLegal reasoning and the authority of lawÕ in Lukas H. Meyer, Stanley L. 
Paulson and Thomas W. Pogge (eds), Rights, Culture, and the Law: Themes from the Legal and 
Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Oxford University Press, 2003); Ronald Dworkin, Justice for 
Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press, 2011); Heidi Li Feldman, ÔThe Distinctiveness of Appellate 
AdjudicationÕ (2012) 5 Washington University Jurisprudence Review 61; Lawrence B. Solum & 
Linghao Wang, ÔConfucian Virtue JurisprudenceÕ in Amalia Amaya & Ho Hock Lai (eds), Law, Virtue 
and Justice (Hart Publishing, 2013); David Enoch and Kevin Toh, ÔLegal as a Thick ConceptÕ in Wil 
Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa (eds), Philosophical Foundations of The Nature of Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2013); Heidi Li Feldman, ÔAppellate Adjudication as Conceptual EngineeringÕ in 
Graham Hubbs & Douglas Lind (eds), Pragmatism, Law and Language (Routledge, 2014) 
322 Solum is a contemporary virtue ethicist hence his emphasis on their usefulness regarding the fact-
value distinction, but there are other reasons for their importance in law and I address these over the next 
three chapters.  See: Lawrence B. Solum, ÔPluralism and ModernityÕ (1990) 66 Chicago Kent Law 
Review 93; Lawrence B. Solum & Colin Farrelly (eds), Virtue Jurisprudence (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008); Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centred Theory of JudgingÕ (2003) 34 
Metaphilosophy, 178; Lawrence B. Solum, ÔVirtue Jurisprudence: Towards an Aretaic Theory of LawÕ 
in Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer & Nuno M.M.S. Coelho (eds), Aristotle and the Philosophy of Law: 
Theory, Practice and Justice (Springer, 2013); and Lawrence B. Solum & Linghao Wang, ÔConfucian 
Virtue JurisprudenceÕ in Amalia Amaya & Ho Hock Lai (eds), Law, Virtue and Justice (Hart Publishing, 
2013) 
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(or are themselves) thick ethical terms.Õ323  Thick legal concepts include MURDER, 
RAPE, THEFT, WOUNDING, CRIMINAL DAMAGE, FRAUD, DANGEROUS DRIVING and 
THREATENING BEHAVIOUR.324  The popularity of the terms ÔthickÕ and ÔthinÕ and the 
variety of applications of these terms is ever increasing in law, the terms ÔthickÕ and 
ÔthinÕ have also been used within law in relation to descriptions and moral arguments 
(although this study specifically focuses on thick and thin concepts).   
 
Those legal theorists who use thick and thin in a descriptive manner describe varying 
levels of thickness and thinness demonstrated/exhibited/possessed by a particular 
aspect of law.325  These descriptive uses of thickness and thinness do not refer to the 
distinction between thick and thin concepts in any way.  In addition to this there are 
those legal theorists who follow Michael WalzerÕs use of the distinction between thick 
and thin to describe different moral arguments, which are described as exhibiting 
varying degrees of thickness/thinness (again this was a descriptive use): the more 
specific (thicker) arguments are distinguished from the more general (thinner) 
arguments.326  This distinction has been most notably adopted by legal theorists in their 
consideration of the role of morality in law.327  Their applications are also distinct from 
																																																								
323 Lawrence B. Solum, ÔLegal Theory LexiconÕ (2012) 
<http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2012/01/legal-theory-lexicon-fact-and-value.html> accessed 
December 2012 
324 R. A. Duff, ÔLaw, Language and Community: Some Preconditions of Criminal LiabilityÕ (1998) 18 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 189, 200 
325 These uses bear closest resemblance to Gilbert RyleÕs idea of thick descriptions (which contrast with 
thin descriptions) identified in: Gilbert Ryle, ÔThe Thinking of Thoughts: What is ÔLe PenseurÕ Doing?Õ 
in Collected Essays 1929-1968 (Routledge, 2009).  These are just some examples of the vast literature 
chosen to demonstrate the breadth of their application in law: Robert Cooter, ÔLaw and Unified Social 
TheoryÕ (1995) 22 (1) Journal of Law & Society, 50; Toni M. Massaro, ÔGay Rights, Thick and ThinÕ 
(1996) 49 Stanford Law Review 45; Adeno Addis, ÔThe Thin State in Thick Globalism: Sovereignty in 
the Information AgeÕ (2004) 37 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1; Matthias Kumm, ÔThe Idea 
of Thick Constitutional Patriotism and Its Implications for the Role and Structure of European Legal 
HistoryÕ (2005) 6 (2) German Law Journal 319; David Robertson, ÔThick Constitutional Readings: 
when Classic Distinctions Are IrrelevantÕ (2007) 35 Georgia Journal of International & Comparative 
Law 277; Michael T. Cahill ÔAttempt, Reckless Homicide, and the Design of Criminal LawÕ (2007) 78 
University of Colorado Law Review 879; Jorgen Moller and Svend-Erik Skaaning, ÔSystematizing Thick 
and Thin Conceptions of the Rule of LawÕ (2012) 33 (2) Justice System Journal 136; Zoe Sinel, 
ÔConcerns about Corrective JusticeÕ (2013) 26 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 137; Stephen 
Riley, ÔThe Function of DignityÕ (2013) 5 (2) Amsterdam Law Forum 90 
326 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1994) 
327 Again these are just some examples of the vast literature to demonstrate the breadth of their 
application in law: Renato Rosaldo, ÔWhile Making Other PlansÕ (1985) 58 Southern California Law 
Review 19; Stephen Diamond, ÔNot-So-Critical Legal StudiesÕ (1985) 6 (4) Cardozo Law Review 693; 
Naomi Mezey, ÔLaw as CultureÕ (2001) 13 Yale Journal of Law & Humanities 35; Amy Bartholomew, 
ÔHuman Rights and Post-Imperialism: arguing for a Deliberative Legitimation of Human RightsÕ (2003) 
9 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 25; Yeludah Mirsky, ÔHuman Rights, Democracy, and the 
Inescapability of Politics; or, Human Dignity Thick and ThinÕ (2005) 38 Israel Law Review 358; Gunter 
Frankenberg, ÔComparing Constitution: Ideas, Ideals, and Ideology Ð Toward a Lawyered NarrativeÕ 
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the idea of thick and thin concepts (the articles listed do not reference thick or thin 
concepts), although in some instances the connection between Ôthick valuesÕ and thick 
concepts is extremely close.328   
 
My thesis supports the views of David Enoch and Kevin Toh, who observe: 
 
We think that discussions of the nature of thick terms and concepts 
could help us in thinking about the nature of legal statements, and of 
law more generally, perhaps even pointing us towards some hitherto 
neglected theoretical avenues and options.  And we also think - 
though we are not as confident Ð that reflecting about the example of 
legal concepts and statements can also serve to enrich the discussion 
of thick concepts more generally.  The hypothesis that should be 
considered quite seriously, we believe, is that legal statements 
employ thick terms, and thereby express thick concepts, and that this 
feature of legal statements is responsible for their straddling the line 
between the descriptive and the normative.329 
 
My thesis agrees with Enoch and Toh regarding the usefulness of the distinction 
between thick and thin concepts in enriching both our understanding of legal concepts 
(and legal judgments) and of the philosophical distinction between thick and thin 
concepts. My thesis extends the scope of this argument to include legal education - 
discussions of thick and thin concepts are relevant to the way we teach law because of 
the role these thick and thin concepts occupy within our legal system and legal 
practices Ð and argues that if we accept the existence and usefulness of thick and thin 
concepts within law (evidenced by their use in legal statements, legal decisions and 
legal theory) then legal education needs to reflect this by teaching future legal 
practitioners the conceptual skills required to engage with these concepts.330  
																																																																																																																																																																
(2006) 4 International Journal Constitutional Law 439; Megan Bradley, ÔBack to Basics: The 
Conditions of Just Refugee ReturnsÕ (2008) 21 Journal of Refugee Studies 258; Shannon M. Roesler, 
ÔThe Ethics of Global Justice LawyeringÕ (2010) 13 Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 
185; Graeme Laurie, ÔRecognizing the Right Not to Know: Conceptual, Professional, and Legal 
ImplicationsÕ (2014) 42 Journal of Law Medicine & Ethics 53; John Gillespie, ÔHuman Rights as a 
Larger Loyalty: The Evolution of Religious Freedom in VietnamÕ (2014) 27 Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 107 
328 Gregory Kaebenick discusses Ôdescriptively rich conceptsÕ which he refers to as Ôthick valuesÕ 
throughout his article, see: Gregory E. Kaebenick, ÔOn genetic engineering and the idea of the sacred: a 
secular argumentÕ (2001) 13 St. Thomas Law Review 863.  ÔThick conceptsÕ are never mentioned but 
notable meta-ethicists John McDowell, David Wiggins and Philippa Foot are all referenced, which 
locates KaebenickÕs notion of thick values in close proximity to thick concepts; and Clifford Geertz is 
credited regarding thick description. 
329 David Enoch and Kevin Toh, ÔLegal as a Thick ConceptÕ in Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa (eds), 
Philosophical Foundations of The Nature of Law (Oxford University Press, 2013), 258-259 
330 This study is not located within philosophy of language (although there are some clear overlaps) 
therefore when I argue that we need to teach legal practitioners how to engage with thick and thin legal 
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This chapter and the next two are not a literature review (because they are not 
exhaustive) but this chapter and chapter seven does give the reader a fuller picture of 
the scope of the terms ÔthickÕ and ÔthinÕ as currently deployed in law.  My thesis 
responds to the need for a compendium of thick and thin within law, therefore the 
extensive references to the wider literature and my footnotes are an important aspect of 
the substantive content of my thesis, they are not merely supplementary.  This 
investigation does not offer a complete compendium of thick and thin within law, but 
one of the major strengths of my thesis is that it offers a much-needed collation of the 
more detailed yet disparate uses of thick and thin within law, it is through this collation 
that I have observed a number of issues concerning clarity.  Whilst this investigation 
does not engage in a lengthy critique of the accuracy of the current legal deployment of 
thick and thin, I highlight some of the problems that seem to pervade the entire legal 
literature and note (within both the footnotes and main body of this chapter and the 
next) specific issues that indicate a lack of clarity within certain theorists use of the 
terms.  Therefore it should be stated that despite these concerns over clarity my 
primary thesis aim and argument continues to advance the use and usefulness of thick 
and thin concepts within law.  Any observation of inconsistency within the legal 
literature and suggestion that these terms need to be rendered sharper is advanced for 
the improvement of their future contribution to law, it only adds strength to my thesis, 
that despite weaknesses with their current deployment these terms can still usefully 




2 - Issues of clarity. 
 
The legal literature on thick and thin concepts utilizes these terms with varying degrees 
of expertise and understanding.  First, although they are not of central concern to my 
investigation (because their use of the term is substantively underdeveloped) it is worth 
mentioning that there are numerous articles that merely reference thick or thin in 
footnotes - these articles demonstrate the rising popularity and influence of thick and 
																																																																																																																																																																
concepts I realize that there could be a lengthy discussion regarding the nature of this engagement and 
what it would mean to be fully fledged thick legal concept users (I refer to this literature in chapter two), 
this study is not the appropriate arena for such a lengthy discussion. 
	 113	
thin concepts in law.331  Out of those articles that refer to thick and thin concepts 
within the main body of the text varying degrees of importance is placed upon the 
distinction depending on the role it performs within the legal theorists central argument 
and secondary concerns, and therefore the terms Ôthick conceptÕ and Ôthin conceptÕ 
receive varying amounts of attention and explanation.  Of these legal articles many use 
the term Ôthick conceptÕ without recognizing or discussing the complexity of the 
term.332  The chief problem with these accounts is that there is no indication that there 
are multiple versions of the distinction between thick and thin and different kinds of 
content that can be picked out by the distinction.  Instead it is presented as a 
universally accepted distinction, which is always applied in the same way picking out 
the same kinds of content (or at least implied through failure to at least mention 
otherwise).333  
 
The difference between descriptive applications (thick and thin descriptions) and 
conceptual applications (thick and thin concepts) of the terms ÔthickÕ and ÔthinÕ are 
often confused.  For example, Robert French AC refers to a definition of the rule of 
law, which Ôis sometimes called a ÒthickÓ concept of the rule of law.Õ334  It is unclear 
																																																								
331 For some examples (this is not an exhaustive list), see: Perry Dane, ÔVested Rights, Vestedness, and 
Choice of LawÕ (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 1191; Bradley W.  Wendel, ÔPublic Values and 
Professional ResponsibilityÕ (1999) 75 Notre Dame Law Review 1; Bradley W. Wendel, ÔValue 
Pluralism in Legal EthicsÕ (2000) 78 Washington University Law Review 113; Christopher A. Whytock, 
ÔTaking Causality Seriously in Comparative Constitutional Law: Insights from Comparative Politics and 
Comparative Political EconomyÕ (2008) 41 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 629; Darryn Jensen, 
ÔTheories, Principles, Policies and Common Law AdjudicationÕ (2011) 36 Australian Journal of Legal 
Philosophy 34; Richard Nobles and David Schiff, ÔDisobedience to Law Ð Debbie PurdyÕs CaseÕ (2010) 
73 Modern Law Review 295; Lawrence B. Solum, ÔPluralism and ModernityÕ (1990) 66 Chicago Kent 
Law Review 93; Scott Brewer, ÔScientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due ProcessÕÕ (1998) 107 
(6) Yale Law Journal 1535 
332 For example (again this is not an exhaustive list), see: Jay Connison, ÔThe Pragmatics of PromiseÕ 
(1997) 10 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 273.  Jay ConnisonÕs article is an article on 
conceptual analysis - the concept under consideration is PROMISE Ð that draws heavily from philosophy 
of language, so the majority of his references stem from this field as opposed to meta-ethics.  He cites: 
Gilbert Harman, ÔThree Levels of MeaningÕ (1968) 65 Journal of Philosophy 590; Steven C. Levinson, 
Pragmatics (Cambridge University Press, 1983); Hilary Putnam, ÔThe Meaning of ÒMeaningÓÕ in 
Philosophical Papers Volume 2: Mind Language and Reality (Cambridge University Press, 1975); John 
Searle, Expression and Meaning (Cambridge University Press 1979) 
333 For some examples see: Larry G. Simon, ÔThe New Republicanism: Generosity of Spirit in Search of 
Something to SayÕ (1988) 29 William & Mary Law Review 83; Jay Connison, ÔAssurance, Reliance, and 
ExpectationÕ (1998) 6 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 335; Mary Ann Glendon, 
ÔFoundations of Human Rights: The Unfinished BusinessÕ (1999) 44 American Journal of Jurisprudence 
1; Mike Redmayne, ÔAppeals to ReasonÕ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 19; Mitchell N. Berman & 
Kevin Toh, ÔPluralistic Nonoriginalism and the Combinability ProblemÕ (2013) 91 Texas Law Review 
1739.  Note that reference is made to the more in-depth discussion of thick legal concepts by one of the 
writers Kevin Toh in: David Enoch and Kevin Toh, ÔLegal as a Thick ConceptÕ in Wil Waluchow & 
Stefan Sciaraffa (eds), Philosophical Foundations of The Nature of Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) 
334 The Honourable Robert French AC, ÔSingapore Academy of Law Annual Lecture 2013 Ð ÒThe Rule 
of Law as a Many Coloured Dream CoatÓÕ (2014) 26 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 1, 7; See also: 
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whether he is identifying the rule of law as a thick concept or referring to a thick 
conception of the rule of law (or maybe a thick description of the concept RULE OF 
LAW).  In his conclusion he states:  
 
there are different ideas of what the rule of law embodies.  There are 
ÒthinÓ concepts and ÒthickÓ concepts.  However, the features of 
lawfulness, rationality, consistency, fairness and good faith in the 
exercise of official powers, and the function of judicial review in 
determining the meaning and constitutionality of laws and the 
lawfulness of action under those laws, are essential elements of any 
constitutionally based concept of the rule of law.335   
 
There are no references to any wider literature on thick and thin in this article, making 
it harder to deduce the intended meaning of the distinction as applied above, this is a 
common problem with articles that utilise the terms thick and thin without any 
reference to the philosophical literature regarding the development and nature of this 
conceptual distinction.336   
 
This is a major problem for legal theory if the thick-thin distinction is expected to be 
beneficial and provide rewarding research, hence my thesis promotes the usefulness of 
the thick-thin distinction for law with the proviso that it needs to be better appreciated 




Much of the legal literature on thick and thin concepts uses WilliamsÕ Ethics and the 
Limits of Philosophy337 as the starting point and operating definition of thick and thin 
ethical concepts (where this is not the case I explicitly state otherwise), although this 
literature often misunderstands WilliamsÕ formulation of the distinction. As I 
demonstrated in chapter two and three WilliamsÕ work needs to be understood as part 
of a wider body of meta-ethical literature regarding concepts that combine evaluation 
and description in some manner.  The legal literature addressed in this chapter and 
																																																																																																																																																																
Michael J. Trebilcock & Ronald J. Daniels, Rule of Law Reform and Development: Charting the Fragile 
Path of Progress (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2008) which critiques the various conceptions of 
the thick-thin distinction. 
335 ibid at 22 
336 Thick and thin concepts are the primary focus of my investigation use of the terms ÔthickÕ and ÔthinÕ 
from this point forwards (unless stated otherwise) should be taken to mean conceptual thickness and 
thinness (to be referring to a distinction between different kinds of concepts and conceptual content). 
337 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Routledge Classics, 2011)   
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chapter seven rarely demonstrates such an understanding or appreciation of the wider 
literature and as a result certain aspects of thick ethical concepts (especially WilliamsÕ 
account of them) are either inaccurately portrayed or missing from the legal discussion 
of thick and thin.338   
  
As described in the last chapter, WilliamsÕ distinction between world-guided and 
action-guiding content is a central feature of his distinction between thick and thin 
concepts, and although this is recognized by most legal accounts (i.e. those legal 
accounts of thick and thin which reference Williams) the distinction is rarely analysed 
and does not receive the careful, critical attention that it receives within meta-ethics 
(see chapter four).339  There are three main aspects of WilliamsÕ work on thick 
concepts that are either missing entirely or insufficiently addressed by the legal 
literature: the distinction between a difference of degree and a difference of kind;340 the 
distinction between separationism or non-separationism (it is often unclear whether the 
legal theorists that operate with WilliamsÕ distinction attribute separationism or non-
separationism to his account);341  WilliamsÕ attack of prescriptivism.342  Failure to 
																																																								
338 David Enoch, Kevin Toh and Heidi Li Feldman are notable exceptions to this, they reference the 
wider literature on thick ethical concepts and their development.  Feldman goes further than this and 
highlights the overlaps between the literature in 20th century moral philosophy and legal philosophy 
arguing that many of the issues discussed by cognitivists and non-cognitivists were also discussed by 
philosophy of law albeit in their own terminology.  It is for this reason that she finds it surprising that 
there is not more literature on thick and thin legal concepts.  see note 329 and 321 
Despite being brief Ronald DworkinÕs succinct account of thick concepts is one of the more 
philosophically nuanced legal accounts. He is the only legal theorist to clearly recognize and explicitly 
state that WilliamsÕ account of thick and thin concepts was in direct contention with the prescriptivist 
account of such concepts as hybrids.  Although Enoch and Toh offer by far the most detailed account of 
thick concepts, they do not explicitly recognize this aspect of WilliamsÕ work.  Dworkin agrees with 
Williams that the prescriptivists are mistaken, stating that Ôthick concepts cannot be dissected to reveal a 
base criterial concept.Õ  Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press, 2011), 181  
Dworkin (unlike other legal theorists) also recognizes the importance attributed to the distinction for its 
ability to mark important divisions within moral theory through analysis of the distinction between a 
difference of degree and kind, conceptual priority and evaluative flexibility.  ibid at182-183 
339 Enoch and Toh utilize WilliamsÕ work as a starting point for their analysis of ÔlegalÕ as a thick term 
(and thick concept), but they do not address the extensive critical literature on these aspects of WilliamsÕ 
work.  see note 329 
Wang and Solum also utilize WilliamsÕ distinction between action-guiding and world-guided content in 
their analysis of REGICIDE but there are many inconsistencies in their formulation of thick and thin 
concepts that seem to be the result of misunderstanding Williams.  See Solum and Wang note 324 
340 Dworkin, Enoch and Toh are notable exceptions to this, they emphasize that the distinction between 
thick and thin concepts Ôis not meant to be a categorical or bright-line one, but is instead one of degreesÕ 
and acknowledge that the characteristics of thick concepts are neither obvious nor settled. See note 329 
341 Dworkin, Enoch and Toh by arguing that the distinction is one of degree touch upon this matter, but 
only Enoch and Toh take this further and consider the arguments of separabilists, although they note that 
they have only touched the surface of these complex meta-ethical ideas. ibid at 267 
342 For example Wang and Solum utilize many of WilliamsÕ ideas in their account, but they advance a 
definition that has prescriptivist undertones: ÔThin ethical concepts are concepts that only have general 
and abstract evaluative or prescriptive content.  Thick ethical concepts are ethical concepts that have 
both descriptive content and prescriptive content.Õ ibid 
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recognize these aspects of WilliamsÕ work combined whilst relying on WilliamsÕ work 
as the basis of the thick-thin conceptual distinction weakens the legal literature on 
thickness and thinness.  
 
Many of the legal theorists noted in this chapter and addressed in more detail in chapter 
seven, fail to identify explicitly with WilliamsÕ terminology yet noted the importance 
of WilliamsÕ work for the distinction between thick and thin concepts.  The lack of 
universality regarding choice of terminology is the root cause of a bigger problem 
within the legal literature (which also exists within the philosophical literature) Ð 
inconsistency - regarding the framing of the distinction (the nature of the content 
identified), which is often accompanied by an interchangeable use of the terms ÔvalueÕ, 
ÔnormativeÕ, ÔevaluativeÕ and ÔprescriptiveÕ.  This interchangability is particularly 
unhelpful, as it hides some of the subtle distinctions between competing accounts of 
thick concepts.  
 
In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy343 Williams was considering the difference 
between specific ethical concepts when he postulated his distinction.  The meta-ethical 
discussion since then has continued to use the thick-thin distinction as a way of 
analysing the nature of specific concepts. This approach to the distinction between 
thick and thin concepts has yet to be fully developed within law, as at present certain 
legal concepts are cited as either thick or thin but there is only limited discussion of the 
reasons why and the implications of such construction.344  There are certain legal 
concepts that seem to feature more frequently under the attribution of thickness and 
thinness, such as those that embody fundamental principles that underpin our legal 
system.  Consider for example HARM - one of the fundamental principles underpinning 
our legal system is that it is wrong to harm another individual.345  Criminal law is one 
area that has sought to codify and criminalise different types of harms and could 
provide multiple opportunities for a rich and diverse discussion of thick and thin 
concepts.  Criminal offences such as MURDER, THEFT or ASSAULT are commonly cited 
as examples of thick concepts although the discussion is often limited to a brief 
																																																																																																																																																																
See note 338 above where I explain that Dworkin is a notable exception. 
343 see note 337  
344 David Enoch and Kevin Toh are a notable exception to this, see note 329 
345 Anthony DuffÕs primary interest is in the criminalization of endangerment, thick ethical concepts are 
only briefly mentioned but in doing so Duff highlights the importance of thick ethical concepts in 
characterizing different kinds of harm see: R. A. Duff, ÔCriminalizing EndangermentÕ (2005) 65 
Louisiana Law Review 941 and R. A. Duff, ÔLaw, Language and Community: Some Preconditions of 
Criminal LiabilityÕ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 189 
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footnote or mention that these are thick concepts.346  Another example is a RIGHT - 
fundamental to most legal and political systems because it represents minimum 
standards of treatment and is seen as offering protection for citizens within those 
systems - the philosophical literature on rights has received attention from thick and 
thin theorists. 347  
 
Criminal offences and the concepts of HARM and RIGHTS have been recognized as 
concepts that could be usefully elucidated by an analysis using the distinction between 
thick and thin to better grasp the metaphysical nature of these concepts. David Enoch 
and Kevin Toh348 offer a more detailed example (using the concept LEGAL VALIDITY) 
of this kind of potential application of the thick-thin distinction to legal conceptual 
analysis. Their work demonstrates the impact this kind of conceptual analysis can have 
for understanding the nature of law and key jurisprudential debates. Chapter six 
therefore utilises their discussion of LEGAL VALIDITY in a demonstration of the 
potential usefulness of thick and thin concepts for legal conceptual analysis, through an 
investigation of HartÕs The Concept of Law.  Enoch and TohÕs work has been chosen 
not because this thesis supports their particular understanding and deployment of the 
distinction between thick and thin concepts, but because their account is one of the 
strongest applications of thick and thin within law, it is precise and lucid.  It is not the 
intention of this study, neither is it necessary, to investigate and dictate the specific 
account of thick and thin concepts that should be adopted by legal theorists deploying 
these terms within law, my intention is to demonstrate how thick and thin have so far 
proved useful for legal theory (especially legal conceptual analysis) and why despite 
																																																								
346 For example James Penner draws on WilliamsÕ work and suggests that reliance on thick ethical 
concepts such as ASSAULT and MURDER is typical of English private law.  The law exists in legal cases to 
the extent that specific cases trigger our knowledge about values (these values are represented by thick 
ethical concepts) and add to our knowledge of those values. J. E. Penner, ÔLegal reasoning and the 
authority of lawÕ in Lukas H. Meyer, Stanley L. Paulson and Thomas W. Pogge (eds), Rights, Culture, 
and the Law: Themes from the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Oxford University Press, 
2003), 83.  For a critique of Penner see: Darryn Jensen, ÔThe Problem of Classification in Private LawÕ 
(2007) 31 Melbourne University Law Review 516.  I return to PennerÕs work later in this chapter. 
347 For examples of discussions of thickness and thinness regarding rights see: Mary Ann Glendon, 
ÔFoundations of human Rights: The Unfinished BusinessÕ (1999) 44 American Journal of Jurisprudence 
1; Perry Dane, ÔVested Rights, Vestedness, and Choice of LawÕ (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 1191; 
Yeludah Mirsky, ÔHuman Rights, Democracy, and the Inescapability of Politics; or, Human Dignity 
Thick and ThinÕ (2005) 38 Israel Law Review 358.  For a discussion of thick and thin concepts regarding 
rights see: Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Harvard University Press, 1992) Thomson 
utilizes the distinction between thick and thin concepts (it is only used in the introduction) to disprove 
the fact-value distinction and therefore also disprove the No-Reason Thesis.  For a critique of Thomson 
see: Amy L. Peikoff, ÔThe Right to Privacy: Contemporary Reductionists and their CriticsÕ (2013) 5 
Washington University Jurisprudence Review 61.  I return to both Thomson and PeikoffÕs work later in 
this section. 
348 see note 329 
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the weaknesses in their current deployment their use should not be abandoned within 
law.  Even if inconsistency is currently preventing these terms from achieving their full 
potential within law this distinction is relevant to and assists with the discussion of key 
jurisprudential debates as evidenced by the next chapter.  
 
 
3 Ð The relevance of thick legal concepts for philosophers. 
 
At the beginning of this chapter I noted that Enoch and Toh thought Ôthat reflecting 
about the example of legal concepts and statements can also serve to enrich the 
discussion of thick concepts more generallyÕ.349  Bernard Williams has advanced a 
similar claim.  In Afterword: What Has Philosophy to Learn from Tort Law?350 
Williams inverts traditional jurisprudence and considers whether it is philosophy that 
could learn something new from legal practices, which could enrich philosophersÕ 
understanding of concepts (especially those that are central to our ethical and political 
practices). Heidi Li Feldman agrees with Williams and summarises the point as 
follows: 
 
Common-law reasoning adjudicates disputes via concepts and 
distinctions (e.g., liability, causation) rooted in ordinary experience 
(e.g., fault, responsibility) but embedded in a body of legal precedent 
(e.g., the common law of torts) that continuously and self-consciously 
refines and reworks these concepts and distinctions in order to better 
resolve current disputes.  The pressure exerted by this process on the 
development of these concepts and distinctions reveals information 
about them that is relevant to their non-legal counterparts, but which 
would not emerge during the course of ordinary usage because 
ordinary usage neither demands nor involves the same sort of intense 
attention required by common-law development.351 
 
There are two potential objections to this, both regarding the relationship between legal 
concepts and non-legal concepts.  The first argues that the concepts and distinctions 
driving legal arguments are neither commonsensical or distinctively legal, but are 
instead derived from other domains e.g. economics.  It is therefore argued that the legal 
concepts do no real work in legal argument and do not come under any pressure; so 
																																																								
349 ibid at 258-259 
350 Bernard Williams, ÔAfterword What Has Philosophy to Learn from Tort Law?Õ in David G. Owen 
(ed), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford University Press, 1995) 
351 Heidi Li Feldman, ÔBlending Fields: Tort Law, Philosophy and Legal TheoryÕ (1998) 49 South 
Carolina Law Review 167, 168 
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they cannot be the subject of philosophersÕ attention.  Williams responds in the spirit of 
J. L. Mackie and observes that the relevant legal concepts Ômust have some force even 
to serve as rationalizations.Õ352  Whatever ÔreallyÕ drives legal argument, these legal 
concepts must have some force in their own right because their use by legal 
practitioners within legal practice is evidence of this. 
 
The second objection accepts that the concepts and distinctions driving legal argument 
are legal and are therefore under pressure; but denies that there is a connection between 
these legal concepts and non-legal concepts.  Both Williams and Feldman find this line 
of reasoning implausible.353  There may be differences between legal and non-legal 
concepts, but they are still sufficiently related that philosophy could learn something 
from legal concepts (the role of lay people in the legal system is evidence of this e.g. 
jurors).  There are differences between the legal use of concepts and the ordinary use 
of non-legal concepts, but once these are acknowledged legal reasoning can still be 
instructive for philosophy.  For example, legal cases require a resolution (a final 
decision) so legal concepts can sometimes seem forced in ways that ordinary use of 
non-legal concepts does not require, for these non-legal concepts can be left fuzzy.354  
An appreciation of the goals and principles that drive a particular area of the law will 
therefore be necessary to understand the forces that operate on legal concepts.355  
 
Both Williams and Feldman claim that these two objections can be refuted, but argue 
over the contestability of the concepts that both are suggesting could be informative for 
philosophers.  Williams writes: ÔIt would be very surprising if philosophy could learn 
only from the less controversial parts of legal argument and doctrine, and it is itself 
significant that some concepts constantly cause trouble in the law and provide a focus 
for reinterpretation and controversy.Õ356  Feldman argues that to a certain extent 
																																																								
352 see note 350 at 489 
Mackie denied that ethical properties were actual properties of the world, but argued that this ontological 
claim should not cause us to alter our moral practices or refrain from making ethical judgments; he 
maintained that ethics and morality do and should guide human action.  See: J. L. Mackie, Ethics: 
Inventing Right and Wrong (Penguin, 1977)   
353 see note 350 at 490 and note 351 at 169 
354 Consider the example from criminal law of an assailant pulling the trigger of a gun in one jurisdiction 
and the bullet hitting the victim who is in another jurisdiction, common sense may be satisfied with such 
an explanation, but the law will need a final decision regarding where the victim was killed to decide 
where to prosecute. 
355 Williams uses the example of tort law again and argues: ÔPhilosophy, then, will not only have to 
attend to the principles and goals of tort law; it will also have to understand at a theoretical level why it 
has those principles and goals.Õ  see note 351 at 492 
356 ibid at 494 
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Williams is right, but that these concepts are not always controversial.  She argues that 
the central legal concepts (thick legal concepts) that are often at the centre of debates in 
appellate cases are the same concepts that also often cleanly resolve cases without any 
disagreement. Their minor disagreement regarding which particular concepts could be 
informative for philosophers, does not subtract from their unanimous claim that legal 
conceptual practices could be useful for philosophers in understanding the nature of 
concepts.  This is further evidence of the importance of my investigation for both law 
and philosophy, and demonstrates that my thesis (that thick and thin concepts are 
useful within law) may also have relevance outside law for analytic philosophy itself.  
 
Thick legal concepts (and to a lesser extent thin legal concepts) are important to 
common law reasoning because they help navigate between the way the world is 
(world-guided content) and our responses to this (they guide our actions and 
judgments).  Williams notes a thorough and careful study of case law could also be 
revealing for philosophy regarding the nature and workings of thick concepts.  
Feldman agrees: Ôcommon-law cases illustrate the full panoply of how thick concepts 
function and develop.  Often thick legal concepts operate smoothly, settling issues and 
outcomes.  In other cases, however, precisely the same concepts become 
problematic.Õ357  Even those thick legal concepts that donÕt seem to have any obvious 
non-legal counterparts could still be revealing.  Feldman suggests: Ôphilosophy could 
benefit from a detailed analysis of how judges and lawyers, apply, deploy, manipulate, 
exploit, and engineer thick legal concepts.  Such an analysis could yield general 
insights into the workings of thick concepts throughout the various domains in which 
they operate.Õ358  The limits of the present research do not allow such a detailed and 
ambitious research project to be entered into here, but the brief discussion of LEGALITY 
(see next chapter) demonstrates how such a project could begin; and chapter seven 
addresses the deployment of thick concepts within the common law by the judiciary. 
 
Williams concludes that philosophy can learn from both the successful and 
unsuccessful applications of concepts in law:  
 
It is not just the success of our concepts under the extreme conditions 
of the law that has something to tell philosophy, but also their 
occasional failure to survive that exposure.  Philosophy will be able to 
																																																								
357 See note 351 at 181, Feldman uses the example of Palsgraf to demonstrate her point. 
358 ibid at 185 
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learn the right lessons, however, only if there is an adequate theory 
(in part provided by political philosophy itself) about what features of 
the concepts, and what special features of the law, have contributed to 
those success and failures.359 
 
The problems that arise when legal concepts are unsuccessfully applied in law are not 
evidence that conceptual analysis in law should be abandoned as some legal theorists 
have suggested (as noted earlier, in chapter two); and neither do the problems 
encountered by the legal application of the distinction between thick and thin concepts 
provide such evidence (as demonstrated by my thesis).  Moreover, legal conceptual 




4 Ð Conclusion. 
 
This chapter has introduced the legal literature on thick and thin and began to collate 
the various disparate legal uses of thick and thin, which when combined with the 
literature referenced throughout the following three chapters provides a picture of their 
current use and supports my argument for their usefulness within law.  This chapter has 
been fairly descriptive, which has been necessary to achieve this extensive (albeit 
incomplete) compendium of thick and thin within law, the following three chapters 
move away from description and towards analysis, to support my thesis that thick and 
thin concepts are useful within law. The following chapter addressed the usefulness of 
thick and thin concepts for legal conceptual analysis and draws upon Enoch and TohÕs 
argument that construing ÔlegalÕ thickly can have important implications for our 
understanding of the nature of law and therefore legal theories such as H. L. A. HartÕs 
legal positivism.360 The next chapter by drawing analogies between the philosophical 
literature on thick and thin and HartÕs legal positivism demonstrates the potential of 
thick and thin concepts for enriching our understanding of the nature of law and 





359 see note 350 at 497-498 
360 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 1994) 
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Chapter Six: Thickness, Thinness 




































The Concept of Law361 has raised issues that have occupied philosophers since its first 
publication in 1961.362  HartÕs legal positivism remains one of the most important legal 
theories to date and is crucial to the legal positivist tradition.363  HartÕs legal positivism 
marked the beginning of a significant shift (within legal positivism) towards an 
increasingly influential new view of the social sciences. Previously the social sciences 
had tried to match the scientific approach used in the Ôhard sciences.Õ364  In contrast, 
the new approach emphasised both the actions within a social practice and the meaning 
those actions have for the participants of the practice.365  HartÕs interchanges with Lon 
																																																								
361 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 1994)   
362 The literature generated by The Concept of Law is vast but I wish to draw attention to the following 
useful texts: Jules Coleman (ed), HartÕs Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2001); Nicola Lacey, A Life of H. L. A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble 
Dream (Oxford University Press, 2004); Neil MacCormick, H. L. A. Hart (Stanford University Press, 2nd 
edition, 2008); Michael Bayles, HartÕs Legal Philosophy: An Examination (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1992); P. M. S. Hacker and Joseph Raz (eds), Law, Morality, and Society: Essays In Honour 
of H. L. A. Hart (Clarendon Press, 1977); and John Mikhail, ÔPlucking the Mask of Mystery from Its 
Face: Jurisprudence and H. L. A. HartÕ (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 733 
363 There are a variety of legal positivist theories advocated, Bix describes legal positivism as Ôbased on 
the simple assertion that the proper description of law is a worthy objective, and a task that needs to be 
kept separate from moral judgment (regarding the value of the present law, and regarding how the law 
should be developed or changed).Õ  Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (Sweet & Maxwell, 
6th edition, 2012), 33 
For further reading on legal positivism (this list is not exhaustive), see: Tom D. Campbell, The Legal 
Theory of Ethical Positivism (Aldershot, 1996); John Gardner, ÔLegal Positivism: 5 ! mythsÕ (2001) 46 
American Journal of Jurisprudence 199; Neil MacCormick, Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal 
Theory (Oxford University Press, 2007), v; Brian Bix, ÔLegal PositivismÕ in W. A. Edmunson and M. P. 
Golding (eds), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Blackwell, 2005), 29-49; Jules 
Coleman and Brian Leiter, ÔLegal PositivismÕ in D. Patterson (ed), A Companion to the Philosophy of 
Law and Legal Theory (Blackwell, 2nd edition, 2010), 228-248; Julie Dickson, ÔLegal Positivism: 
Contemporary DebatesÕ in Andrei Marmor (ed), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law 
(Routledge, 2012), 28-64; Robert P. George (ed), The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism 
(Clarendon Press, 1996); Matthew Kramer, In Defense of Legal Positivism: Law Without Trimmings 
(Oxford University Press, 1999); David Lyons, Moral Aspects of Legal Theory (Cambridge University 
Press, 1993); Andrei Marmor, ÔLegal Positivism: Still descriptively and Morally NeutralÕ (2006) 26 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 683; Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Clarendon Press, 1979); Joseph 
Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Clarendon Press, 1994); Scott Shaprio, Legality (Harvard University 
Press, 2011) 
364 The attempt to mirror the empirical methods of the Ôhard sciencesÕ (e.g. physics and chemistry) was 
exemplified in the rise of ÔformalismÕ in legal education, influenced by Harvard Law School Dean 
Christopher Columbus Langdell.  See: Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer (Harvard University 
Press, 1993) 
365 Max WeberÕs work is the foundational work on hermeneutic approaches to social theory, see: Max 
Weber, Economy and Society, (Bedminster Press, 1968); and Max Weber, ÒÔObjectivityÓ in Social 
Science and Social PolicyÕ in The Methodology of the Social Sciences (Free Press, 1949), 50-112.  
HartÕs immediate influence was Peter Winch (another important scholar on hermeneutic approaches), 
see: Peter Winch, The Idea of Social Science (Routledge, 1958) 
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Fuller,366 Patrick Devlin (Lord)367 and Ronald Dworkin368 shaped twentieth century 
legal theory. An important figure in Ordinary Language Philosophy, and clearly 
influenced by WittgensteinÕs work on language games, Hart famously applied to 
general jurisprudence J L AustinÕs method of Ôusing a sharpened awareness of words to 
sharpen our perception of the phenomena.Õ369  For present purposes his method was 
applied to two problems in law, which can be summed under the topic heads the 
Ôlanguage and normativity of lawÕ and Ôthe semantic stingÕ (referencing DworkinÕs 
famous criticism of Hart).   
 
Ronald Dworkin is routinely seen as HartÕs chief opponent, and indeed Hart dedicates 
most of what is now the postscript to the second edition of his book to replying to 
DworkinÕs criticism.370  Dworkin opposed HartÕs theory of law on the basis that HartÕs 
approach to legal philosophy is undermined/ÕstungÕ by HartÕs own approach to words Ð 
that is, he wrongly thought Ôthat lawyers all follow certain linguistic criteria for 
judging propositions of law.Õ371  The extent to which Hart and Dworkin disagree or are 
engaged in different enterprises (HartÕs concern is to describe law, whereas DworkinÕs 
concern is to normatively justify law) is a controversial issue. 372   HartÕs legal 
positivism led, amongst other things, to a resurgence of natural law, in which 
contemporary natural lawyers such as J. M. Finnis responded to and challenged the 
metaphysical premises of The Concept of Law.373  Significantly, useful analogies can 
																																																								
366 H. L. A Hart, ÔPositivism and the Separation of Law and MoralsÕ (1958) 71 (4) Harvard Law Review 
593 and Lon. L. Fuller, ÔPositivism and Fidelity to Law Ð A Reply to Professor HartÕ (1958) 71 (4) 
Harvard Law Review 630 
367 Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford University Press, 1968).  Hart replied in a series 
of lectures (the Harry Camp Lectures) at Stanford University entitled ÔLaw, Liberty and MoralityÕ later 
published as H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (Stanford University Press, 1963).  
368 DworkinÕs fullest statement of HartÕs legal positivism is found in Ronald Dworkin, LawÕs Empire 
(Harvard University Press, 1986) 
369 see note 361 at 14 
370 Both Hart and Dworkin adopt a hermeneutic approach to law, but Dworkin argues that a hermeneutic 
theory of law should adopt the position of a participant within the practice and offer an interpretation of 
the practice in its best light (morally advantageous).  See note 395 at 45-113.  Hart disagrees and 
advances a descriptive theory of the practice as opposed to participation in the practice.  See: H. L. A. 
Hart, ÔIntroductionÕ and ÔThe PostscriptÕ in The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 
1994); and H. L. A. Hart, ÔCommentÕ in Ruth Gavison (ed), Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy 
(Clarendon Press, 1987) 
371 ibid Dworkin at 45 
372 Scott Shapiro, ÔThe Hart-Dworkin debate: a guide for the perplexedÕ in Arthur Ripstein (ed), Ronald 
Dworkin (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
373 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press, 1980).  Finnis also proffered a 
hermeneutic approach to law (that differed to both DworkinÕs and HartÕs) that argued that a hermeneutic 
theory should adopt the perspective of a (hypothetically) practically reasonable person, who uses 
appropriate moral reasoning to reach conclusions about the binding nature of moral obligations created 
by the legal system.  Hart disagreed with Finnis (and Dworkin).  Bix construes HartÕs approach to 
hermeneutic theory as a theory that simultaneously: Ô(1) attempts to take into account the participantÕs 
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be drawn between WilliamsÕ treatment of thick and thin ethical concepts in Ethics and 
the Limits of Philosophy (ELP)374 and HartÕs legal positivism that illuminate many of 
the distinctions Hart was working with (and later theorists were responding to).  The 
topics so illuminated include HartÕs famous attention to internal and external 
perspectives, the distinction between law and morality, and the distinction between 




The previous chapter introduced the topic of thick and thin within law and began my 
argument in support of my thesis that thick and thin concepts are useful within law I 
argued that thick and thin concepts (and terms) can be found within legal statements 
and legal judgments; further to this they can enrich our understanding of these legal 
concepts, legal statements and legal judgments (Enoch and TohÕs work on LEGALITY 
was used as an exemplar).  This chapter continues to develop my thesis by arguing that 
thick and thin concepts can enrich our understanding of specific legal theories Ð in 
which HartÕs legal positivism, due to its seminal importance within legal theory, is my 
test subject - although the discussion will be based on a supposition that the usefulness 
of thick and thin concepts extends beyond HartÕs legal positivism because the 
jurisprudential issues addressed by Hart (and this chapter) are central jurisprudential 
issues that arguably any theory of law needs to address.376   
 
																																																																																																																																																																
perspective, and (2) manages to choose among possible participantsÕ perspectives without having to 
make moral judgments, while (3) keeping sufficient distance from the participantsÕ perspective to allow 
for moral criticism of the whole system/enterprise.Õ  Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 6th edition, 2012), 44.  Roger Shiner argued that as legal positivism inevitably 
develops, it becomes more sophisticated and closer to natural law theory, as it responds to critique (he 
also argued the reverse of this Ð that natural law develops in the direction of legal positivism).  Roger 
Shiner, Norms and Nature (Clarendon Press, 1992).  In a review, Frederick Schauer agreed with 
ShinerÕs basic analysis, but disagreed with the direction that Shiner saw Ôsophisticated legal positivismÕ 
travelling on the basis that it was in danger of sliding into natural law theory.  For his review see: 
Frederick Schauer, ÔCritical NoticeÕ (1994) 24 Canadian Journal of Philosophy 495.  For SchauerÕs 
proposed alternative approach see: Frederick Schauer, ÔPositivism Through Thick and ThinÕ in Brian 
Bix (ed), Analyzing Law  (Clarendon Press, 1988) 
374 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Routledge Classics, 2011).    
375 HartÕs distinction between the internal and external perspective is sometimes referred to as a 
hermeneutic approach to social science.  The hermeneutic approach (HartÕs emphasis on the internal 
aspect of legal rules) is in tension with those who want social theory to be more scientific, because it 
prioritises the participants in the social practice and their understanding.  See: Brian Bix, ÔH. L. A. Hart 
and the Hermeneutic Turn in Legal TheoryÕ (1999) 52 Southern Methodist University Law Review 167; 
and Thomas Morawetz, ÔLaw as Experience: Theory and the Internal Aspect of LawÕ (1999) 52 
Southern Methodist Law Review 27 
376 Some of these jurisprudential issues will arise again in the next chapter where I consider the wider 
jurisprudential implications of thick and thin. 
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WilliamsÕ formulation continues to inform and lead the legal discussion of thick and 
thin concepts and at no point in this chapter are criteria established for identifying and 
distinguishing between thick and thin concepts, or as an argument in favour of a 
particular account of the thick-thin distinction.  My aim continues to be a 
demonstration of the use and usefulness of thick and thin concepts within law (now 
using HartÕs The Concept of Law377 as an exemplar).  Reference to Enoch and TohÕs 
thick construction of LEGAL378 will be made as their analysis supports my argument for 
the usefulness of thick and thin concepts within legal conceptual analysis and HartÕs 
positivism featured in their discussion of thick and thin concepts within law.379  
 
The following discussion of HartÕs work focuses primarily on his distinction between 
the internal and external perspective because of the close comparisons that can be 
made there with the meta-ethical discussion of evaluative standpoint discussed by 
Williams and other thick and thin theorists, but also because the matter occupies a 
central position within HartÕs theory, underpinning HartÕs many other important ideas 
such as his three key theses: the Social Thesis, the Separability Thesis and the Limits 
of the Law Thesis. 380   The importance attached to the internal perspective by 
hermeneutic theories (such as HartÕs) raises problems for critique in social science, 
specifically how to justify evaluating the descriptions of cultures or social practices.381  
It also raises problems for a notion of ÔevidenceÕ that is already controversial within 
social science.  The internal point of view will have a role in both the evaluations made 
of the evidence gathered, and in the gathering of the data.382  This chapter will 
therefore also have wider implications that extend to descriptive theories in social 
science, although this is not my primary aim in this chapter.383 
 
																																																								
377 see note 361 
378 David Enoch and Kevin Toh, ÔLegal as a Thick ConceptÕ in Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa (eds), 
Philosophical Foundations of The Nature of Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) 
379 ibid 
380 I have limited my discussion of Hart in this way because it would be far too ambitious to try to cover 
all aspects of The Concept of Law, and would detract from this investigation and my thesis. 
381 Charles Taylor notes an ongoing debate regarding whether an attempt to Ôexplain each culture or 
society in its own termsÉ rules out an account which shows them up as wrong, confused, or deluded.Õ  
Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge University Press, 1985), 123.  Taylor 
argues that it is possible to adopt an ÔinterpretiveÕ approach and retain the ability to critique the 
culture/practice that is being explained. 
382 H. Hamner Hill, ÔH. L. A. HartÕs Hermeneutic Positivism: On Some Methodological Difficulties in 
The Concept of LawÕ (1990) 3 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 113, 123-125 
383 For a more detailed discussion of the problems associated with description in social sciences 
(including law), see: Brian Bix, ÔOn Description and Legal ReasoningÕ in L. R. Meyer (ed), Rules and 





2 - Internalism vs Externalism. 
 
The distinction between internalism and externalism plays a key role in The Concept of 
Law384 and parallels WilliamsÕ emphasis on evaluative standpoint in Ethics and the 
Limits of Philosophy.385 HartÕs distinction between an internal and external perspective 
to the practice had important implications for the social sciences in general, not just for 
law.386  According to Hart, to understand Ôany form of normative social structure, the 
methodology of the empirical sciences is useless; what is needed is a ÔhermeneuticÕ 
method which involves portraying rule-governed behaviour as it appears to its 
participants.Õ387  This idea raised an important question: How can we engage in the 
scientific activity of picking out and understanding what is going on amongst other 
peoples, when it appears that we could always be making some catastrophic mistake in 
which the meanings brought by participants to a practice are badly misinterpreted?388   
 
Hart is concerned with the social phenomenon of law, and focuses on the notion of a 
habit of obedience. He notices that if you only occupy the position of an external 
outsider viewing the practice you cannot adequately account for, recognize, or describe 
the social phenomenon in play.389  For example, Hart shows that you cannot identify a 
																																																								
384 see note 361 
385 see note 374  
386 see note 361 at 50-78.  The classification of law as a member of either the social sciences or 
humanities is a contentious issue, this is evidenced at the university level through differences in the 
location of the law faculty, for example at the University of Kent the Law School is located within the 
Social Sciences.  For the purposes of this study I operate on the basis that law is a social science, even 
though the philosophical context I am advocating for law is borrowed from the humanities. 
For an interesting introduction to the philosophy of social science and the particular problems presented 
by this field of enquiry see: Alexander Rosenberg, Philosophy of Social Science (Westview Press, 4th 
edition, 2012) 
387 H. L. A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Clarendon Press, 1984), 13 
388 This problem is not specific to law or philosophy, it is underpinned by fundamental methodological 
questions that philosophy has tried to answer since the beginning of classical philosophy in Ancient 
Greece; this has manifested into a methodological divide within social sciences between naturalism and 
interpretation. See: Alexander Rosenberg, ÔThe Methodological Divide: Naturalism versus 
InterpretationÕ in Philosophy of Social Science (Westview Press, 4th edition, 2012), 11-35 
389 In chapters two and three I addressed the meta-ethical discussion of the external standpoint and these 
ideas will also be relevant to this chapter.  McDowellÕs External Standpoint Experiment challenged the 
non-cognitivistÕs claim that the evaluative and descriptive aspects of an evaluative concept can always 
be disentangled. The debate between cognitivists and non-cognitivists concerned the possibility of 
mastering a concept independently of the evaluative standpoint (shared by the community). The non-
cognitivist argues that an outsider (someone external to the practice) could master the extension of the 
	 128	
sovereign, just by looking at behaviour as viewed from the point of view of the 
external observer.  He makes it clear that his point applies much more generally and 
has wide impact.390  It is of particular relevance to anthropology, for the anthropologist 
trying as a social scientist to understand a tribe will occupy the position of an external 
observer and never truly understand the tribe, yet if he assimilates himself into the tribe 
and becomes internal to the practice he will now be able to understand the tribe, but 
this account will no longer be an objective external social scientific account of their 
practices.391  
 
Hart argues that those external to the legal practice cannot adequately account for, 
recognize or describe the social phenomena of law, because you need to understand the 
internal aspect of the practice that is captured by the evaluative standpoint of the 
relevant community.  Internal legal judgments are those made from the point of view 
of legal officials and others similarly committed to the laws of their legal system, 
containing an element of endorsement that is not present in external legal judgments.392  
External legal judgments are those made by observers external to the legal systems that 
are the objects of their study, they recognize acts of the particular legal system under 
observation as legal or illegal without endorsing or criticizing them.  Despite critical 
attack this distinction still seems to capture something important in the relevant 
phenomenology, something that is also captured by the literature on thickness and 
thinness.393   
																																																																																																																																																																
concept in the same way an insider (someone internal to the practice) could, because disentangling was 
possible.  
390 see note 361 at 55-57 
391 The anthropologist Clifford Geertz shared many of the same philosophical influences as Williams 
and Hart, being largely influenced by Gilbert Ryle and Ludwig Wittgenstein.  He drew from the 
ordinary language aspects of both philosophers, adopting the proposition of thick description from 
Gilbert Ryle and importing into anthropology the concept of family resemblance from Wittgenstein.  It 
is unsurprising then that there are many parallels between HartÕs distinction between internal and 
external perspectives and the work of anthropologists such as Geertz.  See: Clifford Geertz, The 
Interpretation of Cultures (Basic Books, 1973) and Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays 
In Interpretive Anthropology (Basic Books, 1985) 
392 Kevin Toh offers a discussion of Hart as an expressivist, at least with regards to this aspect of his 
account (endorsement).  See: Kevin Toh, ÔHartÕs Expressivism and his Benthamite ProjectÕ (2005) 11 
(2) Legal Theory 75 
393 Joseph Raz, ÔThe Purity of the pure TheoryÕ (1981) 35 Revue International de Philosophie 411 and 
Gerald Postema, ÔCo-ordination and Convention at the Foundations of LawÕ (1982) 11 Journal of Legal 
Studies 165 
Jospeh RazÕs legal positivism suggests a middle ground between external points of view and fully 
committed internal points of view, these are called Ôstatements from a point of viewÕ or Ôdetached 
normative statements;Õ these statements accept a particular normative position is necessary in making a 
particular claim, but maintain that this does not also require endorsement of the particular normative 
position.  Jospeh Raz, The Authority of Law (Clarendon Press, 1979), 153-157.  According to Raz 
Ô[l]egal scholars Ð and this includes ordinary practicing lawyers Ð can use normative language when 
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Thus we can recall that evaluative standpoint is an important feature of WilliamsÕ 
account of thick and thin concepts, Williams asserting a claim similar to HartÕs 
regarding ethical concepts; that is, you need to understand the evaluative standpoint of 
an ethical community (Williams refers to this as a Ôsocial worldÕ) to be able to apply 
their ethical concepts.394  WilliamsÕ discussion of evaluative standpoint acknowledges 
the difference between an internal member of the practice and an external observer, 
and Williams (like Hart) recognises that the evaluations associated with a particular 
practice will be understood differently by those internal to the practice in comparison 
to those external to the practice.  This has important implications for our conceptual 
competence (our ability to understand both our own concepts and the concepts of 
others, especially those from other practices).  The meta-ethical literature on thick and 
thin concepts (in particular WilliamsÕ work) offers a new way of addressing these 
matters pertaining to conceptual competence (the different levels of conceptual 




In chapter two of my thesis I discussed the idea of grasping the meaning of a concept, 
as clarifying this is important to both the meta-ethical literature and legal literature in 
many ways, for example in helping to explicate ethical disagreement and legal 
disagreement. The question is: to what extent do we need to grasp the meaning of a 
concept and endorse this meaning to be able to successfully apply the concept?  There 
seems to be a distinction between having a concept within ones repertoire and being a 
fully-fledged concept user who understands and endorses the meaning of the 
concept.395  Williams discusses this question through the idea of a fully-fledged thick 
concept user, who he requires to share the evaluative standpoint of the social 
community.  The thick concept user if external to the practice may be able to apply the 
thick concept appropriately in some instances, through luck or detailed study of the 
																																																																																																																																																																
describing the law and make legal statements without thereby endorsing the lawÕs moral authority.Õ  ibid 
at 156 
394 As I demonstrated in chapter four this aspect of WilliamsÕ account has been the subject of critical 
scrutiny, this chapter does not engage with these criticisms but I accept that a more detailed examination 
of the parallels between Williams and Hart, and of the role of thick concepts within The Concept of Law 
would need to address these criticisms. 
395 As can be seen from the extensive literature addressed in chapters two and three this is a contentious 
issue and I focus purely on WilliamsÕ contributions to the issue, as it is his work that I argue is 
informative for law. 
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usual applications; yet whilst in certain instances he may demonstrate thick concept 
competence he would still not be classed as a fully-fledged thick concept user, because 
his external status denies him the possibility of sharing the evaluative standpoint 
associated with the social communityÕs thick concepts.  Williams distinguishes 
between the outsiderÕs limited conceptual competence and the insiderÕs fully fledged 
thick concept use on the grounds that, if we are to be confident in our conceptual 
practices then we need more than merely limited conceptual competence, but require 
something closer to concept mastery, however long this may take to achieve.  
 
HartÕs emphasis on the internal dimension of legal practice places the external observer 
of a legal system at a disadvantage in terms of his ability to demonstrate concept 
mastery; he does not share the evaluative standpoint of those internal to the practice 
and his conceptual competence is limited by this (it could also be limited by other 
factors, just as the internal participants conceptual competence is not solely linked to 
their understanding of the evaluative standpoint, there are other factors at work here 
too).  With detailed observation and study he maybe able to identify some legal 
phenomena that insiders to the practice would refer to as the rule of recognition and the 
sources thesis396, but he may not be able to identify successfully what counts as a 
vehicle for the purposes of the Road Traffic Act.397  It is this subtle difference in 
conceptual competence that is the difference between full and partial understanding of 
a concept (also referred to as concept mastery or complete conceptual competence).  
 
There are various interpretations of HartÕs distinction between the internal and external 
perspective, all of which can be enriched by the meta-ethical literature on thick 
concepts (such as Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy).398  Enoch and Toh 
disagree about the accuracy of the distinction between internal and external as 
construed by Hart, but both agree Ôwe can take lessons from the phenomenon of thick 
concepts.Õ 
 
Example Ð the thick term LEGAL.  
 
																																																								
396 It is not necessary for an internal participant in a legal system to understand the term Ôrule of 
recognitionÕ to be able to operate with it, their identification of legal rules is evidence that they possess 
knowledge of the rule of recognition (even if this is subconscious). 
397 This example is used because RazÕs discussion of HartÕs ideas uses the case of Garner v Burr (1951) 
1 KB 31 and the example of how to understand the term vehicle in such a case. 
398 see note 378 at 269 
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Enoch and Toh argue that analogous explanations can be drawn from the above 
discussion that are relevant to the thick term LEGAL: 
 
We suggest, then, that ÒlegalÓ be thought of as a thick term, and the 
concept legal as a thick concept.  The conceptÕs descriptive content 
can then be understood in terms of representations of some social 
facts Ð i.e. the social facts in virtue of which some act or practice 
type counts as legal or illegal.  These facts would differ from one 
jurisdiction to the next, but they may be uniform across jurisdictions 
on sufficiently high levels of abstraction.  But as with other thick 
concepts, that it has descriptive content does not preclude its being 
evaluative as well.  Indeed, often, or perhaps even necessarily, 
declaring an act legal (or illegal) would involve an expression of 
some evaluative or normative commitment.  There may be an 
underlying normative judgment involved here Ð perhaps something 
to the effect that the fact that an act satisfies the descriptive criteria 
for legality is a reason for certain officials to permit them, or 
perhaps to the effect that the fact that an act fails to satisfy these 
descriptive criteria counts strongly against these officials permitting 
it.399 
 
The above analogy of legal as a thick concept distinguishes between two kinds of 
conceptual content: descriptive and normative content.  The descriptive content of 
ÔlegalÕ if perceived as a thick concept can be very easily accommodated; indeed, this is 
hardly surprising because the descriptive features of law have received less critical 
attention than its normative features.400  The relation between an act being legal and 
satisfying the descriptive criteria for legal would be similar to the example of 
courageous; the relation between an act being courageous and it being an example of 
overcoming fear.401  Construing a legal concept thickly does not place any additional 
requirements on the descriptive content, but it does on the normative content, so it is 
upon this aspect that attention is focused. 
 
																																																								
399 ibid at 264-265 
400 The nature of these descriptive aspects has been widely debated, but even those theorists who 
promote the normative aspects of law over the descriptive aspects do not deny the existence of 
descriptive elements.  For example, in the traditional debate between legal positivists and natural 
lawyers neither party denied the role of such descriptive content in legal concepts, statements and 
judgments; it was the relationship between the descriptive and normative content that was under 
contention (and to a certain extent the existence of normative legal content was questioned). 
401 When discussing (earlier in the article) the evaluative or normative commitment that underlies a thick 
concept they provide the example of COURAGE: ÔThus, paradigmatic, literal uses of the word 
ÒcourageousÓ (e.g. Òit was courageous of her to stand up to her boss in that wayÓ) in some way commit 
the speaker not just to the relevant descriptive content (ÒStanding up to her boss in that way involved 
overcoming some fearÓ), and not just to an addition of some evaluative ÒcolouringÓ (Òand hurray for 
that!Ó), but also to some more general evaluative judgments Ð in this case, perhaps something like that 
overcoming fear is often the thing to do, or that many acts that involve overcoming fear are the better for 
it.Õ ibid at 260 
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The accommodation of the more normative features seems problematic in many ways 
(some are specific to the legal application and others are generated by a discussion of 
thick concepts in any arena).  I begin with those that are associated with thick concepts 
(in general) and continue to operate with Enoch and TohÕs characterization: ÔThe uses 
of words or terms expressing thick concepts, or thick terms Ð at least their 
paradigmatic, literal uses Ð in some way involve a commitment to an underlying 
normative or evaluative judgment.Õ402  The evaluative judgment is more than an 
evaluative colouring. 403   It is closer to a general evaluative judgment such as 
Ôovercoming fear is often the thing to do.Õ404  The commitment to the underlying 
normative or evaluative judgment is present in both non-assertoric uses and negative 
statements involving the thick concept. 405  Whilst it might be accepted that thick 
concepts convey some evaluative or normative content (such as the underlying 
normative or evaluative judgment) the location of this evaluation is widely disputed 
(how the evaluation is conveyed by the thick concept).  The dispute is mainly between 
two ways of viewing the matter Ð as a semantic matter or a pragmatic matter Ð and 
goes directly to the question: to what extent is the evaluative content a part of the 
meaning of the concept?   
 
If a semantic account is adopted the evaluative content is part of the very meaning of 
the concept: Ôfurthermore, if evaluation is a matter of the semantics of thick terms, then 
if the evaluative thought conveyed is false, so is the relevant judgment as a whole.Õ406  
The evaluative and descriptive aspects of a thick concept under the semantic account 
are both a part of the meaning of the concept and operate symmetrically as partners in 
																																																								
402 ibid  
403 The kind of evaluation Enoch and Toh seem to have in mind here is similar to that asserted by the 
emotivist, as they suggest such evaluative colouring would be akin to ÒAnd hurray for that!Ó  ibid at 46 
404 ibid  
Enoch and Toh emphasise that by characterizing the evaluation as an underlying normative judgment 
they are not attributing universal status to it, there may be exceptions or variations.  They reference the 
following metaethical literature.  Jonathon Dancy, Ethics without Principles (Oxford University Press, 
2004) who discusses ethical particularism - for a critique of ethical particularism see: Sean McKeever 
and Michael Ridge, Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal (Oxford University Press, 
2006) - and Mark Schroeder, ÔA Matter of PrincipleÕ (2009) 43 (3) Nous 568.  Pekka Vayrynen, ÔThick 
Concepts and VariabilityÕ (2011) 11 (1) Philosophers Imprint 1 discusses the possibility of 
evaluative/normative variability of thick concepts across various contexts and the implications of 
construing evaluative/normative content flexibly. 
405 In non-assertoric uses of thick terms it is not commitment to the underlying normative judgments 
content that is in dispute, it is the appropriateness of the judgment in the particular instance that is 
disputed.  When a thick concept is negatively applied in some manner it is possible to object to this use Ð
the not-one-of-my-words response Ð whilst still endorsing the underlying normative judgment of the 
thick concept. 
406 see note 378 at 261 
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constituting the concept.  The pragmatic account argues that the evaluation is not 
entailed (it is not part of the meaning) but is conversationally implicated or 
presupposed, and the evaluative and descriptive content do not operate symmetrically 
in these accounts (the description is consistent but the evaluation is open to change).407  
If LEGAL is construed as a thick concept its evaluative content can either be viewed as 
a semantic or pragmatic matter; or maybe neither, for perhaps the evaluative content is 
a weaker matter than the descriptive and more context sensitive.  Either way the 
philosophical literature on thick concepts is useful for legal conceptual analysis 
because it raises options that have not previously been discussed in the legal context.   
In sympathy with Enoch and Toh, my thesis does not need to take sides regarding this 
particular dispute to be able to demonstrate the usefulness of the distinction for law.408 
 
These observations about the location of evaluation can help to illuminate HartÕs 
distinction between internal and external standpoint within the context of competency 
with thick concepts such as LEGAL.  Internal participants to the practice adopt the 
associated normative judgment-assumed or presupposed by their use of thick concepts 
such as LEGAL, because these underlying normative judgments are part of the semantic 
value of the thick concept.  HartÕs distinction between internal and external participants 
(thick concept users) questions the ability of the external observer to understand and 
adopt the semantic value of thick concepts such as LEGAL Ð to what extent can they 
participate competently in discussions of legal validity without sincerely committing to 
the associated normative judgment-assumed or presupposed (the semantic value) by 
the internal thick concept user?409  The literature on ethical thick concepts explores the 
nature of this supposed normative commitment (see chapter three) and could therefore 
																																																								
407 There is much more that could be said about the difference between the semantic and pragmatic 
approach to evaluation in thick concepts, for a more detailed discussion see: Pekka Vayrynen, ÔThick 
Concepts and VariabilityÕ (2011) 11 (1) Philosophers Imprint 1.  More details on these matters will be 
drawn out throughout the next three chapters regarding the legal application of thick and thin concepts. 
408 There are actually many more options than the two constructions - semantic and pragmatic Ð cited in 
the text (but these are the two options addressed by Enoch and Toh). Although I have portrayed only the 
location of evaluation as the contentious aspect of a thick concept so far, the location of the description 
(as well as the evaluation) can be challenged in thinner concepts.  There is a direct correlation between 
these aspects of the thick-thin debate and the distinction between a difference of degree and a difference 
of kind.  Although the following statement may not be applicable to all theorists, it is often the case that 
those theorists who advance a difference of kind are more likely to see the location of description as 
settled, whereas those who advance a difference of degree are more likely to see both the location of 
description and evaluation as unsettled. 
409 Stalnaker highlights this feature of the pragmatic account: the speaker is not required to believe what 
he presupposes, he can simply presuppose something because it is convenient to proceed on the basis of 
such assumption(s) in that particular conversation.  See: Robert Stalnaker, ÔAssertionÕ in Context and 
Content (Oxford University Press, 1999), 78-95 
 
	 134	
be useful to discussions of thick concepts such as LEGAL and HartÕs internal/external 
distinction.  The external observer could adopt a temporary or pretended commitment 
to the relevant normative judgment, where the judgment isnÕt presupposed and is 
instead a part of what he says or asserts.  On this understanding his evaluative or 
normative commitment could be treated semantically.410  These explanations requires 
the outsider to try to adopt the point of view of the internal participant, but differ over 
the extent to which the internal and external thick concept users have to share the 
semantic value for the thick concept.  The first explanation requires them to share the 
same semantic value, but allows for two explanations of the relevant presupposition.  If 
the relevant presupposition does not require a belief or some other belief Ðlike 
commitment, the two would still be using the term with the same semantic value, even 
though the external thick concept user did not share the same presupposition.  The two 
participants have different semantic values for the thick term, but in this situation the 
external thick concept user temporarily adopts the internal thick concept usersÕ 
semantic value. 
 
Even if the external participantÕs ability to grasp the semantic value can be explained 
(see above), their ability to grasp the evaluative standpoint of the concept must also be 
accounted for.  Construing LEGAL as a thick concept therefore has implications for 
legal notions of evaluative standpoint, and how we can account for the external 
participantÕs ability to grasp evaluative standpoint.  Enoch and Toh highlight two well-
known challenges to HartÕs idea of an external standpoint: 
 
DworkinÕs claim that judgments as to what the law is (and more 
generally what he calls Òconstructive interpretationsÓ) require 
judging persons to attribute some ÒpointÓ or Òjustifying purposeÓ to 
the practices and traditions that make up the legal systems whose 
laws they are interpreting and RazÕs claim that legal judgments are 
judgments who take Òthe legal point of viewÓ whether that point of 
view is assumed sincerely or insincerely.  Both of these claims arose 
out of the belief that what the law is could not be characterised 
accurately from what Hart called the external point of view, or the 
belief that there is a distinction to be observed between what the 
																																																								
410 For a relevant discussion of simulation that could be serviceable here see: Stephen Yablo, ÔGo 
Figure: A Path through FictionalismÕ reprinted in Things (Oxford University Press, 2010), 177-199.  He 
opines that the belief of S (the simulation) could be per accidens, one significant implication of this is 
that the person who is simulating the belief need not be aware it is a simulation he does believe (this 
may only become apparent after critical reflection).  Yablo attributes this notion to Kendall Walton, 
ÔSpelunking, Simulation, and Slime: On Being Moved by FictionÕ in M. Hjort and S. Laver (eds), 
Emotion and the Arts (Oxford University Press, 1997), 37-49 
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members of a community think that a practice requires and what it 
Òreally requiresÓ.411 
 
The above discussion between Hart, Dworkin and Raz concerns the extent to which an 
external participant to a practice needs to be able to Ôjoin inÕ the practice to be able to 
characterize legal practices in a manner similar to someone internal to the practice.  
Significantly, the literature concerning thick concepts also considers the extent to 
which concept users need to Òjoin inÓ the conceptual practices that they are trying to 
understand.  Enoch and Toh draw on this similarity and argue that understanding 
ÔlegalÕ because of its thickness necessarily involves understanding the evaluative 
content captured by the evaluative standpoint of LEGAL.412   
 
Enoch and TohÕs thesis then raises familiar issues regarding the location of evaluation 
in thick concepts (such as LEGAL) that were raised in the previous chapter.  Compare 
the following two examples: COURAGEOUS and PHYSICALLY STRENUOUS.  ÔPhysically 
strenuousÕ seems to be thinner than ÔcourageousÕ because there is less need to 
understand an associated evaluative standpoint to be able to apply this concept (some 
theorists may argue that there is no need - if it is construed as a thin concept and thin 
concepts are understood to be purely descriptive then the issue of evaluative standpoint 
will not arise). It does not seem to be necessary to understand that in some 
circumstances this term will convey an underlying evaluation (such as an 
endorsement). 413   ÔCourageousÕ seems to be thicker than Ôphysically strenuousÕ 
because an application of the term seems to require an understanding of the underlying 
normative judgment that is typically associated with COURAGE: e.g. standing up to fear 
																																																								
411 see note 378 at 270-271 
For DworkinÕs claims regarding Ôconstructive interpretationsÕ see note 395 at 47 and Ronald Dworkin, 
ÔHard CasesÕ reprinted in Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977), 101-105.   
Similar claims are made in the following texts: John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon 
Press, 1980) in chapter one; Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press, 1964), in 
chapter four; and M. Murphy, ÔNatural law TheoryÕ in M. Golding and W. Edmundson (eds), The 
Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Wiley-Blackwell, 2004), 15-28 
On the distinction between what members of a community think a practice requires and what it Ôreally 
requiresÕ see: note 399 at 64; Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Princeton University Press, 2nd 
edition, 1990), 175; and Joseph Raz, ÔPostscript Sources, Normativity, and Individuation 1Õ in The 
Concept of a Legal System (Clarendon Press, 2nd edition, 1980), 235-6 
412 This raises many questions concerning difference of degree and kind, again.  If the distinction 
between thick and thin concepts is a matter of degree (Enoch and Toh see things this way, see my 
previous chapter regarding this) then is our understanding of the evaluative content also a matter of 
degree?  Maybe the disagreement between Hart, Dworkin and Raz can be seen as a disagreement over 
the degree of understanding that is required for someone to be classed as internal to the practice rather 
than external; or to put it another way it is a disagreement about the degree to which you need to Ôjoin 
inÕ the practice. 
413 see note 378 at 271 
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or danger in some situation as a good thing.414  In the previous chapter the difference 
between viewing the location of evaluation in concepts such as COURAGE as a 
semantic or pragmatic matter was raised.415   Returning to these issues now: ÔIf 
evaluation is a matter of the semantics of thick terms, then if the evaluative thought 
conveyed is false, so is the relevant judgment as a wholeÉ  In general, if we go for a 
semantic answer to the location-of-evaluation question, we seem to think of the 
evaluative and descriptive elements of thick concepts symmetrically, as equal partners 
in constituting the relevant concept.Õ416  According to pragmatic accounts:  Ôthe 
relevant evaluation is conversationally implicated or is presupposed.  On such 
pragmatic accounts, there is an important difference between the descriptive and the 
evaluative elements of thick concepts.Õ417  Thus the pragmatic and semantic accounts 
of COURAGE seem to disagree over the extent to which it would be possible to use 
thick concepts such as COURAGE without engaging with the associated evaluations; 
and whether (if it was possible) this external use would be parasitic upon the more 
evaluatively charged internal-point-of-view-ish use of COURAGE.  
 
Dworkin and Raz can be seen as viewing LEGAL as similar to COURAGEOUS (or 
FASHIONABLE) rather than PHYSICALLY STRENUOUS, because they require the LEGAL 
concept user to join in the practice and take up the evaluative content associated with 
LEGAL before they can understand fully or master the concept.418  There are different 
ways to join in a practice and the two philosophersÕ attitudes differ here regarding what 
is necessary for joining in.  Enoch and Toh surmise that Ôthe attitudes that the two 
philosophers deem necessary for joining in Ð the ÒpointÓ, attributing interpretive 
attitudes and Òthe legal point of viewÓ, respectively Ð could be cashed out in terms of 
the normative judgment that underlies the uses of the thick term ÒlegalÓ, and that 
																																																								
414 There are other ways of characterizing the evaluative standpoint of COURAGE these will be dependent 
on the shared evaluative standpoint of the evaluative community under consideration.  It could also be 
argued that this evaluation is flexible and open to change depending upon the context it is applied in. 
415 For example Òit was courageous of her to stand up to her boss in that wayÓ could commit the speaker 
not just to the relevant descriptive content (ÒStanding up to her boss in that way involved overcoming 
some fearÓ), and not just to some additional evaluative ÔcolouringÕ (Òand hurray for that!Ó), but also to 
an underlying normative or evaluative commitment such as Òovercoming fear is often the morally right 
thing to do, or that many acts that involve overcoming fear are the better for it.Ó   
416 see note 378 at 261 
417 ibid  
418 In chapter two I noted that within the literature on concepts there is widespread disagreement 
regarding what it means to Ôfully understandÕ or ÔmasterÕ a particular concept; or to be a Ôfully fledged 
thick concept userÕ (this is how meta-ethicists have phrased the same point).  There is not room in this 
thesis to enter into such a lengthy and complex debate, but it is important to highlight that the 
differences between Hart, Dworkin and Raz could be seen as differences in terms of the degree of 
Ôconceptual masteryÕ that each requires of internal and external participants.   
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commitment could be characterized either pragmatically or semantically.Õ419  If an 
insider is taken to be someone who is sincerely and fully committed to the relevant 
normative judgment then in contrast the outsider can be viewed as someone who does 
not have this level of normative commitment (which could vary in degree e.g. from 
only slightly to substantially less).  Dworkin seems to think the outsider would only be 
able to achieve a limited understanding of what the law really requires, as he would be 
handicapped by his lack of relevant normative commitment.420  Raz doesnÕt think that 
the outsider will be limited to such an extent; he envisages that the outsider will be able 
to temporarily adopt the required relevant normative commitment for the conversation 
at hand and therefore accurately understand characterizations of what the law really 
requires.  This temporary commitment could be pragmatic or semantic.   
 
As can be seen from the above discussion of Hart, Dworkin and Raz, thick and thin 
concepts can not only better enrich our understanding of the norms and evaluations 
advanced by HartÕs legal theory (the evaluative standpoint conveyed by legal 
concepts); but it can also enrich our understanding of the nature of the interchanges 
between Hart and his critics in this area, which is essentially a disagreement over 
which legal theory captures our legal practices (the nature of law).  However, it is 
important to note that further progress in my argument regarding the debate between 
Hart, Dworkin and Raz on these aspects of internalist versus externalist accounts of 
law, would not only require the acceptance of LEGAL as a thick (or thicker) concept, 
but it would also require an accurate account of thick concepts.421   
 
For the purpose of this study it is possible to note (without a universally settled/agreed 
upon account of thick and thin concepts) how the distinction between difference of 
degree and a difference of kind could impact upon Hart, Dworkin and RazÕs 
disagreement (i.e., on their opposing viewpoints).  For example, if an explanation of 
the distinction between thick and thin concepts is treated as being a difference of 
degree was accepted (where the distinction picked out relative levels of thick/thin 
																																																								
419 ibid at 271 
420 see note 368 at 101-113 
421 As demonstrated throughout this study the nature of concepts (including thick and thin concepts) is 
far from settled, theorists are yet to agree upon the account of thick and thin concepts that most 
accurately reflects our conceptual practices; but such disagreement and controversy does not mean that it 
is not worth pursuing these matters or that interesting ideas cannot be generated by the discussions of 
these ideas (even if an agreement or resolution is not generated).  In the previous chapter I highlighted 
that there is no reason to expect a uniform answer to the issues pertaining to thick and thin concepts, it is 
important to once again remember this point. 
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content along a scale), the disagreement between Dworkin, Raz and Hart may too be a 
disagreement over degree only.  Their argument could then be seen as a disagreement 
regarding the thickness of the evaluative aspect of legal and the degree to which an 
outsider could be a competent user of the term ÔlegalÕ.  This would account for those 
theorists who have always argued that Dworkin and Hart are not so vehemently 
opposed as many critics suggest (that is, that their positions are more compatible than it 
seems).  Whereas, if an explanation of the distinction between thick and thin concepts 
as being a difference of kind was accepted (where the distinction picked out two 
different kinds of concept whose membership is based on a concept being either thick 
or thin, but never both), then the disagreement between Dworkin, Raz and Hart may 
too be a disagreement of kind.  In this instance their positions would be more distinct 
from each other, rather than differing regarding the level (degree) of conceptual 
competence that is required of the internal participant in comparison to the external 
observer, they would differ regarding the kind of conceptual competence that was 
perceived to be required.  
 
The differences between Dworkin, Raz and Hart could be further elucidated by 
considering the philosophical literature on entangling (separation) in thick concepts, 
which considers the nature of the relationship between the evaluative and descriptive 
aspect in a thick (and in some cases thin) concept.422  The disagreement between 
Dworkin, Raz and Hart could be seen then not as a disagreement about whether there 
are evaluative and descriptive aspects at work here, but whether these two aspects can 
be separated (disentangled) and still remain intelligible.  Dworkin, Raz and Hart all 
seem to clearly agree that there are evaluative and descriptive aspects within the law 
(within legal concepts, legal statements and legal judgments), because they all 
recognize that there is an evaluative standpoint that is a part of any legal system. The 
internal participantÕs placement within the legal system places them in a better position 
to understand the evaluative standpoint and both the evaluative and descriptive aspects 
																																																								
422 Legal positivism has often been characterized as a Ôpurely descriptiveÕ theory, and whilst this is an 
unfair and inaccurate characterization it does highlight a methodological problem associated with legal 
positivism.  Contemporary legal positivists (such as Hart) have noted that the construction of theory is 
not purely descriptive, it necessarily involves elements of evaluation and selection, but that the forms of 
evaluation and selection are not traditional moral evaluations, they go to judgments of Ôimportance.Õ  
Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory (Hart Publishing, 2001) 
Stephen Perry and Ronald Dworkin argue that moral theory ineluctably involves moral evaluations, the 
question that can be sensibly asked about these moral evaluations: is whether they are explicit choices 
(argued for) or tacit (lack express justification).  Stephen R. Perry, ÔInterpretation and Methodology in 
Legal TheoryÕ in Andrei Marmor (ed), Law and Interpretation (Clarendon Press, 1995), 97-135 
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of the law (legal concepts, legal statements and legal judgments).  But this is only 
problematic if the evaluative and descriptive aspect of the thick and thin concepts 
cannot be clearly separated, and so it is necessary to understand evaluative standpoint 
to understand the thick concept. 
 
However, there is an alternative approach to all the issues considered above that draws 
on separationism.  Separationists have argued that those external to the practice can 
still demonstrate conceptual competence because the evaluative and descriptive aspects 
of thick concepts (and maybe thin concepts) can be understood separately.  According 
to this approach the external observer only needs to understand the descriptive aspect 
and not the evaluative standpoint to be able to understand the legal practices of a legal 
system and thus to demonstrate conceptual competence regarding the law; because for 
every thick concept that combines evaluation and description a purely descriptive 
concept can be identified, that picks out the same objects or identifies the same things 
as falling under the concept (has the same conceptual extensions).  This is important, 
for as Bix notes, the popularity of legal positivism is in part linked to the positivist 
separation of the evaluative and descriptive aspects of law: Ôthe notion that the 
description of a practice or an institution should be prior to and separate from its 
evaluation seems to modern audiences too obvious to need declaration, let alone 
justification.Õ423   
 
Consider once more Enoch and TohÕs example of LEGAL, different accounts of the 
nature of thick concepts will yield different analyses of the thick concept LEGAL, 
which will in turn yield different results regarding the nature of law.  As Enoch and 
Toh argue: Ôa better understanding of legal statements may depend on the true nature 
of thick concepts.  For instance, if separabilists or disentanglers have it right in 
general, so that at least in principle it should always be possible to disentangle the 
normative and descriptive elements of thick concepts, then this will apply to the case of 
legal as well.Õ424 Such universal statements should be treated with caution though, as 
there is no reason to assume that the answer to the location of the evaluative aspect will 
be uniform across the entire class of thick concepts and terms.425  Even if we accept 
																																																								
423 Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (Sweet & Maxwell, 6th edition, 2012), 34.  This was 
not always the case, as recently as the 19th century natural law was the default position. 
424 ibid at 267 
425 Williams was keen to dispute the notion of a homogenous class of ethical assertions as a fiction see 
note 374 
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that as a general rule thick legal concepts behave according to the separabilist account, 
we still need to ask whether a specific thick concept such as LEGAL behaves this way.  
It is common practice in law (and in many other areas) to stipulate a meaning (use) for 
a technical term and this needs to be reflected in discussions of thickness and thinness.  
Many of the legal statements by judges and legislators are prime examples of this, so 
construing the term ÔlegalÕ thickly should not be taken as a conclusive denial or limit to 
this feature of legal conceptual practice. 
 
It is not necessary to explore these options (non-separationism/separationism) further 
because the aim has simply been to demonstrate that the distinction between thick and 
thin concepts can be useful in discussing matters pertaining to HartÕs legal positivism; 
it is instead more beneficial to demonstrate the usefulness of these ideas in relation to 
another aspect of HartÕs work. 
 
My discussion now moves away from the conceptual abilities of the internal 
participant/external observer in general, and towards understanding and explication of 
specific legal concepts such as LEGAL.  LEGAL VALIDITY in The Concept of Law is 
determined by adherence to the rule of recognition and it is the rule of recognition that 
now becomes the focus of my investigation.  The rule of recognition is one of HartÕs 
central theses and is an extension of his ideas regarding the internal and external divide 
within law (it relates to the above discussion of evaluative standpoint and to what 
extent it is necessary to Ôjoin inÕ a practice, so some of the ideas discussed above will 
be relevant to my discussion of the rule of recognition).426  By discussing two related 
but distinct aspects of The Concept of Law (the internal and external divide, and the 
rule of recognition) strength is added to the argument advanced in this chapter (that 
thick and thin concepts can enrich our understanding of HartÕs legal positivism) and 
thus to the overarching thesis that I develop throughout (that thick and thin concepts 





426 The distinction between difference of kind and degree surfaces here again, because if the distinction 
between thick and thin legal concepts is based on a difference of kind, then the above discussion applies 
only to the rule of recognition and other thick legal concepts.  If it is based on a difference of degree 
then the same discussion could be theoretically applicable to thinner legal concepts as well, because they 
would also involve a combination of descriptive and evaluative content, which would raise the issues of 
entangling and separation. 
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3 - The Rule of Recognition. 
 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter HartÕs distinction between the internal and 
external perspective has important implications for many other aspects of his theory.  
The distinction between an internal and an external perspective is not always clear-cut, 
as it appears the distinction can often be a matter of degree.  The distinction can 
sometimes become blurred because many aspects of our legal system seem to exhibit 
qualities of an internal perspective and an external perspective. The Rule of 
Recognition is a prime example of this: it is internal to the practice and identification 
of it by the practice is internal, requiring a grasp of the evaluative standpoint of the 
legal system (i.e. of the relevant legal culture); but it can also be described externally 
and its existence can be verified by an external observer.  It is through the Rule of 
Recognition that Hart blends evaluative standpoint with empirical criteria to provide a 
kind of practice-specific objectivity for the criteria of legal validity.427  The following 
section continues to demonstrate the usefulness of thick and thin concepts in 
understanding the role evaluative standpoint plays in The Concept of Law, this time 
through the rule of recognition; which is one of the most well-known and enduring 
topics of debate between positivists and non-positivists.428  
 
HartÕs exposition of the rule of recognition. 
 
Hart outlines the nature of the rule of recognition and its relationship with other rules 
of the legal system as follows: 
 
																																																								
427 Feldman takes a similar approach when she formulates her Ôblend conception of objectivityÕ, 
addressed in the next chapter.  See: Heidi Li Feldman, ÔObjectivity in Legal JudgmentÕ (1994) 92 (5) 
Michigan Law Review 1187 
428 Dworkin and RazÕs writings on HartÕs rule of recognition are the most well known, see: Ronald 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, new impression with a Reply to Critics, 2005) chapters 
one and two; Ronald Dworkin, LawÕs Empire (Harvard University Press, 1986) chapter one; Joseph Raz, 
ÔAuthority, Law and MoralityÕ in Ethics in the Public Domain (Clarendon Press, 1994).  The rule of 
recognition has attracted attention from many legal theorists, such as Scott Shapiro who argued that it is 
in the nature of legal rules that they make a difference to practical reasoning, the inclusive nature of the 
rule of recognition limits its ability to make a difference to practical reasoning, it points towards the 
moral evaluations that are already applicable to our choices.  Scott J. Shapiro, ÔOn HartÕs Way OutÕ 
(1998) 4 Legal Theory 469 
See the following additional literature that addresses the rule of recognition: Leslie Green, ÔThe Concept 
of Law RevisitedÕ (1996) 94 Michigan Law Review 1687; John Gardner, ÔLegal Positivism: 5 ! mythsÕ 
(2001) 46 American Journal of Jurisprudence 199; Scott Shapiro, ÔThe Hart-Dworkin debate: a guide 
for the perplexedÕ in Arthur Ripstein (ed), Ronald Dworkin (Cambridge University Press, 2007); Brian 
Leiter, ÔExplaining theoretical disagreementÕ (2009) 76 University of Chicago Law Review 1215; John 
Gardner, ÔSome types of lawÕ in Law as a Leap of Faith (Oxford University Press, 2012) 
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A secondary rule of recognition is accepted and used for the 
identification of primary rules of obligation.  It is this situation 
which deserves, if anything does, to be called the foundations of a 
legal systemÉ..Wherever such a rule of recognition is accepted, 
both private persons and officials are provided with authoritative 
criteria for identifying primary rules of obligation.  The criteria so 
provided may, as we have seen, take any one or more of a variety of 
forms: these include reference to an authoritative text; to legislative 
enactment; to customary practice; to general declarations of 
specified persons, or to past judicial decisions in particular casesÉ.  
In a modern legal system where there are a variety of ÔsourcesÕ of 
law, the rule of recognition is correspondingly more complex: the 
criteria for identifying the law are multiple and commonly include a 
written constitution, enactment by legislature, and judicial 
precedents.  In most cases, provision is made for possible conflict by 
ranking these criteria in an order of relative subordination and 
primacyÉ.  For the most part the rule of recognition is not stated, 
but its existence is shown in the way in which particular rules are 
identified, either by courts or other officials or private persons or 
their advisors.429 
 
As can be seen from HartÕs explanation above, he believes that the rule of recognition 
plays an important role in identifying the law (the primary and secondary rules) in any 
particular legal system (i.e., in any legal culture), but the ability of the rule of 
recognition to perform such a role has received widespread critique.430 The rule of 
recognition is the analytic tool Hart uses to secure his political and social project, 
creating a union of primary and secondary rules. 
 
																																																								
429 see note 361 at 100-101 
430 DworkinÕs attack on HartÕs theory (in particular the rule of recognition) challenges Hart to account 
for Ôtheoretical disagreementÕ in law, which is based on the seemingly innocent observation that judges 
Ôdisagree about the grounds of law, about which other kinds of propositions, when true, make a 
particular proposition of law true.Õ  See note 395 at 5.  ÔThe grounds of lawÕ is another term for the rule 
of recognition, therefore DworkinÕs argument suggests that judges disagree over the content of the rule 
of recognition, and this raises serious doubts over the capability of the rule of recognition to perform the 
role Hart attributes to it.   
Both Leiter and Gardner have challenged the nature of the disagreement that Dworkin highlights and 
suggest that they actually demonstrate differences over the content of the rule of recognition.  Brian 
Leiter, ÔExplaining theoretical disagreementÕ (2009) 76 University of Chicago Law Review 1215, 1224; 
and John Gardner, ÔSome types of lawÕ in Law as a Leap of Faith (Oxford University Press, 2012), 71-
72 and 73-74 
In his Postscript Hart had softened his views on the role of the rule of recognition.  He protested against 
the idea asserted by many of his critics (such as Dworkin) that: Ôthe rule is meant to determine 
completely the legal result in a particular case, so that any legal issue arising in any case could simply be 
solved by mere appeal to the criteria or tests provided by the ruleÉ[T]his is a misconception: the 
function of the rule is to determine only the general conditions which correct legal decisions must satisfy 
in modern systems of law.Õ  H. L. A. Hart, ÔThe PostscriptÕ in The Concept of Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2nd edition, 1994), 258 
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Many critics have found issue with the rule of recognition because it is ÔslipperyÕ, or 
claiming that it seems very similar to KelsenÕs Grundnorm.431  Dworkin, for example, 
criticizes Hart for attributing a central role to the rule of recognition because he thinks 
there must be something that stands beyond the rule of recognition in our 
determination of legal validity.432  And indeed, Hart is careful to make it clear that 
there is more to law than the rule of recognition.  It is not the whole thing, but in terms 
of analytic description of the existence of a legal system, what has most explanatory 
power in our elucidation of a legal system, is that there is a rule of recognition that is 
open to change.  Nonetheless, many theorists see this apparent vagueness as a sign of 
weakness.433   
 
In practice the rule of recognition is never explicitly stated, but is used by legal 
practitioners when identifying legal rules, which is why Hart argues it Ôis characteristic 
of the internal point of view.Õ434  The legal practitionersÕ use of the rule of recognition 
carries with it an endorsement that it is characteristic of the internal point of view Ôand 
with this attitude there goes a characteristic vocabulary different from the natural 
expressions of the external point of view.Õ435  The rule of recognition is closely 
connected to the evaluative standpoint of the law and its internal location within the 
legal system means that its existence cannot be challenged.  Hart states: Ôthe rule of 
recognition exists only as a complex, but normally concordant, practice of the courts, 
																																																								
431 Dennis Patterson argues that HartÕs Rule of Recognition is flawed because law is not as the 
positivistÕs conceive Ð social facts do not make propositions of law true, law cannot be conceived of as 
social or institutional facts that operate in a similar way to scientific propositions regarding truth-aptness 
Ð it is not akin to science.  ÔThe truth of a proposition of law is the product of an activity (justification) 
and is not a matter of correspondence between a proposition and a social fact.Õ  Dennis Patterson, Law 
and Truth (Oxford University Press, 1999), 64 
See also: Margaret Davies, Asking the Law Question (Law Book Co of Australasia, 2nd edition, 2002)   
432 Dworkin has been the chief opponent of the Rule of Recognition, he begins Laws Empire by 
contending that Hart (amongst other theorists) suffer from a Ôsemantic stingÕ: Ôthey insist that lawyers all 
follow certain linguistic criteria for judging propositions of law.Õ  See note 395 at 32 and 45.  Dworkin 
argues that Hart (and theorists like him) all fail to explain theoretical disagreement in law because they 
operate under the mistaken assumption that the language of law can be meaningful only if lawyers all 
share the same uncontroversial tests for the meaning of a word (criteria) for determining the truth of 
propositions of law.  It leads to the conclusion that people cannot have any substantive/genuine 
disagreement about law instead their disagreements must be empirical, about penumbral cases or about 
what the law ought to be.  Hart is not the only target of the semantic sting DworkinÕs criticism extends to 
all semantic theorists and their semantic theories of law. 
Hart denied that his theory suffered from the semantic sting, see note 361 at 246 
433 Hart acknowledges that the value of the rule of recognition can be challenged (this is the aspect of the 
rule of recognition that can then be open to change in response to such challenges), but its existence can 
never be challenged.  ibid at 107-109 
Dworkin was unsatisfied by HartÕs claim that the Rule of Recognition could be vague like other legal 
rules, for the Rule of Recognition to be able to provide a way of identifying the law, the tests provided 
need to be complete and uncontroversial otherwise there is no shared way of identifying the law.   
434 ibid at 102 
435 ibid 
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officials, and private persons in identifying the law by reference to certain criteria.  Its 
existence is a matter of fact.Õ436 
 
The rule of recognition straddles both the distinction between internal and external 
perspectives because it exists within the practice (is internal to the practice) and any 
such statement of it (often implied through behaviour) is internal; but statements 
regarding the rule of recognitionÕs legal validity are external statements of fact.437 The 
rule of recognition is analytically entailed by a legal system in the same way that an 
evaluative standpoint is analytically entailed; in this sense it is no different from any 
other social practice.  Hart challenges the notion that we have put law on a pedestal and 
assume that it is in some mythical way different and more important than all our other 
practices, demonstrating instead that law is still simply participation in social practice 
(although the practice can still be challenged and questioned). 
 
The above outline of HartÕs exposition of the rule of recognition could of course be 
elaborated further as there is much to say (and much has been written) about this aspect 
of his work, but as my thesis argues for the usefulness of thick and thin concepts within 
law it is more beneficial to move away from exposition and towards comparison with 
the meta-ethical literature. The meta-ethical literature on evaluative standpoint 
(addressed above) can be useful here also. WittgensteinÕs work on game theory has 
influenced the notion of evaluative standpoint in many disciplines including meta-
ethics and law.  Hart draws on WittgensteinÕs game theory to articulate his points about 
the rule of recognition and to demonstrate that we have many rules of recognition in 
many different practices and, as we all know what it is to be a participant to a practice, 
why should law be any different.438  Yet it is the nature of this participation Ð what it 
means to be an internal participant rather than an external participant Ð in a legal 
practice that is under contention.  There are other aspects of WilliamsÕ work (besides 
evaluative standpoint) that can be used to draw relevant analogies here, and it is to 
																																																								
436 ibid at 110  
437 There is no necessary connection between the validity of any particular rule and its efficacy, unless 
the rule of recognition expresses among its criteria that no rule is to count as a rule of that system if it 
ceases to be efficacious.   
438 Hart explicitly recognizes the influence of Wittgenstein, ibid at 280 and 297.  He also draws 
analogies between law and games in his other works, see: H. L. A. Hart, ÔDefinition and theory in 
jurisprudenceÕ in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 1983).  He states: 
ÔThe economist or the scientist often uses a simple model with which to understand the complex; and 
this can be done for law.  So in what follows I shall use as a simple analogy the rule of a game which at 
many vital points have the same puzzling logical structure as rules of law.Õ  ibid at 26-27 
	 145	
these the discussion now turns, as evaluative standpoint was discussed in the previous 
section and many of the same points are applicable to the rule of recognition. 
 
 
4 Ð Extending the discussion of the Rule of Recognition. 
 
The rule of recognition is clearly concerned with action-guidance and this is hardly 
surprising considering the normativity of law (often itself characterized in terms of 
action-guidance). HartÕs identification of the rule of recognition as the criterion for 
legal validity attributes to it an action-guiding role: it guides the actions of participants 
of the legal practice in their identification of valid legal rules (and concepts).  Action-
guidance is closely tied to evaluative standpoint, in which action-guidance is a 
reflection of underlying normative judgments and evaluations captured by evaluative 
standpoint. 
 
WilliamsÕ thick terms and concepts rely on a combination of both action-guiding and 
world-guided content and the world-guided aspect of thick concepts is also relevant to 
better understanding the rule of recognition.  The potential world-guidedness of the 
rule of recognition refers to its ability to identify features of the way the world really is 
and this requires us to consider the kind of world-guidedness that could be identified 
by the rule of recognition. Hart has already stated that although we can find a rule of 
recognition in any legal system, the nature of that rule of recognition will be specific to 
a particular communityÕs evaluative standpoint it is a reflection of.  The world-guided 
content therefore refers to the way the world actually is in that particular community, 
but this community specific notion of world-guidedness is different from the traditional 
notion of empirical knowledge.  As we have already seen, Williams accounts for this 
by drawing a distinction between two kinds of worlds - the Ôsocial worldÕ and the 
physical Ôscience worldÕ Ð after considering the legal context more closely, Williams 
claims that the kind of world-guided content associated with the rule of recognition is 
Ôsocial world-guidednessÕ.  Even if WilliamsÕ distinction between the Ôsocial worldÕ 
and the physical Ôscience worldÕ and his conclusion that the kind of world-guided 
content associated with the legal context is Ôsocial world-guidednessÕ is incompatible 
with accounts of law that are influenced by empiricism (and therefore view law as 
belonging to the physical Ôscience worldÕ); WilliamsÕ discussion of world-guidedness 
will still be of interest to those legal theorists engaging with legal positivist 
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jurisprudence (particularly the jurisprudential debates concerning the rule of 
recognition).  Another example of a legal positivist thesis where it could be useful to 
consider the nature of social world-guidedness, is the sources thesis.439 
 
The sources thesis clearly locates law within the Ôsocial worldÕ as Williams categorizes 
it, but the sources thesis is intended to provide empirical criteria rather than evaluative.  
WilliamsÕ distinction locates thick and thin ethical concepts as existing within the 
social world(s) and his definition of thick and thin in terms of action-guiding and 
world-guided content, when applied to legal concepts, necessarily adds some form of 
evaluative dimension to all legal concepts in terms of action-guidance.440  Reference to 
evaluative criteria becomes a necessary part of the rule of recognition because the rule 
of recognition identifies the Ôsocial factsÕ of a particular social practice.441 If the rule of 
recognition is reflective of the social practice that it belongs to, then the rule of 
recognition must be evaluative at least to the extent that it conveys the evaluative 
standpoint of that particular Ôsocial worldÕ (culture).  Hart seems to accept this because 
the rule of recognition is based on the social practices of the officials of the legal 
system.442   
 
																																																								
439 Raz identifies the sources thesis as follows: ÔAll law is source-based.  A law is source-based if its 
existence and content can be identified by reference to social facts alone, without resort to any 
evaluative argument.Õ  Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Clarendon Press, 1994), 194-5 
440 If we consider the role of evaluative standpoint in the sources thesis in terms of action-guidance, it is 
important to note that this still requires us to understand the evaluative reasons behind that particular 
action-guidance, but the reasons for action-guidance may not be evaluative in the standard ethical sense.  
It could be the best course of action for financial reasons, or it could be based on a principle such as 
utility.  Whilst we may be required to understand the role of action-guidance in the legal norms we are 
identifying, this does not require us to endorse the evaluation behind that action-guidance.  As Williams 
argues the link to action-guidance is only typical and maybe indirect, there may be other reasons that 
override.  For example a judge may identify a source of law as applicable in a particular case, and whilst 
it may conflict with his ideology, his application of the law may stem from other reasons that override 
his ideological conflict, such as respect for the Rule of Law above all else.  The connection between 
evaluation and the identification of law (the sources thesis) may not be as straightforward as first 
imagined, as demonstrated by the above analogy with WilliamsÕ action-guidance.   
441 Both action-guiding and world-guided content are an important aspect of Ôsocial facts,Õ both kinds of 
content are therefore captured by the Ôsocial thesis,Õ although I do not discuss this in my thesis. 
442 Shapiro argues that basing the rule of recognition on the practices of legal officials gives rise to what 
he has termed a Ôchicken and eggÕ problem.  Scott J. Shapiro, ÔOn HartÕs Way OutÕ (1998) 4 Legal 
Theory 469; and Scott Shapiro, Legality (Harvard University Press, 2011), 36-40.  If the existence of the 
rule of recognition is dependent upon the existence of legal officials, then this seems to presuppose the 
existence of a legal system within which they are officials and are endowed with legal powers, and the 
existence of a legal system is dependent on the existence of a rule of recognition.  Hence Shapiro asks Ð 
what came first, the officials or the rule of recognition?  Hart seems to be required to answer that the 
officials came first (otherwise he must abandon his claim that the existence of the rule of recognition 
depends on the practices of legal officials), but this then leaves open the question Ð where did the 
officials come from? 
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There needs to be more careful consideration of what we mean by the ÔevaluativeÕ in 
law, particularly in the case of the sources thesis and utilizing WilliamsÕ ideas on 
evaluative standpoint in thick concepts can help unpick the nature of this evaluative 
content.443  Evaluation may play a key role in the identification of legally valid norms 
and rules through evaluative standpoint in the guise of the rule of recognition, but this 
is very different to relying solely or primarily on evaluative criteria; and very different 
to any possibly related claims that this necessarily leads to evaluative 
questions/judgments such as Ôought this be a legally valid norm/rule?Õ Clarifying the 
nature of the evaluation operating within law is crucial to many aspects of legal 
positivism and has led to a division within legal positivism between inclusive and 
exclusive positivism.444  The meta-ethical literature can shed light on the various 
shapes that evaluative content can come in and the implications this diversity may have 
for law.  The debate between inclusive and exclusive positivism notes the relevance of 
meta-ethics for this reason, although theorists have not drawn on the meta-ethical 
literature of thick and thin ethical concepts.   
 
In remarks now contained in the Postscript Hart softened many of his earlier views and 
adopted an inclusive stance in response to critics (such as Dworkin). For example, he 
draws attention to his express statement in the first edition of The Concept of Law: 
Ôthat in some systems of law, as in the United States, the ultimate criteria of legal 
validity might explicitly incorporate besides pedigree, principles of justice or 
substantive moral values, and these may form the content of constitutional legal 
restraints.Õ445  He also noted his explicit acknowledgment: Ôthat the rule of recognition 
may incorporate as criteria of legal validity conformity with moral principles or 
																																																								
443 The following definition of evaluation demonstrates the variety of ways that evaluation can be 
understood: ÔEvaluation can be understood generally as any or all of the more or less complex processes 
of sampling, discriminating, comparing, assessing, and selecting that constitute the ongoing activities of 
responsive creatures in their interactions with their environments.  So understood, evaluative behavior is 
not confined to human beings and is not necessarily deliberative, conscious, rational, verbal, overt, or 
intentionally communicative Ð though it can, of course, be all these as well.Õ  Barbara Herrnstein Smith, 
ÔEvaluation: Cultural EvaluationÕ in Michael Kelly (ed), The Encyclopaedia of Aesthetics (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd edition, 2014) 
444 Jules Coleman, ÔBeyond Inclusive Legal PositivismÕ (2009) 22 Ratio Juris 359; Jules Coleman (ed), 
HartÕs Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2001); 
Kenneth Einar Himma, ÔInclusive Legal PositivismÕ in J. Coleman, S. Shapiro and K.E. Himma (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press, 2002), 125-
165; Andrei Marmor, ÔExclusive Legal PositivismÕ in J. Coleman, S. Shapiro and K.E. Himma (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press, 2002), 104-
124; and Scott J. Shapiro, ÔWas Inclusive Legal Positivism Founded on a Mistake?Õ (2009) 22 Ratio 
Juris 326 
445 H. L. A. Hart, ÔThe PostscriptÕ in The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 1994), 
247 
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substantive values.Õ446  The issue can be rephrased as the question: can the rule of 
recognition exist in a legal system where law is bounded by morality, or generated by 
morality (or maybe both)?447 According to soft (inclusive) legal positivism this can be 
the case. 448   Exclusive legal positivists are often unconvinced by the inclusive 
positivistÕs argument that the rule of recognition can make legal validity a matter of 
conformity with moral principles or substantive values.449 
 
Dworkin provides two versions of his argument from ÔcontroversyÕ.450  It is the second 
version that is relevant here, which argues that it is a controversial issue in moral 
theory whether moral statements express truth-apt beliefs about the way the world is, 
thereby arbitrating between correct and incorrect beliefs.451  On this count Dworkin 
explicitly refers to the meta-ethical literature on cognitivism and non-cognitivism, and 
although he does not refer to Williams or thick ethical concepts, they are also relevant 
to his argument.  McBride and Steel summarise the point well: Ôif the rule of 
recognition of a legal system made the validity of a legal rule dependent on morality, 
then what the law said on a particular issue would depend on which of these 
																																																								
446 ibid at 250   
447 Nicholas McBride and Sandy Steel suggest two possible ways the rule of recognition could make the 
content of law dependent on morality: Ô(1) The first is to say that a rule with a particular pedigree will 
count as a valid legal rule unless it violates some moral standard.  Some would say that this is the 
position under the US Constitution, where a legal rule contained in an act of Congress will count as a 
valid legal rule unless it violates a moral standard set out in the US Constitution such as the 8th 
Amendment to the Constitution which forbids, among other things, the infliction of Òcruel and unusual 
punishments.Ó  (2) The second is to say that a rule will count as a valid legal rule if it satisfies a test that 
requires one to evaluate the content of the rule.  An example might be the mini rule of recognition 
determining whether or not one person will owe another a duty of care under the test laid out in the case 
of Caparo Industries plc v Dickman.  Under the Caparo test, a defendant will owe a claimant a duty of 
care if (1) it is foreseeable that the claimant would suffer some kind of harm if the defendant were 
careless; (2) the defendant and the claimant were in a sufficiently proximate relationship; and (3) it 
would be Òfair, just and reasonableÓ to find that the defendant owed the claimant a duty of care.Õ  
Nicholas J. McBride and Sandy Steel, Jurisprudence (Palgrave, 2014), 52-53 
Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, 617-618 
448 Hart was responding to the Ôpedigree thesisÕ (the criteria for legal validity concerns the pedigree of 
legal rules Ð the manner in which they were adopted or developed).  Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously (Duckworth, new impression with a Reply to Critics, 2005), 17 
449 Dworkin and Raz have both rejected this aspect of HartÕs account, this chapter looks at DworkinÕs 
rejection - the argument from controversy Ð as this provides more useful analogy with the meta-ethical 
literature.  
450 The first version argues that if we accept that the rule of recognition owes its existence to shared 
acceptance by the legal officials within a legal system, that shared acceptance must permeate both 
concrete and hard cases; but this depth of shared acceptance is impossible to maintain if the legal 
officials are required by the rule of recognition to make moral judgments to determine legal validity.  
Differences in their moral views would lead to disagreement regarding the application of the rule of 
recognition in particular cases.  Ronald Dworkin, ÔThe Model of Rules IIÕ in Taking Rights Seriously 
(Duckworth, new impression with a Reply to Critics, 2005) and Ronald Dworkin, ÔA Reply by Ronald 
DworkinÕ in Marshall Cohen (ed), Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence (Duckworth, 
1984), 253 
451 My earlier discussion of cognitivism and non-cognitivism in chapters two and three is relevant here. 
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philosophical theories about the nature of moral statements was true.Õ452  Dworkin is in 
favour of judges engaging with such complex moral issues in their determination of 
legal issues. 453   He doubts that legal positivists would be quite so willing to 
accommodate moral debates in determining the content of the law though.454  In the 
Postscript Hart accepted that DworkinÕs criticism required attention, considering that 
he (Hart) thought that Ôthe question of the objective standing of moral judgments 
[should be] left open to legal theory.Õ455  As a result, he conceded that his soft 
(inclusive) positivist claim that the rule of recognition could determine legal validity 
on the basis of morality might need replacing.  He suggested that a legal system could 
include a secondary rule of recognition that required judges to develop or change the 
law in accordance with certain moral values or precepts (when required).456   
 
The debate between inclusive and exclusive legal positivists regarding the rule of 
recognition and its ability to contain a moral component provides a good starting point 
for future research into the relevance of meta-ethics for law (in particular thick and thin 
ethical concepts).457  HartÕs inclusive legal positivism seems to have an advantage over 
exclusive accounts because of the social roots of the rule of recognition, the onus shifts 
to the exclusive positivist to prove that the judges of a legal system could not operate 
																																																								
452 Nicholas J. McBride and Sandy Steel, Jurisprudence (Palgrave, 2014), 54 
453 See note 395 at 80-85 and Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press, 2011). 
454 Dworkin states: ÔI had thought it was part of HartÕs ambition  (and of the ambition of positivists 
generally) to make the objective standing of propositions of law independent of any controversial theory 
either of meta-ethics or of moral ontology.Õ  Ronald Dworkin, ÔA Reply by Ronald DworkinÕ in 
Marshall Cohen (ed), Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence (Duckworth, 1984), 250. 
Jules Coleman argues that philosophy of law is yet to engage with the cognitivist/non-cognitivist 
literature regarding the semantics and metaphysics of legal discourse, even though this literature has 
proved central to similar areas in philosophy.  He notes that Dworkin and Putnam are an exception, they 
have both considered the relevance of cognitivism and non-cognitivism in understanding the truth-
aptness of legal statements.  For his discussion of this see: Jules L. Coleman, ÔTruth and Objectivity in 
LawÕ (1995) 1 (1) Legal Theory 33 
455 see note 445 at 254 
456 ibid  
This idea was derived from Raz according to McBride and Sandy Steel see note 474 
457 Research in this area is still in its infancy, Jose Juan Moreso is one of the few theorists who have 
undertaken such research. Moreso utilizes thick and thin concepts in his defense of inclusive legal 
positivism, where he postulates that the rejection of moral objectivity doesnÕt necessarily lead to 
abandoning inclusive legal positivism.  His use of thick concepts is brief, preferring HareÕs 
prescriptivism over WilliamsÕ formulation (unlike many legal theorists he recognizes that these two 
theorists proposed conflicting accounts of thick concepts). Jose Juan Moreso, ÔIn defense of Inclusive 
Legal PositivismÕ in P Chiassoni (ed), The Legal Ought Proceedings of the IVR Mid-Term Congress in 
Genoa 2000, (Giappichelli, 2001) 
See also Jose Juan Moreso, ÔLegal Defeasibility and the Connection between Law and MoralityÕ in Jordi 
Ferrer Beltran and Giovanni Battista Ratti (eds), The Logic of Legal Requirements: Essays on 
Defeasibility, (Oxford University Press, 2012) where he relates legal positivism to discussion of thick-
intuitionism (thick intuitionism argues that moral rules are formulated with thick concepts, which are not 
definable in non-moral terms making them susceptible to critical attack). 
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with a rule of recognition that determines legal validity on the grounds of moral 
criteria.  DworkinÕs argument that the inclusive account of the rule of recognition 
renders the content of law dependent on the outcome of a meta-ethical debate between 
cognitivists and non-cognitivists, offers the most promise for the exclusive positivist 
camp.  If the cognitivists are seen as the winners in this debate then DworkinÕs 
challenge is unsubstantiated, but as my thesis has demonstrated (particularly in 
chapters two to four) there is a clear lack of consensus in the meta-ethical literature and 
cognitivists are yet to prove themselves the convincing winners.  As noted in chapter 
two, the literature on thick and thin ethical concepts is an extension of the discussion 
between cognitivists and non-cognitivists and can provide a useful and interesting 
medium for discussing the wider meta-ethical issues that are relevant to conceptual 
analysis in law, such as the relevance of the distinction between internal and external 




5 Ð Concluding remarks on HartÕs internal/external distinction. 
 
Hart offers an examination of law from an internal perspective, this places parameters 
on those who he can engage with, but it then renders attacks such as Ð why havenÕt you 
considered this alternative account of law? Ð fallacious, because they impose an 
external standpoint.  This move by Hart is influenced by his ordinary language 
philosophy (Wittgenstein was a major influence) and it is a reflection of his position 
that you can only articulate from within your own language game.  His whole thesis is 
based on ÔrecognitionÕ Ð he offers illustrations to help us recognize things that we call 
the social phenomena of law.  The concept of law Hart is concerned with is the concept 
of law for everyone for there are not multiple concepts of law, though the concept is 
open to extension.  He is open to contrary claims that some other thing should have 
been included in ÔtheÕ concept of law, but this is different from the claim that there is 
an alternative concept of law, because that supposes that Hart should have called it ÔA 
Concept of Law.Õ  This misses the point and makes a fetish out of the inscription and 
sound.  We have to occupy the standpoint of someone internal to the practice to be able 
to engage with and see if the definitions of law we have so far been given actually 
work, and Hart argues that once we realize this we can see that they donÕt.  He 
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specifically attacks such generalist jurisprudence in the notes. 458   Many of the 
criticisms or misunderstandings of Hart stem from a cultural disposition towards 
generalist reductionist techniques that Hart is specifically opposed to and countering in 
The Concept of Law.459  These cultural dispositions towards methodology can be seen 
not only in academic research, but also in teaching. My thesis argues for the use and 
usefulness of thick and thin concepts on the grounds that these terms (and associated 
ideas) can enrich our understanding of law, which includes legal education (addressed 
in chapter nine). 
 
This chapter has used HartÕs The Concept of Law as an exemplar of a legal theory (and 
an aspect of law) that can be illuminated through the application of WilliamsÕ work on 
thick and thin concepts, with the aim of therefore demonstrating the use and usefulness 
of thick and thin concepts within law (particularly in relation to enriching our 
understanding of specific legal theories, such as HartÕs legal positivism).  This chapter 
has focused on HartÕs discussion of the internal/external standpoint because it is one 
aspect of HartÕs thesis where WilliamsÕ work on thick concepts can be most usefully 
applied; and because the internal/external standpoint is also of direct relevance to the 
teaching of law in law schools. Legal education seems to be an internal practice Ð it is 
taught by members of the practice to those who are becoming members of the practice 
Ð it teaches students how to determine the answer to one key question: what is it I 
ought to do (as a lawyer/law student)?  Yet when we examine law school module 
outlines it is becoming increasingly popular to look outside of law (the legal practice) 
for answers, and these new directions and taught modules are increasingly focusing on 
the external standpoint; e.g. Ôlaw and literature;Õ Ôrace, religion and law;Õ and Ôlaw, 
science and technology.Õ460  Recently, following Hart, the whole idea of the enterprise 
of law has been imagined as predicated on there being a practice - an internal 
normative practice - that participants recognizing law as social phenomena engage in 
(legal positivists such as Hart particularly agreed with this approach towards law).  
																																																								
458 see note 361 at 283-285 
459 For example see: Margaret Davies, Asking the Law Question (Law Book Co of Australasia, 2nd 
edition, 2002).  Davies criticizes Hart for having a closed and systematic account of law, which excludes 
everything that does not fit his predetermined picture of the law (which happens to correspond to 
western democratic states).  This could not be further from the truth, HartÕs account does not reserve the 
ÔlegalÕ for characteristics which attach only to modern western developed systemic jurisprudence. See: 
H. L. A. Hart, ÔLaws as the union of Primary and Secondary RulesÕ in The Concept of Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd edition 1994), 79-91 
460 These are all optional modules offered by the University of Kent for students at stage two or three of 
their degree.   
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Thus we are nowhere better positioned to embrace that study than within law schools, 
but Dworkin (and others) think that almost everywhere law schools have done 
everything but this.  The disagreement between those theorists who think the study of 
law should be an internal normative practice and those theorists who think our 
understanding of law can be illuminated by looking outside of law to other practices 
remains a prominent issue within legal education.  The recent Legal Education and 
Training Review,461 by arguing that students need a broader knowledge base that 
includes an understanding of external influences on the law such as economics and 
business, has added to the need to rethink matters pertaining to legal education (how 
we teach the law).   
 
I consider the topic of legal education further in chapter nine, but in the next chapter I 
continue my discussion of the usefulness of thick and thin concepts for law in the 
context of key jurisprudential debates as this provides further evidence of the 
usefulness of thick and thin in law (thereby presaging the discussion of legal education 



















461 Work commenced on the Legal Education and Training Review in May 2011 and the report was 
published in June 2013. 
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Chapter Seven: Thick and Thin and 





1 Ð Introduction. 
 
Hilary Putnam is one of many authors who have noted that the philosophy of law 
shares many core philosophical concerns with meta-ethics, observing ÔIn recent years 
we have come to see that there are intimate connections between questions in meta-
ethics, in philosophy of law, and in the theory of truth.Õ462  The previous two chapters 
demonstrated the usefulness of thick and thin concepts regarding the nature of law.  
This chapter develops the discussion further in relation to the shared core philosophical 
concerns that must be addressed by any legal theory and that have traditionally 
perplexed jurisprudes.463  This chapter focuses on two aspects of the legal system and 
legal practices that have received widespread attention in jurisprudence Ð the judiciary 
and legal objectivity Ð because certain legal theorists writing on these aspects of law - 
have already began to draw on the philosophical literature of thickness and thinness.464 
																																																								
462 Hilary Putnam, ÔAre Moral and Legal Values Made or Discovered?Õ (1995) 1 Legal Theory 5 
Putnam doesnÕt specifically address thick concepts in this article, but does address the meta-ethical 
literature on the fact-value distinction and notes the parallels between the ethical and legal discussions of 
objectivity.   
Brian Leiter and Jules L. Coleman replied to PutnamÕs article (they also did not use the terminology 
ÔthickÕ or ÔthinÕ) and their discussions offer interesting insights into the connections between the 
cognitivist and non-cognitivist literature and philosophy of law. See: Brian Leiter, ÔThe Middle WayÕ 
(1995) 1 Legal Theory 21 and Jules L. Coleman, ÔTruth and Objectivity in LawÕ (1995) 1 (1) Legal 
Theory 33 
Putnam replies to these challenges in: Hilary Putnam, ÔRepliesÕ (1995) 1 Legal Theory 69 
463 These philosophical concerns are wide-ranging and include some of the following: the nature of truth 
and knowledge in the legal context; the relationship between facts and values; the nature of obligations 
(legal) and the enforcement of law; the nature of justice; and the nature of normativity.  All of which are 
further complicated by our legal language practices and the interpretive nature of social practices such as 
law.  Many of these core philosophical concerns are central to other disciplines as well (such as ethics), 
which is one of the many reasons why a close connection between law and morality has often been 
asserted. 
464 R. A. Duff, ÔLaw, Language and Community: Some Preconditions of Criminal LiabilityÕ (1998) 18 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 189; discusses thick concepts in relation to legal language. 
Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press, 2011); Heidi Li Feldman, ÔAppellate 
Adjudication as Conceptual EngineeringÕ in Graham Hubbs &Douglas Lind (eds), Pragmatism, Law 
and Language (Routledge, 2014); Heidi Li Feldman, ÔThe Distinctiveness of Appellate AdjudicationÕ 
(2012) 5 Washington University Jurisprudence Review 61; J. E. Penner, Ô Common Law Cognition and 
Judicial AppointmentÕ (2001) 38 Alberta Law Review 683; all discuss thick concepts in relation to 
aspects concerning the judiciary, such as: judicial agreement and disagreement; judicial interpretation, 
judicial knowledge and judicial appointment. 
Thick concepts have arisen in the following theorists discussions of legal objectivity and the fact-value 
distinction in law, see: Heidi Li Feldman, ÔObjectivity in Legal JudgmentÕ (1994) 92 (5) Michigan Law 
Review; Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Harvard University Press, 1992); Amy L. Peikoff, 
ÔThe Right to Privacy: Contemporary Reductionists and their CriticsÕ (2013) 5 Washington University 
Jurisprudence Review 61; Joseph Raz, Engaging Reason (Oxford University Press, 1999); Henry 
Mather, ÔNatural Law and Right AnswersÕ (1993) 38 American Journal of Jurisprudence 297, 313; 
Simon Hope, ÔThe Basic Goods and the ÒLawlikeÓ Use of Reason: Comments on Human Rights and the 
Common GoodÕ (2013) 8 Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 136; John Finnis, ÔA Response to Harel, 
Hope, and SchwartzÕ (2013) 8 Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 147; John Finnis, Human Rights and 
the Common Good: Collected Essays volume III (Oxford University Press, 2011); John Finnis, Reason 
in Action: Collected Essays Volume I (Oxford University Press, 2011); Lawrence B. Solum & Linghao 
	 155	
The chapter identifies, emphasises and builds on the usefulness perceived for thick and 
thin by these writers.  Sections two and three will thus discuss jurisprudential matters 
pertaining to the judiciary, addressing such apparently diverse topics such as judicial 
disagreement and agreement; judicial interpretation; judicial engineering of legal 
concepts; judicial knowledge (including legal expertise); and appointment of the 
judiciary.  In turn, section four will discuss jurisprudential matters pertaining to legal 
objectivity this will include challenges to the traditional (empirical) notion of legal 
objectivity and the fact-value distinction.465  The jurisprudential debates canvassed 
through these sections often overlap with many of the legal theorists concerned 
addressing multiple jurisprudential issues Ð the breadth of these points of focus serves 
to emphasise the usefulness I argue for.  Section five provides an example of the sweep 
and range of the approach I support, in which the aim is to demonstrate the usefulness 
of thick and thin in reviving classical theories of law Ð such as virtue jurisprudence.  
  
What follows in this chapter is an exposition of the current deployment of thick and 
thin concepts to these shared core philosophical concerns; it is not a literature review 
but it will continue to collate the many disparate uses of thick and thin concepts within 
the legal literature (the task that I started in chapter five) and will therefore be fairly 
descriptive.  This description is necessary to demonstrate the extent of the research 
required in my investigation into the current use and usefulness of thick and thin 
concepts within law, which begins to establish a compendium of thick and thin 
concepts within law. This chapter continues to add to my observations regarding a lack 
of clarity in the legal literature on thick and thin (see chapter five), reference will be 
made within both the footnotes and main text regarding specific theorists 
understanding and appreciation of the meta-ethical literature on thick and thin 
concepts.  The applications of thick and thin concepts drawn on here have been chosen 
for their ability to demonstrate the usefulness of thick and thin concepts for key 
jurisprudential debates, not on the basis of their contributions to their chosen topic 
areas (although it is interesting to note that all of the legal scholars and their 
contributions have been recognized as important).  So this chapter is consistent with 
the previous two in showing the use and usefulness of thick and thin concepts within 
																																																																																																																																																																
Wang, ÔConfucian Virtue JurisprudenceÕ in Amalia Amaya & Ho Hock Lai (eds), Law, Virtue and 
Justice (Hart Publishing, 2013) 
465 This chapter is not an exhaustive discussion of these jurisprudential debates the aim is to focus on 
those theorists who have used thick and thin concepts to illuminate these issues, and demonstrate the 
usefulness of thickness and thinness for jurisprudence. 
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law (the particular aspect of law addressed in this chapter is jurisprudential debates).  
Whilst the acceptance that certain legal concepts (such as LEGAL VALIDITY) can be 
construed thickly will not by itself solve jurisprudential debates within law (such as 
those addressed in this chapter), it may reframe existing ideas and facilitate new ideas 
by placing the discussion within the wider philosophical context of thickness and 
thinness.  Enoch and Toh note: ÔAdmittedly, a part of what we are doing here is to 
reframe old questions. But, as we hope our discussion shows, such reframing has 
theoretical payoffs.Õ466  The following chapter will show how this wider philosophical 
context could be extended to education, particularly legal education.  
 
 
 2 Ð The Judiciary. 
 
This section discusses various matters pertaining to the judiciary that can be 
illuminated by a reframing of the terms of the debate, using the language employed by 
philosophers, of thickness and thinness.  The judiciary has an important role to play in 
shaping the legal system and future laws and it does this, inter alia, through its use of 
legal language. Legal language notes Duff, is Ôthe language of legal professionals Ð 
most obviously of judges and lawyers.  It is a language in which they, at least, are at 
home.  They can not only understand it, as one might understand what is being said in 
a foreign language: they can use it to express the kinds of judgment and argument 
which belong to it.Õ467  Legal language is both factual and normative (as demonstrated 
by the previous two chapters); therefore an understanding of legal language must entail 
an understanding of both its factual and normative aspects.468  The judiciary (and other 
legal professionals) are trained in legal language unlike ordinary citizens, yet both 
groups seem to be able to operate with legal concepts and understand the legal 
obligations and responsibilities placed on them.  Duff argues that this is possible 
																																																								
466 David Enoch and Kevin Toh, ÔLegal as a Thick ConceptÕ in Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa (eds), 
Philosophical Foundations of The Nature of Law (Oxford University Press, 2013) 
467 R. A. Duff, ÔLaw, Language and Community: Some Preconditions of Criminal LiabilityÕ (1998) 18 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 189, 198.  This section focuses on the use of legal language by the 
judiciary; but it is important to note that the lay participants in the legal trial (and legal system) must also 
be able to understand enough of legal language to play their parts.  Sometimes a translation from a legal 
professional (judge, counsel or magistrates clerk) may be required.   
468 Duff provides the example of a defendant in a criminal trial: Ôthe defendant must be able to 
understand the values that underpin the claim that their alleged conduct constituted a criminal 
wrongdoing.  Second, the defendantÕs understanding of legal language must be sufficient to enable the 
defendant to make Ôfirst personal, committed normative statements which express her own acceptance of 
the law and its values.Õ  Ibid at 199.  Grasping legal language in this way is an essential condition of 
criminal responsibility and precondition of criminal liability. 
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because thick legal concepts provide a bridge between legal language and extra-legal 
language:  
 
 Of course the law will give partly technical meanings to concepts 
which it takes over from extra-legal language Ð to enable those 
concepts to serve the particular roles that they fill in the special 
context of the law.  But there must be a bridge, a bridge which is 
neither too long nor too far, which can take ordinary citizens from 
ordinary language into enough of the language of the law for them to 
be able to speak the relevant parts of that language in the first 
person.469 
 
These thick legal concepts,  
 
are sufficiently closely connected to their extra-legal forms for 
citizens, defendants and jurors to grasp as much of them as they need 
(if necessary with some judicial assistance); and the language of the 
law thus clearly is a language which lay citizens can speak, as much 
as they need to and when they need to.470 
 
The relationship between thick legal concepts and extra-legal language is important in 
explaining how we understand legal language and why this understanding sometimes 
leads to disagreement.  Williams notes a similar connection between legal language 
and its non-legal counterparts and argues that philosophy (as well as law) can learn 
from legal concept use.471  Jay Connison identifies PROMISE and PROMISING as 
examples of thick concepts and distinguishes between the everyday concept PROMISE 
and the legal concept PROMISE which often forms the basis of legal obligations, 
particularly within contract law.472  Heidi Feldman cites NEGLIGENCE and its sister 
concepts REASONABLE PERSON and UNREASONABLE RISK as examples:   
 
NEGLIGENCE and its sister concepts are examples of blend concepts 
that appear in non-legal discourse and then receive conscious 
cultivation from legal specialists, including courts, lawyers, and legal 
scholars.  The cultivated terms of art responds to the needs and 
																																																								
469 ibid at 200 
470 ibid at 201 
471 Bernard Williams, ÔAfterword What Has Philosophy to Learn from Tort Law?Õ in David G. Owen 
(ed), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford University press, 1995).  For an explanation of 
WilliamsÕ argument see my earlier discussion of this article in chapter five. 
472 Jay Connison, ÔThe Pragmatics of PromiseÕ (1997) 10 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 
273, 312 
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interests that inform negligence in a more refined and powerful way 
than does its uncultivated ordinary language counterpart.473 
 
Technical legal language (thick legal concepts) cannot become excessively esoteric or 
technical because these terms still need to be intelligible to the lay people, especially 
those involved in the legal system such as jurors.  Feldman argues that Ôwhile legal 
mechanisms constrain jury judgments of negligence, social facts about reasonable 
behaviour and risk constrain legal development of negligence and its subsidiary 
concepts.Õ474  For example the REASONABLE PERSON is an idealised notion, but it is 
still based on a composite of the community and therefore is constrained by social 
facts. 
 
These discussions of thick legal concepts are important for legal agreement and 
disagreement, because it demonstrates that a certain level of agreement in both the 
factual and normative elements of legal language, or as Wittgenstein put it: agreement 
Ôin form of lifeÕ is necessary.475  There are many different kinds of agreements and 
disagreements, but this chapter is concerned with legal disagreement amongst the 
judiciary, because this seems to have important implications for legal objectivity and 
the legitimacy of the legal system.  
 
Legal Agreement and Disagreement. 
 
Ronald Dworkin has been one of the most significant contributors to the debate on 
legal disagreement in jurisprudence, so it is of particular relevance to my thesis that his 
latest work draws on the philosophical distinction between thick and thin concepts.476  
																																																								
473 Heidi Li Feldman, ÔObjectivity in Legal JudgmentÕ (1994) 92 (5) Michigan Law Review 1187, 1210 Ð 
1211  
474 ibid at 1233 
475 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell, 3rd edition, G. E. M. Anscombe 
(trans.), 1953-1958), para 241 
476 His views have developed throughout the following books: Ronald Dworkin, ÔHard CasesÕ reprinted 
in Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977); Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 
(Harvard University Press, 1986); Ronald Dworkin, LawÕs Empire (Harvard University Press, 1986); 
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, new impression with a Reply to Critics, 2005); 
and Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Harvard University Press, 2006).  This chapter focuses on his 
latest work: Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press, 2011) 
For useful further reading on DworkinÕs ideas and their impact on jurisprudence, see: Justine Burley 
(ed), Dworkin and His Critics (Blackwell, 2004); Marshall Cohen (ed), Ronald Dworkin and 
Contemporary Jurisprudence (Duckworth, 1984); Stephen Guest, Ronald Dworkin (Edinburgh 
University Press, Edinburgh, 2nd edition, 1997); Scott Hershovitz (ed), Exploring LawÕs Empire: The 
Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin (Oxford University Press, 2006); Brian Leiter, ÔThe End of Empire: 
Dworkin and Jurisprudence in the 21st CenturyÕ (2004) 36 Rutgers Law Journal 165; Andrei Marmor, 
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DworkinÕs discussion of thick concepts whilst succinct recognises many of the key 
issues addressed by the meta-ethical literature on thick concepts. He acknowledges the 
wide variety of approaches to the distinction and the tendency of some philosophers to 
over exaggerate its importance whilst others underestimate it.  In Justice for 
Hedgehogs477 Dworkin distinguishes between various types of concepts as part of his 
explanation of legal agreement and disagreement.478  Part of the judges role in deciding 
a case involves interpreting legal concepts (hence the chapter title: conceptual 
interpretation).  Many legal theorists have used GaillieÕs notion of essentially contested 
concepts to explain legal disagreement.479  Dworkin takes an alternative approach.  He 
argues that many moral and political concepts are interpretive: Ôwe share an 
interpretive concept when our collective behavior in using that concept is best 
explained by taking its correct use to depend on the best justification of the role it plays 
for us.Õ480  Interpretive concepts are subject to agreement and disagreement when 
applied to specific cases but we can explain this agreement and disagreement not on 
the basis of shared criteria for application, but by supposing that there are shared 
practices that these concepts figure in.481  Our Ôabstract moral conceptsÕ (thin concepts) 
seem to require a different account of interpretation because in these instances 
Dworkin argues that we are interpreting Ôan open-ended and large set of practices 
rather than a smaller and more focused practice.Õ482  This aspect of DworkinÕs account 
ties in with the earlier accounts of thick and thin that were based on a distinction 
between specific (thick) and more general (thin) concepts and descriptions.483  
 
																																																																																																																																																																
Interpretation and Legal Theory (Clarendon Press, 1992); Arthur Ripstein (ed), Ronald Dworkin 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007); Scott Shapiro, ÔThe Hart-Dworkin debate: a guide for the 
perplexedÕ in Arthur Ripstein (ed), Ronald Dworkin (Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Nicos 
Stavropolous, Objectivity in Law (Clarendon Press, 1996) 
477 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press, 2011) 
478 He distinguishes between ÔinterpretiveÕ concepts, ÔcriterialÕ concepts, and Ônatural kindÕ concepts.  I 
address only interpretive concepts because he categorises both thick and thin concepts as a way of 
distinguishing between different types of interpretive concept. 
479 W. B. Gallie ÔEssentially Contested ConceptsÕ (1956) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 167.  
See chapter two for my earlier discussion of essentially contested concepts, where I note HurleyÕs 
relevant work on centralism and non-centralism, see: Susan Hurley, Natural Reasons Personality and 
Polity (Oxford University Press, 1992) 
480 see note 477 at 158 
481 ibid 
If there was a shared criteria of application that was unanimously agreed upon (as in the case of criterial 
concepts) then disagreement would seem to be illusory about its proper use in some circumstances.   
482 ibid 181 
483 See Hurley on concepts: Susan Hurley, Natural Reasons Personality and Polity (Oxford University 
Press, 1992); and Ryle on descriptions: Gilbert Ryle, ÔThe Thinking of Thoughts: What is ÔLe PenseurÕ 
Doing?Õ in Collected Essays 1929-1968 (Routledge, 2009)  
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Dworkin (like all the legal theorists I have addressed in the previous two chapters) 
draws on WilliamsÕ distinction between thick and thin concepts, writing: ÔÉ  thin 
concepts, because they are very abstract vehicles of commendation or disparagement 
that can be attached to an almost unlimited range of actions or states of affairs.  We can 
intelligibly say, of almost any human action, that it is morally required or wrong.Õ484  
These more general (abstract) concepts leave more room for interpretation because 
they contain less descriptive (world-guided content), whereas the more specific (thick 
concepts), 
 
mix the praise or disparagement they offer with more concrete factual 
descriptions.  ÒBrave,Ó Ògenerous,Ó Òcruel,Ó and ÒtrustworthyÓ are 
thick concepts: each of these praises or condemns a particular kind of 
behavior that it also describes.  So each of the thick concepts can 
sensibly be applied only to a certain kind of act, an act, we might say, 
that is a candidate for that particular kind of commendation or 
condemnation.485  
 
There is less room for interpretation and disagreement regarding thick concepts, 
because they are more closely connected to the way the world is (world-guided 
content) and contain more detailed descriptive content.486  Williams asserts a similar 
claim in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy: he argues that thick concepts are more 
likely to lead to ethical knowledge or ethical confidence, because of their world-guided 
content.487  Dworkin never explicitly discusses this particular aspect of thick concepts 
Ð their ability to act as a vehicle for legal knowledge Ð although it is implied through 
his account of conceptual interpretation that judicial knowledge is still possible via the 
interpretation and application of thick legal concepts.   
 
DworkinÕs terminology differs from Williams, but both assert the importance of 
action-guidance; Dworkin asserts the role of an underlying normative judgment 
(commendation or condemnation) in thick concept application. Unlike many legal 
theorists he addresses conceptual priority and advances a no-priority view on the 
																																																								
484 see note 477 at 181 
485 ibid  
486 At the moment though this is all suppositional, to really understand whether it is thick legal concepts 
or thin legal concepts that seem to be the cause of legal disagreement an investigation into the nature of 
legal concepts that feature frequently in judicial disagreement would be needed.  My thesis cannot 
permit such an investigation, but for those legal theorists interested in legal disagreement this could be a 
useful research opportunity and may also benefit the philosophical literature on thick and thin. 
487 See my earlier discussion in chapter four of Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 
(Routledge Classics, 2011)  
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grounds that both concrete (thick) and abstract (thin) concepts have roles to play in our 
moral repertoire.488 Dworkin opines:  
 
On some occasions idiom or practice or context makes it more natural 
to say that an act is just plain wrong than that it is treacherous, 
inconsiderate, cruel, dishonestÉ.  On other occasions the more 
concrete charges or claims would seem more natural. In either case, 
more concrete or more abstract judgments are waiting in the wings, 
though they never appear.489 
 
DworkinÕs no-priority view ties in neatly with the flexibility of thickness provided by a 
difference of degree and is useful for understanding judicial decisions.490  Evaluative 
flexibility allows judges a degree of flexibility in their judgments: to distinguish 
overall judgments from pro tanto considerations (for example his actions were cruel 
but in that particular case at that particular time they were the right thing to do); and to 
use thinner concepts to state final conclusions in hard cases or evenly balanced cases.  
Dworkin concludes that thin concepts, despite being abstract, still function as 
interpretive concepts and that our disagreement over their application is evidence of 
this: 
 
But the interpretation they require must be focused, at least in the first 
instance, on other concepts, because the thinner concepts draw 
conclusions but do not themselves suggest much by way of argument.  
When argument is needed, we interpret the thicker concepts, 
including the relatively thinner of those thicker concepts, like the 
ideas of what is reasonable and what is just, to find grounds for 
redeeming the less clothed conclusions we offer in the very thin 
concepts we use first.491   
 
DworkinÕs conclusion responds to those critics who have argued that thin concepts 
(and therefore the distinction between thin and thick concepts as well) threaten his 
interpretive understanding of morality and moral concepts.  DworkinÕs inclusion and 
use of thick and thin concepts in his latest book - demonstrates the relevance and 
importance of thick and thin concepts for law, it is also an interesting reflection of how 
DworkinÕs ideas have developed over the course of his academic career.  His seminal 
																																																								
488 The issue of conceptual priority is rarely discussed in the legal literature on thick and thin and even 
within the meta-ethical literature no-priority views have only recently been expressed.  For example 
Simon Kirchin suggests a no-priority view of thick ethical concepts in his forthcoming monograph on 
thick evaluative concepts. 
489 see note 477 at 183 
490 Again DworkinÕs account is one of the few legal accounts of thick and thin to address the two related 
topics from the philosophical literature: difference of degree and evaluative flexibility. 
491 ibid at 184 
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status within jurisprudence and his inclusion of these ideas thereby appears to add 
further credence to my thesis (which advances the usefulness of these ideas within 
law).  DworkinÕs work acknowledges many aspects of the meta-ethical literature on 
thick and thin concepts that are missed by other legal theorists working with thick and 
thin concepts (in chapter five I noted that many legal theorists working with these 
terms misunderstood many aspects of the meta-ethical literature on thick and thin 
concepts, and cited Dworkin as a notable exception), but his work (like much of the 
legal literature) would still benefit from a more detailed analysis of these ideas, 
because as noted earlier in chapter five the legal literature on thick and thin concepts 
lacks clarity.  DworkinÕs work on thick concepts supports my earlier argument (chapter 
five) that despite the current weaknesses with the legal deployment of thick and thin 
concepts, the distinction is still useful within law and sharpening their future 
application will add value to their utility.  The area of law that Dworkin applies these 
ideas to Ð legal disagreement Ð is a crucial aspect of any legal curriculum, and if 
thickness and thinness can be helpful for Dworkin in explaining the nature of judicial 
interpretation and disagreement then this suggests that they could be useful for legal 
education in explaining legal disagreement. 
 
ÔRe-engineeringÕ Legal Concepts. 
 
Conceptual interpretation alters a concept slightly (the concept users interpretation will 
always be unique to them) but this may be unintentional and subconscious, and it may 
not even be noticeable to an observer.  Sometimes these interpretations maybe more 
like manipulations and in these instances the concept will be interpreted in a manner 
that fits the concept users purpose (often to convince someone else to agree with them).  
Thick concepts like purely evaluative concepts can be the ideal vehicle for this kind of 
interpretive practice and investigating thick concepts within law can be useful for law 
as a way of investigating and potentially explaining how legal concepts seem to alter 
and develop overtime.   
 
Heidi Feldman is an example of a legal theorist who has suggested that legal concepts 
can be re-interpreted in an evaluatively driven manner (she refers to this as re-
engineering).  She continues DworkinÕs discussion of legal agreement and 
disagreement, but uses the term ÔentangledÕ legal concepts rather than ÔthickÕ legal 
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concepts.492  Due to the similarity between her notion of  ÔentangledÕ or ÔblendÕ 
concepts and ÔthickÕ concepts my investigation proceeds on the basis that her 
arguments are also applicable to thick concepts.493  Feldman takes her discussion 
further than Dworkin in two ways: she asserts the evaluative flexibility of certain legal 
concepts (thick concepts), and argues that judges not only interpret these concepts but 
re-engineer these entangled (thick) concepts, the judiciary therefore play a part in 
shaping the evaluative nature of these legal concepts (which in turn shapes the law).   
Feldman argues that the nature of ÔentangledÕ legal concepts can lead to judicial 
disagreement because of their evaluative flexibility, but that this evaluative flexibility 
can also be used by judges to Ôre-engineerÕ these concepts into more ÔappropriateÕ legal 
concepts.494  Judicial discretion and interpretation is an already controversial aspect of 
judicial behavior, the idea of Ôre-engineeringÕ entangled concepts explicitly 
acknowledges that the judiciary have an active (rather than passive) role in developing 
the common law, which can be controversial. 
 
Feldman argues that Ôthe courts engineer entangled legal concepts via appellate 
adjudication, and it is in this respect appellate adjudication is both crucial and unique at 
least in the U.S. legal system.Õ495  The merger of fact and value in entangled concepts 
explains both judicial disagreement and the constraints that are placed on judges when 
																																																								
492 Feldman states: ÔEntangled concepts intertwine description and evaluation.  They also facilitate and 
constrain legal reasoning and legal judgments, in ways that distinguish legal adjudication from pure 
politics or the implementation of public policy.Õ Heidi Li Feldman, ÔThe Distinctiveness of Appellate 
AdjudicationÕ (2012) 5 Washington University Jurisprudence Review 61.  They are very similar to thick 
concepts and draw clear parallels from the separationist and non-separationist debate regarding 
entanglement in thick and thin concepts.  Feldman makes it clear in her first footnote that she is utilizing 
Hilary PutnamÕs term Ôentangled conceptÕ to refer to concepts that resist deduction to discrete 
descriptive (fact) and evaluative (value) components.  See: Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the 
Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (Harvard University Press, 2004).  Feldman has also used the 
term ÔBlend ConceptÕ to refer to the same conceptual phenomena in her work that predated PutnamÕs 
terminology.  see note 498 
493 Feldman has written numerous articles concerning concepts which combine evaluation and 
description in some manner (as evidenced by my references), although these may not specifically 
address thick concepts her work offers one of the most detailed accounts of the relevant meta-ethical 
literature and demonstrates a sharp and nuanced understanding of the nature of these terms.  
494 There are a number of ways ÔappropriateÕ could be interpreted, but I am using it to refer to an 
evaluation made by the judge (for whatever reasons) that this version (re-engineered) of the entangled 
concept is a better legal concept given the circumstances.  
495 Heidi Li Feldman, ÔThe Distinctiveness of Appellate AdjudicationÕ (2012) 5 Washington University 
Jurisprudence Review 61.  Her claims are specifically targeted at the appellate courts in the U.S. but 
many of her ideas are relevant and useful to an analysis of the English court hierarchy and appeals 
process.  English common law dictates that the lower courts follow precedents set by the higher courts, 
and these legal precedents involve elements of judicial discretion and judicial interpretation that could 
be (at least partially) explained by engineering entangled legal concepts. 
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deciding cases.496  Feldman elaborates: ÔIn entangled concepts, the descriptive and the 
evaluative are fundamentally interrelated such that when one aspect is reshaped so is 
the other.  This provides a check on the malleability of legal concepts: insofar as one 
does not wish to disturb the evaluative point of a concept, one cannot unthinkingly 
modify its descriptive reach, and vice versa.Õ497  Thinking of legal concepts that are 
often at the centre of legal disagreement as thick concepts or entangled concepts can be 
useful in understanding the nature of legal disagreement and judicial conceptual 
interpretation; because these concepts acknowledge that evaluative content is present 
and many theorists (like Feldman and I suspect Dworkin) allow for a degree of 
flexibility in the construal of the evaluative aspects of the concept.498  
 
Explicitly acknowledging the role of the judiciary in re-engineering legal concepts may 
raise concerns over the amount of discretion and unfettered power they have.  Feldman 
pre-empts this concern: ÔIn entangled legal concepts, the descriptive and the evaluative 
check and balance one another.  However, entanglement does allow for the 
modification or reengineering of entangled legal concepts.Õ499  The idea of checks and 
balances of course has a long history in the judiciary as a way of limiting abuses of 
power, but this may only be sufficient to satisfy the concerns of some theorists.500  The 
evaluative and descriptive aspects in her entangled concepts are related in a manner 
indicative of non-separationism, although there is no reference to the shapelessness 
hypothesis (see chapter three).  Rather the hypothesis seems to be implied by her claim 
																																																								
496 Williams notes these constraints and the pressure exerted on concepts by the legal system see note 
471  
497 Feldman does not define the extent to which a concept can be re-engineered and its evaluative point 
remain undisturbed; but there must be a limit, because at some point the concept is no longer re-
engineered it is an entirely new concept.  The same principle applies to many of our thin concepts (or 
purely evaluative concepts depending on how you draw the distinction between thick and thin concepts) 
and is not something that can be addressed in this thesis.  see note 495 at 63   
498 In a lengthy footnote Feldman demonstrates the close parallel between her Ôentangled conceptÕs and 
thick concepts.  Feldman charts the contemporary philosophical discussion of concepts that blend 
description and evaluation; she references the influence of Philippa Foot and G.E.M. AnscombeÕs 
challenges to the strict separation of description and evaluation, on WilliamsÕ development of thick 
ethical concepts.  See: G. E. M. Anscombe, ÔModern Moral PhilosophyÕ (1958) 33 (124) Philosophy 1; 
G. E. M. Anscombe, ÔOn Brute FactsÕ (1958) 18 Analysis 69; and Philippa Foot, ÔMoral beliefsÕ (1958) 
59 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83.  Post WilliamsÕ Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy she 
references the work of philosophers such as Peter Railton, Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn on thick 
concepts.  See: Peter Railton, ÔRed, Bitter, GoodÕ in Fact, Values and Norms: Essays towards a morality 
of consequence, (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 131-47; Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn, 
ÔMorality and Thick ConceptsÕ (1992) 66 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 267 
499 see note 495 
500 Consider for example the separation of powers within the English system of governance (legal and 
political), this acts as a check and balance against abuses of power. 
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that the evaluative and descriptive aspects are entangled to such an extent that they 
cannot be understood separately.501  Feldman states: 
 
As circumstances and values change, appellate courts can put these 
changes to work to redesign an entangled concept that has become 
outmoded.  If the conceptsÕ evaluative point is obsolete, this will 
drive a modification in its descriptive reach that responds to a revised 
understanding of the relevant values.  Likewise, if the descriptive 
reach of the concept no longer serves its evaluative point, courts can 
update the conceptÕs situational range.  In either case, though, the 
aspect of the concept undergoing revision must answer to the other 
aspect: the descriptive and evaluative cannot be understood or 
engineered independently of one another.502 
 
Re-engineering of entangled concepts must always be in line with the evaluative 
standpoint of the legal practice (and the wider social community it is located within), 
but it will not always be the intended result of a judgeÕs actions or decisions.  
Sometimes entangled concepts can be intentionally reengineered to reflect changes in 
the social morality of a community (shared evaluations of the practice), these 
conceptual interpretations involve conscious concept manipulation. More subtle 
changes in the evaluative standpoint of a community can sub-consciously impact the 
judicial application of concepts, in these instances the judge may unintentionally 
reengineer the entangled concept in line with the altered evaluative standpoint. 
 
FeldmanÕs argument specifically addresses Appellate judges because she argues that 
Ôno other legal actor effects change at such a foundational level and on such a routine 
and ongoing basis.Õ503  Legislatures can also make sweeping structural changes but 
legislative law is Ôovertly political and stipulativeÕ 504  it is not answerable to a 
conceptual scheme in the same way that the judiciary are.  She distinguishes appellate 
courts from other lawmakers:  ÔAppellate courts shape the law differently.  They work 
concept by concept, and must answer to the constraints imposed by the entangled 
concepts themselves.Õ505  It is for this reason that thick concepts can be so useful (and 
important) in understanding our legal practices, in particular those of the judiciary. 
																																																								
501 FeldmanÕs non-separationism is reflective of both PutnamÕs challenge to the fact-value distinction 
and WilliamsÕ challenge against the prescriptivist account of concepts (she notes the influence of both of 
these theorists in her work). 
502 see note 495 at 63 
503 ibid at 66 
504 ibid  
505 ibid at 67  
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Feldman cites the example of the thick legal concept COMMERCE which has been re-
engineered throughout a series of cases, focusing particularly on the most recent 
Supreme Court case: National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.506  The 
decision in this case was not unanimous therefore from a precedential perspective this 
case provides two rival engineering efforts rather than one definitive engineering of 
COMMERCE.507   Feldman discusses the various competing interpretations of the thick 
concept to demonstrate that the term ÔcommerceÕ is: Ôtoo fraught with competing views 
of the relevant factual-evaluative considerations for that concept to lend itself to an 
agreed-upon engineering.Õ508  From her discussion of appellate conceptual engineering 
she concludes that appellate cases, such as National Federation, teach us something 
important about thick concepts: Ôthey come in sets or clusters.  When one concept 
cannot be engineered to garner sufficient judicial endorsement, this can pave the way 
for another entangled concept to come into play, a concept that at first may not have 
seemed to be important to deciding a case.Õ509  In this particular case COMMERCE lent 
itself to being engineered in radically different ways because the judiciary understood 
the Ômesh of fact and valueÕ510 within the concept differently, as a result the concept 
got sidelined and the thick concept TAX was engineered.  Feldman concludes that her 
analysis of National Federation demonstrates the U.S. courts (both the state appellate 
courts and the Supreme Court) recognise and utilise the entanglement of facts and 
values within thick legal concepts when engineering legal concepts: Ôsensitivity to and 
engagement with entanglement to achieve practicable legal concepts is the hallmark of 
appellate adjudication in the United States, whether the adjudication concerns 
constitutional law or common law.Õ511 
 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh agrees with FeldmanÕs argument concerning both the 
usefulness of thick concepts within legal cases and the engineering of thick concepts 
																																																																																																																																																																
Her argument could be extended to other members of the judiciary but there will be a direct relation 
between the judicial hierarchy and the extent of reengineering that occurs.  For example lawyers will 
indirectly influence the reengineering of entangled concepts because their conceptual behaviour in the 
courtroom will impact on those judges with the ability to reengineer concepts. 
506 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012) 132 S. Ct. 2566  
It is important to note that Feldman uses this example because it demonstrates the link between appellate 
engineering of thick legal concepts and the legislature as this case concerned the thick concept 
COMMERCE as defined by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 2010. 
507 see note 495 at 100 
508 ibid at 103 
509 ibid 
510 ibid 
511 ibid at 104 
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within legal cases, he cites the example of the thick concept CONSIDERATION as 
utilised by Chief Justice Cardozo in Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County 
Bank.512  This case is normally understood as involving the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel and its relationship to contract laws requirement for consideration within 
contracts.513  Cardozo manipulates the thick concept CONSIDERATION in a process of 
incremental doctrinal change.  Cardozo within his judgment extols the malleability of 
thick legal concepts in the common law, whilst remaining ÒdistinctiveÓ within the 
doctrinal apparatus of law:   
 
Decisions which have stood so long, and which are supported by so 
many considerations of public policy and reason, will not be 
overruled to save the symmetry of a concept which itself came into 
our law, not so much from any reasoned conviction of its justice, as 
from historical accidents of practice and procedure.  The concept 
survives as one of the distinctive features of our legal system.514 
 
Balganesh argues that whilst thick concepts are malleable and can be flexibly applied 
their meaning is stable.  He uses the example of another thick concept from contract 
law - GOOD FAITH - the core jural meaning of this thick concept is understood or 
defined in the same way by all judges and explains judicial ability to distinguish 
between GOOD FAITH and other obligatory thick concepts, such as REASONABLENESS 
in torts.515  He argues that thick legal concepts despite their:  
 
normative open-endedness when applied to specific situations signals 
to judges and actors that the disagreement (if any) in application is to 
be limited to certain specific criteria.  The identification of such 
criteria enables the jural meaning of the legal concept to feed into a 
communityÕs shared understandings and linguistic conventions, 
despite the overall ethical and evaluative nature of the legal concept.  
A conceptÕs thickness, in other words, contributes directly to the 
stability of the conceptÕs meaning, even in the face of differential 
application.516  
 
Banglesh argues that it is this these two feature of thick concepts Ð the stable jural 
meaning and the flexible normative meaning Ð imbued within thick common law 
																																																								
512 Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank (1927) 159 N. E. 173  
513 Shyamkrishna Balganesh and Gideon Parchomovsky, ÔStructure and value in the common lawÕ 
(2015) 163 (5) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1241 
Chapter eight (legal education) returns to the issue of re-engineering thick concepts and an example case 
cited by Feldman is noted here. 
514 see note 512 at 175 
515 see note 513 at 1273 
516 ibid at 1272-1273 
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concepts that creates an important equilibrium.  ÔThis equilibrium allows the common 
law to guide behaviour, promote reliance, and ground decisionmaking, while at the 
same time remaining open and receptive to competing normative theories and 
values.Õ517 The robust nature of this equilibrium explains the endurance of the common 
lawÕs core architecture of concepts, many of which are thick concepts. 
 
When we consider ordinary concept use (especially in the context of an argument) it 
seems fairly reasonable to accept that our use of certain concepts will be interpretive 
and that this interpretation may alter slightly (re-engineer) that concept to better fit the 
nature of our argument.  Many of our most passionate arguments (such as ethical ones) 
operate this way.  Our language is constantly evolving - new words are developed and 
old words fall out of use Ð and our concepts evolve in many ways.  This evolution is 
partly driven by both our conscious and subconscious manipulation of concepts 
through their use.  When these aspects of our ordinary conceptual practices are noted it 
seems odd to think that law would be excluded from this.  The engineering of 
entangled concepts by the judiciary is a reflection and extension of our ordinary 
conceptual behaviour and practices (albeit with more limitations placed upon it).  
Thick (entangled) and thin concepts are useful here because they capture the flexibility 
of our legal concepts and articulate how such concepts can be manipulated.  The 
picture that emerges is therefore consistent with WilliamsÕ argument (addressed at the 
end of chapter five) that philosophers could learn from law about the nature of thick 
concepts, because legal arguments (and judgments) place additional pressures on 
concepts.518  This additional pressure places additional requirements on the judiciary in 
terms of their knowledge and expertise, the legal literature on thick and thin has 
recognised this and in chapter eight (legal education) I note the importance of teaching 
competency with thick and thin legal concepts and hence the relevance of these terms 
for legal education. 
 
Feldman argues that understanding the specific entanglement in a particular legal 
concept requires a tremendous amount of background knowledge (cultural, historical, 
sociological, anthropological, and psychological) and that engineering entanglement 
also requires this level of knowledge.  Such a widespread knowledge base could take 
years to develop and although we do not need a ÔtrueÕ account of thick and thin 
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concepts to develop this kind of knowledge, it does challenge jurisprudes to re-think 
many other jurisprudential issues associated with the judiciary.  For example: does the 
existence of thick and thin concepts within our legal system and their use by the 
judiciary, require any additional knowledge or expertise; and if so does this have 
implications for the kinds of people that should be appointed to the judiciary?  This 
question has started to receive attention from legal theorists writing on thick and thin 
concepts, so I turn to this literature now. 
 
 
3 Ð Legal Knowledge.  
 
Accepting the notion of entangled concepts and the picture above of both judicial 
conceptual practices (choosing to evaluate and describe in one particular way, rather 
than another) and the conceptual behavior of lawyers in the courtroom as sometimes 
reengineering these entangled concepts; has implications for the kind of individuals we 
wish to be appointed to the judiciary.  If our legal concepts are not simply descriptions 
of legal facts then this places additional knowledge requirements on the judiciary (the 




 In Common Law Cognition and Judicial Appointment519 James Penner offers a similar 
discussion to Dworkin and Feldman, but uses the term Ôbasic moral concepts.Õ520 
Penner argues that the common law Ôremains wedded by necessity to exploring the 
guidance provided by an irreducibly plural set of basic moral concepts.Õ521  These 
Ôbasic moral conceptsÕ both influence judicial decisions and are themselves shaped by 
judicial decisions (the same point is applicable to entangled legal concepts and thick or 
thin legal concepts).  In a later piece Legal Reasoning and the Authority of Law522 
Penner explores Ôthe legitimacy of the authority of judge-made law from the 
																																																								
519 J. E. Penner, Ô Common Law Cognition and Judicial AppointmentÕ, (2001) 38 Alberta Law Review 
683   
520 In this article Penner discusses Williams on thick ethical concepts and the Ôbasic moral conceptsÕ that 
he refers to are related to WilliamsÕ thick ethical concepts, which Penner treats as Ôdescriptive and 
evaluative wholes.Õ  ibid 
521 ibid at 700 
522 J. E. Penner, ÔLegal reasoning and the authority of lawÕ in Lukas H. Meyer, Stanley L. Paulson and 
Thomas W. Pogge (eds), Rights, Culture, and the Law: Themes from the Legal and Political Philosophy 
of Joseph Raz (Oxford University Press, 2003) 
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perspective that common law judges and lawyers legitimately possess authority 
generated by their having a kind of expertise.Õ523  The kind of expertise Penner wishes 
to propose that common law judges and lawyers demonstrate is moral expertise (they 
quite clearly have legal expertise: this is not in question). The literature on thick 
concepts could explain this phenomenon of moral expertise as it has done in ethics, and 
thus explain how judges seem to demonstrate a kind of moral expertise through their 
use of thick legal concepts.524  
 
Given the prevalence of thick evaluative concepts in practical judgments, it may be 
worthwhile to consider whether it is the thick rather than the thin concepts that are the 
basis of normative or evaluative judgment.  If it is the thick concepts that form the 
basis of the underlying normative or evaluative judgments in legal cases, then common 
law lawyerly and judicial expertise may not be equivalent to abstract moral 
philosophical reasoning, and may be indicative of some kind of superior knowledge or 
expertise in dealing with thick ethical concepts.  This is interesting because Williams 
actually advances a similar argument in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy525 when he 
claims that we should focus more on the thick rather than the thin, because it is the 
thick concepts that are more likely to lead to ethical knowledge or ethical confidence 
(though this connection is not mentioned in the relevant legal literature). 
 
Penner argues that RazÕs account of values paints an attractive picture that could 
provide the basis for a plausible account in which, common law judges and lawyers 
possess a kind of moral expertise that endows them with authority.526  Common law 
development responds to the disputes presented in the court room; judges and lawyers 
involved in such disputes need to understand the facts of the case and what values and 
disvalues are instantiated in the case (this includes an understanding of their cultural 
contingency).  This understanding leads to a familiarity with the thick ethical concepts 
that represent those values and disvalues.   
 
The common law tradition requires the judge to explain their interpretation of the facts 
and their reasoning for their decision and this requirement for intelligibility is likely to 
																																																								
523 ibid at 73-74 
524 Williams argues for a kind of ethical expertise based on thick ethical concepts see chapter 4. 
525 ibid    
526 Joseph Raz, Engaging Reason (Oxford University Press, 1999)  
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involve the use of thin ethical concepts.527  The use of both thick and thin ethical 
concepts in their reasoning can demonstrate the consistency of their current decision 
with previous decisions and ensure that no factors of importance that can often only be 
seen at the more abstract level have been left unconsidered by their judgment.  Penner 
thinks this picture represents the character of legal discourse accurately.528  Penner 
describes the picture as follows: 
 
It occupies a median level of abstraction.  And it also seems to 
permit the claim that judges and lawyers can have (not always, nor 
necessarily) the moral expertise which would entitle them to make 
law.  This would lie in both their familiarity in applying thick ethical 
concepts to often puzzling or complex sets of facts, and in their 
learned facility in giving voice to the intelligibility of these thick 
ethical concepts and their application in particular cases by 
reference to thin ethical concepts, in particular thin ethical concepts 
which have made their appearance in law as much as moral and 
political philosophy, thin ethical concepts such as ÔrightÕ and 
ÔjustÕ.529 
 
Judges and lawyers demonstrate a kind of moral expertise that is developed through the 
practice of adjudication, which in turn legitimises their authority to make common 
law.530  This legitimacy arises due to their ability (developed over time through 
experience and study) to use conceptual apparatus: Ôa practical familiarity and facility 
with the battery of concepts and the doctrinal system in which these concepts have 
been limited and shaped and organized into some more or less coherent body of 
considerations which may be prayed to in aid to give normative guidance to the subject 
of the law.Õ531  This conceptual apparatus is closely related (sometimes identical) to 
moral concepts applicable to the same factual situations, and it is because of this ability 
they can also be said to demonstrate a kind of moral expertise.532   
																																																								
527 It is interesting to note that the legal theorists that have been addressed up until this point in this 
chapter have focused on thick concepts, although my thesis argues for the usefulness of both thick and 
thin concepts within law, thick concepts play a more prominent role in my investigation and therefore 
receive more attention. 
528 The accuracy of the picture is not in question here, it is the usefulness of the picture that is the focus. 
529 see note 522 at 87 
530 Penner argues that from RazÕs writings a cognitive explanation can be gleaned for his claim. See: 
Joseph Raz, Engaging Reason (Oxford University Press, 1999); Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public 
Domain (Clarendon Press, 1994); Joseph Raz, ÔNotes on Value and ObjectivityÕ in Brain Leiter (ed), 
Objectivity in Morality and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Joseph Raz, Practical 
Reason and Norms (Princeton University Press, 2nd edition, 1990) 
531 see note 519 at 700 
532 This is where Raz and Penner depart, Penner admits that whilst attractive, RazÕs position relies on a 
mistaken assumption Ð that thick evaluative concepts are parochial concepts, and that thin evaluative 
concepts are in comparison to the thick more general, less context dependent, capable of subsuming the 
thick and therefore less parochial.  Penner argues contrary to this, and like Williams favours thick 
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The idea that the judiciary is required to possess expertise in handling thick and thin 
legal concepts, which then manifests itself as a kind of moral expertise; as already 
noted has implications for the judicial appointment process.  Penner concludes: Ôthat it 
seems sensible, before designing an appointments process, to determine the character 
of the job to be done by the appointee, and thus the sort of expertise required to 
undertake the job.Õ533  The appointment of judges has implications for both the future 
content of law and the development of the legal system.  The law is in part a reflection 
of the judiciary (and of many other aspects of the legal system) and to understand the 
nature of the law requires an understanding of the role the judiciary play in the legal 
system; therefore thinking about the role of the judiciary and the judicial appointment 
process is an important aspect of jurisprudence.   
 
Concluding Remarks on the judiciary. 
 
This chapter has so far argued for the usefulness of thick and thin concepts within 
jurisprudence in matters pertaining to the judiciary, I have focused upon those legal 
accounts which exhibit a detailed and nuanced understanding of the distinction. None 
of the legal theorists addressed in this chapter (including Feldman or Penner) assert 
that all legal concepts are thick concepts (entangled legal concepts or basic moral 
concepts); it is just that these concepts have been the focus of their discussion because 
of their ability to enrich our understanding of jurisprudential debates concerning the 
judiciary. Thick and thin concepts are more prevalent in certain areas of law, so the 
legal discussion of these terms has tended to focus on only certain areas, such as 
criminal law,534 but this should not be taken as an indication that the usefulness of 
these terms within law is limited to the areas currently addressed by the legal 
literature.535   
 
																																																																																																																																																																
concepts.  Both Penner and Raz incorporate thick and thin concepts into their legal theory in a manner 
that adds credence to my thesis. 
533 see note 519 at 702 
534 Anthony Duff promotes the role of thick ethical concepts in criminal law, he argues that for criminal 
law to be an accurate representation of the evaluative standpoint of a particular community it must 
operate through the thick ethical concepts of that particular community.  see note 467 
535 In the footnotes Duff notes for an interesting discussion of non-fatal offences against the person that 
implies that these offences may be examples of thick legal concepts see: J. Gardner, ÔRationality and the 
Rule of Law Offences against the PersonÕ (1994) 53 Cambridge Law Journal 502; J. Horder, 
ÔRethinking Non-Fatal Offences against the PersonÕ (1994) 14 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 335 
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It is important to note that none of the legal theorists (or indeed meta-ethicists) 
addressed in this study deny that these terms are a development of pre-existing ideas 
within meta-ethics (see chapter two and three), but this does not detract from their 
value.  Returning to Feldman as an example: she never claims that entangled concepts 
are a recent legal invention or that the role of the judiciary has changed to now include 
the engineering of entangled concepts, instead she is arguing that our recognition of 
this feature of our legal system is fairly recent and needs to be acknowledged 
explicitly.536 The role of thick concepts (entangled legal concepts) in cases and the 
reengineering of such concepts by the judiciary, indicates that these are terms law 
students (our future lawyers and judges) need to be familiar with.  Acknowledgment of 
their role in judicial practices requires law school curricula (and legal education more 




4 Ð Legal Objectivity. 
 
At the start of this chapter I argued that the jurisprudential debates that thick and thin 
concepts were relevant to, were interrelated and often overlapped.  Legal disagreement, 
judicial interpretation and judicial appointment are all closely connected to legal 
objectivity, because they are all underpinned by the notion of truth.  Legal claims of 
knowledge (like any knowledge claim) are judged on their ability to be truth-apt: to be 
true representations of the way the world really is. Traditionally facts have been 
perceived as being truth-apt, whereas values havenÕt.  Thick and thin concepts have 
been praised by meta-ethicists for their ability to elucidate how the evaluative and 
descriptive aspects of our world are captured by our conceptual practices, and they 
have also therefore been applied to the fact-value distinction.  Thick and thin concepts 
have been thought to challenge both the traditional distinction between facts and values 
(see chapters two and three), and the traditional distinction between objective and 
subjective claims of knowledge.  It is important to note that most meta-ethicists are not 
suggesting that the terms ÔthickÕ concept and ÔthinÕ concept can somehow solve the 
																																																								
536 It tracks the changes in conceptual analysis and the contemporary analytic philosophers recognition 
of concepts which blend evaluation and description in some manner.  It is irrelevant for this purpose the 
name you attribute to such recognition e.g. blend concepts, entangled concepts, interpretive concepts or 
thick concepts. 
537 Feldman advances a similar line of argument in her conclusion I return to these issues in more detail 
in my next chapter on legal education.  see note 495 
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intractable debates surrounding objectivity (and the fact-value distinction) for these 
terms are merely a philosophical tool for conceptual analysis that can reinvigorate 
traditional debates (such as the fact-value distinction) but the academic discussions and 
new research generated by their use will hopefully result in academic progress (for 
example, a better understanding of the philosophical problems concerned).  Not all 
legal theorists have been as cautious in their use of thick and thin concepts in matters 
pertaining to legal objectivity (and the fact-value distinction within law), this further 
evidences my earlier observation (chapter five) that the current use of thick and thin 
concepts within law lacks clarity.  In this section (that is, of the chapter) I argue for the 
usefulness of thick and thin concepts within law, particularly in relation to 
jurisprudential debates concerning legal objectivity (the fact-value distinction in law 
will also feature in the following discussion because of its close connection to legal 
objectivity).  However, a significant dimension of my argument will also be the 
demonstration that this is clearly one area of law where the ideas of thick and thin have 
been misunderstood and inadequately applied, to the detriment of the ideas themselves 
and the use to which they are intended to be put.538 
 
Judith Jarvis Thomson is the first legal theorist whose work is relevant to both aspects 
of my argument in outline above: that thick and thin concepts are useful in relation to 
the jurisprudential debates concerning legal objectivity, and that this is one area of the 
law where their use needs sharpening. She utilizes WilliamsÕ notion of thick ethical 
concepts to disprove the fact-value thesis.539  Thomson argues that the application of a 
thick ethical concept is guided by fact and yet also contains a normative or evaluative 
component.540   Thomson elaborates: Ôit is arguable that [such concepts]É. have 
something important in common, a something in virtue of which they all yield 
																																																								
538 The fact-value distinction is a vast and complex topic and my intention is merely to demonstrate that 
it is one area of jurisprudence (one of many) where thick and thin concepts could be useful.  For a more 
detailed discussion of the fact-value distinction that notes the meta-ethical literature on thick and thin 
concepts, see: Eric A. Bilsky, ÔMetaphysical and Ethical SkepticismÕ (1997) 75 Denver University Law 
Review 187 
539 She also argues: if successfully disproved this would also disprove the No-Reason Thesis (although I 
do not address this aspect of her account in this study).  See: Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of 
Rights (Harvard University Press, 1992), 9 
540 ibid at 10-11   
Thomson dismisses the skeptics concern that morality does not mesh with the world (in particular 
descriptive aspects), she argues that we can find Ôplaces where facts mesh directly with strong moral 
judgments to the effect that a person ought or ought not to do a thing.Õ   ibid at 18  
Moral skeptics who are concerned with the weakness of these moral judgments are told to discover the 
real source of their discomfort Ôrather than succumbing to [this feeling].Õ  ibid at 17 
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countercases to the Fact-Value Thesis.Õ541   She does not specify whether her notion of 
a thick concept is based on a separationist or non-separationist construction of the 
relationship between the evaluative and descriptive aspects, although this will clearly 
make a difference to the success of her challenge to the fact-value thesis (see chapter 
three).542  Williams notes in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy543 that thick ethical 
concepts may challenge the fact-value thesis, but this is never elaborated further and it 
is unclear whether he advances a separationist or non-separationist account (see 
chapter four).  
 
ThomsonÕs use of thick and thin concepts is very brief and Amy Peikoff argues that it 
does not really do the work Thomson requires it to do to support her argument (to 
disprove the fact-value thesis).544  Peikoff maintains that although applications of thick 
concepts are guided by facts whilst also containing a normative or evaluative 
component, these concepts cannot provide a solution to the fact-value thesis (or the no-
reason thesis). Thick ethical concepts hide the problem (the fact-value distinction) 
behind our use of language, as she opines: Ôin the act of using these concepts, one is 
already counting on the fact that there is some way to decide what is ÒgoodÓ or what 
Òought to be doneÓ based on what is.Õ545  PeikoffÕs concern is that Thomson uses thick 
concepts as a substitute for an answer to the philosophical problem that underlies the 
fact-value distinction: the problem of objectivity.  So, while thick and thin concepts 
might be used effectively to challenge traditional views regarding the fact-value 
distinction by facilitating conceptual analysis and reinvigorating philosophical 
discussion, they cannot be used as a substitute for the philosophical analysis that is 






541 ibid at 11 
542 A separationist account such as prescriptivism could accommodate a distinction between facts and 
values, by maintaining that the prescriptive aspect of the thick concept is detachable and therefore 
separate from the descriptive aspect.  A non-separationist account argues that the evaluative and 
descriptive aspects are incapable of intelligible separation, and therefore challenges the distinction 
between facts and values. 
543 see note 487 
544 Amy L. Peikoff, ÔThe Right to Privacy: Contemporary Reductionists and their CriticsÕ (2013) 5 
Washington University Jurisprudence Review 61 
545 ibid 
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Re-thinking traditional notions of legal objectivity. 
 
Traditional positivist accounts of legal objectivity advance an empirical notion of legal 
objectivity that may be unable to accommodate legal concepts that are not purely 
descriptive concepts (thick and possibly thin concepts), and therefore offer a good 
starting point from which to consider whether thick and thin concepts challenge 
traditional notions of legal objectivity (and whether such a challenge establishes the 
need to rethink legal objectivity).546   
 
Heidi Feldman argues that we need to rethink traditional notions of legal objectivity, 
using blend concepts to consider the extent to which legal judgments could be said to 
be objective, and considers what kind of conception of objectivity would be required 
for blend judgments to be statements of fact.547  Feldman argues that blend concepts 
require a specific conception of objectivity - neither scientific, nor moral-rationalist 
conceptions can serve as they are - although they provide insight into what is 
required.548  The close parallels between the blend conception of objectivity and 
WilliamsÕ notion of knowledge derived from thick ethical concepts indicate the 
relevance of thick ethical concepts (in particular WilliamsÕ account of them) for legal 
discussions of objectivity. 
 
Objectivity matters to blend legal judgments because of the relationship between law 
and interpersonal reasons, which goes a long way in providing these judgments with 
interpersonal validity.  Sanctions only play a part in procuring obedience to the law 
(and fear-driven obedience is undesirable).  A law that is interpersonally valid (in its 
own right) is less likely to be the result of a government who coerces and pressurises 
citizens into obeying the law, which is why legitimacy is closely related to laws 
interpersonal validity: it licences the imposition of law and penal sanctions on those 
																																																								
546 see notes 473, 474 and 526 
547 see note 473 at 1190 
 Feldman uses both the term Ôblend conceptÕ and Ôentangled conceptÕ to refer to a concept that bears 
close proximity to WilliamsÕ term Ôthick ethical conceptÕ.  In light of this it is important to bear in mind 
that FeldmanÕs Blend Conception of Objectivity is theoretically applicable to entangled concepts, and I 
argue that it is also applicable to thick concepts. 
548 Feldman combines this argument with a wider assertion Ð developing a blend conception of 
objectivity can teach us something about the nature of blend concepts and sharpen our understanding of 
the nature of objectivity Ð the same argument is applicable to thick concepts.  Developing a conception 
of objectivity that can accommodate thick concepts will not only be revealing about the nature of those 
specific thick concepts (and potentially the distinction between thick and thin concepts in general), it 
will also be revealing about legal objectivity (and objectivity in general). 
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who dissent.  Objectivity is an important aspect of legitimacy but it is not the only 
criterion for establishing legal legitimacy, and objectivity is not the only factor that is 
considered when deciding whether to apply a blend concept or adopt a blend judgment 
in a particular instance. 
 
Feldman argues that the reason-givingness of blend concepts - combined with the 
tendency of reasons to influence the social world we live in - explains why when 
deciding whether to apply a blend concept in a particular situation we often consider 
the effects of applying the blend concept on the social world.  This is an acceptable 
consideration, because it relates to how one wants the social world to be e.g. 
classifying Sally as negligent will affect how others behave because it will discourage 
them from behaving like Sally, and this prospect may then appropriately influence your 
decision whether to classify Sally as negligent (you may not want your classification of 
Sally as negligent to deter others from behaving like Sally because it may not always 
be considered negligent). 
 
The world-guidedness of blend concepts has a normative quality that means their 
application is partly governed by facts about the world which are independent from the 
concept users preferences for how the world should be.  This is why sometimes certain 
uses or refusals to use blend concepts seem odd, misguided or mistaken.  Of course 
there can be unusual uses e.g. Ôclaiming that a pianistÕs rendition of _____ was rude.Õ  
The point though is that we canÕt classify things as rude or negligent just because we 
want them to stop (e.g. calling someone rude for asking you to pass the salt just 
because it annoys you).  The world-guidedness of blend concepts prevents these 
inappropriate uses; it restricts the extent to which a concepts application can be goal-
driven. 
 
The word-guidedness restriction is important because without it the blend concept can 
fail to maintain its reason-givingness.  Blend concepts derive their reason-givingness 
from their place within the evaluative taxonomies they belong to.549  The taxonomies 
refer to specific human needs and interests, which are served by specific 
categorisations of the world.  The blend concepts are reason-giving because they serve 
																																																								
549 Feldman argues: ÔBlend concepts are members of evaluative taxonomies.  Evaluative taxonomies 
categorize the world for us, just as scientific taxonomies do, but they afford us evaluative, rather than 
explanatory power.  They enable us to make distinctions of worth rather than distinctions of causal role.Õ  
see note 473 at 1195 
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the evaluative point of the taxonomy.  If you were to ignore this and apply blend 
concepts to serve your goals and interests, they would fail to provide reasons because 
they didnÕt serve the evaluative point of the taxonomy.  Others would then be disposed 
to question these puzzling uses of the blend concept and start to question its reason-
givingness even in standard applications. 
 
Correct application according to Feldman turns on whether certain facts marked out by 
the taxonomy obtain (she uses ÔcorrectÕ in the sense that other concept users of that 
evaluative community agree with the use, based on their prevailing norms of use).  
Often the facts that guide the concepts use will be social, - Ôconventional mores, shared 
cultural ideas, community values, and customs.Õ550  Correct application especially in 
hard cases, is also based on ascertaining and interpreting the evaluative point(s) of the 
relevant taxonomy and this derives from the functions of the taxonomy.  Evaluative 
taxonomies are responsive to particular human needs and interests, and their evaluative 
point is thus a function of what it takes to satisfy those needs and interests.  Therefore 
correctly applying a blend concept requires sensitivity to the human needs and interests 
of the evaluative taxonomy the blend concept belongs to.  
 
It is significant to note that thick concepts could also be grouped together under 
evaluative taxonomies (especially thick legal concepts).  It can be clearly noted within 
law that there is a contrast between legal concepts that are applicable to multiple areas 
of law (concepts such as GOOD, RIGHT and WRONG) and legal concepts that are 
specific to one area of law or at least lack a general legal application (such as those 
concepts specific to criminal law e.g. THEFT, MURDER and MANSLAUGHTER).  I 
therefore anticipate that FeldmanÕs discussion of the role of evaluative taxonomies in 
determining the application of a blend concept is relevant to thick legal concepts.  If, as 
Feldman argues,551 evaluative taxonomies are responsive to particular human needs 
and interests then investigating the nature of evaluative taxonomies within law could 
illuminate the needs and interests that influence the legal developments within 
particular areas of law. 
 
The above account of the blend conception of objectivity suggests that a kind of legal 





objective knowledge.  Williams advances a similar line of argument but within the 
context of ethics.552  Joseph Raz has also considered the role of thick and thin concepts 
in elucidating legal objectivity (although they were not his primary focus), but his 
conclusion is far less positive (he does not suggest outright that we abandon legal 
objectivity, but he does deny the possibility of objectivity for thick legal concepts).553  
I turn to his account now to demonstrate that accommodating thick and thin concepts 
within law may have negative implications for legal objectivity, especially if a 
traditional (empirical) account of objectivity is desirable for law (this desire may be 
inappropriate for law in the first place, in which case the implications of thick and thin 
concepts may not be negative). 
 
The Abandonment of Objectivity.  
 
Raz in his Notes on Value and Objectivity554 distinguishes between parochial and non-
parochial concepts: ÔÒParochial conceptsÓ are concepts which cannot be mastered by 
all, not even by everyone capable of knowing anything at all.  ÒNon-parochial 
conceptsÓ can be mastered by anyone capable of knowing anything at all.Õ 555  
Evaluative or normative concepts are identified as parochial because they too are 
interest-related concepts (because mastery of the concept requires understanding some 
interests or others); thick concepts and our Ôabstract normative conceptsÕ (thin 
concepts) in virtue of being a type of evaluative concept are also parochial.556  RazÕs 
attention is focused on parochial concepts and both thick and thin concepts arise in his 
discussion only to the extent that they are a type of parochial concept and can 
potentially illuminate the discussion of parochial concepts.557  For example: ÔDoubts 
																																																								
552 see note 487 
553 In this chapter I address only one of RazÕs recent contributions: Joseph Raz, Engaging Reason 
(Oxford University Press, 1999) because this is where he offers his most in-depth analysis of thick and 
thin concepts.  Any other mention of thick and thin concepts in later publications, borrows the term from 
this earlier discussion.  For example see: Joseph Raz, ÔThe Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service 
ConceptionÕ (2006) 90 Minnesota Law Review 1003, he only mentions thick concepts once, when he 
states that it is doubtful thick concepts can be reduced down to thin concepts.  ibid at 1007 
554 Joseph Raz, ÔNotes on Value and ObjectivityÕ in Engaging Reason (Oxford University Press, 1999), 
118-160 
555 ibid at 132 
He further elaborates that parochial concepts are those which require particular perceptual capacities 
(e.g. colour concepts) as opposed to some perceptual capacity or other.  Parochial concepts are also 
those whose mastery presupposes interests or imaginative or emotive capacities that neither are nor ever 
can be shared, by those capable of possessing knowledge.   
556 The examples he cites are all thin concepts and from the tone of the rest of the discussion it is clear 
thin concepts are what he had in mind at this point.  ibid  
557 It is important to highlight that this is the first point in Engaging Reason that either thick concepts or 
thin concepts have been discussed, yet there is no footnote or reference to Bernard Williams or any other 
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have been cast on the objectivity of parochial concepts, on the possibility of knowledge 
that depends on their possession, and cannot be reformulated without their use.  I will 
examine some grounds for such doubts.Õ558  The term thick concept reappears regularly 
throughout his chapter but only to serve RazÕs primary purpose, they are not 
accompanied by references to or discussions of the relevant meta-ethical literature (See 
chapter two and three).   
 
Thick concepts resurface twice in Notes on Value and Objectivity.559  First in RazÕs 
discussion of social authority where he acknowledges that Ôthick concepts are indeed 
crucial to any attempt to establish the objectivity of practical thought, and its 
conformity with the relevance condition.Õ560 The relevance condition is explained as a 
question that needs answering: Ôare there grounds which are not merely persuasive, but 
logically relevant to the confirmation or disconfirmation of any practical thought?Õ561 
Thick concepts seem to offer the most promise for an affirmative answer, yet they 
seem to depend on a shared culture and shared values which means their truth-aptness 
is dependent on the social facts of shared views; and if the truth-aptness of practical 
propositions is dependent on the truth-aptness of social facts then this is problematic.  
Raz states: 
 
Typically, just about all our evaluative conclusions and reasons for 
them are typically expressed by the use of thick evaluative concepts.  
An account of the relevant reasons which support or undermine 
evaluative or normative propositions will largely consist in an 
explanation of the relations between thick concepts.  But, and that is 
where the objection starts, mastery of thick concepts depends on 
shared understandings and shared judgments.  These shared 
judgments both enable us to understand the meaning of thick 
evaluative terms, and incline us to accept the legitimacy of their use.  
There is no independent way of validating the legitimacy of the use of 
thick concepts.  Hence, the validity of evaluative standings and 
judgments, that is, on social facts.  The truth or correctness of value 
propositions cannot, however, depend on social facts.  Such 
dependence will make value judgments contingent, for the facts they 
depend on are contingent, and arbitrary Ð whether or not one has 
cogent reasons to accept them will depend on the evaluatively 
																																																																																																																																																																
author regarding these terms or explanation of what is meant by the terms Ôthick conceptÕ and Ôthin 
conceptÕ.  Williams is later referenced (at 137 and 138) but even then the terms Ôthick conceptÕ and Ôthin 
conceptÕ are not elucidated. 
558 ibid at 133 
559 see note 554 
560 ibid at 146 
561 ibid at 145 
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arbitrary fact of oneÕs membership in one culture or another.  Worst 
of all, if the truth conditions of evaluative propositions are contingent 
social facts then they cannot be normative, they are merely statements 
of those facts whose existence renders them true.562 
 
RazÕs dismissal of social facts as a legitimate ground for legal knowledge poses a 
problem for WilliamsÕ defence of ethical knowledge derived from thick concepts; this 
attack on the legitimacy of social facts also has clear undertones of legal positivism.563  
RazÕs account of law ultimately leads to the conclusion that traditional (empirical) 
notions of legal objectivity should be abandoned: whilst the normative dimension of 
law is clearly connected to social facts (and therefore thick concepts) it cannot depend 
on social facts (or thick concepts) for its legitimacy and until we have an alternative 
explanation of the way practical thought meets the relevance condition we must accept 
that it lacks objectivity.564   
 
Henry Mather reaches a similar conclusion to Raz, but his approach seems to be closer 
to Williams and Feldman, because he attributes some form of truth to legal statements 
that use thick legal concepts. Mather utilises WilliamsÕ idea of thick ethical concepts to 
delineate different forms of moral truth, such as constructive truth.565  Constructive 
truth is always relative to some social practice566 - a regular pattern of conduct that is 
guided by shared rules accepted and used to evaluate behavior by members of the 
social group - and such constructive moral truth Ôis likely to be a linguistic practice, a 
moral practice, or a practice concerning rationality in practical reasoning.Õ567  Mather 
																																																								
562  In ÔThe Value of PracticeÕ he revisits his earlier discussion of socially constituted values (values that 
are constructed by social practices) and discusses conceptual priority.  He opines that Ôthin and thick 
concepts are interdependent.  Thick concepts have to be explained by reference to thinner ones in order 
to satisfy the requirement of intelligibility.  The thin concepts, on the other hand, while explained by 
reference to thicker ones, also have an open-ended aspect: new thick concepts subject to them can 
always emerge.  This makes them relatively independent of the thick concepts currently subsumed under 
them.Õ  See: Joseph Raz, ÔThe Value of PracticeÕ in Engaging Reason (Oxford University Press, 1999), 
202-217, 146 
563 This is hardly surprising - Raz is considered one of the key contemporary legal positivists in 
anglophone analytic philosophy of law. 
564 It is interesting to note that this apparent lack of objectivity does not seem to concern Raz: where 
others have denied the normative aspects of law in order to uphold legal legitimacy and objectivity, Raz 
prefers to acknowledge normativity and accept the resulting problems this poses for legal objectivity. 
565 Asserting constructive truth based on linguistic practices requires a form of ÔdefinismÕ(definists claim 
moral statements are truth-apt if they contain moral terms that have factual descriptive meaning) such as 
that advanced by Philippa Foot who argues that moral terms have determinate descriptive meaning.  
Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices (1978), she argues that there are certain factual criteria that must be met 
for a moral term to be used properly at 102-105.  
566 Henry Mather, ÔNatural Law and Right AnswersÕ (1993) 38 American Journal of Jurisprudence 297, 
313 
567 ibid at 314   
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argues that thick concepts are truth-apt in a constructive sense, but that they are still 
insufficient guidelines for the resolution of moral dilemmas and are therefore incapable 
of resolving the conflicting moral considerations that law makers are faced with, when 
different moral considerations favour the adoption of different laws.568  Despite taking 
different routes both Mather and Raz conclude that thick legal concepts are not 
compatible with legal objectivity as a kind of empirical knowledge.569 
 
The second time thick concepts resurface is in RazÕs consideration of whether 
evaluative objectivity is in any way dependent on (and therefore affected by) how thick 
concepts are deployed.  A familiar charge levied against thick concepts is that their 
close connection to evaluative standpoint (or to revert back to the terminology Raz has 
been favouring: the dependence of thick concepts on shared culture and shared values, 
and therefore social facts) means that thick concepts are culturally specific and can 
only be understood by members of that culture. Raz dismisses this charge: 
 
There is little doubt that often we fail to understand concepts 
embedded in a culture or system of thought which is alien to us.  But 
is there any reason to think that even given favourable conditions we 
could not master them?  That they cannot be exhaustively or 
satisfactorily explained using our concepts does not establish that 
conclusion, for we can learn them directly, by being exposed to their 
use, rather than through translation.  Sometimes we could do so by 
actually living in the alien society, at other times it is possible to learn 
their meaning by learning about that society and reconstructing in 
imagination, or simulation, its ways and beliefs.570 
 
Accepting the claim that members of a culture are only capable of understanding the 
concepts of their own culture and can therefore never understand those of another 
culture, results in the implausible claim that our capacity to acquire concepts is limited 
to one culture only.  However this limitation is framed - maybe because our capacity to 
																																																																																																																																																																
Both Wittgenstein and Hart discuss similar notions of normative regularity at the social level (social 
rules), see: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations and H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 1994) 
568 Mather is discussing Natural Law so there is an assumption that judges do and should decide moral 
dilemmas that present themselves within law, it is not appropriate to my discussion (of the use of thick 
concepts in law) to challenge that assumption. 
569 MatherÕs discussion of thick and thin ethical concepts is brief and his lack of referencing to the wider 
meta-ethical literature (although he does appropriately reference Wittgenstein and Foot who were 
important influences on Williams) implies that these terms stem solely from Williams and indicates 
MatherÕs failure to capture the complexity of these terms.  An alternative construction of the distinction 
between thick and thin ethical terms (such as a non-separationist account) may have provided an account 
of moral truth and moral dispute resolution that better defended the right answer thesis. 
570 see note 526 at 157 
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grasp concepts is exhausted or blocked after we have understood our own culture Ð 
there seems to be only one possible reason for such a suggestion: that complete 
understanding of a concept requires an understanding of its relation to the rest (all) of 
the concepts in the concept users repertoire.  The implausibility of this claim is 
demonstrated by a wider look at language practices: ÔIt flies in the face of the evidence.  
There were and are people who inhabited more than one culture, and understood both.  
It also overlooks the fact that our own culture contains concepts derived from different 
systems of thought, which have not merged together.Õ571  Whilst it may be possible to 
agree with RazÕs dismissal of the incommensurability of thick concepts on the basis of 
practical evidence (that we can observe bilingual individuals), how does this fit with 
his negation of their ability to legitimize knowledge claims: how can we be sure these 
individuals are bilingual as opposed to lucky in their application of ÔforeignÕ 
concepts.572  Such questions as these are normally the province of anthropology. 
Anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz have noted the close connection between law 
and morality, and the relevance of both to their investigations of other cultures: ÔLaw, 
rather than a mere technical add-on to a morally (or immorally) finished society, is, 
along of course with a whole range of other cultural realities from the symbolics of 
faith to the means of production, an active part of it.Õ573 Meta-ethicists have also paid 
attention to these issues because of their relevance to thick ethical concepts.  As can be 
seen from the above discussion the credibility of a distinction between facts and values 
is an underlying question that runs throughout many aspects of the legal objectivity 
debate and the meta-ethical literature on thick and thin concepts.  There are certain 
legal theories, such as natural law theories, where this question is brought to the 
forefront. 
 
Recently contemporary natural lawyers such as John Finnis, have contributed to this 
discussion regarding the nature of social (legal) facts.574  Simon Hope and John Finnis 
both agree that anthropological evidence indicates a lack of substantive core moral 
																																																								
571 ibid at 158 
572 A similar question could be asked regarding their own (first language) concepts. 
573 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (Basic Books, 1985), 
218 
574 FinnisÕ most well known work is: John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press, 
1980).  His more recent contributions have incorporated the notions of thickness and thinness into his 
virtue jurisprudence.  See: John Finnis, Reason in Action: collected essays volume I (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011); John Finnis, Human Rights and the Common Good: collected essays volume III 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011); and John Finnis, ÔA Response to Harel, Hope, and SchwartzÕ 
(2013) 8 Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 147 
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values shared across all cultures (social moralities).575 Finnis argues that despite this 
there are still Ôsome values (basic human goods) and practical principles more or less 
self-evident to all adults of more or less normal experience and intelligence, anywhere 
and anytime.Õ 576   These basic human goods can be derived through practical 
reasonableness, in turn establishing an objective basis for the action-guidance these 
basic human goods provide.577  Their objectivity may be challenged given RazÕs 
criticism of Ôsocial factsÕ above.  Contemporary natural lawyers have therefore (like 
Raz above) considered the relationship between Ôsocial moralitiesÕ and Ôsocial factsÕ.  
For example Hope states: ÔTo say that moral reflection is shaped by the social morality 
or moralities one has been habituated into is not to say that the deliverances of a social 
morality determine the outcome of oneÕs moral reflection to any substantive degree.  
All bearers of a social morality draw on roughly the same repertoire of thick concepts 
in arriving at their own individual ethical outlooks, but that is as far as anything shared 
goes.578  The aim is to deny any significant reliance on social facts (shared knowledge) 
and instead argue that thick or thicker accounts of the basic goods (which are more 
closely connected to objective facts) underpin these goods and provide objective 
reasons for action; although there is room for disagreement (as shown by Hope and 
FinnisÕ disagreement) regarding the degree of thickness required to provide reasons for 
actions that support the correct conception of human goods.579  Framing the issue of 
legal objectivity within the context of natural law theory explicitly draws attention to 
another way of framing the debate Ð the relationship between law and morality Ð 
suggesting that this is another area of law where thick and thin concepts could prove 
useful.  The close connection between jurisprudential debates regarding objectivity, the 
distinction between facts and values, and the relationship between law and morality 
indicates that if thick and thin concepts are useful in one area of jurisprudence, they are 
likely to be useful to many other areas of jurisprudence due to the interrelated or 
																																																								
575 Simon Hope, ÔThe Basic Goods and the ÒLawlikeÓ Use of Reason: Comments on Human Rights and 
the Common GoodÕ (2013) 8 Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 136 and John Finnis, Natural Law and 
Natural Rights (Clarendon Press, 1980) 
576 John Finnis, ÔA Response to Harel, Hope, and SchwartzÕ (2013) 8 Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 
136, 147 
577 ibid at 164 
Finnis notes that his term Ôpractical reasonablenessÕ is a translation of AquinasÕ PRUDENTIA and 
AristotleÕs PHRONESIS.   
578 see note 575 Hope at 140 
579 Hope argues: ÔFinnisÕs account of the accessibility of the basic goods as thick reason-giving concepts 
appears, in this light, implausibly idealized: Finnis either downplays the diversity and contingency of 
social moralities, or he builds into the conditions for accessibility an identification with one substantive, 
thick understanding of human good.Õ  ibid at 145 
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connected nature of jurisprudential debates (maybe even those jurisprudential debates 
and ideas that have fallen out of fashion). 
 
Natural law theory (and virtue jurisprudence) has undergone a recent revival and the 
reference to thick and thin concepts by Hope and Finnis demonstrates that these terms 
can usefully enrich our understanding of key jurisprudential debates and shared core 
philosophical concerns (such as objectivity); and spearhead the revival of classical 
theories and ideas that could offer interesting new avenues for jurisprudential research 
and discussion. 
 
Natural law is not the only virtue ethics-based approach to law that has drawn upon 
thick and thin concepts.  Linghao Wang and Laurence Solum utilise Bernard WilliamsÕ 
work on thick concepts in their revival of Confucian Virtue Jurisprudence.580  They 
argue that thick concepts can provide an insight into the Confucian doctrine of 
correcting names and the normativity of law.  Confucian names are like thick ethical 
concepts, because both can be used to categorise and pick out similar and dissimilar 
kinds of things, whilst conveying ethical attitudes as to what is right and morally 
wrong; thus they both seem to indissolubly entangle descriptive and prescriptive 
elements.   
 
The aim of the Confucian doctrine of correcting names is therefore normative 
guidance, a role shared by the law: 
 
Since names are concepts with rich ethical meaning, they provide 
ethical guidance for actions.  Confucian philosophersÕ ultimate goal 
in emphasising the correction of names is to give people ethical 
guidance through the application of names in the correct way and to 
the correct persons and actions.581 
 
																																																								
580 It is worth noting at this point a related paper presented by Linghao Wang at a conference.  Linghao 
Wang ÔLiving by Thick Legal Concepts: A Confucian Account of how Law Guides PeopleÕs Actions.Õ  
Solum has produced a number of articles that advocate virtue jurisprudence, see also: Lawrence B. 
Solum, ÔPluralism and ModernityÕ (1990) 66 Chicago Kent Law Review 93; Lawrence B. Solum & 
Colin Farrelly (eds), Virtue Jurisprudence (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue 
Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centred Theory of JudgingÕ (2003) 34 Metaphilosophy 178; and Lawrence B. 
Solum, ÔVirtue Jurisprudence: Towards an Aretaic Theory of LawÕ in Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer & 
Nuno M.M.S. Coelho (eds), Aristotle and the Philosophy of Law: Theory, Practice and Justice 
(Springer, 2013) 
581 Linghao Wang and Lawrence B. Solum, ÔConfucian Virtue JurisprudenceÕ in Virtue, Law, and 
Justice (Hart Publishing, 2012), 114 
	 186	
Confucian names such as REGICIDE and CRUELTY,582 like thick legal concepts provide 
reasons for action and emphasise the normative functions of law.583  The exact nature 
of Confucian names (and thick ethical concepts) that they suggest is unclear.584  They 
suggest that there might be a multi-layered structure concerning the thickness of 
Confucian names, but it is unclear how this correlates to the distinction between a 
difference of degree and a difference of kind as discussed by the meta-ethical literature 
on thick concepts.585 
 
Despite concerns regarding inconsistencies in their account of the nature of Confucian 
names and thick ethical concepts, which are complicated further by the multi-layered 
structure they suggest their account raises many of the shared, core philosophical 
concerns that have already been raised in this chapter and demonstrates that thick and 
thin concepts could be useful for jurisprudence as a way of reframing classical ideas, 
and potentially lead to the resurgence of the associated classical theories of law.  Their 
work also supports my earlier observation (chapter five) that the legal literature on 
thick and thin lacks clarity, for the terms thick and thin concepts to be useful within 
law the legal understanding and application of these terms needs sharpening and 
rendering more consistent; it is only after this process that these terms can be utilised 





582 REGICIDE is classified as thinner than CRUEL because the action requires deep and complex evaluation 
of whether the person in question is virtuous and fulfils the political obligations attached to his political 
role and is therefore justified in claiming to be a lord.  Whereas they argue that cruel doesnÕt require 
such deep and complex evaluations prior to application.  ÔUsually, we are able to see cruelty: we are able 
to perceive cruelty in the situation.  In the case of regicide, more than perception is required.  For this 
reason, we believe that regicide is thinner than cruel.Õ  ibid at 124 
583 Normally the distinction between thick and thin concepts is based either on a lack of descriptive 
content or a more minimal amount of descriptive content being conveyed by thin concepts.  It could be 
potentially harder to reach agreement regarding a thin concepts application, because they lack the levels 
of descriptive content found in thick concepts and the evaluative content is also less specific.  This is not 
how they frame it though. 
584  It is unclear whether they are proposing an amalgam account of Confucian names (and thick 
concepts) or whether they are advancing a difference of degree: ÔOur view of the doctrine of correcting 
names explicitly adopts the idea that what we call the thickness of ethical concepts is scalar Ð although 
the scale maybe coarse-grained rather than continuous.Õ  ibid 
585 Wang and Solum state: ÔThicker names like cruel or courageous are in the lower layers, layers that 
are tightly entangled with the non-ethical qualities of the world.  Thinner names like regicide or thief, 
whose application may involve moral norms or other thicker names, are in the upper layers Ð where the 
entanglement of fact with value is mediated by the system of social norms.  Due to their thinness, the 
layer of thinner names is tied more closely to Li.  Expressed from a different angle, the world-
guidedness of thinner names is dependent on the normative system of particular communities.Õ ibid at 
125 
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5 Ð Conclusion. 
 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate the relevance of thick and thin 
concepts for jurisprudence, by demonstrating their usefulness within jurisprudential 
debates; and to do this I focused on two particular topics that arise frequently within 
jurisprudence: the judiciary and legal objectivity.  This chapter addressed the work of 
legal theorists working within these two topic areas that had already began to utilise 
the terms thick concept and thin concept within their work with varying degrees of 
depth, which adds strength to my thesis (that thick and thin concepts are useful within 
law) in relation to jurisprudential debates.  
 
Chapters five, six and seven (this chapter), whilst containing their own individual 
arguments for the relevance of thick and thin concepts in relation to specific areas of 
law (chapter five: legal concepts; chapter six: legal positivism; and this chapter:  
jurisprudential debates), all advance the same overall argument: thick and thin 
concepts are useful within law, but this usefulness is currently limited because these 
terms lack sufficient understanding and consistent application within law.  Whilst this 
study of thick and thin concepts does not offer or favour a particular approach to thick 
and thin concepts (though like many of the legal theorists addressed within this 
investigation I have used WilliamsÕ formulation of thick ethical concepts) because of 
the many possible positions available and the disagreement that surrounds these 
positions (see chapters two and three), this study has demonstrated that it is still 
possible for these terms to prove themselves useful within law by paying particular 
attention to WilliamsÕ formulation (which is commonly used by legal theorists).  
Further legal (and possibly philosophical research) into this area (thick and thin 
concepts within law) will not only improve the legal understanding of these terms, 
which could render future applications more consistent and precise, but it may also 
reveal a particular position (meta-ethical account of thick and thin concepts) as more 
favourable. 
 
The areas of law so far addressed within this investigation (legal concepts, legal 
positivism and jurisprudential debates) are all closely connected and any argument for 
the usefulness of thick and thin concepts within these topic areas is accompanied by 
the suggestion that these terms will also be relevant elsewhere within law; and to 
demonstrate this the following chapter considers the current use and usefulness of 
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these terms for legal education. Considering the relevance of thick and thin concepts 
for legal education adds a practical dimension to this so far theoretical research project 
(it demonstrates that there are practical implications for the use of these terms within 


























Chapter Eight: Thick and thin in 
Legal Education
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1 Ð Introduction. 
 
At present both the legal profession and legal system are undergoing a series of 
unprecedented changes due to legislative enactments, and these changes have in turn 
impacted upon legal education.  The Legal Services Act 2007 (LSA) and the Legal 
Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO) have both enabled 
and necessitated dramatic structural changes to the profession, which have also 
impacted upon its ethos at all levels including education.586  This chapter argues that 
the transformation the legal profession is currently undergoing will dramatically alter 
the shape of legal education and the future of the legal profession to such an extent that 
now is the opportune time to rethink legal education and consider the potential 
usefulness of the distinction between thick and thin concepts within law school 
teaching. 
 
The Legal Education and Training Review (LETR)587 reflects upon the current legal 
curriculum and was intended to be the most substantial review of legal education and 
training since the ÔOrmrod ReportÕ 1971.588  The LETR concluded that there was no 
evidence to suggest that the current education and training system was unfit for 
purpose, but there was evidence to suggest that it needed improving, as existing 
strengths needed to be built upon and weaknesses remedied.  One of the main 
observations to emerge from the LETR is the increasing commercialisation of the legal 
profession and the need to adapt legal education to better reflect the demands this 
change places on legal professionals.589   
																																																								
586 One of the important implications of the LSA 2007 was the provisions which enabled law firms to 
become Alternative Business Structures in partnership with other occupations, this marks a change in the 
distinctiveness of both the legal profession and legal services.  The cuts to legal aid implemented by 
LASPO 2012 have dramatically eroded the Ôsocial serviceÕ aspect of the legal profession.  See: Steven 
Bint, In an Age of Experts: The Changing Role of Professionals in Politics and Public Life (Princeton 
University Press, 1994); Harry W. Arthurs, ÔThe State WeÕre In: Legal Education in CanadaÕs New 
Political EconomyÕ (2001) 20 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 35 
587 Work commenced on the LETR in May 2011 and the report was published June 2013.  The LETR 
was initiated by the Legal Services Board (LSB), which is a regulatory overseer in the legal sector 
created by the Legal Services Act 2007.  The responsibility for managing the LETR (the LETR  
executives) fell to the three main legal regulators: the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA), the Bar 
Standards Board and ILEX Professional Standards.  The LETR was conducted by a research team of 
university academics who reported to the LETR executives. 
588 Committee on Legal Education, Report of the Committee on Legal Education (Cmmd 4595, 1971) 
(Ormrod Report) 
589 This chapter presents a brief survey of the concerns (regarding the increasing commercialization of 
the legal profession) that were noted by a selection of the presenters at the second conference held by 
Birmingham Law SchoolÕs Centre for Professional Legal Education and Research (CEPLER) held in 
October 2013.  The conference and the following associated publication aimed to bring together leading 
academics, senior figures from the professional practice, representatives of the regulatory authorities and 
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Julian Webb,590 one of the lead researchers, notes that the demands of powerful 
commercial customers for more focused and affordable legal services has led to the 
redistribution of many simpler routine legal tasks to those staff who are less qualified 
and cheaper to employ.591  This raises questions about the legal skills and legal ethics 
that the educators should be trying to inculcate into this new breed of legal employee Ð 
the non-lawyers and para-legals Ð operating in the lower echelons of the legal 
profession.  The unbundling of the legal profession and increase in the number of legal 
employees who are not trained solicitors or barristers, means that any changes that are 
made to legal education and regulation will still only apply to those who have 
undertaken the traditional routes of entry into the profession (as it is only lawyers who 
are regulated by the LSB).  Any discussions of reform regarding legal education and 
regulation must take this factor into consideration unless they wish such discussions to 
be rendered a mute point.  Alex Roy592 therefore suggests that any reforms of legal 
education and regulation must be undertaken flexibly and may need to move away 
from standard models of regulation.593   
 
																																																																																																																																																																
policy makers to reflect on the key issues that arise from the recent changes within law (noted above).   
For the associated collection of papers see: Hilary Sommerlad, Richard Young, Steven Vaughan and 
Sonia Harris-Short (eds), The Futures of Legal Education and the Legal profession (Hart Publishing, 
2015).  CEPLER  aims to promote in undergraduate and graduate legal education an enhanced 
awareness of professional culture, values and practices and to assist in cutting edge research on both the 
legal profession and legal education. 
These contributors to the conference (as opposed to others that also presented) have been noted in this 
chapter because of the variety of positions they occupy within the profession and their differing 
viewpoints.  Although their responses do not refer to thickness or thinness in any way, I assert that 
future academic responses to the LETR could benefit from a consideration of the literature on thick and 
thin concepts because these concepts can be useful in enriching understanding of legal values (legal 
ethics). 
590 Professor Julian Webb currently teaches legal ethics and legal theory at the University of Melbourne 
Law School, having previously held chairs at the Universities of Warwick and Westminster (in the UK). 
591 Webb offers the viewpoint of an academic researching within the fields of legal education policy and 
theory; the ethics and professional regulation of lawyers; social and legal theory; and the ethics of socio-
legal research.  Julian Webb, ÔThe LETRÕs (Still) in the Post: The Legal Education and Training Review 
and the Reform of Legal Services Education and Training Ð a personal (Re)viewÕ in Hilary Sommerlad, 
Richard Young, Steven Vaughan and Sonia Harris-Short (eds), The Futures of Legal Education and the 
Legal profession (Hart Publishing, 2015), 97-138 
592 Alex Roy was the Head of Development and Research at the Legal Services Board (LSB) until April 
2014, when he became Manager (Pensions and Investments) at the Financial Conduct Authority.  See his 
paper: Alex Roy, ÔCreating a More Flexible Approach to Education and TrainingÕ in Hilary Sommerlad, 
Richard Young, Steven Vaughan and Sonia Harris-Short (eds), The Futures of Legal Education and the 
Legal profession (Hart Publishing, 2015), 169-180 
593 He notes that the strategy adopted by the financial services regulators post the credit crunch may 
provide an appealing example, although it is unclear whether such a regulatory approach will fare any 
better.  Colin Scott, ÔA Meta-Regulatory Turn? Control and Learning in Regulatory GovernanceÕ in Sam 
Muller, Stavros Zouridis, Morly Frishman and Laura Kistemaker (eds), The Law of the Future and the 
Future of Law: volume II (Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2012), 61-71 
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Richard Abel and Julia Evetts both argue that increased marketisation is bad for 
consumers because it often leads to a trade off between quality and prices, the 
associated unbundling of legal services places legal consumers in a position where they 
are unable to evaluate the appropriate legal solutions or resources that they need.594  
Abel worries that the increasing freedom and liberalisation offered by marketisation of 
the legal sector may actually increase social injustice and inequality Ð ÔfreeÕ market 
ideology can facilitate poor pay and insecure working conditions Ð and most often 
those affected the worst are those who are already marginalised by society.595  Andrew 
Sanders also voices concerns over increasing marketisation of the legal profession and 
the effect this has upon legal education - the results of this will be a legal curriculum 
that focuses on the commercial aspects of law and so on the wealthy, neglecting the 
poor and questions of social justice Ð the practical implications of this for the legal 
profession will be an increasing lack of accountability.596 
 
The LETR identified a need for legal educators to balance the greater desire for 
Ôcommercial awarenessÕ and managerial skills within law students as voiced by the 
profession, against the need to ensure that legal ethics, values and professionalism 
remain central aspects in an ever increasingly commercialised legal profession.597  
																																																								
594 Richard Abel is the Connell Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus and Distinguished Research 
Professor at UCLA School of Law, California.  He is a leading global scholar on the legal profession 
known for his seminal text: Richard L Abel, English Lawyers between Market and State (Oxford 
University Press, 2003).  He was also the keynote speaker at the conference, see his conference 
presentation here: Richard L Abel, ÔAn Agenda for Research on the Legal Profession and Legal 
Education: One AmericanÕs PerspectiveÕ in Hilary Sommerlad, Richard Young, Steven Vaughan and 
Sonia Harris-Short (eds), The Futures of Legal Education and the Legal profession (Hart Publishing, 
2015), 201-220 
Julia Evetts is Emeritus Professor at the School of Sociology and Social Policy at The University of 
Nottingham and has established an international reputation in the field of sociology of professional 
groups, practitioners and clients.  Julia Evetts, ÔProfessionalism, Enterprise and the Market: 
Contradictory or Complementary?Õ in Hilary Sommerlad, Richard Young, Steven Vaughan and Sonia 
Harris-Short (eds), The Futures of Legal Education and the Legal profession (Hart Publishing, 2015), 
23-36 
595 Increasing unemployment rates in law graduates, lower starting salaries and reductions in training 
contracts/pupillages are all cited as evidence of this. 
596 Andrew Sanders offers the perspective of someone involved with both the academic and regulatory 
aspects of the legal professions.  He is Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology at the University of 
Birmingham, and Head of the School of Law; he is also a board member of the Bar Standards Board and 
former Chair of the Committee of Heads of University Law Schools in England and Wales.  Andrew 
Sanders, ÔPoor Thinking, Poor Outcome?  The future of the Law Degree after the Legal Education and 
Training Review and the Case for Socio-LegalismÕ in Hilary Sommerlad, Richard young, Steven 
Vaughan and Sonia Harris-Short (eds), The Futures of Legal Education and the Legal profession (Hart 
Publishing, 2015), 139-168 
597 It is important to note that even within legal education and training the responses of the various 
regulatory bodies differ.  The LSAÕs objectives include encouraging: Ôan independent, strong, diverse 
and effective legal profession, promoting the public interest, improving access to justice and supporting 
the rule of law.Õ ibid at 16   
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Sommerlad et al note that the direction legal education will take in relation to 
balancing these competing aims will be dependent on the definitions of such concepts, 
which are subject to wider and more powerful socio-political forces outside of the 
ambit of the LETR.598  A better understanding (knowledge) of the legal values and 
concepts concerned, which can be gained through conceptual analysis using the 
analytic distinction between thick and thin concepts can help both students and 
educators to balance the competing interests.  
 
In his response to the LETR Andrew Sanders suggests that it is still possible for all 
legal employees (including non-lawyers and para-legals) to demonstrate an awareness 
of their capacity to shape the law and society, but for this to be possible the law school 
curriculum needs to move away from traditional doctrinal-based teaching (studying the 
rules) and towards socio-legalism (studying the socio-economic impact of the law and 
lawyers). This approach has not been supported by the LETR.599  Drawing from my 
experiences as both an educator and a student this chapter notes the practical relevance 
of thick and thin concepts within law by highlighting their usefulness within a critical 
approach that aims to facilitate a move away from traditional doctrinal-based teaching.  
Invoking the distinction between thick and thin concepts within legal education allows 
educators to highlight the interplay between the evaluative and descriptive aspects of 
legal concepts and challenge the traditional doctrinal understanding of law.  
 
The full effect of the LSA, LASPO and LETR remains unknown, but it is clear that 
they will affect all those involved within the legal profession Ð including both 
educators and practitioners Ð and are of direct relevance to this investigation (in 
particular this chapter on legal education).600  So far the changes within legal education 
have been less revolutionary than elsewhere within the profession: much of the legal 
curriculum remains the same Ð doctrinal and traditional - but there have been 
modifications made to take account of the skills movement within society and the 
																																																																																																																																																																
The Legal Services Board (LSB) has not chosen to emphasise the objectives the LSA identified, it has 
instead focused on promoting the interests of consumers and promoting competition within the legal 
market.	
598	see note 589 at 15	
599 The LETR reported that practitioners find jurisprudence and socio-legal studies the least relevant 
subjects in the legal curriculum, although Sanders notes that the LETR provides no scientific evidence to 
support this claim.  see note 596 
600 Many of these issues were discussed at the second conference of Birmingham Law SchoolÕs Centre 
for Professional Legal Education and Research (CEPLER) held in October 2013.   
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diversification of the student body.601  More law schools now offer ÔclinicÕ teaching 
and employability based modules within their law programmes.602   Law school 
programmes have started to push the need for a business and economic based 
understanding of the law (even if this is only in certain modules or areas of law) in 
response to the increasing dominance of the corporate sector within the legal 
profession.603  Law schools have started to reflect theoretical changes within the law Ð 
such as a socio-legal approach to law Ð through both their teaching styles and research 
output.604  Despite changes to legal education and attempts by many universities to 
improve graduate employability it is becoming harder for law graduates to qualify as 
lawyers.605  Competition for pupillages and training contracts has increased and the 
number of paralegals has increased.606  Legal education has began to respond to the 
changing legal climate, but as responses to its findings note there is still a big gap 
between the shape of the current legal curriculum and the shape of the current legal 
profession (or, as some contend, market).  Many law schools have tried to close this 
gap by offering new modules and methods of assessment that aim to prepare students 
for the legal profession and cultivate the skills that are now required by legal 
																																																								
601 The LETR has noted that the level of change across the justice system has profound implications for 
law school graduates.  It has also noted that the demographic profile of the law student body has also 
undergone many changes, since 1989 the number of female graduates and trainee lawyers has 
outnumbered the number of males.  See: Law Society, ÔAnnual Statistical Report 2000Õ (Law Society, 
2000) para 9.7. < http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/policy-campaigns/research-trends/annual-statistical-
reports/ > The proportion of Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) trainees has risen in the last 
decade.  See: Black SolicitorÕs Network, ÔDiversity League Table 2013Õ (BSN, Law Society and Bar 
Council, 2013)  < http://satsuma.eu/publications/DLT2013/ > Questions of diversity and social 
exclusion within the legal profession are often directed towards legal education providers, where it is 
suggested the root of the problem lies.  In response to this, legal apprenticeships through the Chartered 
Institute of Legal Executives and the government have been pushed.  See: Chartered Institute of Legal 
Executives, ÔApprenticeships in Legal ServicesÕ (CILEX, 2014) available at 
<www.cilex.org.uk/study/legal_apprenticeships.aspx. >  
In England the government programmes are run by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 
see: <wwww.gov.uk/government/consultations/future-of-apprenticeships-in-england-richard-review-
next-steps>   
In Wales they are developed as Skills for Justice run by the Sector Skills Council < 
http://www.sfjuk.com/about/nations/justice-sector-in-wales/higher-apprenticeship-in-legal-services-
wales/ > 
602 The Kent Law Clinic enables Kent law students to develop the legal skills required for professional 
practice by working on legal cases with qualified practitioners. 
603 see note 596 
604 Sanders argues for a socio-legal approach to legal education to foster the appropriate legal ethics 
within law students and the profession.  ibid 
605 Webb voices concerns over the impact of the neo-liberalism agenda on higher education, which is 
now treated as a private economic good and struggling under the pressure of increasing privatisation and 
marketization of universities and their funding bodies.  This is coupled with increasing pressure to 
demonstrate student employability to ensure the universities future survival.  see note 591 
606 Hilary Sommerlad, ÔThe New ÒProfessionalismÓ in England and Wales: Talent, Diversity, and a 
Legal PrecariatÕ in S Headworth et al (eds), Rhetoric and Reality (forthcoming) 
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employers.607  As noted by Rosemary Auchmuty608 these changes within the legal 
curriculum have opened the way for more innovative and imaginative methods of 
teaching and assessment that could incorporate the distinction between thick and thin 
concepts as a teaching tool.  Auchmuty notes that these changes are what enabled her 
to incorporate the skills of judgment writing into an assessment as part of a new 
property law module that was modelled on the feminist judgments project.609 
 
The changes within the legal profession are part of much wider changes within society 
brought on by the rise of capitalism.  Law was originally a pre-capitalist craft 
occupation.610  There was little outside regulation as the industry relied on self-
regulation through collegiality.  The partner-run law firms were small enough that 
every practitioner could in theory one day become a partner.611  Since then law has 
transformed into a capitalist service industry where the majority of legal professionals 
(in particular lawyers) are better viewed as employees.612  The transformation in the 
legal profession is a reflection of broader socio-economic changes, such as the decline 
of Keynesian based economic policies and the welfare state and the rise in popularity 
of free market ideologies.613  Sommerlad, Young, Vaughan, and Harris-Short all argue 
that:  
free market ideologies have transformed the profession into one that 
is thoroughly commercial and market driven, eroding justice and 
rights in the public discourse of law so that it has become a 
commodity much like any other.  The LSA exemplifies and 
accelerates this development.  Such free market ideologies are also 
seen in higher education: the rise in student fees; and, for law in 
																																																								
607 I have undertaken teaching within a variety modules Ð A Critical Introduction to Law, English Legal 
Institution and Methods, and Critical Approaches to Law Ð that aim to close this gap. 
608 Rosemary Auchmuty, ÔUsing feminist judgments in the property law classroomÕ (2012) 46 (3) The 
Law Teacher 233 
609 ibid 
Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley (eds), Feminist Judgments: From Theory to 
Practice (Hart Publishing 2010) 
610 Sommerlad discusses the modernization of working processes within law firms towards becoming 
capitalist entities who are increasingly concerned with the mass production of law as a Ôlegal productÕ 
than law as an individualised service run through partner-centric law firms.  See: Hilary Sommerlad, 
ÔManagerialism and the Legal Professional: A New Professional ParadigmÕ (1995) 2 International 
Journal of the Legal Profession 159 
611 Traditional law firms and barristersÕ chambers have been likened to ÔkinshipÕ networks, see: M 
Burrage, ÔFrom a GentlemanÕs to a Public Profession Ð Status and Politics in the History of English 
SolicitorsÕ (1963) 3 International Journal of the Legal Profession 45 
612 see note 589 
613 The welfare state is a form of governance that emerged after the Great Depression and the two world 
wars in response to the political challenges that called for a more socially just society.  Keynesian 
economic based policies encouraged government intervention to create more employment and a fairer 
distribution of wealth throughout society. 
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particular, the tensions between employability/vocationality and a 
liberal arts education.614 
 
These broader socio-economic changes are also evidenced by the rise in popularity of 
ÔlearningÕ as a key topic in political and economic contexts.  All societies have a vested 
interest in education: it equips individuals with the skills and knowledge necessary to 
flourish as an individual and as a member of a community.615  The level of education 
and skills demonstrated by nations, companies and individuals is used as a measure to 
determine their position within the globalised market and knowledge society.616 The 
field of education and the narrower sub-field of legal education, is now sufficiently 
vast that neither this chapter nor the entire study could possibly provide exhaustive 
coverage of the relevant philosophical issues (neither has it been my intention to do 
so).617  This investigation into the use and usefulness of thick and thin concepts within 
law now culminates in the present chapter which argues for their relevance within legal 
education, which in light of the recent legislative changes is now a prominent topic of 
discussion (and tension) within both academia and the legal profession, with the legal 
curriculum a particular focus.  
 
Chapter Aims and Argument. 
 
This chapter continues the discussion of thick and thin concepts in law by drawing on 
aspects from the previous three chapters in arguing for one final way in which thick 
and thin concepts can be useful within law.  Legal education is the final area that this 
																																																								
614 see note 589 at 4 
615 PlatoÕs The Republic addressed many of the philosophical issues that still concern philosophy of 
education today.  There are multiple editions and translations of this text, the following example 
includes both notes and an interpretative essay: Allan Bloom, The Republic of Plato (Basic Books, 1968) 
616 Learning has always been an important part of the human experience, traditionally it was understood 
as the acquisition of knowledge and skills, today it covers a much larger field that now includes many 
different theories of learning with emotional, social and societal dimensions.  For a good introduction to 
the many different contemporary learning theories now available see: Knud Illeris (ed), Contemporary 
Theories of Learning (Routledge, 2009).  For some interesting discussions of learning theories within 
the context of legal education see: Robin A Boyle, ÔEmploying Active-Learning Techniques and 
Metacognition in law School: Shifting Energy from Professor to StudentÕ (2004) 81 University of 
Detroit Mercy Law Review 1; Elizabeth Mertz, The Language of Law School: learning to ÒThink Like a 
LawyerÓ  (Oxford University Press, 2007); Robin A. Boyle and Rita Dunn, ÔTeaching Law Students 
through Individual Learning StylesÕ (1999) 62 Albany Law Review 213; Michael Hunter-Schwartz, 
ÔTeaching Law By Design: How Learning Theory and Instructional Design Can Inform and Reform 
Law TeachingÕ (2001) 28 San Diego Law Review 347; Paul L. Caron and Rafael Gely, ÔTaking Back the 
Law School Classroom: Using Technology to Foster Active Student LearningÕ (2004) 54 Journal of 
Legal Education 551; Karl S. Okamoto, ÔLearning and Learning-to-Learn by Doing: Simulating 
Corporate Practice in Law SchoolÕ (1995) 45 (4) Journal of Legal Education 498 
617 Randall Curren undertakes such a task and divides the field of education into forty-five subfields, see: 
R. Curren, A Companion to the Philosophy of Education (Blackwell, 2003) 
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study argues could benefit from attending to the ideas of thick and thin concepts, and 
the result of this chapter is therefore to extend my thesis argument for the use and 
usefulness of thick and thin concepts within law, and to illustrate the benefit of (and 
danger in) using existing literature in parallel disciplines and subject areas. 
 
Moreover, legal education has been addressed last and as a culmination because it adds 
a practical dimension to the theoretical discussion and argument that has been building 
gradually throughout this investigation.  Also it recapitulates in a new testing ground 
now familiar ideas that have been introduced in preceding chapters: it draws upon 
aspects of the meta-ethical literature on thick and thin concepts and the legal literature 
on thick and thin concepts.  Lastly, the topic area is of manifest importance as legal 
education both shapes the law (influencing future legal practices and reforms) and 
responds to changing pressures on the law externally and from within:618 
 
The interaction between the legal system and legal education is really 
a two way process.  On the one hand, a countryÕs legal system 
determines and shapes the structure and approach of the legal 
education.  On the other hand, legal education influences a countryÕs 
legal system.  Moreover, the interaction between the legal system and 
legal education reflects the dynamics of progress moving towards 
professionalism.619 
 
This chapter draws on this two-way relationship between the legal system and legal 
education in arguing for the importance of thick and thin concepts in legal education.   
 
The way we teach law (the shape of legal education) has generated substantial 
academic discussion620 demonstrating widespread differences in ideology between the 
																																																								
618 I do not address legal reform in this thesis but note that it is a potential avenue for future research.   
619 Jun Zhao and Ming Hu, ÔA Comparative Study Of The Legal Education System In The United States 
And China And The Reform Of Legal Education In ChinaÕ (2012) 35 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 
329, 343 
620 This can cover a wide variety of issues such as the impact of globalization, for example see: Larry E. 
Ribstein, ÔPracticing Theory: Legal Education For The Twenty-First CenturyÕ (2011) 96 Iowa Law 
Review 1649, 1652-53, 1672; Lewis A. Kornhauser and Richard L. Revesz, ÔLegal Education and Entry 
into the Legal profession: The Role of Race, Gender, and Educational DebtÕ (1995) 70 New York 
University Law Review 829; James R. Faulconbridge and Daniel Muzio, ÔLegal Education, 
Globalization, and Cultures of Professional PracticeÕ (2009) 22 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 
1335; and Sandra R Klein, ÔComment, Legal Education in the United States and England: A 
Comparative AnalysisÕ (1991) 13 Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review 601.  
The advantages of clinical experience over university based legal education has always been a source of 
disagreement, see for example: Erwin Chemerinsky, ÔRethinking Legal EducationÕ (2008) 43 Harvard 
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 595, and Judith Welch Wegner, ÔReframing Legal EducationÕs 
ÒWicked ProblemsÓÕ (2009) 61 Rutgers Law Review 867, 867-68.  The role of values in legal education, 
see for example: Sandra Janoff, ÔThe Influence of Legal Education on Moral ReasoningÕ (1992) 76 
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parties to them.621  In the argument that follows I shall be making what could be 
perceived as ideological claims regarding the legal curriculum by arguing for the 
relevance of the literature on thick and thin concepts within law with a sharp focus on 
reform of legal education, whereas the previous three chapters (and chapter five in 
particular) were included (in part) to demonstrate that the literature on thick and thin is 
useful for law because it recognises phenomena that already exist within the legal 
system and offers an illuminating new voice or articulation for pre-existing legal 
issues.  However, this chapter (like the other chapters in my study) will leave it open as 
to which is the appropriate account of thick and thin concepts to adopt, and will 
continue to demonstrate that there is a range of options regarding this issue, not least 
because this concession to generality is all that is presently necessary to defend my 
argument that these terms are useful within law. 622   More positively and less 
methodologically, of course, my demonstration that there is value in adopting these 
analytic tools regardless of how they are cast within the range presently deployed in 
the philosophical literature, stands as a considerable testament to their robust and 




Thick and thin legal concepts are relevant to legal education in two important ways; 
i.e., to the method(s) of teaching law and to the ethical values fostered by legal 
education.623  Much of legal learning is accomplished through studying the legal 
statements contained within case law, and as already suggested this body of law 
																																																																																																																																																																
Minnesota Law Review 193; David B. Wilkins, ÔTwo Paths to the Mountaintop? The Role of Legal 
Education in Shaping the Values of Black Corporate LawyersÕ (1993) 45 (6) Stanford Law Review 1; 
Julian Webb, ÔEthics for Lawyers or Ethics for Citizens?  New Directions for Legal EducationÕ (1998) 
25 (1) Journal of Law and Society 134; and Martha C. Nussbaum, ÔCultivating Humanity in Legal 
EducationÕ (2003) 70 University of Chicago Law Review 265 
621 Describing the conflicting objectives of legal education, see: Harry T Edwards, ÔThe Growing 
Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal ProfessionÕ (1992) 91 Michigan Law Review 34; 
Alex M Johnson, Jr., ÔThink Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between Law 
School and Law PracticeÕ (1991) 64 Southern California Law Review 1231; Duncan Kennedy, ÔThe 
Political Significance of Structure of the Law School CurriculumÕ (1983) 14 Seton Hall Law Review 1; 
Anthony T. Kronman, ÔForeword: Legal Scholarship and Moral EducationÕ (1981) 90 Yale Law Journal 
955; Chris Langdell, ÔLaw School Curriculum: A Reply to KennedyÕ (1984) 14 Seton Hall Law Review 
1077; Richard A. Posner, ÔLegal Scholarship TodayÕ (1993) 45 Stanford Law Review 1647; and Richard 
A. Epstein, ÔLegal Education and the Politics of ExclusionÕ (1993) 45 Stanford Law Review 1607  
622 My study focuses on thick and thin concepts, but many of the arguments made throughout this study 
including those within this chapter could also be applicable to thick and thin descriptions, which are also 
relevant to the case based method of learning in law. 
623 They may be useful in other ways too, but these are the two areas that I think are most promising for 
initial research. 
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contains many uses of thick and thin concepts (chapter five).  Understanding the 
philosophical ideas of thickness and thinness (and the accompanying literature) can be 
particularly useful for understanding these cases and for the legal method of teaching 
through cases. In this chapter I argue that thick and thin concepts can be useful 
philosophical tools within legal education because they can substantially assist case-
based teaching and learning, which is a useful teaching aid within many law modules, 
including legal ethics, which encourages critical reflection upon the nature of legal 
values and the traditional conception of a legal professional.624 
  
The distinction between thick and thin concepts can be utilised within legal conceptual 
analysis to investigate the nature of legal values and their role within law.  One area 
where the ethical dispositions of the legal system can be directly influenced is through 
the ethical values that are fostered in law students (and teachers) by the teaching 
process (an area also known as legal ethics).  The changes the legal system has 
undergone (see chapter introduction) have challenged the traditional values associated 
with the legal profession, and the ethical literature on thick and thin concepts (chapters 
two through four) can be useful in enriching our understanding both of these traditional 
legal values and of the problems currently grappled with in contemporary legal ethics 
debates.  There is also an underlying premise that runs throughout this chapter, which 
asserts that all aspects of the legal profession are connected (legal practice, legal 
education, legal ethics, legal regulation and legal research)625 and therefore the current 
shifts in the legal landscape will affect and lead to changes in all areas of the legal 
profession and the substantive law.626   
 
 
2 Ð Case-based teaching and learning. 
 
I turn first to the case-method and my argument that thick and thin concepts can be 
useful philosophical tools because they substantially assist case-based teaching and 
learning, which supports my overall thesis argument that thick and thin concepts are 
																																																								
624 It is important to note that at no point in this chapter should my discussion of case based learning be 
taken as an argument for the case-method of learning as the primary or only method of legal learning. 
625 This list is not intended to be exhaustive, these are some of the aspects of the legal profession that 
arise in this chapter. 
626 The law changes and alters in line with wider socio-economic, political and moral changes within 
society, see the articles referenced in notes 617 and 618 
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useful within law as demonstrated in this chapter in relation to legal education.627  The 
case-method of teaching draws on the usefulness of examples at facilitating learning, 
they Ômay facilitate the aquisition of knowledge, either for the exampleÕs author, its 
reader, or bothÕ628 and are therefore an important learning tool. Whilst much of case-
based learning within law utilises real legal cases, it is common practice for teachers to 
devise legal problem scenarios (fictional cases), both kinds of cases are beneficial 
learning tools.  Eileen John claims that reading fiction can still yield conceptual results: 
Ôcertain fictions add to our comprehension of the conditions of application for a 
concept or to our understanding of basic competence in using a concept.  
Comprehending fiction can also expand our conceptual knowledge in broader ways, by 
showing us that a concept can have a broader or different ÒdomainÓ or ÒpointÓ than we 
previously thought.Õ629  Cases (both real and fiction) are an important learning tool 
because they enable students to develop their competency with legal concepts, and as 
many of these legal concepts can be identified as thick concepts or thin concepts, this 
establishes their value as a learning tool for developing competence with thick and thin 
legal concepts. 
 
As my thesis argues for the usefulness of thick and thin concepts within case-led 
learning, it is helpful to first establish, why case-led learning is considered so useful by 
many disciplines (such as law).630  Dena Davis suggests the following advantages of 
case-led learning: 
																																																								
627 The casebook method of learning law through studying the judicial opinions that become the law via 
stare decisis, is the primary method of teaching law in many common law jurisdictions (especially the 
United States) and was pioneered at Harvard Law School by Christopher Columbus Langdell.  Whilst 
Dean of Harvard Law School from 1870-1895 he applied the principles of pragmatism to the teaching of 
law, he advanced a dialectical process of learning that came to be called the case-method, which 
encouraged students to use their own reasoning powers to deduce how the law might apply in a 
particular case.   
For further reading on this see: Anthony Chase, ÔThe Birth of the Modern Law SchoolÕ (1979) 23 (4) 
American Journal of Legal History 329; Robert Granfield, Making Elite Lawyers: Visions of Law at 
Harvard and Beyond (Routledge, 1992); Bruce A. Kimball, The Inception of Modern Professional 
Education: C. C. Langdell, 1826-1902 (University of North Carolina Press, 2009); Bruce A. Kimball, 
ÔÒWarn Students That I Entertain Heretical Opinions, Which They Are Not To Take as LawÓ: The 
Inception of Case Method Teaching in the Classrooms of the Early C. C. Langdell, 1870-1883Õ (1999) 
17 Law and History Review 57; and William P. LaPiana, Logic and Experience: The Origin of Modern 
American Legal Education (Oxford University Press, 1994) 
628 Heidi Li Feldman, ÔBeyond the Model Rules: The Place of Examples in Legal EthicsÕ (1998) 12 
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 409, 416 
629 ibid at 423 
For further discussion of JohnÕs ideas see: Eileen John, ÔReading Fiction and Conceptual Knowledge: 
Philosophical Thought in Literary ContextÕ (1998) 56 Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 331, 333 
630 For example see: Roger B. Dworkin, ÔEmerging Paradigms in Bioethics: IntroductionÕ (1994) 69 
Indiana Law Journal 945 who argues for the importance of cases in bioethical analysis, Dworkin also 
notes their importance in ethical and legal learning.   
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First, a good case can serve as an indispensable tool for teaching 
theory, useful for class discussions and exam questionsÉ. A second 
use for cases is to provide a pool of shared experience (if only 
second hand), a fixed point for discourse in the professionÉThird, 
by describing real experiences ethicists can make points and draw 
conclusions while inviting their readers to make their own 
independent judgements.631 
 
In law, cases serve an additional role, because it is through judicial decisions that the 
body of case law is generated.  In all four roles (DavisÕs three and the additional 
feature brought by law) an understanding of thick and thin can have a significant 
impact that can now be given substance.  I now turn to consider DavisÕ claims in more 
detail.  Her first claim asserts the role of cases in teaching law as an illuminating way 
of not only teaching students about legal judgements and decisions, but also in 
bringing legal theory to life.  The following example helps to demonstrate the validity 
of her claim.  Eric Wiland argues that REASONABLE is a thick concept632 and notes the 
involvement of this thick concept in the development of the ÔreasonableÕ man test.  He 
states: 
 
The reasonable person standard governing appropriate care emerged 
specifically from English common law; it has not always existed, 
and it does not exist everywhere.  We first see it in the case of 
Vaughan v. Menlove (1837), in which the court ruled that liability 
for negligence depends not upon the details of the defendantÕs state 
of mind, but instead upon the standard of caution that Òa man of 
ordinary prudence would observe.Ó  In 1856, the English courts 
again reaffirmed that Ònegligence is the omission to do something 
which a reasonable man guided upon those considerations which 
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing 
something which a prudent and reasonable man would doÓ (Blyth v. 
Company Proprietors of the Birmingham Water Works).633 
 
Whilst most students are generally led to believe that the law does not punish 
omissions there are certain exceptions to this general rule of thumb and these 
exceptions can be determined through application of the reasonable man test. 
Interpreting and applying the reasonable man test employs practical reasoning skills, 
which depend heavily on competency with legal concepts.  If the legal concepts in 
																																																								
631 Dena S. Davis, ÔRich Cases The Ethics of Thick DescriptionÕ (1991) 21 (4) The Hastings Centre 
Report 12, 12-13 
632 Eric Wiland, ÔWilliams on Thick Ethical Concepts and Reasons for ActionÕ in Simon Kirchin (ed), 
Thick Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013), 210 
633 ibid at 212 
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question are thick concepts (such as REASONABLE) then it is important that legal 
education equips individuals with the skills to understand and engage with all kinds of 
legal concepts, including thick concepts.  Especially if, the thick concept e.g., 
REASONABLE, directly informs and shapes the legal criteria Ð the reasonable man test- 
which in turn informs and shapes the legal doctrine of negligence (negligent omissions 
in this particular case).634  Studying thick concepts such as REASONABLE, which are 
used as legal criteria by the judiciary when deciding legal issues can reveal the nature 
of legal concepts - how specific (often thick) legal concepts play an important role 
within the common law development of legal doctrine - this can in turn usefully 
illuminate the nature of law and the philosophical, political and economic 
commitments that operate beneath the surface of the common law.    The above brief 
example also therefore demonstrates how the case-method of teaching and thick 
concepts when combined helps to clarify the theoretical construct of a reasonable man, 
which can be particularly hard to grasp as it has been developed and honed over many 
judicial decisions (all of which reflect deeper theoretical commitments regarding the 
nature of law); and the legal process of common law adjudication and doctrinal 
development. 
 
The second use of cases identified by Davis Ð providing a pool of shared experience Ð 
indicates the ability of cases to reveal the social aspect of law and the relations between 
the individuals involved in the practice.  Consider for example the law on assisted 
suicide, an area of law that clearly invokes ethical as well as legal considerations.  
Richard Nobles and David Schiff discuss the role of the thick concept CIVIL 
DISOBEDIENCE in the Purdy case635 and note the judgesÕ use of legal theory in their 
discussion of the thick term Ôcivil disobedience,Õ which demonstrates a significant 
departure from the traditionally descriptive nature of legal judgments.636 The negative 
values associated with disobedience align with the judges reluctance to identify a right 
to disobey the law, even if this was only in limited circumstances.  Case-led learning 
utilises legal judgments, such as Lord HopeÕs, which deploy thick concepts such as 
DISOBEDIENCE in their reasoning and studying the thick concepts deployed within 
those judgments, highlights the social aspect of law and the role of the judiciary in 
deciding matters of social justice.  Fostering an understanding of thick concepts is 
																																																								
634 ÔNegligenceÕ is also a thick concept and is used as an example twice, later on in this chapter. 
635 Richard Nobles and David Schiff, ÔDisobedience to Law Ð Debbie PurdyÕs CaseÕ (2010) 73 Modern 
law Review 295 
636 ibid at 301 
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therefore important to developing awareness of social justice and the social movements 
these thick concepts feature within.  Joel Ngugi argues that the THE RULE OF LAW is 
deployed as a thick concept within rule of law projects, because it has Ôa powerful 
emotive appeal by implicitly linking values with action.  By juxtaposing facts and 
values, the thick conception of the rule of law is an effective tactic for the successful 
mobilization of public opinion by appeals to conscience that call on value.Õ637  He 
argues that social movements often use thick concepts to influence ÔpeoplesÕ way of 
viewing particular political choices as ethical by ensconcing them in ethical values.Õ638  
These wider political movements also impact upon the ethos of law and suggest the 
relevance of thick concepts to legal ethics. 
  
As Davis notes studying legal judgments (which I argue includes the thick concepts 
deployed within these judgments) also helps to clarify the relations between various 
legal actors within the legal profession e.g., the relation between the judiciary and the 
legislature.  For example, in the Purdy case the legislature and the judges seem to be in 
conflict, the judges were clearly governed by statute, yet their judgments also attended 
to the legal values and social values that influence legal principles, such as - the 
sanctity of life and the harm principle Ð studying their legal reasoning and the concepts 
they use helps to identify the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature in 
complex cases.   The complexity of the legal issues addressed by this case indicate why 
Lord HopeÕs judgment concluded that the DPP must produce specific guidelines 
Ôwhich make it clear when at least some persons who breach section 2 (1) (he thought 
it would be a narrow category) would not be prosecuted.Õ639  HopeÕs statement reflects 
the conflicting relation between the legislature and the judiciary in this particular case 
(and also between the statute and wider legal principles), because as Nobles and Schiff 
argue, it is hard to describe his process of reasoning as anything other than an act of 
ÒdecriminalisationÓ640 despite his claim that the law remained unchanged in light of his 
judgment.  Studying the relations between the judiciary and the legislature is also of 
interest to legal ethics (I address this in the next section). 
 
																																																								
637 Joel M. Ngugi, ÔPolicing Neo-Liberal Reforms: The Rule of Law as an Enabling and Restrictive 
DiscourseÕ (2005) 26 (3) Journal of International Law 514, 557 
638 ibid  
639 see note 632 at 302 
640 ibid 
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The above examples demonstrate that ÔrealÕ cases are Ôlong, richly detailed, messy, and 
comprehensive,Õ641 this is also evidenced by the thickness of the concepts that are often 
employed within these cases.  The third role described by Davis is quite specific to 
ethicists, but can still actually be relevant to legal theorists.  Law is meant to be non-
retroactive and policy makers when trying to formulate new laws or improve current 
laws have to try to envisage the possible applications of their ideas (it is very hard to 
conceive of every possible situation in advance).  Case law deals with real experiences; 
it is more closely connected to our social world than theoretical accounts and abstract 
universalisations, which necessarily have to form the basis of statute based law.642 
Cases are a better reflection of the social world, because they provide a thicker account 
of the practices and values of that society, which (as already discussed in chapter four) 
is also one of the advantages Williams attributes to thick concepts.  
 
The above discussion of the merits of case-led learning within law has utilised case 
examples that involve thick concepts to demonstrate their occurrence within case law 
and therefore their relevance to the case-method of teaching, but as yet has failed to 
offer any significant argument or demonstration (based upon the thickness of these 
concepts) as to how these concepts could be incorporated into legal curriculums and 
utilised within legal education.  This has been intentional and important to the structure 
of my argument within this chapter.  The previous three chapters laid important ground 
work in establishing the existence of thick and thin concepts within law, including case 
law, therefore this chapter proceeds on the assumption that the existence of thick and 
thin concepts within legal cases has already been established (at least to a sufficient 
extent that can justify further investigation of their usefulness).  As this chapter makes 
what could be perceived to be ideological claims regarding the legal curriculum Ð that 
thick and thin concepts due to their use within case law and potential usefulness when 
deployed alongside the case-method of teaching, should be included within the legal 
curriculum - it has been important to first establish the significance of the case-method, 
before proceeding to argue that thick and thin concepts can be useful philosophical 
tools which substantially assist in case-led teaching and learning.  The following 
																																																								
641 see note 628 at 13 
642 This directly relates to WilliamsÕ argument that explanations of our social practices (he has ethics in 
mind), have to take into account the perspectival nature of those practices (by this he does not mean 
differences in opinions) and the evaluative standpoint of the practice.  See my earlier discussion of 
Williams (chapter four) for more detailed discussion of this argument.   
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section explores the connection between cases and thick concepts in more detail 
through a discussion of their potential uses within the legal curriculum. 
 
 
3 - Thick and thin concepts within cases. 
 
Reforming the legal curriculum in such a manner that facilitates the development of 
competency with thick and thin legal concepts is a valuable enterprise that has 
implications for our understanding of the current law and the development of future 
law.  The prominence of the case-method of learning and the use of thick and thin 
concepts by judges within their legal judgments provides a starting point from which to 
explore further the distinction between thick and thin concepts.  The following section 
suggests how developing a competency with thick and thin concepts could be 
incorporated into the legal curriculum via the case-method of learning and could aid in 
the teaching and development of legal concept competency, which is essential to not 
only understanding the law but also to developing the skills of practical deliberation 
required for participation within the practice of law.  To demonstrate how the case-
method of teaching can be developed in innovative and interesting ways and therefore 
how the distinction between thick and thin concepts could be incorporated into the 
curriculum via the case-method of teaching, this section uses the example of the 
feminist judging project and its incorporation into law school teaching.643   This 





Case-led teaching and learning helps to foster the skills required for practical 
deliberation - it aims to teach the future lawyers not just what the law actually is, but 
how to determine what the law actually is, and, moreover, to construct compelling 
arguments that conclude what the law actually is, the use of cases in legal education in 
some respects is a lesson in comprehending, arguing and deciding cases Ð these same 
skills are required when the legal concepts involved in practical deliberation are 
thick/thin legal concepts.  In fact many of the concepts that are regularly deployed 
																																																								
643 Rosemary Hunter, ÔIntroduction: feminist judgments as teaching resourcesÕ	(2012) 46 (3) The Law 
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during practical deliberation are thick legal concepts, because these concepts tend to be 
ethically rich (laden with value).  Developing competency with thick and thin legal 
concepts therefore becomes integral to practical deliberation.  The need to develop 
competency with thick and thin concepts for the purposes of practical deliberation has 
been noted by Roger Dworkin (a bio-ethicist) and Iris van Domselaar (a virtue 
ethicist).  They argue that legal education should pay special attention to thick and thin 
concepts within legal cases and seek to develop the conceptual skills required to 
engage with these concepts because of their relevance to the case-method of learning 
and practical deliberation. Dworkin notes: Ôcases are a way to learn how to perceive, 
comprehend, and judge ethically.  Their use develops skills in moral diagnosis, 
discernment of particularities, analogical reasoning, judicious weighing and balancing, 
and practical strategies for coping with risk and judicial uncertainty.Õ644  Developing 
these skills through case-led learning should be of particular concern to law students 
and educators, because these are many of the skills required by the legal profession, in 
particular the judiciary who are expected to demonstrate this kind of knowledge, when 
deciding cases.645   
 
It is possible to combine an argument for the inclusion of thick and thin concepts 
within the legal curriculum with a particular political ambition or to advance a 
particular pedagogy, but that is not my intention in this thesis.  For example 
DoomselaarÕs calls for reform of the legal curriculum to include attention to thick and 
thin concepts is tailored to her Ôvirtue-centred approach to adjudication,Õ but her 
arguments can be extrapolated and applied to a more general argument for reform of 
the legal curriculum.  Domselaar argues for a Ôvirtue-centred approach to adjudicationÕ 
that fosters the judicial virtues such as ethical perception that are employed when 
engaging with thick legal concepts.646  She cites ÔRACISM, COURAGE, POVERTY, 
NEGLECT, HONESTY, and VIOLENCEÕ 647  as examples and advances a non-
separationist understanding.  She argues that the legal education institutions need to 
foster judicial virtues such as ethical perception that enable students to engage with the 
evaluative standpoint of thick concepts.  
																																																								
644 Roger B. Dworkin, ÔEmerging Paradigms in Bioethics: IntroductionÕ (1994) 69 Indiana Law Journal 
945, 949 
645 Chapter seven already demonstrated that many of the shared core philosophical concerns of law can 
be seen in the jurisprudential debates surrounding the judiciary.  The method of teaching law through 
cases brings many issues associated with the judiciary to the forefront of legal education. 
646 Iris van Domselaar, ÔMoral Quality in Adjudication: On Judicial Virtues and Civic FriendshipÕ 




The usefulness of including thick and thin concepts within the legal curriculum stems 
in part from their ability to highlight the interplay between evaluation and description 
within legal concepts and bring to the forefront the wider jurisprudential issues that are 
often buried beneath the surface in cases.  Once these jurisprudential issues are brought 
to the surface of a case, students begin to understand the complexity of the practical 
deliberation required to reach that particular judgment and can begin to take a critical, 
questioning stance regarding the law.  Thick and thin concepts can therefore not only 
facilitate the development of legal skills such as reading cases, they can also foster a 
critical approach towards law.  Research in US law schools has noted how the more 
successful students Ôquestion court decisions, evaluate the results of cases, and 
consider the implications of rules.  Reading the law is far more than making notes or 
highlighting text.  We want our students to read the law creatively and critically.Õ648  
Despite the traditional doctrinal nature of law many law schools are now offering 
critical modules such as ÔCritical Introduction to LawÕ offered at the University of 
Kent and ÔCritical ApproachesÕ offered at the University of Canterbury Christchurch.  
Having taught on both these modules it was interesting to notice that most students are 
initially resistant to critical approaches to law and recognising the role of evaluation 
within law (and legal concepts), despite their (albeit unknown) exposure to thick and 
thin concepts within legal cases, particularly appellate case-law. 
  
Studying appellate adjudication is crucial to the case-method and also usefully 
highlights key features of thick concepts Ð their flexibility and malleability Ð that adds 
to their usefulness within law.  Understanding appellate adjudication as the engineering 
of thick (entangled) legal concepts both explains and justifies why appellate cases have 
proven to be an enduring part of the law school curriculum, therefore I return to the 
work of Heidi Feldman (see chapter seven), to demonstrate the usefulness of thick and 
thin concepts within legal education regarding the teaching of the appellate 
adjudication process which plays a major role in the development of the common 
law.649  Feldman cites MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.650 as an example of appellate 
																																																								
648 Leah M. Christensen, ÔLegal Reading and Success in Law SchoolÕ (2006-7) 30 Seattle University 
Law Review 603 at 646 
649 The following articles have already been noted in the earlier discussion (chapter seven) of FeldmanÕs 
work on thick concepts in law, see: Heidi Li Feldman, ÔAppellate Adjudication as Conceptual 
EngineeringÕ in Graham Hubbs &Douglas Lind (eds), Pragmatism, Law and Language (Routledge, 
2014); Heidi Li Feldman, ÔThe Distinctiveness of Appellate AdjudicationÕ (2012) 5 Washington 
University Jurisprudence Review 61; Heidi Li Feldman, ÔBlending Fields: Tort Law, Philosophy and 
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engineering of thick legal concepts to defend the importance of both the case-method 
and thick concepts within legal education. 
 
When law students study this case, they learn that it stands for the 
elimination of the privity requirement (the requirement of a 
contractual or quasi-contractual relationship) between an injured 
plaintiff and a maker of a defective product that injured him or her.  
For the purposes of the development of the law of products liability, 
this take-away makes sense.  But from the perspective of how New 
YorkÕs highest court reached its conclusion, this future oriented 
understanding is anachronistic.  Looking forward from CardozoÕs 
opinion, rather than backward to its particular underpinnings, misses 
some significant data important for understanding the engineering of 
entangled concepts.651 
 
Cardozo dispensed with IMMINENT DANGER and INHERENT DANGER so as to 
better engineer NEGLIGENCE, a concept better suited to the emergence of mass 
production within industry.  The case ultimately demonstrated that the concept 
IMMINENTLY DANGEROUS was inadequately structured to specify the situations in 
which ÔprivityÕ was inapt and liability should be found; and that Ôimminent dangerÕ 
could not mediate the tension between the two thick concepts PRIVITY and 
NEGLIGENCE.  Cardozo who gave the majority judgment never referred to the 
Ôinherent dangerÕ/Ôimminent dangerÕ distinction which had been the central focus of 
the defendants argument throughout all phases of the trial, instead Cardozo used a 
series of cases to demonstrate that the courts are always applying the principle that 
where there is foreseeable danger there is a duty placed upon the creator to avoid injury 
to persons even if they are not the immediate purchaser of the item.   His judgment 
therefore developed a conception of duty in relation to manufactured goods that sets 
aside the privity limitations.  
 
CardozoÕs holding accomplishes two things.  First, he abolishes the 
privity limitation.  Second, he abolishes the need for the concepts of 
Ôimminent dangerÕ and Ôinherent dangerÕ. Rather than try to shore up 
either or both, he dispenses with the pair in favour of engineering 
																																																																																																																																																																
Legal TheoryÕ (1998) 49 South Carolina Law Review, 167 and Heidi Li Feldman, ÔObjectivity in Legal 
JudgmentÕ (1994) 92 (5) Michigan Law Review 1187 
Feldman uses the term ÔentangledÕ legal concept to refer to legal concepts that blend evaluation and 
description (thick concepts) in such a manner that renders these two aspects of the concept incapable of 
separation (disentanglement).  Feldman argues that judges engineer entangled legal concepts sometimes 
in their legal decisions.  See chapter seven for a more detailed discussion of these ideas and her work. 
650 MacPherson v Buick Motor Co. (1916) 217 N. Y. 382  
651 Heidi Li Feldman, ÔThe Distinctiveness of Appellate AdjudicationÕ (2012) 5 Washington University 
Jurisprudence Review 61, 67 
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neliegenceÕs duty of care with a focus on foreseeable, knowable 
risk.652 
 
CardozoÕs re-engineering of ÔnegligenceÕ eventually led to its demise in deciding 
liability for manufacturing defects, as future courts used more apt thick concepts to 
replace NEGLIGENCE and instead introduced the principles of liability without fault.  
Coming to understand how thick legal concepts such as NEGLIGENCE are engineered 
Ôeven explicitly engaging in reverse engineering, is not only an intriguing intellectual 
exercise, it is also instruction in a craft, perhaps even an art, uniquely performed by 
lawyers.Õ653  The engineering of thick concepts within cases provides further support 
for the need to develop a competency with thick and thin concepts as part of the legal 
curriculum.  As noted above this ambition could be incorporated into the legal 
curriculum via the case-method of learning.  Discussion now turns to the feminist 
judging project and its incorporation into law school teaching, because this innovative 
project provides an example of how the theoretical aspects of this thesis could be 
applied practically as a learning tool.654 
 
The feminist judging project. 
 
The feminist judging project involved the writing of alternative feminist judgments in 
significant legal cases655 and has inspired the use of feminist judgments as a teaching 
resource.656  Law school modules that have sought to employ feminist judgments as a 
teaching tool require students to reflect upon the differences between the original 
judgment and the feminist judgment.  Such reflection aims to foster critical thinking, 
Ôemphasising the various ways in which law may be questioned rather than taken for 
granted, evaluated rather than simply learnt, and considering how a critical, feminist 
approach may be brought to bear, while also being concerned to take a critical, 
questioning stance in relation to the feminist project itself.Õ657  Whilst the use of 
feminist judgments as a teaching tool may be part of a political project of feminist 
pedagogy this is not their only possible use, the judgments may also be used by 
																																																								
652 ibid at 94 
653 ibid at 105 
654 The teaching materials developed from the feminist judging project are available online at 
http://www.feministjudgments.org.uk 
655 Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley (eds), Feminist Judgments: From Theory to 
Practice (Hart Publishing, 2010) 
656	Rosemary Hunter, ÔIntroduction: feminist judgments as teaching resourcesÕ (2012) 46 (3) The Law 
Teacher 214-226	
657	 ibid at 225  	
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educators who do not share these broader political goals but instead wish to teach 
students to question the nature of legal reasoning and the development of legal 
doctrine.  My own experience of the use of feminist judgments as part of my teaching 
at Kent in the ÔCritical introduction to LawÕ module highlights how an understanding 
of the distinction between thick and thin concepts could have better equipped students 
to reflect upon the differences between the original judgment and the feminist 
judgment.  Reading cases through a thick-thin lens enlivens the legal narratives and 
wider ethical, political, and socio-economic concerns that influence judicial decision-
making.  Understanding thick and thin concepts enables students to grasp the role of 
evaluative standpoint within legal cases and appreciate how the evaluative aspect of 
legal concepts can affect the outcome of a legal case, this new knowledge can then be 
put to use when comparing and contrasting the original and feminist judgments.  
Identifying the thick and thin concepts employed by both the original and feminist 
judgment offers a starting point from which to compare and contrast the two judgments 
and may help students understand how two differing outcomes could be arrived at from 
the same set of legal facts.  Rosemary Auchmuty argues: 
 
Good lawyers know that there may be many ways to reach the ÔrightÕ 
result and there may be disagreement as to what the right result might 
be.  Disputes presuppose at least two sides to the question and judges 
must choose, sometimes by exercising a moral judgment, not just a 
simple application of rules.  Law, and even facts, can be manipulated 
to serve desired ends.  Reading cases reveals all this.  It makes law 
much more complicated, but it makes it come alive.  If we want our 
students to understand legal method, and to learn to think like good 
lawyers, there are few more useful skills for them to acquire than the 
skill of reading cases.658 
 
Identifying and examining the role of thick and thin concepts within legal judgments 
provides another opportunity for students to acquire and develop the skill of reading 
cases.  The usefulness of thick and thin in developing legal skills such as reading cases 
and practical deliberation further supports their inclusion within legal education. 
     
Developing the skills associated with reading cases is particularly difficult because 
although teachers may be keen for students to read cases, the reality is that many 
students do not read cases and instead rely on case summaries found in textbooks.  The 
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Law Teacher 227, 233 
	 211	
arrival of new kinds of textbooks and learning resources that make it possible for 
students to complete an undergraduate law degree based entirely on these textbooks 
and associated websites has meant that for many students it becomes their sole 
resource.  This means that students not only lack the skills developed by reading cases 
and articles, but further than this it is easy to see why these students: 
 
 find it hard to grasp the reasoning behind a given judgment, to 
imagine the possibility of a different response to the same set of facts, 
or to distinguish a case on its facts Ð because the facts they read in the 
summary are often so brief and diluted as to mask all essential 
distinctions.  ItÕs no wonder they remain unaware of dissenting 
judgments, lines of reasoning that have been abandoned (and why) 
and alternative (often better) reform proposals that have never been 
enacted (and why), and that they fail to appreciate the complex 
negotiation of facts and law that goes into a routine decision, let alone 
a land mark one.659  
 
This became particularly noticeable when teaching Equity and Trusts at Kent where 
students favoured the textbook case summary over the required case reading and then 
struggled to partake in seminar discussions concerning details of the case and its wider 
implications for Equity and Trusts Law.660  Thick and thin concepts can be found 
within both cases and textbooks but they serve very different purposes.  Textbooks 
often start with thinner concepts that are then fleshed out through the use of case 
summaries and example problems,661 whereas as noted earlier in this chapter cases 
revolve around key thick concept(s) such as NEGLIGENCE that are then applied to the 
facts of the case maybe with the additional support of thinner concepts such as HARM.  
In light of this observation it is interesting to reflect upon the order in which thick/thin 
concepts are taught and whether this is indicative of a priority of the thin over the thick 
(or vice versa).662  My own experiences as both a student and educator have taught me 
that it is the thinner concepts due to their vagueness and lack of detail that are harder to 
grasp, in comparison to thicker concepts which are more detailed and specific making 
them easier to grasp and apply.  I have observed that students respond better to topics 
																																																								
659 ibid at 232 
660 This was in stark contrast to my experience of a Critical Introduction to Law where there were 
allocated readings, but there was no textbook. 
661 For example Brian OrendÕs introductory text to human rights is split into two parts Ð part one: 
concept and part two: context Ð he begins with the basic core concepts such as HUMAN and RIGHT 
and then in the latter part of the book expands upon these notions through examples. 
Brian Orend, Human Rights: Concept and Context (Broadview Press, 1971)   
662 In chapter four I note WilliamsÕ criticism that ethics has focused too much on the thin even though 
the thick offers more action.  It would be interesting to consider whether legal education asserts 
(intentionally or unintentionally) a thick or thin priority. 
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and reading that revolves around thicker concepts and that it is not until the thinner 
concepts are supported by examples of application, that students can begin to grasp 
these vaguer concepts.  The incorporation of feminist judgments into legal education 
through critical modules such as ÔCritical Introduction to LawÕ provides a testing 
ground for students to explore their understanding of both thick and thin legal concepts 
and build their competency with both thick and thin concepts.  It also creates an 
opportunity for teachers to observe students responses to thick and thin concepts, and 
stimulates dialogues regarding student learning and responses to thick and thin legal 
concepts.  Considering legal concepts through a thick/thin lens not only illuminates a 
difference in approach between textbooks and cases, but it facilitates a wider dialogue 
regarding the decline of cases and rise of textbooks as a key learning tool, and how to 
orient the case-based method of teaching within this changing learning environment.  
 
Although the above discussion has predominantly addressed thick concepts this should 
not be construed as an argument for or implication that it is only thick concepts that are 
of relevance to legal education. Investigating the potential thickness or thinness of 
concepts employed by legal professionals within cases and statutes, demonstrates the 
wide spectrum of evaluations and descriptions conveyed by the law; and a legal 
education that recognises the usefulness of both thick and thin concepts within case-led 
learning will stand a better chance at defending the value of the case-method within the 
legal curriculum. 
 
The incorporation of feminist judgments into legal education through critical modules 
is one example of the innovative methods of teaching the law that are becoming 
increasingly popular and demonstrates one possible area of application for thick and 
thin concepts within the legal education.  This section has argued for the usefulness of 
thick and thin concepts within the case-method of instruction, and as such offers a 
partial defence of this educational tool that has received critical attention within law.  
Interestingly contemporary ethical analysis has advocated the adoption of the common 
law method (that is, the case-method), and scholarship in ethics has recognised that the 
case-method of instruction helps to capture the thickness and diversity of social 
practices such as ethics, and this argument could be used to defend the use of the case-
method in law which is also a social practice.663  The following section will continue to 
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demonstrate the relevance of thick and thin concepts within legal education in relation 
to the methods of teaching law (the case-method of instruction), but with a particular 
focus on legal ethics.   
 
 
4 - Legal Ethics and Legal Values. 
 
The second half of this chapter considers one other area, already trailed, that has also 
received critical attention in response to the recent changes within the legal system 
and, for example, the LETRÕS findings: legal ethics. 664   Legal ethics has been 
highlighted as an emerging area of law that needs to be fostered by legal curricula in 
their response to the LETR and changes within the legal profession and thick and thin 
concepts have been recognised as relevant to legal ethics.665  It is important to 
introduce and elucidate the subject matter of legal ethics, because as Alice Wooley 
notes Ôphilosophical legal ethics exists at the intersection between the abstraction of 
philosophy and the tangible problems of the real world.Õ666  Wooley asks the following 
question to highlight the multi-faceted nature of legal ethics and therefore the multi-
faceted concerns it must necessarily address: ÔIs the concern of legal ethics the 
morality of lawyers, the morality of clients, or the morality of law?Õ667  This section 
considers the usefulness of thick and thin concepts in addressing the morality of law 
and the morality of lawyers.  
 
The first possible application of thick and thin concepts within legal ethics concerns 
the morality of the law, because accepting the existence of thick and thin concepts 
within law provides the opportunity to rethink the nature of legal values and their role 
within legal education.   As noted throughout chapters five, six and seven there are 
																																																								
664 See the following examples: Frances Lee Ansley, ÔRace and the Core Curriculum in Legal EducationÕ 
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665 David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: an Ethical Study (Princeton University Press, 1988); David 
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many examples of thick concepts within law all of which contain an evaluative or 
normative commitment that could also be referred to as a ÔthickÕ value, consider for 
example the various criminal offences MURDER, RAPE, THEFT and MANSLAUGHTER 
(Chapter five) LEGAL VALIDITY (chapter six) and NEGLIGENCE (chapter seven).  The 
distinction between thick and thin concepts and the accompanying literature can be 
utilised within legal conceptual analysis (as demonstrated by chapter six in relation to 
the thick term Ôlegal validityÕ) to illuminate our understanding of specific thick legal 
concepts, which can assist the legal ethics project in illuminating our understanding of 
legal values (such as the thick values associated with Ôlegal validityÕ) 
 
The role of thick and thin concepts in understanding legal values was noted by the 
1998 Conference of the Clinical Section of the Association of American Law Schools 
on ÒvaluesÓ.668  Topics under discussion were: Ôwhat values law professors hold, how 
they might differ from those of their students, whether it is appropriate to ÒteachÓ about 
values, whether it is even possible not to teach about them, how to discuss values in a 
non-threatening fashion, whether some values might simply be wrong, and so forth.Õ669  
Tremblay defends the importance of legal values within legal education, but argues 
that we need to rethink the role of values within legal education, particularly legal 
ethics.  He opines: 
 
The philosophers say that we err when we think that values are 
separate from facts.  We tend to think that we ÒhaveÓ values, that we 
possess them, and we then use, or apply, or reflect those values when 
we encounter situations in the worldÉThe philosophers tell us that 
the fact/value distinction is false.  Moral sensibility arises from the 
experience of and action upon concrete circumstances.  I do not have 
ÒvaluesÓ as much as I ÒexperienceÓ values when I encounter others.  
It is therefore not helpful to talk about teaching or imposing or 
indoctrinating values, because values are not something that you have 
or do not have, outside of specific contextual interactions.670 
 
Despite intense and lively discussions at the conference, there was a lack of resolution 
about the role of values in education (although the conversations were positively 
																																																								
668 The conference was held in Portland, Oregon, the following account of the conference is provided by 
Paul Tremblay Associate Clinical Professor at Boston College Law School who discusses the conference 
and its findings in his: Paul R. Tremblay, ÔCoherence and Incoherence in Values-TalkÕ (1999) 5 Clinical 
Law Review 325.  This includes a sample of the ideas collected by the conference organizers from small 
group work, attendees were asked Ôwhat are our values?Õ the responses are noted in the footnotes of his 
article on the conference: ibid 
669 ibid 
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viewed as a significant normative statement) because a more careful (coherent) 
understanding of the term ÔvaluesÕ was needed.671   
 
Tremblay suggests that the common misunderstandings about the role of values in 
lawyering (and behaviour in general) are symptomatic of wider misunderstandings that 
are so deeply embedded we struggle to recognize them, writing; Ôvalues-talk rests on 
an assumption that we do not have a shared, substantive, theoretical framework telling 
us what is good, and, reciprocally, what is bad.Õ672  The search for a shared evaluative 
language to discuss values animated this conference which, in TremblayÕs view is 
capable of being captured by Ôthe thick theory of the goodÕ (whilst also raising 
helpfully the philosophical distinction between fact and value).673  He elaborates: there 
will be disagreements but if we instead work on identifying the instances where we 
agree (there will always be agreement at some level), then a coherent conversation 
using common language can occur with the possibility of closure.  WilliamsÕ thick 
concepts are dependent upon the notion of a shared evaluative standpoint, which 
supports the idea that there will always be at least some ethical agreement, he argues 
that meaningful legal ethical discourse presupposes a quasi-descriptive vocabulary, and 
that the profession needs to cultivate professional dispositions amongst its practitioners 
that incorporate a sustainable degree of professional reflectiveness (ethical 
reflectiveness). 674   Legal educationÕs role in fostering professional reflectiveness 
through legal ethics courses highlights the second possible application of thick and thin 
concepts. 
 
The morality of Lawyers. 
 
As Tremblay notes above there is widespread disagreement regarding the role of 
values within legal education and this is partly due to disagreement over how to teach 
legal ethics.  Linda Haller recognises the difficulty of teaching legal ethics and 
suggests that legal cases, an already respected learning tool, if read through a legal 
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673 Tremblay notes that the idea of ÔthickÕ and ÔthinÕ theories can be traced to John Rawls who advanced 
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ethics lens rather than a doctrinal reading could prove useful.675   For example, reading 
cases through a legal ethics lens encourages ethical reflection upon the nature of legal 
values and critical self-reflection upon the studentsÕ own values.676   It can also 
facilitate discussion concerning the morality of lawyers, which is one of the primary 
concerns of legal ethics (this concern was also noted by many of the responses to the 
LETR cited within this chapter).  The following argument for the usefulness of thick 
and thin concepts within legal ethics will therefore draw upon my earlier discussion of 
the case-method as a learning tool that facilitates practical reasoning with thick legal 
concepts.   
 
Haller does not enter the debate over whether fictional or real cases are a better 
teaching tool within legal ethics.677   As many teachers will only have reported 
appellate decisions to work with, the following discussion utilises Walmsley v. 
Cosentino678 as an exemplar.  The case provides a valuable vehicle through which to 
explore the morality of the legal professionals involved and the thick values that the 
case rested upon, which as noted earlier will require an understanding of thick and thin 
concepts.   
 
Walmsley679 is a common law professional negligence case - the solicitor was being 
sued for professional negligence for not issuing court proceedings relating to a 
personal injury claim arising out of a motor vehicle accident within the limitation 
																																																								
675 Linda Haller, ÔComing to terms with legal ethics assessmentÕ in Michael Robertson, Lillian Corbin, 
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few examples of these.   
T. Floyd and J. Gallagher ÔLegal ethics, narrative and professional identity: The story of David 
SpauldingÕ (2008) 59 Mercer Law Review 941 
R. Abel, Lawyers in the Dock: Learning from Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings, (Oxford University 
Press, 2008)   
678 Walmsley v. Cosentino (2001) NSWCA 403 
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period, and then subsequently failing to inform the client to seek independent advice 
by a certain date regarding a possible claim against himself - it is legal authority for the 
proposition that: Ôwhere a solicitor has failed to file proceedings in time, the solicitor 
will be in breach of his or her tortious duty of care to the client if the solicitor fails to 
tell the client not only that the client may have a cause of action against the solicitor 
and should seek independent advice, but also the date before which the client must 
seek that independent advice if they are to preserve their legal rights.Õ680  What began 
as an apparently simple case took twenty one years to be resolved and raises many 
interesting issues about the ethical responsibilities of the legal professionals involved 
and the nature of the thick concepts NEGLIGENCE and DUTY OF CARE. 
 
The case involved a number of legal professionals as Walmsley the solicitor briefed six 
barristers, yet the court never considered whether the barristers had been negligent, 
even though they all appeared to be aware of WalmsleyÕs negligence and conflict of 
interest and failed to warn or protect the client.  Haller argues that reflecting upon the 
behaviour of the legal professionals involved in this case, demonstrates an Ôinability or 
disinclination to see ethical issues, exercise ethical judgment or Òrock the boatÓ when 
tasks and information are divided among a number of individuals in a work team who 
also rely on each other for future patronage and financial reward.Õ681  This provides 
students with the opportunity to reflect upon the conduct of the particular legal 
professionals employed within this case, and the ethical dispositions (or the legal 
virtues as Domeslaar, Wang and Solum argue) that lawyers should exhibit, which as I 
have already suggested requires knowledge of thick legal concepts.  
 
The case also provides a valuable vehicle through which to explore the ethical 
implications of a divided legal profession and consider why none of the barristers took 
responsibility for the clients welfare.  Wooley notes: 
 
Courts continue to emphasise that a barrister is only expected to 
advise Ôas instructedÕ; the instructing solicitor is the primary arbiter as 
to whether the barrister has discharged his or her obligations, and it is 
																																																								
680 see note 675 at 193 
681 ibid at 196 
See also: C. Parker, A. Evans, L Haller, S. Le Mire and R. Mortensen, ÔThe ethical infrastructure of 
legal practice in larger law firms: Values, policy and behaviourÕ (2008) 31 University of South Wales 
Law Journal 163 
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usually the responsibility of the instructing solicitor not the barrister 
to ensure the client understands their rights and obligations.682 
 
Considering the distance between the barristers and client it is hardly surprising they 
felt a lack of responsibility towards the client.  This case gives students a chance to 
consider the nature of the relationship between barristers and instructing solicitors and 
the tensions that can arise within this relationship, for example the barrister is reliant 
on the instructing solicitor for future work and like many other work teams the 
barrister may not wish to question the work of the solicitor on their team.  Although 
none of the legal professionals faced criticism from the court, the New South Wales 
Bar rewrote its professional conduct rules to prevent future occurrences like this and 
place a clear professional obligation upon the barrister to act in similar situations. The 
case therefore also highlights the lack of clear and consistent guidance available to 
lawyers regarding professional conduct as often the professional conduct rules and case 
law are in tension.  This provides students with the opportunity to reflect upon their 
understanding of the legal professionals role, and the legal values that the legal 
professional is expected to possess and exhibit, this reflection will involve practical 
reasoning with thick concepts.683  
 
Encouraging students to reflect upon the role of legal professionals within the legal 
system has become a key responsibility of legal education and legal educators, in light 
of the LETR and the recent changes within law (see chapter introduction).  Tony King 
argues for a greater communication to potential lawyers regarding the nature and 
expectations of the legal profession (both the benefits and challenges faced by those 
working with the legal sector) he argues that it is an aspect of the legal educators role 
to try to objectively communicate this to law students.684  King also notes a need for 
better communication between teaching institutions and legal employers to ensure a 
better understanding of their respective needs, noting that communication is also an 
																																																								
682 see note 675 at 196 
683 Alice Wooley suggests thick concepts may be relevant to the discussion of legal virtues and their role 
within developing the moral character of legal professionals Alice Wooley, ÔThe Legitimate Concerns of 
Legal EthicsÕ 168 
684 Tony King is the Director of the Clifford Chance Academy at the international law firm Clifford 
Chance LLP, after a period of practicing as a solicitor and teaching at the then College of Law, he has 
since been involved in education, training and professional development at Clifford Chance. See his 
paper: Tony King, ÔThe Future of Legal Education from the ProfessionÕs Viewpoint: a Brave New 
World?Õ in Hilary Sommerlad, Richard Young, Steven Vaughan and Sonia Harris-Short (eds), The 
Futures of Legal Education and the Legal profession (Hart Publishing, 2015), 181-200 
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essential part of ensuring continuing competence with the profession.685  Legal ethics 
has previously been shaped by the closed nature of the legal profession and Richard 
Able argues that law schools have often been complicit in fostering a notion of Ôlegal 
professionalismÕ that seeks to not only control how many could enter the profession, 
but also ÔwhoÕ could enter the profession, because they teach students to Ôargue both 
sides of every case, approach law positivistically, as a set of constraints to be 
manipulated or evaded, followed grudgingly, only as required by the letter of the law, 
not by its spirit.Õ686  Better understanding the nature of legal values is important to 
legal education, because it is one area where the ethical dispositions of the legal system 
can be directly influenced through the ethical values that are fostered by the teaching 
process.  Legal education instills a set of legal values within students and fosters a 
certain ideology (even if this is at a subconscious level that students are unaware of), 
both of which can be consciously engineered by those individuals responsible for 
designing the legal curriculum.  This is one reason why consciously engineering and 
reflecting upon the legal curriculum can be both beneficial and important for the future 
of the legal profession and legal education; especially as all aspects of the legal 
profession are connected (legal practice, legal education, legal ethics, legal regulation 
and legal research).  The meta-ethical literature on thick and thin concepts offers 
interesting insights for the discussion of legal values, insights that can be drawn upon 
in developing a better understanding of legal values, which is important as these 
underpin the legal ideology and ethos fostered by legal education (the legal curriculum 
is a reflection of the laws values and ideology).   
 
 
5 Ð Conclusion. 
 
This chapter has argued that in light of the transformation that the legal profession is 
currently undergoing, now is the time to consider reforming the legal curriculum in a 
manner that reflects the relevance of thick and thin concepts within legal education, 
which is hardly surprising considering their use and usefulness within law, as 
																																																								
685 Julian Webb also noted this problematic aspect of the legal set up: Ôthe lack of established structures 
for effective engagement between the professions and the academy has been a recurrent complaint of 
every review of legal education in England and Wales since 1934.Õ See note 589 at 18.  The LETR 
suggested the establishment of a ÔLegal Education CouncilÕ to achieve such a dialogue, although as yet 
this remains to be instigated. 
686 Richard L Able, ÔWhat Does and Should Influence the Number of Lawyers?Õ (2012) 19 International 
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demonstrated by my investigation. Changes within the legal profession exert pressure 
on the legal education structures that help to shape the legal profession and much of 
this pressure can be seen in terms of the changing legal curriculum and the changing 
ideology that can be seen reflected in both the legal profession and legal education.687   
 
This chapter has presented a brief survey of opinions from those involved with this 
lively debate regarding the future of the legal profession and legal education many of 
the issues are related to or draw upon issues from legal ethics, and whilst these issues 
seem unlikely to be resolved at present due to the many diametrically opposed 
viewpoints, it seems clear that the issue of legal ethics will remain an important aspect 
of the debate regarding the legal curriculum.688  The literature on thick and thin 
concepts can both add to the existing debate and provide new ideas or opportunities for 
dialogue, the literature can therefore be useful for legal education even if it does not 
resolve the disagreements regarding the future of legal education (I admit that whilst 
thick and thin are useful for law they are unlikely to resolve such deeply entrenched 
philosophical disputes).   
 
At present the future of the legal profession and legal education are unclear as the 
effects of the recent transformation of the legal system are yet to be fully realised or 
understood; and the legal system and profession are both constantly evolving.  The 
extent to which thick and thin concepts within law could be useful to legal education 
will to a certain extent be dependent upon important decisions regarding the legal 
curriculum (in particular legal ethics) that are yet to be made.  Despite this as long as 
legal values continue to play a role in both the legal profession and legal education 
then thick and thin concepts can be useful within legal education. This chapter has 
demonstrated that these terms are useful and relevant within legal education in relation 
to legal ethics, the legal curriculum, and the case-method of teaching; and this chapter 
therefore further supports my thesis that these terms are useful within law. 
 
																																																								
687 For example McGill University has adopted a unique program of legal study that integrates 
transnational legal perspectives into the legal curriculum, which ensures that students graduate with 
degrees in both civil and common law.  See: Rosalie Jukier, ÔTransnationalizing the Legal Curriculum: 
How to Teach What We LiveÕ (2006) 56 Journal of Legal Education 172 
688 Russell Pearce goes further than this and places legal ethics at the centre of the legal curriculum, in 
which case thick and thin concepts may also be of central importance.  See: Russell G. Pearce, ÔLegal 
Ethics Must Be the Heart of the Law School CurriculumÕ (2002) 26 Journal of the Legal Profession 159 
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This thesis set out with a single aim: to argue for the use and usefulness of thick and 
thin concepts within law.  The criteria employed in this thesis to determine usefulness 
were not particularly technical, as my method was simply to show the benefit found in 
the use of the distinction in relation to a series of persistent problems or standing 
concerns within the frame of legal theory, legal understanding and legal practice.  It is 
now possible to draw together the main elements of the argument pursued throughout 
the study and to demonstrate to what extent my thesis aim has been met.  Before these 
concluding remarks commence it is useful to elaborate upon the method and arguments 
this investigation has pursued, one final time. 
 
It has been an intended and major strength of my thesis to collate the many disparate 
instances of the use of thick and thin across a number of sub-disciplines within law.  
My thesis is one of the first significant attempts at an overarching conspectus of thick 
and thin within law, which has been undertaken with the aim of demonstrating that we 
are at a point of major change within analysis.  The popularity and reach of the 
distinction between thick and thin concepts is increasing rapidly and my thesis argues 
for the importance of this distinction within law, an area where this distinction is yet to 
receive widespread acknowledgement.  It is through my extensive research into the 
many disparate uses of thick and thin within law that I have observed a lack of clarity 
within the legal literature concerning both the nature of the distinction and the 
accompanying meta-ethical literature, this is hardly surprising in light of the relatively 
recent emergence of these ideas within legal analysis. 
 
It is therefore important to begin with the following caveat: that whilst this thesis argues 
for the use and usefulness of thick and thin concepts within law, any claims regarding 
their potential are hampered to a certain extent by the quality of their current 
deployment by legal philosophers and other scholars within law. For these terms to 
prove useful within law our current legal use needs sharpening and these terms need to 
be deployed in a more consistent manner, and so it has therefore been important in 
terms of the credibility of my thesis to argue that if these terms are to achieve their full 
potential within law their use by legal philosophers needs to be rendered more precise 
(chapters five through seven highlighted weaknesses within the legal literature).  Only 




The jurisprudential pay-offs that could follow from a consistently sharper and more 
precise use of thick and thin concepts within law could impact upon many different 
aspects of the law.  In brief sum, and as a reminder of my claims, these benefits will 
include new and helpful ways of understanding existing difficulties and the generation 
of new and profitable avenues for research study and discussion, but also extend to the 
claim that awareness of the distinction creates the opportunity for a radical remodelling 
of how we understand law and come to build knowledge and expertise within legal 
practice.  Many of the persistent legal issues that the distinction between thick and thin 
concepts can usefully help illuminate (and perhaps, resolve), also persistently present 
within philosophy as long-reigning philosophical problems.   
 
If sound, one of the main strengths of this thesis is that thick and thin concepts are 
relevant to many different aspects of law: they can reignite traditional jurisprudential 
debates (the literature on thick and thin concepts within law is one of the first genuine 
invigorations of the debates surrounding law and morality since the 1950Õs); and 
contribute to contemporary legal issues (as demonstrated by the attention this study 
places on legal education).  It is the relevance of thick and thin concepts to many 
different aspects of law that has led to the many disparate localised uses of thickness 
(such as those noted within chapters five through eight), therefore a significant value of 
my thesis stems from the overarching conspectus of these different inevitably local uses 
of thickness that I provide.  This conspectus not only demonstrates the reach and power 
of my thesis, but it also responds to the needs of thick scholars.  A lot of the detailed 
work excavating the research literature and its interconnections and similarities to other 
work in the relevant area is contained in my compendious footnotes, it is therefore an 
important aspect of my thesis that my footnotes are not a supplement or bibliographical 
reference point only. 
 
Legal education has been an important aspect of this study because it unifies the 
relevance of thick and thin for many disparate topics within law (addressed in chapters 
five through seven) and unites the traditional and contemporary jurisprudential 
concerns addressed in this study.  Legal education is at the forefront of any changes 
within the law and can both instigate legal change and respond to changes made to the 
legal system.  Although legal education is not addressed until chapter eight of this 
thesis, this chapter is drawing upon the earlier discussion of thick and thin in law and 
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unites the theoretical implications of my thesis with the practical implications of 
pursuing thick and thin concepts within law. 
 
The current legal application of thick and thin concepts within philosophy of law covers 
a number of separate but related legal concerns, and it has not been the intention of this 
investigation to provide detailed coverage of all these potential areas for research 
(although chapter five does go part way towards establishing the current extent of their 
legal application).  Chapters five through seven have instead focused on those aspects 
of their current application within philosophy of law that can best demonstrate the 
scope of these terms and their relevance to long-reigning debates and key concerns 
within jurisprudence.  Through an investigation of their relevance for legal positivism 
(chapter six) this study ensures the relevance of these terms for one of the most 
important and enduring legal theories, indeed this is the legal theory that continues to 
hold its position as the operative legal theory of the English Legal System.  Chapter 
seven moves away from legal positivism towards general jurisprudence noting the 
wider jurisprudential uses of these terms by seminal legal philosophers, which furthers 
the credibility of this thesis and demonstrates the importance of these ideas for 
contemporary jurisprudence. 
 
Throughout chapters five through seven I highlight some examples of thick concepts, 
particularly thick concepts that have been deployed within legal cases to demonstrate 
the benefit of the distinction between thick and thin concepts within law.  These 
examples are brief and can be in light of the groundwork undertaken in my early 
chapters, because my intention is merely to demonstrate the existence of thickness 
within law, particularly case law, and the importance of recognising thickness because 
doing so brings to attention key jurisprudential questions that have wider significance, 
such as the distinction between facts and values which is central to the debate between 
separationists and non-separationists within the thick-thin literature.  The distinction 
between thick and thin concepts therefore has significant implications for our general 
theories of law, such as legal positivism (as I demonstrate in chapter six) and natural 
law theory, which can be brought to life in every single case that deploys thick 
concepts. 
 
By demonstrating the use and usefulness of thick and thin concepts in relation to two 
dissimilar topics within law (philosophy of law addressed in chapters five through 
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seven and legal education addressed in chapter eight) this study offers a more robust 
and comprehensive demonstration of the value of the distinction than would have been 
possible had my focus remained bound to a single focus or area of potential application. 
This enables my thesis to demonstrate the wider scope and benefit of these terms (thick 
and thin concepts), and ensures the strength of my single thesis: that thick and thin 
concepts are useful within law. 
 
The specific conclusions of the enquiry can be stated simply.  Thick and thin concepts 
are useful within law (in relation to many different aspects of law), they can enrich our 
understanding of both traditional and contemporary legal issues, they can help generate 
interesting new avenues for research study and discussion, and offer a new way (a new 
approach and terminology) to address legal issues; but as this investigation of their 
usefulness has demonstrated there are a number of problems with their current legal 
use.  The literature on thick and thin legal concepts whilst still in its infancy suffers 
from a lack of clarity - the terms are often applied inconsistently and understood 
imprecisely Ð and this results in a number of ambiguities in both the legal application 
of these terms and the understanding demonstrated by legal philosophers working with 
the terms (particularly of their meta-ethical heritage).  Whilst this investigation has 
never intended to dictate how these terms should be understood and applied by legal 
theorists, it has been an important part of this investigation and indeed my thesis, to 
recognise the current problems associated with the legal use of these terms, because 
future research in this field and any potential jurisprudential payoffs will be dependent 
upon improving the legal understanding and use of thick and thin concepts.  One of the 
significant values of my thesis therefore lies in its recognition that you cannot invoke 
thickness in a casual or slight way, because the invocation of thickness (as I show in 
my early chapters) carries with it philosophical, metaphysical and ethical commitments 
seen in the divisions amongst philosophers who use the distinction between thick and 
thin, which are then likely to appear in the legal scholarship in question.  Their 
appearance may be inadvertent and haphazard at present, but this only adds strength 
and value to my thesis for recognising that the invocation or deployment of the 
distinction between thick and thin within law, brings with it a need to clarify the 
philosophical commitments that are necessarily entailed by its use.  I take no stance in 
my thesis, at any point, regarding which version of the distinction ought to be adopted 
(as this would also carry with it deeper philosophical, metaphysical and ethical 
commitments), instead my argument is wider and urges legal theorists operating with 
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this distinction to pay closer attention to the meta-ethical literature and develop an 
understanding of the many divisions within this literature.  Once our understanding and 
use of thick and thin concepts is improved then the full potential of these terms (within 
law) can be realised.  This could ultimately culminate in a greater awareness of how 
we understand law and come to build legal knowledge and expertise within legal 
practice, potentially offering the opportunity for radically remodelling our approaches 
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